SAAKASHVILI STYMIED AMERICAN PLANS WITH REGARD TO IRAN
WPS Agency
What the Papers Say (Russia)
August 21, 2008 Thursday
Russia
Was it that Georgia decided that there was nothing it couldn’t try
now that it made its territory available to the Americans for a strike
at Iran?
DID WASHINGTON NEED GEORGIA FOR A STRIKE AT IRAN?; Saakashvili’s
escapade cost him dearly and jeopardized American plans regarding Iran.
Was Mikhail Saakashvili acting on his own or was he carrying out
orders? What was the South Ossetian escapade for? Experts’ comments
suggest the following hypothesis.
It was anticipated more than once already that if a blow were to
be delivered, it would be an American blow at Iran. The forthcoming
election of the US president compelled the Republicans to place their
stakes on a war – so as to take out Iranian nuclear and military
sites first and foremost. Time was running out. An excuse was needed.
Launch of satellite by Iran was reported when Mikhail Saakashvili
was up the South Ossetian creek without a paddle. Launch of a dummy,
that was. Since it was a dummy that the Iranians launched, absence
of a genuine satellite was quite clear. Why the hurry then? Satellite
launch had been scheduled for late September or early October.
Military experts meanwhile advise to focus attention on the delivery
means rather than on the payload. Tehran has proved that it possesses
the delivery means that are essentially ballistic missiles. Specialists
say that Iran has four of six of them.
Had Saakashvili kept a low profile, Iran would have launched the bona
fide satellite in October and consequently invited an attack on its
nuclear, military, and other vital sites. Launch of the dummy now
failed to prompt a strike. Why? Because there is no place for the
Americans to lash at Iran from.
To attack Iran, the United States needs a base or rather a territory
500-600 kilometers from the targets. What country could give the
Americans the permit to use its own territory?
Not Azerbaijan because, among other considerations, of all the
Azerbaijanis living in Iran. Turkey is out too because any such
permit to the Americans would foment colossal problems with brothers
in faith and stir the Islamists already eager to topple the secular
regime in Ankara. Moreover, Ankara closed the passage to the Black
Sea for the US Navy even on the humanitarian mission. It follows that
Turkey is not going to wave American carrier battle groups through to
where they will strike at Iran from. Armenia is out too, for obvious
reasons. Israel is somewhat too far, and its readiness to become
involved in so direct a manner is questionable in the first place.
With all these countries out, what is left? Georgia alone. It is the
launch pad for the Americans, courtesy of Saakashvili. Plus Ukraine
nearby, some experts point out.
Abkhazian volunteers returning from Georgia told Izvestia that Slav
and namely Ukrainian mercenaries had fought in the war and not just
in the Georgian infantry. Examination of the sites where Georgian
antiaircraft complexes had been stationed proved the latter manned
by professional Ukrainian military.
This piece of the puzzle fits if we assume that Ukraine intended
to assist the operation against Iran. It delivered antiaircraft
complexes to Georgia and posted them around the sites where US aircraft
would have been stationed prior to launching salvos at targets in
Iran. Moreover, Kiev graciously provided both the hardware and the
personnel capable of putting it to use against Iranian efforts to
retaliate against the US military in Georgia.
What do Ukraine and Georgia need it for? Victor Yuschenko and
Saakashvili demanded Membership Action Plan (MAP) for their respective
countries in return. Kiev and Georgia had been denied it in Bucharest
earlier this year, but the United States – principal advocate of
the MAP for these two Russia’s neighbors – never actually abandoned
the idea.
That was the general state of affairs at the moment when Saakashvili
decided that he was indispensable for Washington and when he tried
to solve his domestic problems as well. By and large, his reasoning
was solid: in return for the use of the Georgian territory in the
operation against Iran, official Washington would have to forgive
Saakashvili an aggression against South Ossetia and Abkhazia and even
support him if necessary. By all means available including military
ones. Saakashvili probably counted on a blitzkrieg, he thought to
pull it off over a day or two.
Tbilisi’s tactical designs are clear as well. Moscow would be slow to
react, and mass bombardment of Tskhinvali would send the survivors
stampeding through the Rok Tunnel and making it impassable for the
Russians. All of that would give Georgia time to overrun Tskhinvali
defenders, hoist the Georgian flag above the city, install Tbilisi’s
puppet Sanakoyev, and proclaim South Ossetia under Georgian control
again. Once that is accomplished, the international mechanisms
will kick in and Washington will waste no time shutting up foreign
objections to genocide and war crimes committed by the Georgian regime.
Russia in the meantime reacted swifter and more efficiently
than Saakashvili (and probably his American curators too)
expected. Moreover, the response was smart. The Russians never
restricted it to driving the Georgians out of Tskhinvali environs. They
hit elements of the military and transport infrastructure the Georgian
regular army was using or could use to counter the Russian advance
into South Ossetia. The Russians hit airfields (their runways) and
seized the crossroads controlling transport arteries. It prevented
Georgian reinforcement in the conflict area and therefore prevented
procrastination of the conflict itself.
Hence the emotional reaction to the Russian deployment in Washington,
a reaction which promptly deteriorated into hysterics. Saakashvili
set himself up and jeopardized the American plans of a strike at
Iran. Tehran in the meantime saw through the disguise and decided quite
correctly that it was a perfect opportunity for the launch – even
of a dummy. Needless to say, the Americans could not simulate wrath
and lash at Iran from the Georgian territory at the moment. Moreover,
any attempt to dispatch US troops to Georgia would have been seen in
Moscow as a probable aggression against Russia with all that it would
imply. It is clear that America could not afford a direct confrontation
with Russia, in the state of hysterics (feigned in the first place)
or not.
It is necessary to add a few words about US State Secretary
Condolleezza Rice and her role in all of that. Rice kept telling
whoever was willing to listen that she was firmly in control of
thoroughly inadequate Saakashvili. This "eater of ties", however,
proved her utterly wrong – much to Rice’s chagrin. Rice meanwhile
had more riding on it than the presidential campaign currently under
way. She apparently counted on vice presidency in four years (or twice
four years). Or even presidency perhaps? In any event, Rice’s dismal
failure in Europe that obstinately refused to see the American stand
on the matter as unconditionally and unquestionably correct might put
an end to her political future. Hence garbled statements and nearly
hysterical bouts.
Russia meanwhile should wonder what is going to happen should it
withdraw the troops. Indeed, what will the Americans do if we bow to
the demands and pull out? The Americans demand withdrawal of the troops
in order to send some sort of contingent (NATO’s or international)
to the conflict area to block Russian peacekeepers there. Will they
try to repair runways so as to move their aviation to Georgia and
strike at Iran? Washington is running out of time. It has to lash
out before the election, so that the current US Administration will
shoulder all responsibility. Bush does not care. He is about to return
to his family business. It is McCain who will have to continue along
these lines – and will be happy to.
It is not as though Russia was out to make things lively for Washington
at all costs. Decimation of Iran will be just a beginning of the
process of rearrangement of the world order around Russia. It does
not appear as if ordinary Georgians and Ukrainian guessed what their
presidents were angling for or what colossal a folly Saakashvili and
Yuschenko were cogs in.
American "relief aid" in the meantime is ferried to Georgia by
the Pentagon and not through the usual channels (non-governmental
organizations, that is). The shipments are not to be approached
by non-authorized personnel. Does it mean that Operation Iran is
not aborted?
P.S. Ruslan Pukhov (Center for Analysis of Strategies and Techniques):
Charting an operation against Iran, the Americans more or less follow
the scenario of their Iraqi operation. If it is ever to be launched
or not is not clear at this moment, but preparations for the operation
continue with zest. Since not all of the Iranian neighbors are prepared
to make their territories available to the Americans, the latter need
Georgia as this bridgehead. Particularly when Turkey flatly refused to
participate in this escapade. Ankara’s stand is understandable: the
Americans are getting increasingly more pro-Kurdish. What with their
plans to have sovereign Kurdistan established and all… Needless
to say, Turkish society and the army (and the latter is playing an
instrumental part in this country) cannot accept it. In 2003, the
Turks denied the Americans the permit to advance on Iraq via their
territory and thus prevented the second front against Saddam Hussein.
Azerbaijan is unlikely to desire involvement for approximately similar
reasons. High oil prices allow for a steady economic growth. In a war,
Iran may fail to reach out far enough to strike at the United States
but create major problems for Azerbaijan it certainly will. Beginning
with missile strikes and ending with the fact that the Azerbaijanis
themselves belong to the same school of Islam. They are Shi’ah. And
since Tehran backs and sponsors Shi’ah all over the world, it might
even incite a turnover and Ilham Aliyev in Baku knows it.
Saakashvili on the other hand turned out to be a hothead with a fuse
sufficiently short to sacrifice his own country in return for some
preferences.