The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, April 5, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 66
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Voronin returned to office in Moldova
*Kyrgyz presidential race begins to take shape
*President Aliev visits Warsaw, seeking advice
*Georgian, Kazakh leaders discuss trade and transit issues
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MOLDOVA’S VORONIN REELECTED PRESIDENT WITH BROAD DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT
On April 4, Moldova’s President Vladimir Voronin was reelected to a
second four-year term by an unprecedented — indeed, until now,
unthinkable — political alliance, ranging from his Communist Party to
right-wing Christian-Democrats and right-of-center
Social-Liberals. This informal alliance defeated Moscow’s goal of
unseating Voronin. The parties to this alliance hope against
considerable odds to turn it into a political construction for the
four-year duration of the newly elected parliament.
A ten-point reform agenda (see below), worked out by
Christian-Democrat People’s Party (CDPP) leader Iurie Rosca and
Social-Liberal Party (SLP) leader Oleg Serebrean with Voronin and his
aide Mark Tkachuk, laid the basis for the informal alliance that
reelected the president. Rosca and Tkachuk also co-authored a
pro-reform inaugural address, read by the parliament’s new chairman,
Marian Lupu, a 38 year-old Western-trained economist without party
affiliation.
Under the Moldovan constitution, the president is elected by
parliament with the votes of at least 61 members out of 101. The March
6 parliamentary election gave the Communists 56 seats. The staunchly
anti-communist CDPP and SLP, with 11 and three seats, respectively,
refused until the last moment to support the reelection of a communist
president, although Voronin is a communist in name only. The Bloc
Moldova Democrata’s (BMD) “centrist” leaders, Russian-backed but
waffling, in command of some 20 deputies, maneuvered to prevent a
61-strong majority from forming. BMD leaders wanted to trigger the
constitutional mechanism that leads to the dissolution of parliament
and repeat elections within 45 days. In that case, Russia could have
amply funded a winning electoral campaign based on the Communist
retrograde wing, the red-brown “Rodina” movement, and BMD “centrists”
with financial interests in Russia and Transnistria. Such a campaign
could have convulsed Moldova, and would have opened the door to
significant Russian political influence for the next four years.
While sharing Voronin’s sense of alarm at that prospect, CDPP and SLP
deputies were loath to deviate from life-long anti-communist
sentiments and work with a president who had only recently overcome
his past, and whose entourage and party are in large measure still
mired in that past. Moreover, CDPP and SLP deputies came under intense
pressure from their party organizations, many voters, and several
vociferous newspapers, to refuse any cooperation with a “communist
president” under any circumstances. It was not until April 2 that
Rosca and Serebrean decided to submit the ten-point reform agenda to
the president as a basis for cooperation. Finalized with Voronin and
Tkachuk on the evening before the presidential balloting, the
agreement became the basis not only for the president’s reelection,
but possibly for a political partnership as well.
The ten goals are:
freeing public television and radio from any government control or
political interference and naming an independent board for the
broadcasting media;
closing down government-owned newspapers;
depoliticizing and ensuring the independence of the Central Electoral
Commission;
separating the Prosecutor-General’s office from the government, and
re-staffing it with non-corrupt personnel;
testing the integrity and competence of judges to weed out the
corrupt, under a new Magistrate Council, on the model of Georgia’s
judiciary reform carried out by Mikheil Saakashvili while Justice
Minister there;
ensuring government transparency at every level through media
coverage, Internet availability, full publication of all regulations;
decentralizing local government;
removing corrupt and/or Russia-connected personnel from the
intelligence and security services;
creating a new Constitutional Reform Commission to address existing
“gray areas” in the Constitution and legislation;
turning the Accounts Chamber into an effective anti-corruption tool by
changing its charter to strengthen its independence and integrity.
Many of these points are closely related to the European Union-Moldova
Action Plan for 2005-2008 and should facilitate its implementation. It
is also understood as part of this agreement that the Moldovan party
system would transition toward a center-left/center-right model, with
Voronin intending to initiate the Communist Party’s transformation
into a European-type socialist party. Meanwhile, in his April 4
address to parliament as presidential nominee, and in his acceptance
speech as president-elect the same day, Voronin announced his
intention to give up the post of party leader. He called in eloquent
terms for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova and appealed
to the United States, the European Union, Ukraine, and Romania to
support a democratic solution in Transnistria. Ultimately he garnered
76 votes, including those of several defectors from BMD (Moldpres,
April 4).
Former U.S. Congressman John Conlan (R-AZ) was the indispensable
facilitator in negotiations and document drafting among the political
leaders and factions in Chisinau over a two-week period. He proved
highly effective in reducing deep-seated political and inter-personal
animosities, not only among communists and anti-communists, but also
among opposition figures with long histories of mutual rivalry. Conlan
used his political experience in Black Sea region countries, including
work last year as a consultant to Viktor Yushchenko’s election
campaign.
–Vladimir Socor
AKAYEV OFFICIALLY RESIGNS WHILE KULOV DECLARES CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT
Although the mass lootings in Bishkek have ended, Kyrgyzstan’s
political crisis is not over. The legacy of Askar Akayev’s regime is
patently apparent as the new government begins to revise the ownership
status of the country’s major businesses. At the same time, more and
more political figures are announcing their intention to compete for
the presidency. As Bishkek businessman Esenbek Abdyldayev remarked,
“Now the looting begins on the governmental level.”
President Askar Akayev did not reappear publicly until five days after
the opposition declared its victory on March 24. He then refused to
officially resign the presidency until various conditions had been
met. He finally resigned on April 3 after negotiations with a special
parliamentary commission at the Kyrgyz Embassy in Moscow. Before
Akayev’s interview with Ekho Moskvy radio on March 29, there were no
official statements about where he and his family had fled when the
political opposition captured the White House. Akayev and his
daughter, Bermet Akayeva, gave several interviews to foreign media
claiming they had been violently forced out of the country as a result
of a coup d’etat, not a people’s revolution (Ekho Moskvy, March 29,
Komsomolskaya pravda, April 1). After submitting his formal
resignation, Akayev asked for political asylum in Turkey (Akipress,
April 4). This is the second country, after Russia, to which he has
appealed for protection.
Akayev’s refusal to resign quickly after fleeing Kyrgyzstan created a
legal catch-22. The interim government headed by Kurmanbek Bakiyev was
recognized both domestically and abroad, but at the same time there
continued to be an elected president who had lost access to state
power. The status of the newly elected parliament was another point of
concern for the interim government. While opposition protesters argued
for its illegitimacy, opposition leaders such as Felix Kulov strongly
disagreed with the idea of holding new parliamentary elections because
the February 27 ballot had largely met international
standards. Instead, he proposed repeating elections only in some
disputed districts.
Meanwhile, Acting Prime Minister Bakiyev is watching as members of
Akayev’s former opposition and pro-Akayev candidates come forward to
compete in the presidential election in June. But most importantly,
Bakiyev now has to confront Felix Kulov, the country’s best-known
politician. After being freed from prison, Kulov has managed to regain
popular support surpassing that of Bakiyev. Kulov’s prison term was
scheduled to end this September and a special working group has been
formed to review his legal case. The original charges against him will
likely be dropped within the next few months. It is also evident that
Bakiyev’s interim government is not pleased with Kulov’s freedom
(Kommersant, April 2). Frictions between Bakiyev and Kulov are
mounting and, although the two have avoided any harsh statements about
the other, both candidates have made indirect accusations in public.
Bakiyev has a reputation as a clean politician from the south. He has
an even temper, yet strong respect for the rule of law. Southern
residents, including the Uzbek population in Osh Oblast, have great
hopes for their leader. But there is one more southern candidate,
Adakhan Modumarov, who was active in mobilizing the crowds that ousted
Akayev’s government. Modumarov refused a deputy prime minister
position in the interim government and declared his intention to
compete for presidency.
Nurbyek Turdukulov, a Kyrgyz businessman, has also registered to run
for the presidency and has Akayev’s support. Turdukulov is CEO of
Bitel GSM, which controls mobile telephone service in
Kyrgyzstan. Bitel has over 200,000 subscribers and over 200 employees,
a high number by local standards. Although it is unlikely that
Turdukulov will win the presidency, he is laying the groundwork for a
future career as a politician.
The new government will have to face the same problems that led to the
Akayev regime’s ouster: rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and
unbalanced political representation between the northern and southern
halves of Kyrgyzstan. In the long run, Bakiyev, or any other elected
president, may find it difficult to lessen the economic cleavage
between the more prosperous north and the poorer south. The economic
problems are complicated by general underdevelopment, scarce
recourses, and overpopulation in the Fergana Valley. If the government
cannot increase southern living standards in the near future, mass
tensions might arise again.
Unlike in Ukraine, where the Kuchma regime lost much of its support
overnight when evidence of official corruption was revealed to the
public, there is no substantive evidence of Akayev family involvement
in Kyrgyzstan’s largest businesses or embezzlement. However, Akayev’s
personal diaries have recently been discovered, along with records
about positions for sale at government agencies, bribe rates, and
bought parliamentary candidates; these papers might shed light on the
real state of affairs. However, it is already evident that some large
businesses, such as Bitel GSM, are ready to be sold to foreign buyers
without the consent of the new government.
There are dual-power situations at some state institutions, where old
leaders are refusing to yield their positions to newly appointed
officials (Kabar, April 4). For now, the interim government, declared
presidential candidates, and post-revolution policies are under close
scrutiny by the Kyrgyz media. The former opposition’s online editions
have recovered from massive hacker attacks and state-funded television
and newspapers are loosely regulated.
–Erica Marat
AZERBAIJAN’S ALIEV SEEKS POLISH HELP FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
After visits to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China, Azerbaijan’s President
Ilham Aliev reversed course and paid a visit to a European country —
Poland — on March 30. The trip refuted speculations that Azerbaijan
was gradually shifting its foreign policy course towards the East. The
visit was important from two perspectives: Poland’s involvement in
energy transport issues in Azerbaijan and the political-military
assistance that Poland can render to Azerbaijan in its efforts to
integrate with European institutions. “We should do our utmost to
widen our links in numerous fields,” Aliev said in Warsaw (Baku Sun,
April 1). Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski responded by saying
that Poland was ready to help Azerbaijan integrate into Euro-Atlantic
structures (Zerkalo, March 31).
As in his visits to other countries, economic issues dominated
President Aliev’s program. The inclusion of Minister of Economic
Development Farkhad Aliev (no relation to President Aliev) and the
head of the Customs Committee, Kamaleddin Heydarov, in the delegation
has become a regular feature of the President’s visits. This shows the
vital role that President Aliev gives to the issues of foreign
investment, bilateral trade, and increased economic cooperation.
During Aliev’s visit to Poland, the governments of the two countries
signed several economic agreements on topics such as mutual trade and
economic cooperation, double taxation, and mutual protection of
investments (Azeri Times, April 1). President Aliev also met with
Polish businessmen and encouraged them to invest in the Azerbaijani
economy by describing the recent legal and economic reforms in the
country. A group of Polish private sector representatives already
visited Baku several years ago (Azeri Times, April 1). Poland, which
has recently joined the European Union, can serve as a good model for
— as well as an advocate of — Azerbaijan, which also aspires to
become a member of the EU in the future.
Yet, potential cooperation in the oil and gas sector overshadowed all
other issues. Poland seemed very eager to cooperate with Azerbaijan on
the issue of oil and gas transit from the Caspian region. This topic
has been active since 1998, when Poland’s President Kwasniewski
visited Azerbaijan. On April 3 ANS television’s weekly analytical
program claimed that Poland’s interest in this issue comes from its
desire to lower its dependence on Russian energy supplies. One way
Poland could boost its role in the East-West energy transport corridor
is by extending the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline from Ukraine to the
Polish port of Gdansk on the Baltic Sea. President Kwasniewski has
repeatedly mentioned this idea during bilateral talks.
The project is a worthwhile consideration, if for no other reason than
it would boost the trade between Poland and GUAM members (Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) and lower their dependence on Russia
transit routes. However, in order to fully realize this idea, two
factors are required: increased amounts of oil coming from the Caspian
and reversing the flow of the Odessa-Brody pipeline (currently it is
running southward carrying Russian oil to the Black Sea.) Newly
elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has already expressed
his intention to reverse the course of that pipeline. As for the first
factor, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili recently visited
Kazakhstan where he actively urged President Nursultan Nazarbayev to
ship some Kazakh oil to Europe through Georgia and Ukraine. Nazarbayev
has reportedly promised to send a governmental delegation to
Azerbaijan to discuss the tariff issues (Echo, April 2). Should these
issues be resolved, Poland could become another important outlet for
Caspian oil, which would further strengthen the European integration
of Azerbaijan.
Another issue emphasized in the bilateral talks was military
cooperation. Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Safar Abiev was added to
the delegation specifically for this topic. Unlike China, Poland has
even signed a special agreement with Azerbaijan in the sphere of
military-technical cooperation and assistance.
Poland, having recently become a member of NATO, can offer Azerbaijan
priceless lessons in terms of modernizing its army, raising it to NATO
standards, and conducting military exercises and training for soldiers
and officers. Poland could also become a strong advocate of Azerbaijan
inside the European political and military structures, especially on
the issue of the Karabakh conflict.
During the bilateral talks, President Kwasniewski reportedly said that
Poland supports Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and believes that
the Karabakh conflict should be resolved according to international
law. “Baku’s offer to give the broadest level of autonomy to
Nagorno-Karabakh is worth considering,” President Kwasniewski said
(ANS TV, April 3).
–Fariz Ismailzade
SAAKASHVILI AND NAZARBAYEV TURN NEW PAGE IN KAZAKH-GEORGIAN RELATIONS
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili made his first visit to
Kazakhstan on March 31, marking a new, post-Shevardnadze era in
Kazakh-Georgian relations. The young and beaming Saakashvili, a child
of the Rose Revolution, sitting together with his aging Kazakh
counterpart, a lingering shadow from the communist past, would make
odd bedfellows in other circumstances, but in Astana both leaders
demonstrated common views on key issues related to security,
economics, and political reform.
Saakashvili, whose markedly pro-American stance had puzzled the
Moscow-oriented policymakers in Kazakhstan, made another unexpected
overture prior to and during his trip to Astana. The Georgian
president profusely lauded the Kazakh “economic miracle” under
Nazarbayev, whom he called “a very wise person who has his own vision
for many ongoing processes” (Panorama, March 25).
Carefully sidestepping the thorny subject of regime change in Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan — the last particularly painful for the
Kazakh leader — discussion focused chiefly on trade relations,
business ties, and opportunities for investment in the recovering
Georgian economy. The talks mainly centered on cooperation in the oil
and gas sector. Speaking at a Kazakh-Georgian business forum in
Astana, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov reaffirmed his
government’s readiness to discuss a potential oil-transport joint
venture with Georgia. He added that the efficient operation of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline plays a key role in transporting
hydrocarbons.
One component of developing a Trans-Caucasus transport corridor
envisages the construction of an oil pipeline along the Caspian
seabed. However, that costly venture remains on paper so far. More
realistic at the moment are Black Sea shipments of Kazakh oil through
the Georgian seaport of Poti, to Romania’s Constanta seaport, and
onward to European markets.
For Kazakhstan the Black Sea route is the shortest way to access
energy-intensive European markets. If the agreements reached in Astana
are successfully implemented, Kazakhstan would channel huge
investments to update the Georgian seaport infrastructure and boost
the Georgian economy through transit tariffs for shipments of its oil
through Georgian seaports. The new maritime route is expected to also
increase the volume of cargo shipped through the Kazakh seaport of
Aktau. Kazakhstan also hopes to export its natural gas to Georgia
(Kazakhstanskaya pravda, April 1).
Saakashvili spared no words in praising the pace of economic reforms
in Kazakhstan in anticipation of wide-scale privatization in his own
country. In fact, the Georgian President presented himself as a modest
disciple who had come to Kazakhstan not to flaunt the fruits of the
Rose Revolution but rather to learn from Kazakh experience with social
and economic reform. These flattering words, much to the delight of
Nazarbayev, took the wind out of the Kazakh opposition’s sails.
Saakashvili visibly cheered President Nazarbayev when he said, “Events
in Kyrgyzstan are hardly possible in Kazakhstan, where people prefer
peaceful economic reforms to revolutionary sentiments.” According to
him, any political structure should be based on a solid economic
foundation (Kazakhstanskaya pravda, April 1). These views fully
harmonize with Nazarbayev’s approach to political reforms. In his
public speeches Nazarbayev always stresses the precedence of economic
growth over political renewal. At the same time, the half-hearted and
pre-calculated steps in political and economic areas in Kazakhstan are
no comparison to the radical moves made by Saakashvili to root out
corruption among high-ranking officials and to impose strict control
over budgetary spending.
Saakashvili made an impression on Astana as a pragmatic leader. He
called on Kazakh businesspeople to invest in the Georgian economy,
personally guaranteeing the safety of their investment. Some of the
documents signed during Saakashvili’s visit, such as the anti-terror
agreement, seem to be vague. Talks on this issue were held previously
“in a narrow format” and then in a larger circle with the participants
of the talks (Interfax Kazakhstan, March 31). Despite a mutual desire
to expand bilateral cooperation to the security sphere, Georgia and
Kazakhstan have little to share in fighting terrorism. Kazakhstan has
good reason to be preoccupied with ensuring security along the Kyrgyz
border, fearing the infiltration of Islamic extremists and criminal
elements set free after the riots in Kyrgyzstan. Georgia has enough to
handle with the unguarded border with Dagestan and Chechnya.
But the Kazakh-Georgian rapprochement comes at a time when, in the
wake of revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, the
geopolitical balance of power in the Commonwealth of Independent
States is changing and the very survival of this highly bureaucratized
and inefficient structure seems uncertain. While Russia increasingly
distances itself from the European Union, OSCE, and other
international organizations, Georgia, a WTO member and pro-Western
state, could help Kazakhstan integrate with the international
community (Panorama, March 18).
Partnership with Kazakhstan fully corresponds to Saakashvili’s
personal political beliefs. When asked to explain his reasons for
visiting Kazakhstan, the Georgian president replied, “Global politics
is one of the main instruments by which Georgia can protect itself and
improve its position. Georgia should be part of European Union. We
want to respect Russia, and we want Russia to respect us” (Imedi TV,
March 29). That is the goal that really brings Georgia and Kazakhstan
together.
–Marat Yermukanov
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The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation,
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