Eurasia Daily Monitor
April 3, 2007 — Volume 4, Issue 65
READING AND MISREADING MOSCOW’S POSITIONS ON KOSOVO
by Vladimir Socor
On March 30 in Brussels, the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of the European Union’s 27 member countries showed for the first time some
cracks in the EU’s common front regarding conflict resolution in Kosovo. The
EU collectively, as well as the United States and NATO, seek to finalize
Kosovo’s transition to Western-supervised independence.
Brussels also offers Serbia the prospect of European integration if
Belgrade overcomes the archaic Greater-Serbia nationalist quest to somehow
regain Kosovo with its 90% Albanian majority. However, Russia supports
Belgrade’s hardliners in order to control Serbia’s foreign policy and
separate the country from the EU. Serbian leaders such as Prime Minister
Vojislav Kostunica are rising to the bait: `Russia’s support to Serbia [on
Kosovo] is of historic importance. Russia’s support in the U.N. Security
Council will help maintain Serbia’s sovereignty’ (Interfax, April 1).
Moscow is trying to unnerve certain European countries by warning that
recognition of Kosovo’s independence without Serbian and Russian consent
would set a `dangerous precedent’ that could work against these countries’
territorial integrity. This Russian argument seems to be having an effect on
several European governments.
Thus, Spanish diplomacy seems concerned that a Kosovo `precedent’
could become an argument for Basque nationalists to demand secession from
Spain. Such a linkage and scenario seem, however, so far fetched as to raise
the question of whether the Spanish Socialist government’s bilateral
relationship with Russia might not partly explain Madrid’s sudden nod to
Moscow’s position.
Greece and Cyprus also show some sympathy for Russia’s position, their
concern being that recognition of Kosovo’s independence would encourage
certain countries to recognize the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. In the
case of Greece, moreover, a legacy of pan-Orthodox solidarity with Serbia
and even with Russia sometimes influences the position of Athens on Balkan
issues. Even so, some spokesmen for Russian policy seek to unnerve the
Greeks by suggesting that a Kosovo `precedent’ might prompt some Muslim
countries to recognize Turkish Cyprus (National Interest Online, March 21).
In Slovakia, the existing coalition government includes some
nationalist parties harboring irrational fears of Hungarian irredentism
within the country and in neighboring Hungary. Thus the Slovak government
wants the Kosovo settlement to strengthen, not weaken, the principles of
territorial integrity of states and inviolability of existing international
borders. Slovakia carries special weight as a member of the current UN
Security Council, which is expected to debate a resolution on Kosovo’s
status next month.
For similar reasons, the Romanian presidency and government seem
concerned by the possible implications of Kosovo’s recognition for
Romanian-Hungarian relations in Transylvania. Thus, Romania backs `Serbia’s
territorial integrity.’ Moreover, Serbia enjoys some traditional sympathies
among Romania’s populace and governing class alike. Ukrainian diplomacy also
has expressed all along serious misgivings about Kosovo’s independence, out
of concern for its possible impact on the Crimea.
These views seem to misread Moscow’s position in a number of ways.
First, while opposing secession in Kosovo’s case, ostensibly on the basis of
international law, Russia is sponsoring territorial secession and de facto
annexation in the post-Soviet conflicts in defiance of international law.
Thus, the notion of enlisting Russia to uphold international law through
`single-standard’ conflict-resolution, in ways that would `set positive
precedents,’ seems illusory. It also recalls former Georgian president
Eduard Shevardnadze’s futile efforts to commit Russia to the principle of
territorial integrity in the case of Georgia, hoping that Russia would have
to demonstrate consistency while it was fighting for that same principle in
Chechnya. However, Russia persisted with its dual approach to this issue
even during the Chechen war; and it is even more cynical about such dualism
now, when no longer encumbered by the Chechen problem.
In Kosovo’s case, Russia professes to uphold first and foremost the
notion that any settlement terms must be accepted by both parties to the
conflict (not imposed on one of them) and approved by decision of the U.N.
Security Council. This implies a double veto by Serbia and Russia and a deep
freeze on settlement, leaving Moscow with plenty of bargaining chips to play
through open-ended linkages with other conflicts and other issues.
On one hand, Russia poses as a responsible power by warning that
recognition of Kosovo’s independence could destabilize certain European
countries through the `precedent’ thus created. On the other hand, Russia
threatens to exploit itself such a `precedent’ by recognizing the
post-Soviet secessionist territories — a move that could multiply the
selfsame destabilizing potential that Russia claims it wants to defuse.
Thus, insecure or wavering governments that accept the logic of
linking Kosovo with other existing or potential conflict situations, hoping
thereby for a `model’ or `precedent’ that could operate in their favor, do
so at their peril. Their most effective protection would be to rally behind
the U.S., EU, and NATO position that each conflict has its individual
characteristics requiring a case-by-case resolution and ruling out any
linkages with other conflicts.
Moscow and the post-Soviet secessionist leaderships are indirectly
admitting to the unsustainability of their own conflict-resolution proposals
based on a Kosovo `precedent.’ For example, one of their favorite recent
arguments holds that international recognition of an autonomous unit
(Kosovo) that existed within a republic (Serbia) that formed a subject of a
federation (former Yugoslavia) should open the way for `analogous’
recognition of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. However, the
analogy does not hold up because Moldova and Georgia were never federations;
Transnistria never formed any kind of unit within Moldova; the three
secessionist territories are treated internationally as integral parts of
Moldova and Georgia, respectively, from 1991 onward; and both countries
effectively hold portions of the secessionist territories.
Moreover, the leaderships of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
and Karabakh openly speak of the possibility or probability of their
territories’ accession to the Russian Federation or Armenia, respectively;
whereas the Western-endorsed status of Kosovo explicitly rules out any
merger of Kosovo with another country (i.e. Albania). Furthermore, the
ethnic cleansing of Georgians from Abkhazia and of Azeris from a large part
of Azerbaijan has yet to be reversed; whereas international intervention has
successfully reversed the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian majority from
Kosovo.
Ultimately, Moscow is making clear that it would hold on to Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and Transnistria irrespective of any outcome in Kosovo. As
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov told the Duma on March 21, Russia
would in any case retain its `responsibility’ for its citizens or
`compatriots’ that populate those three territories (Interfax, March 21).
Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan quite appropriately refuse to argue with
Russia over `precedent’-setting or linkages. The great majority of Western
countries similarly decline being drawn into any such discussion with
Moscow.
While Spain and Greece seem to lend an ear to Moscow for reasons of
their own, it would be risky and naïve for Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine to
become entangled in fine-tuning the `right’ kind of `precedent’ or `model’
in Kosovo, instead of adhering to the joint position of the EU, NATO, and
the U.S., ruling out any linkage to other situations.
(EUObserver [Brussels], March 26; ATA, March 29; Interfax, March
26-April 2; Rossiiskaya gazeta, March 29; see EDM, March 23, April 2)
–Vladimir Socor