LET THE ONE WHO SETTLES THE KARABAKH ISSUE CAST A STONE AT KOCHARYAN AND ALIYEV
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 30 2006
The statisticians of the meetings of Kocharyan and Aliyev are in a
much better state than the historians of the same meetings, if there
are such. Every year enables the statisticians to add two more points
to the statistics of meetings, whereas the historians can tell nothing
to the generations about the contents of these meetings because as a
rule it is not revealed. In this respect, it was pointless to expect
that the meeting in Minsk on November 28 would be different. It is
possible that we may hear the echos of this meeting, or it is possible
that the echo of all these meetings will be the resolution of the
Karabakh conflict for which the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan
meet. But since nothing is reported about these meetings, and the
conflict is simply moved from one year to another, we may conclude
that the presidents meet for another purpose than the settlement of
the Karabakh conflict.
Therefore, perhaps, it is pointless to accuse them. Let the one who
settles the Karabakh issue cast the first stone at Kocharyan and
Aliyev. The current process of settlement of the Karabakh conflict is
not realistic, therefore a new settlement should be considered. And
for a new settlement it is necessary to demolish the existing process
settlement. In other words, it is necessary to spark a new conflict
and get down to resolving it. There seems to be no other option. And
if the presidents meet to resolve the problem of Karabakh, currently
their goal – the presidents are ostensibly considering this variant –
is to turn the settlement into a conflict to reach its settlement
afterwards. The point is that any proposal on settlement does not
differ from the present "unsettled" state. The proposals that have
been offered are even more disputable, considering the status quo
and the history of its formation. The settlement should be acceptable
for the publics. The agreement of the presidents must take the test
of their publics too.
Besides the fact that the offered proposals on the settlement of
the conflict are actually as unacceptable as the current situation,
the publics have got used to the existing situation. In Armenia, in
Karabakh and in Azerbaijan people no longer wait for the settlement
of the Karabakh conflict in planning their future and work out their
programs and prospects considering the present situation. In other
words, in order to make the agreement of the presidents acceptable for
the societies, it should be better than the present reality, moreover,
so good that it does not contradict to the vision of the societies for
their future, based on the status quo. In this case, it is apparent
that in order to make their agreement on the proposals on settlement
acceptable for the societies the presidents and the mediators have
to make the current situation worse than the offered proposals. And
if the presidents meet with a sincere wish to reach a settlement,
it means they are discussing the way of reaching settlement at the
price of deteriorating the situation. In this sense, if the suggestion
that the settlement does not worry the presidents, and they meet for
quite another purpose is true, it is rather favorable. In this case,
these meetings should be encouraged, and everything should be done for
them to have a good time together and not remember about the confict
over Karabakh. It is possible that this is what the mediators are
busy doing.