There is already tension in the relations between Baku and Tehran, but it is possible to avoid breaking relationships or making them more dramatic.
Relations between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan have witnessed complications in recent years, but with the attack on the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Tehran, things have become more complicated and sensitive.
At the end of January, the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Tehran was the target of an armed attack in which one citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan was killed and two others were injured. In the midst of the coldness of the relations, the telephone conversation between officials, condolences to Azerbaijan were not effective, and the media in Baku intensified their attacks against Iran.
In fact, Baku authorities called the attack on the embassy a “terrorist act” and issued a “travel warning” regarding the presence of Azerbaijan’s citizens in Iran. From Tehran’s point of view, this was caused by the attacker’s personal motivation. In fact, the complete departure of the embassy staff and their families from Tehran is “temporary” and does not mean the termination of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the Azerbaijani consulate in Tabriz is open. But this incident has affected the outlook of relations.
Northern Aras was a part of Iran until the 19th century, but after the defeat in the war with Russia, it was ceded. After the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Tehran supported Baku at the beginning of the first Armenian-Azerbaijani war (1988-1994). However, Tehran’s approach during the second 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan (2020), which supported the recovery of many lost areas, did not meet Baku’s satisfaction.
In the interpretation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement, Baku demands the right to have a land and extraterritorial rail corridor along the current border of Armenia and Iran (Azerbaijan- Syunik-Nakhchivan-Turkey) or Zangezur Corridor.
However, Tehran sided with Yerevan on the issue of the Zangezur Corridor and the dispute still remains. As of September 2022, Iran warned against changing the Azerbaijan-Armenia borders.
In addition to this, the expansion of relations between Iran and Armenia, the opening of the Iranian consulate in the city of Qapan in Armenia, the military maneuvers on the border of Aras, and in a way Iran’s tacit support for Armenia can be seen, which is not welcomed by Baku. In fact, if the drills of Iran and Azerbaijan continue on the border like in the past years, it will not be possible to change the conditions to a completely normal situation in terms of relations.
Also, Tehran is worried about Turkey’s aggressive policy near its borders. Iran is worried that the strengthening of Turkey’s foothold in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus will limit Tehran’s access to Armenia and weaken its transit advantage and its military-political and commercial-economic position. This would be a geopolitical disaster for Iran.
In another dimension, the deepening of relations between Azerbaijan and “Israel” has added to Iran’s concerns, as in 2022, trade exchanges between Azerbaijan and “Israel” will reach more than 1.2 billion dollars. From Tehran’s point of view, “Israel’s” presence in the region and the relations between Azerbaijan and the Israeli occupation (like an iceberg) can lead to tension and differences in the relations between Tehran and Baku.
The expansion of relations between Azerbaijan and “Israel”, and the opening of the Azerbaijani embassy in “Tel Aviv” have also been criticized by Iran. For many years, Iran has accused “Israel” of attacks against its interests and sees allowing military presence near the borders, and sheltering Israeli forces in Azerbaijan, as practically turning Azerbaijan into a field of attack against Iran.
On the other hand, the reduction of Moscow’s presence in the South Caucasus will force Iran to look for ways to increase its position in the region. But if Baku still feels that Tehran is not in a position to maintain its power in the South Caucasus, the tensions and conflicts will increase. Meanwhile, the 3+3 talks (Georgia+ Armenia+ Azerbaijan and Russia+ Iran+ Turkey) can be a useful solution to reduce tension and advance solutions for the Caucasus.
Iran is against the presence of foreign and extra-regional forces in the South Caucasus. The danger of the presence of foreign fighters near Iran’s borders will lead to a reaction by Tehran.
In addition, the fact that Azerbaijani members of ISIS citizens were included in the terror attack on the Shah Cheragh shrine in Shiraz, and Baku’s greater security and military cooperation with “Israel” and NATO, in addition to the arrest of many spies, can have a more negative impact on bilateral relations in the future.
Moreover, more than 12 percent of Iran’s population are Azeri, and they are mostly present in the northwest of the country. Separatist activities in Iran can be an important challenge.
Iran is sensitive to some separatist sentiments and the reaction of pan-Azeri movements in the Republic of Azerbaijan. If the media and authorities of Azerbaijan fuel separatism, it can make relations much more challenging. In addition, continuous criticism can increase the scope of problems, and in November 2022, Iran’s ambassador to Baku, and Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Tehran, were summoned.
Despite the 25% growth of trade between the two countries, with the trade balance reaching about 120 million dollars, the fact is that Iran’s trade with Azerbaijan does not constitute a significant figure, and despite the effects of political and security decisions, numerous economic potentials have not yet been realized.
Condemning the armed attack at the entrance of the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Tehran, Iran announced the arrest of the assailant and the investigation of various aspects of the incident.
In this situation, if Tehran convinces Baku about the result of the investigations, the punishment of criminals, and guarantees the security of diplomatic missions, relations will probably face an improvement.
There is already tension in the relations between Baku and Tehran, but it is possible to avoid breaking relationships or making them more dramatic.
Paying attention to the opportunities and political economic potentials in relations, such as fulfilling all the agreements reached, Iran’s participation in the revival of Nagorno-Karabakh, the reconstruction of the railway line, the outpost in the Khoda Afrin area, the construction of a bridge over the Aras River, the completion of the North-South International Corridor (INSC) and… can lead to the restoration of relations.
However, the assumption of severance of relations between the two countries and even a military intervention is very pessimistic. Due to the existence of various geopolitical and political security variables involved, it is more likely that relations be reduced to a consulate level (Iranian consulate in Nakhchivan and Azerbaijani consulate in Tabriz) or that diplomatic and political interaction be reduced in the short term.