INTERVIEW WITH A DOYENNE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OhmyNews International, South Korea
April 3 2006
Damla Aras, on Turkey’s EU bid, the Middle East and World Cup
Since 9/11, international relations (IR) has become one of the
sexiest subjects to study, with university courses worldwide massively
oversubscribed and academic bookstores drowning in Dummies’ Guides
to Unilateral Geostrategy. Damla Aras is indubitably one of IR’s
sexiest practitioners.
Currently completing her second PhD at King’s College in London, Aras
is at the forefront of a new generation of international relations
scholars, with particular expertise on the Middle East and southeast
Europe. She has been interviewed on Al Jazeera as well as appearing on
Turkish television stations NTV, Kanal A, TV8 and TRT and writing for
mass circulation daily Milliyet; Aras’s knowledge is so respected that
she has even briefed the Turkish parliament on the delicate issue of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Damla Aras
©2006 Asad Yawar Yet, despite being a genuine star in the field
of international relations, in person Aras is engagingly modest in
addition to being seriously photogenic. When meeting up with her for
this interview in London’s Tower Hill, she wore the international
uniform of the student: blue jeans and a very cool sweatshirt. Aras
was also philosophical about conducting this interview in Starbucks, a
suitable venue for a discussion about some of the most pressing global
issues of our time: Turkey’s entry to the European Union; the Middle
East crisis; and all too briefly, this summer’s World Cup finals.
Damla, let’s start with the big question that’s on everybody’s lips:
will Turkey eventually join the EU?
Well, I don’t think it’s totally up to Turkey. There are many different
aspects to the situation. First of all, there are criteria that the
European Union asks from all candidate countries which are merely
technical — those concerning human rights, economic stability,
etc. But there are also other issues that will make a difference for
Turkey’s membership, such as history and culture, which have not been
major concerns with other candidates, such as those from Eastern Europe
With most of the Eastern European candidates, Western Europe has
historically had a relationship with at least some warmth, but Turkey
as the Ottoman Empire has always been “the Other” of Europe. In terms
of the situation at the moment, what Turkey needs to do in theory
is meet the technical criteria, but what the Germans or Austrians or
French really think about Turkey’s accession is another matter. It’s
not only about politics and economics; it’s a decision for the peoples
of European countries as well. Whether Turkey can overcome all the
historical prejudices against them remains to be seen.
That’s one issue. Then there is the matter of religion. Even though
Turkey is a secular state, over 90 percent of its people are Muslims.
Especially considering the recent history of the relationship between
Islam and the West, this is not a small thing. As you know, Samuel
Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” has become a big topic.
Obviously Turkey’s secular identity has come a long way, but Islam
still plays an important role in many people’s lives in Turkey. Even
the leadership of the current ruling party, the Justice and Development
Party, has a strong Muslim identity. Thus, how the West perceives
Turkey is very important.
If historically, culturally and religiously, Turkey has been defined as
“the Other” of the West, is it now possible to overcome this perception
and admit Turkey into the European Union?
The decision-makers in Europe may see Turkey’s accession as a good
opportunity to bridge the East-West gap, as Turkey gives a good
example of how two cultures can live together. On the other hand,
there are a lot of points of contention between Turkey and the EU.
For instance, Turkey’s approach to the Kurdish issue is very
different to that of the European Union. Of course, Turkey wants to
accommodate some EU demands to improve reconciliation between Turks
and Kurds. However, there are limits to this. It’s the same with the
Armenian issue. Recognition of the Armenian genocide in EU countries
such as France — something which is hotly disputed in Turkey —
both these issues will cause a lot of problems between Turkey and
the European Union.
Then of course, you have the role of the military, which has been
an important institution not just in modern Turkey, but historically
in the Ottoman Empire, as well. Obviously the military plays a much
greater role in Turkish society than is acceptable for a candidate
country. But whether the EU limitations on the role of the military
are feasible in the context of perceived internal and external threats,
e.g. the conflict with the Kurdish separatist group the PKK, or threats
stemming from Turkey’s geostrategic location is a big question mark.
The Turkish military would be more willing to give up its rights if
the generals believed that after all the EU-inspired reforms, Turkey
would be given membership. However, they believe that the EU has double
standards towards Turkey and suspect that even after doing everything
the EU wants, Turkey may not be granted with accession and they may
have to deal with the chaos created by the EU demands such as an
independent Kurdish state comprising the south-eastern part of Turkey.
Resume of an International Relations Star
Damla Aras completed her B.A. in Media Studies at the University
of Istanbul in 1994, following this with an M.A. in International
Relations from the same institution.
She gained her MPhil via a paper on Turkish foreign policy (University
of Manchester, England) in 2002 while finishing up her first doctorate
in IR in 2003. As well as pursuing another PhD, she is lecturing at
King’s College London on topics including the relationship between
the Islamic and Western worlds. / Asad Yawar
Another important issue is Turkey’s relations with Greece and Greek
Cyprus, especially now the latter is now a full member of the European
Union. For Turkey to take the necessary steps to protect its own
interests in Cyprus, yet at the same time not collide with Greece
and the Greek Cypriot administration, is very difficult.
So these are the potential risk areas. Can they be overcome? Well,
I think it’s a very, very long process, and each step is a potential
risk to strain relations between Turkey and the European Union.
So to summarize, there are historical, cultural and religious aspects
to Turkey’s accession, and also there are institutions that are
perceived as vital in Turkish domestic politics that conflict with
some EU demands. The Armenian and Kurdish issues, Europe’s attitude
towards the PKK, and also Turkey’s foreign policy, especially the
problems with Greece and the Greek Cypriots: each of these will pop
up one by one, and the pressure coming from EU countries to lessen
the military’s influence over foreign policy decisions looks to be
a very hard pill to swallow.
Since 2002, the Turkish government has taken unprecedented steps
towards social liberalization. Restrictions on freedom of expression
have been lifted and broadcasts of Kurdish language programs by
private TV channels are no longer prohibited. However, the case of
Orhan Pamuk shows that the judiciary still apply fairly conservative
interpretations of concepts such as “national security.” Is this
likely to change?
Change in Turkey is a must and it is inevitable, but you need
to understand one thing: These interpretations have not come out
of nowhere. They have emerged out of the history and geography of
Turkey. If you look at what is going on currently in the Middle East,
you can understand why Turkey fears the possible emergence of a
Kurdish state and resents the Armenian claims on eastern Turkey.
You only have to look at the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, the treaty that
dismantled Turkey’s predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, to see
why this is the case. According to this treaty, in the eastern part
of Anatolia, an Armenian state would be established and in southeast
Anatolia an independent Kurdish state was to be created. In Turkey,
there is something called “Sevres Paranoia,” but it’s difficult
to say how much is constructed threat perception and how much is
based on facts. Some part of this perceived threat may be called as
conspiracy theory, but there is also possibility that there may be
truth in it. If you look at the reshaping of the Middle East in 1900s
and the Western strategies in the region, it seems nothing is that
impossible. Especially if you look at what is going on in northern
Iraq, it’s the emergence of a free Kurdish state. Gradually we could
witness the creation of an internationally-recognized Kurdish state
in the north of what was Iraq.
In the 1990s, Jalal Talabani, a prominent Iraqi Kurdish leader who
is now president of Iraq, was making references to the Treaty of
Sevres and how the Kurds’ right to establish an independent country
was taken from them. Also, many people believe that the president
of the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq, Masud Barzani,
is influential in the southeastern part of Turkey.
To some, this might be paranoia. But given the historical context of
division in 1919-1920, then it is inevitable that in the psyche of
the nation and of Turkish decision-makers, the perception of threat
is shaped with all these concepts and notions. And current affairs
seem to show similar phenomena influencing decision-making. If you
look at the state of the world then you can see examples of why
Turkish politicians might be cautious. A large number of countries
now recognize the Armenian genocide; it is clear that internationally,
Turkish Cypriot interests are not valued as much as those of the Greek
Cypriots. Therefore it is not surprising that Turkish security policies
are moulded by this perception that Turkish interests are under threat.
Now, as to what happened to Orhan Pamuk, he’s not the only one. If
you look at Hrant Dink, the editor of Agos, an Armenian-language
newspaper in Turkey, criminal charges were also filed against him for
“denigrating the Turkish state.” This no doubt must change. These are
basic freedoms of people which in the West are commonly accepted and
used by everyone, whereas in Turkey this is not settled. But having
said that rather than just reactionarily blaming Turkey, one should
try and understand why this type of paranoia is emerging. Obviously
the European Union accession process will force Turkey to change,
as will the influence of globalization, which is inevitably affecting
attitudes towards basic freedoms in Turkey as well.
I think that every country must be evaluated within their own context
and circumstances. Just like human beings, the psychology of the state
must be understood and necessary steps must be taken accordingly to
obtain a constructive result.
Support for EU membership in Turkey has declined somewhat in recent
months, though still around 60 percent of people in Turkey support
accession. Why is this?
As I mentioned above, because most Turks believe at both
decision-making and ground levels that double-standards are being
applied by the EU towards their application for full membership. If
Turkey could meet European Union accession demands knowing that
in the end there will be membership of the EU, there would be no
problems. However, this is patently not the case. In the eye of the
Turk, the goalposts keep shifting — the more Turkey gives, the more
the EU asks. And at the end of this process, Turkey is not guaranteed
to be a member.
Don’t forget that in the first World War, the Ottoman Empire fought
against the French, the Italians and the British, but they also fought
against those same forces during the Turkish War of Independence. So
when Turks see the EU making controversial policy demands, they don’t
see it as a human rights or political issue, but they have suspicions
that these demands are part of an agenda with its aim as the total
destruction of the Turkish state. Turkish people feel that in the
worst case scenario, their country might be divided and membership
not obtained.
A lot of people perceive Turkey as an economically backward country.
However, since 2002, growth rates have been consistently impressive —
comparable to China’s, only from a much higher base.
There’s no doubt about it, especially lately, Turkey has been quite
successful economically, especially compared with past. The fight
with inflation has been especially notable. Economic policies have
generally been much more successful. However, in terms of unemployment
there is still a big problem, and the improvement in the economy does
not reflect in the pockets of the average person. The numbers are
impressive, but they don’t translate that well at ground level. They
have not made a lot of difference to most people. The real success
will be when all these achievements are felt by the general population.
What can Turkey bring to the EU?
A huge market; a young population, especially compared to that of the
EU; a cheaper market not just in terms of wages but economic inputs
generally; a gateway to Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey is a
place where everything from energy pipelines to peoples and cultures
meet. Turkey can help better relations between Europe and the Middle
East, and it can be a good channel between the European Union and
Central Asia.
How would you describe the new generation in Turkey? Are their
desires the same as young people everywhere, or do they have more
specific goals?
It’s like everywhere: young people want better jobs, education,
lives. Especially in big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara, the
aspirations of people are exactly the same as in the U.K. And really
cultural hegemony is everywhere, so whatever is trendy in the West —
from “Desperate Housewives” to MTV, from music to movies – everything
is the same in Turkey too.
Having said that, in my opinion, the climate in Turkey is more socially
conservative; people’s values are a mixture of Middle Eastern and
Western ones.
“The Clash of Civilizations” or “End of History”?
Both of them are American constructs. They do not reflect the ideas of
others. What Fukuyama and Huntington say may be valid for the United
States and its aspirations, not the rest of the world. These theses
should be considered as good brainstorming sessions, not as universal
rules. To take the “The Clash of Civilizations” or “The End of History”
as the Bible of international relations is rather mistaken. Both are
good for brain gymnastics, but that’s all.
Every civilization has their own value system and something to
contribute to the world. A country or one civilization declaring
the end of history or prophesizing that there will be a clash of
civilizations…the latter concept is really harmful. It has become
a motto which everyone uses as it has received global acclaim. Today,
China and India are rising powers. In international relations, every
empire has a start, a peak and an end. Whether it’s going to be today,
tomorrow or 100 years later doesn’t matter, all of them have an end.
Let’s move on to current geostrategic questions. Turkey surprisingly
refused a lucrative U.S. offer of $30 billion for cooperation in
Iraq. Would the Turkish people support a military strike against Iran,
or are they in favor of a diplomatic solution?
Of course, Turkey would favor a diplomatic solution. Both Iran and Iraq
are Turkey’s neighbors, and starting from the late 1990s, there has
been a significant improvement in relations between Turkey and these
countries. They have mutual concerns, such as security, prevention
of the emergence of Kurdish states and so on, so I don’t think that
U.S. designs on the Middle East overlap with Turkey’s in this case.
Most decision-makers in Turkey do not approve of Iran’s nuclear
program, unless it is used for civilian purposes. However they do
not perceive a direct threat coming from Iran either. And also a
conflict with Iran will further destabilize the Middle East. So,
neither decision-makers nor ordinary people agree on the U.S. designs
on Iraq or Iran.
In the very unlikely event of military action, there might be limited
use of air bases like Incirlik. During the Iraq war, Turkey refused
deployment of 62,000 U.S. troops in Turkey. However, during the early
stages of the operation, Incirlik airbase was still used by the United
States forces. There was a limited use, but not in the way that the
US wanted.
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has been very enthusiastic
about deepening economic and diplomatic relations to the Western
Balkans countries such as Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is this
trend likely to continue?
Yes, of course. Turkey has always wanted to develop better relations
with surrounding countries, Iran, Iraq, Syria and with other countries
as well. Just like the Middle East, Turkey has a historic bond with
the Balkans. At every opportunity, such as the crises in Kosovo and
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, Turkey actively participated and
played an important role in finding workable solutions. So in the
region, it is for the interests of no one to clash, rather to improve
bilateral relations in the interests of everyone.
Finally, Turkey was knocked out by Switzerland and will not be at
this year’s World Cup finals. Who will you be supporting instead?
I have no idea! I don’t know anything about the World Cup. If it was
something like fashion or girlie stuff, maybe. But football? Yuck!
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