RUSSIAN MILITARY PUNDITS CONSIDER RECENT MISSILE LAUNCHES, PROSPECTS
Radio Mayak, Moscow
8 Aug 07
In an interview within Russian Mayak radio’s "Panorama" slot at
0816 gmt on 8 August, with Dmitriy Kiselev, two Russian military
pundits offered an upbeat perspective on the present and future of
the Russian armed forces as demonstrated by the missile launches
announced recently. The two were Ruslan Pukhov, director of the
Strategy and Technologies Analysis Centre; and Igor Korotchenko, who is
editor-in-chief of the Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer [Military-Industry
Courier] weekly. Both are also members of the Public Council under
the Defence Ministry. In response to several critical questions
on the state of the armed forces, both denied that there was any
truth in the listeners’ assertions. The following is excerpted from
a report by Russian Mayak radio on 8 August (some 30 minutes long),
with the first part taken from the text posted on the Mayak website
and the second taken from a recording of the radio broadcast:
[Presenter] We have two studio guests. They are Ruslan Nikolayevich
Pukhov and Igor Yuryevich Korotchenko. You are both members of
the Public Council under the Russian Defence Ministry. Ruslan
Nikolayevich Pukhov is also director of the Strategy and Technologies
Analysis Centre, while Igor Yuryevich is editor-in-chief of the
Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer weekly.
The subject of our conversation today is Russia’s armaments. Over
the past five years, the figures for the amount of money spent on
defence have risen 10-fold, from 80 billion roubles to 800 billion
roubles in 2007. A considerable proportion of these funds have gone
on re-equipment in the armed forces.
In addition, the share of defence spending that goes on re-equipment
in the armed forces is constantly on the rise. Ideally, this should
be 50:50, as Sergey Ivanov, at the time defence minister, said. We
are now close to this ratio.
Let us take a look at where this money has gone. Literally yesterday,
there was another launch of the Sineva missile, which is an upgraded
system. It was launched by the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy strategic
missile submarine from the Pacific towards the Chizha range in
Russia’s north.
What is the Sineva? Let us go over all the latest developments which
have alarmed the West. On the other hand, let us be aware that US
defence spending is 25 times that of Russia.
[Korotchenko] As part of the state defence order, the issue of
re-equipment in the strategic nuclear forces of Russia is being
accorded exceptional importance. Why is this so important? First and
foremost, it is important for the following several reasons.
The first is that the Soviet legacy in our possession requires major
modernization, which is under way. In particular, as we can see,
the ballistic missile about which we are talking has entered service
with the strategic submarines in operation notably in the Pacific
Fleet, where our grouping is older than that in our Northern Fleet,
which is newer. This is a Project 667 BDR submarine. This submarine,
which is still in service and which will remain in service for probably
another 10 years, has now received a new ballistic missile.
It is a high-precision system, which can, first and foremost,
guarantee that targets will be destroyed over intercontinental
ranges. Realistically, they are targets that could be situated in
North America or other geographic regions. Thus, our submarines,
notably in the Pacific and Northern Fleets, which will receive this
missile, will be able, if need be, to guarantee that targets are
destroyed at intercontinental ranges.
[Presenter] In conjunction with the Bulava.
[Korotchenko] We’ll talk about that later. That is a new type, which
for the moment is at the stage of tests. As for the Sineva, it is a
new missile type. It was built by the Makeyev [Makeev] missile centre
in Miass.
So, our submarines, which perform the function of nuclear deterrence,
its naval component, have now received a new missile system. This is
a major step towards the extension of the potential that we inherited
from the Soviet Union.
As for the Bulava, it is a new system. It is a solid-fuel one, and is
being developed for new strategic submarines of the Borey class. The
lead ship, the Yuriy Dolgorukiy [Yuri Dolgoruky], was literally a few
months ago taken out of the workshop and will now be completed. In
the future, some seven or eight of these submarines, armed with the
Bulava system, will be in service with our navy.
[Presenter] We are developing and making not only sea-launched
missiles.
Recently, it was announced that the S-400 Triumf system came on combat
alert duty near Moscow. What is this system?
[Pukhov] Here, I would also hand over to Igor Korotchenko, since
as regards air-defence systems he is probably the best expert there
is. Let me very quickly add that in addition to the Sineva and the
Bulava, we are also developing the two other components of our nuclear
triad now, such as the Topol-M missile for our ground component.
[Presenter] How are they different from each other?
[Pukhov] Their weight and size are different. It is much simpler to
squeeze something into a silo on the ground than stick something on a
submarine. It is this that the Bulava’s problems have to do with. Not
all its tests have been successful. However, the last two were.
In addition to the naval missile, we also have the Topol, the Topol-M
– plus another missile which is now being developed, which has been
given the provisional designation YaRTs [three letters in the Russian
alphabet; all capital-case as given by the Mayak website] and which
has entered service [as received], as has another new missile for
aircraft, nuclear-armed, Kh-102 [also letter (X) in the Russian
alphabet], about which Defence Minister Serdyukov reported to the
president when he met him recently.
[Korotchenko] Why is the strategic component so important to
Russia? In these conditions, as we are rising from our knees, when
our leadership has taken the line that Russia has global interests
which must be defended, we are coming under some very great pressure,
including politico-military pressure from the world’s major powers,
first and foremost the US.
So, Washington will talk to us and will take our interests into
consideration on condition that our strategic nuclear forces are ready,
if necessary, to guarantee the destruction of the US as a civilization
in the event that some forms of politico-military pressure are deployed
against us, or direct military intervention.
The situation now is that to politicians in Washington this is the
only factor that matters. So, to us, it is critically important that
we achieve precisely that, re-equip our forces and reinforce our
strategic component.
In essence, the decisions taken back when Putin was prime minister
(1999, autumn, precisely a programme to re-equip our strategic nuclear
forces), as we can see today, are not just being put into practice but
are being put into practice very successfully. The fact is the Topol-M
programme, which will be the main component for the Strategic Missile
Troops, is being implemented superbly. It is a superb system. Moreover,
they are being upgraded.
The main thing is that, in the nearest future, we’ll approach
a milestone where, instead of a single warhead, there will be a
separable warhead, which will carry a certain number of charges. Up
to 10, as we are assured by our designers. It is an excellent missile.
As for the Bulava, from next year, once all the necessary tests
are complete, its serial production will be launched. What they are
saying are failed launches are in reality the price one has to pay
for technological progress.
We have always had to pay this price, in the form of unsuccessful
launches, in order to improve our armament. That is the nature of
technology, the nature of the beast.
Strategic missiles have also exploded in the US, France and China. This
is the price of technological progress. However, every such launch
results in the data that helps us identify problem areas. [Website
text ends here; radio broadcast follows]
[Passage omitted: the strategic nuclear forces have always been a
priority, even in the hardest of times such as the 1990s, when money
was nevertheless found for the Topol-M, Pukhov notes. With Putin in
power, attention has also turned to other arms, he goes on to say,
as well as to pay and contract service. This culminated in such
new types of arms as the Su-34 fighter bomber, the Yak-130 trainer
and the Iskander-M short-range missile, he sums up. The latter can
be used against US ABM sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, the
consensus in the programme is. Poland in particular is unfriendly,
Korotchenko says, and should be given a warning]
[Presenter] What is the Iskander-M? Is it a missile which flies
tremendously fast and, as it does, changes the direction of its flight,
both its altitude and its course, which is also invulnerable? Is
this right?
[Korotchenko] The fact is that it is a new operational-tactical missile
system which can potentially be armed with any type of warhead,
including nuclear. It is also high-precision, invulnerable to the
air defence assets that exist –
[Presenter] Because it moves like a fly?
[Korotchenko] First, it can be said to be the case. The fact is
that its trajectory is quite unpredictable. The main point is that
both the way it is launched and the missile itself are optimized
for high-precision strikes against its targets. It means that even
if armed with a conventional warhead, we can destroy, specifically,
this positional area of the US missile defence system in Poland and
put out of action the radar to be built in the Czech Republic. This
represents a definite asymmetrical answer to that problem. It is,
by the way, quite a low-cost option, too.
[Passage omitted: presenter invites questions from listeners]
[Presenter] As for aviation, the US already has an airworthy
fifth-generation fighter aircraft. It is the F-22. What is our
situation?
[Pukhov] To begin with, there are two airworthy types of US
fifth-generation fighter aircraft. They are the light F-22 and heavy
F-35. We are making one.
Our answer will be asymmetrical. It will be a heavy fighter jet. It
is due to fly next year or early in 2009. It is being developed by
the Sukhoi OKB.
[Passage omitted: break for news on the half hour]
[Presenter] We have already received questions. As members of the
Public Council, have you asked our defence minister why our armed
forces have in effect been disarmed, why 6bn dollars’ worth of our
arms are sold abroad while our own armed forces have just kopecks’
worth? This PR exercise is in effect just a lot of hot air. An aircraft
a year, or 10 every 10 years, is ridiculous, had it also not been so
sad, this from Vladimir, in Lyubertsy.
[Korotchenko] What kopecks when, just now, you heard the figures. The
figures are enormous, and are commensurate with the budget that Russia
now has as a dynamically developing nation. This is a very large sum
of money.
We can see the real items that are entering service.
[Presenter] Over the past five years, our defence spending has risen
10-fold. You can write this down and quote this figure.
[Korotchenko] As for what is sold abroad, first of all it is not the
armed forces that sell it but Rosoboronexport. And it is a bonus, for
the more weapons we sell, the stronger our geopolitical positions. The
main point, however, is that our defence industry earns a great deal
of money.
[Passage omitted: Pukhov contemplates the hardship of military life
in the context of underfunding, and the Soviet military-technology
legacy, which has been regenerated]
[Presenter] With the deployment of a new missile, Moscow’s east and
Moscow Region will be better protected than other areas. Or does it
also mean we can hope that the rest of our territory will also be
covered? This was from Valentina Ivanovna.
[Korotchenko] This is obviously about the S-400 system, which has
entered service. It covers a 400-km radius. In the next few years,
the plan is to deploy these systems around the main major industrial,
economic and administrative centres, which means that the principal
areas will be protected.
[Passage omitted: a question about the ratio of spending on procurement
and housing, to which Korotchenko says the aim is 50:50]
[Presenter] A question from Sergey, in Moscow: Please tell us how
the MiG-35 has acquitted itself in the tender.
[Pukhov] The Indian tender to buy 126 aircraft has just opened. There
is every chance for us either to take the whole tender, for all 126
aircraft, or split it with someone else, the French or the Americans
for instance, for political reasons.
[Presenter] The next question is: Do you yourselves believe these
fairytales for the naive electorate? According to you, everything
we have is without parallel anywhere else in the world, its service
life decades, and is superior to everything else and unique. I do
not believe it.
[Korotchenko] Over the past eight years, under Putin, we have taken
a giant leap ahead, including in the arms sector. They are not
fairytales. This is real. This is about geopolitics. The main point
is that the real fact that Russia is now getting stronger, including
from a military-technology standpoint, is recognized by everyone,
including the Americans.
[Pukhov] Take a look at Russian warplanes. They are built like
a tank. Now take a look at US warplanes. They are like a Swiss
watch. What would you like to go to war with: a tank or a Swiss watch?
[Passage omitted: Pukhov goes on to enlarge on the superiority of
Russian weapons, as demonstrated by Vietnam where second-generation
MiG-21s defeated third-generation F-4s. As for problems, "we know
about them". He mentions Russian communications gear, "which is much
worse than the West’s, and we are working on this". Against US or
Israeli radio sets that weigh in at 5 kg, the Russian sets are 25
kg, for example. The same goes for tank radios, 60 kg in Russia,
its removal a two-man job, against 15 kg elsewhere]
[Presenter] Here is a question from a female perspective, from Vera:
Esteemed experts, on the subject of our hypothetical enemy capable
of a military strike against Russia, how would you rank them and what
types of weapons could be used to deliver this strike?
[Korotchenko] First and foremost, they are the US, the UK and France,
as members of NATO and members of the nuclear club. Today, it would
be pointless to go to war with Russia with conventional weapons,
the reason being that it would not work. We are not Iraq. It could
only be an all-out nuclear strike. The main point is that we would
retaliate adequately, re-equipment as discussed, and in kind. That
is to say, it would be a case of mutual destruction. While we have
this capability, it is a guarantee against this scenario.
[Pukhov] However, we are not immune against low-intensity conflicts
of one kind or another.
[Presenter] Such as terrorist threats?
[Pukhov] Not quite. When, for example, we entered Afghanistan, we were
still armed with MiG-23 fighter jets, while Pakistan already had the
F-16. So, for a while, it is a little known fact that Pakistan enjoyed
air superiority, over Afghanistan, over the mighty Soviet forces.
The situation could now hypothetically be the same, if we do not
begin more actively to buy warplanes, with the construction of the
northern pipeline route to Germany. Poland is actively buying the
latest versions of the US F-16. We, on the other hand, still have our
MiG-29s and Su-27s, not yet fully upgraded, in service. When, say, they
make an attempt to drive us away with the use of their combat assets,
without a clash, for a while they could achieve that. That is to say,
our duty is not only to allow for the possibility of global war,
but also this kind of minor conflict, such as in Afghanistan in the
air against the Pakistani air force or possibly with the Polish air
force, or even in Karabakh where to back Armenia indirectly we could
clash with Turkey. Therefore, there are various levels of threats,
not to mention the threat of terrorism, with which the whole world
is now well versed.
[Presenter] What about the new US idea of a global, instant strike,
within one hour to be able to reach everyone and to suppress everyone
at once?
[Korotchenko] That would have been realistic at the time when we
did not pay proper attention to re-equipment. I mean that notorious
article from the spring of last year, where US experts analysed
whether a first strike could take away Russia’s nuclear capability.
[Presenter] What article was that?
[Korotchenko] It was an article by two US experts in an influential
foreign-policy journal –
[Pukhov] Foreign Affairs –
[Korotchenko] – where they analysed what scenarios could be opted for
if, for example, an all-out nuclear strike were delivered against
Russia to take away its retaliation potential. I think that this
will not be an issue for the next 50 years, as long as we invest
substantially in serial production of both the Topol-M and the
Bulava-30, which will automatically close the matter.
[Pukhov] Such an analysis would not be productive for the Americans.
[Presenter] Esteemed experts: What is your assessment of the
US use of unmanned aerial vehicles in Iraq? Are there our
counterparts? Respectfully yours, Doctor Artamonov.
[Pukhov] Indeed, this is a major problem. We are very significantly
behind them as regards unmanned aerial vehicles. The irony is how
those behind could forge ahead, and vice versa. We were unmanned
aviation pioneers. We had a vast array of unmanned aerial systems at
the break-up of the Soviet Union. Afterwards, this was ignored.
Thus, attempts are now being made to revive something. Quite possibly,
we shall have to buy something, some technologies, on the external
market, of course have a license and manufacture and improve it.
As for their use in Iraq and in other countries, it has been quite
successful. It is better to fight with the use of unmanned systems
than to lose expensive aircraft and people.
[Korotchenko] The Israelis are even ahead of the US here, as regards
UAVs, including their combat use.
[Presenter] Here is another question, from Valeriy Vladimirovich:
Every single item of equipment has no equivalent anywhere else in
the world. Nor will it have it in the next 10 years. How does anyone
know what our potential enemy and adversaries have? After all, we
have had no intelligence service since 1991.
[Korotchenko] This is not so. The Americans themselves admit that the
GRU and SVR agents have dramatically stepped up their activities in the
US, both with regard to operations and their own numerical strength.
[Presenter] What is the difference between the GRU and SVR?
[Korotchenko] The GRU is our military intelligence service. The SVR
is our foreign-policy intelligence service. Their main mission is
obtaining secret documentary intelligence in the West, including
military-technology intelligence, for which they are primed.
[Presenter] Do you mean the SVR?
[Korotchenko] I mean the GRU. Its remit is up to capturing specific
items of arms and military hardware. To judge from the cries at the
level of counterintelligence subunits and services in major Western
countries, I suppose they represent indirect proof of how active
we are. Our intelligence services are active. It’s just that not
everything can be talked about since they can report only to the
president, so of course only Putin has the full picture of what
goes on.
[Presenter] Did you want to add anything, Ruslan Pukhov?
[Pukhov] I wanted to say that, in general, 90 per cent of information
is obtained from open sources. After all, this is not the Cold War
or World War I. A great many things are evident. Some information
may remain secret for an hour or two, for a day or a month. It then
becomes public knowledge. So, in the scheme of things, we know what
we have and what they have. We may not know some details, of where
something will be deployed or where it will turn up, or how much of
it will be bought. Fundamentally, however, now there is quite a lot
of open information for analysis, so we have a clear understanding
of where we are ahead, where we are on a par and where we are behind
and need to work on it.
[Passage omitted: the final question thanks Putin; presenter thanks
his panel of two]