NAGORNO KARABAKH NOT OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE FOR RUSSIA IN SOUTH CAUCASUS – EXPERT
Leyla Tagiyeva
news.az
April 13 2010
Azerbaijan
Pavel Salin News.Az interviews Pavel Salin, a leading expert at the
thinktank the Russian Centre of Political Conjuncture.
The United States and Russia are the main mediators in the Karabakh
settlement. How can the increased mutual understanding between Moscow
and Washington on issues of global security fixed in Prague affect
the conflict settlement?
I think it won’t affect it at all. The policy of both countries in the
South Caucasus is almost not tied to the problem of missile defense
(except for Russia’s proposal to use radar station in Gabala) unlike
their policy on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Probably,
such connection will appear if Washington starts the large scale
deployment of the missile defense systems in the region) but not now.
What do you think about prospects of normalization of the
Armenian-Turkish relations in the light of the upcoming meeting of
Turkish Premier Erdogan with Armenian President Sargsyan?
The tendencies connected with the improvement of bilateral relations
will continue. The matter is that Turkey is becoming a regional leader
while a leader is obliged to take into account the interests of all of
his "charges", otherwise, his leadership will be questioned. Earlier
Ankara has oriented only on Baku in the light of historical and ethnic
reasons but now the situation is changing. Turkey claims for regional
leadership. It is time for Baku to understand that the positions
have changed and they would hardly return to the past. As soon as
the Azerbaijani side recognizes this, the negotiations will advance.
Is it possible to say that Turkey’s intensification in the resolution
of problems in the South Caucasus supplements the US-Russian efforts?
The matter is that the United States are currently distancing from the
principle of direct participation in world policy. Their strategy lies
in the appointment of "plenipotentiaries" from Washington in every
region of the world, which would have been loyal to the United States.
Turkey is also suitable for this role as a confrontation to Iran in
the South Caucasus. Thus, Turkey’s intensification is coordinated with
Washington’s purposes. As for Moscow, it is tired of this conflict
that it is unable to settle for twenty years, thus any assistance or
initiative will be welcomed.
EU has declared the intention to take some measures to raise trust
between Azerbaijan and Armenia. How can this intensification of the
European Union be perceived in Russia which is historically considered
the main player in the resolution of security problems in the Caucasus?
As I have already said, any assistance will be perceived positively,
there will be no jealousy, especially considering the fact that Russia
is striving for the European family.
The conflict in Karabakh has always been compared to the
Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts (before the 2008
war) in terms of different approaches of Baku and Tbilisi to their
solution. What do you think is the main difference of these conflicts?
On the whole, I would not say that they are too different. Baku has
recently addressed bellicose statements to Nagorno Karabakh and the
Azerbaijani authorities have never concealed the intention to settle
the problem by way of force. Today, these statements have calmed
down but this is not because of the growing pacifism of Baku but the
changes in the overall situation. If earlier Azerbaijan could hope
for Turkey support during hostilities (at least diplomatic one), now
it can hardly hope for it. Thus, I think the main different between
the two conflicts is that Tbilisi has taken the military adventure,
while Baku was wise enough not to do it.
Unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan positions Russia as its strategic ally.
Does the stake on Russia facilitate the solution of problems of
security in the region and Karabakh conflict, in particular?
Azerbaijan conducts a multi-directional policy positioning not only
Moscow but also Ankara and Washington and Brussels to some extend as
its strategic allies. Thus, I would not say that Azerbaijan stakes
on Russia. Meanwhile, Moscow’s foreign policy has changed and become
more pragmatic. Russia does not view its interests through the prism
of general security (though this issue will be raised if terrorists
start to gain steam). It views them via the prism of oil and gas. The
main issue for Russia in the South Caucasus is the confrontation of
South Stream and Nabucco rather than Nagorno Karabakh and even South
Ossetia or Abkhazia.