Pashinyan to resume testimony at parliament select committee on 2020 war next week

 13:52,

YEREVAN, JUNE 20, ARMENPRESS. The next session of the parliamentary select committee probing the causes and course of the 2020 war will take place on June 27 with participation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

Pashinyan delivered a speech at the committee on June 20.

During the next session on June 27, lawmakers will have the chance to ask questions to Pashinyan.

“Today’s speech has caused numerous questions that we must include in the question time to receive answers publicly, but if that turns out to be impossible then we will continue the work in the closed format,” chair of the committee Andranik Kocharyan told reporters.

Pashinyan said he will answer all questions at the committee publicly.

“But I assume that there could be questions where I’d have something to add to the public answers, which would be classified. If I find those additions to be classified information, I will ask to do so in a closed format session,” Pashinyan said.

250 persons under investigation for online drug trafficking

 15:39, 29 May 2023

YEREVAN, MAY 29, ARMENPRESS. Investigators have carried out serious work as part of a criminal case on drug trafficking via Telegram channels and the details will be announced soon, Minister of Internal Affairs Vahe Ghazaryan has said.

A division designed to combat specifically online drug trafficking has been active in the General Department of Criminal Police since 2021, Minister of Internal Affairs Vahe Ghazaryan told lawmakers at a joint committee debate on the 2022 budget.

Ghazaryan said there is an active criminal case instituted by the Investigative Committee on online drug trafficking via Telegram. Ghazaryan said this type of drug trafficking is the most difficult and problematic type for authorities.

“We have carried out serious work over this. And you will hear about this soon,” Ghazaryan said, adding that 250 persons are being investigated as part of the case.

On the sidelines of the summit of the European Political Community, new discussions between Armenia and Azerbaijan

India – June 1 2023

You should throw away your false laws and abandon your dreams (…) You must follow us and continue your life as a citizen within the framework of our laws. We are only holding on for now! At any moment we can launch a military operation. Everybody knows it.The words of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on May 27, made during a trip to Lachin, leave no ambiguity. The Head of State celebrated the installation of Azeri families in this city of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, an enclave populated mainly by Armenians, and which was, by Stalin’s decision, attached to Azerbaijan in 1921.

Since Nagorno-Karabakh unilaterally proclaimed its independence after the collapse of the USSR, its status has never been recognized by the international community. Without taking a formal position, the Armenian authorities have since remained the de facto protectors of Karabakh.

In 2020, Azerbaijan, after 44 days of a deadly war, regained control of 70% of the enclave. On December 12, Baku took a new step by installing a blockade on the only road linking the enclave to neighboring Armenia. The corridor that the 120,000 Armenians of Artsakh regularly used, and where until then food and medicine passed, now only allows Red Cross convoys to pass for the dropper transfer of urgently ill patients.

We are still alive. We try to hold onsighs Vadim, a resident of Stepanakert. He’s been out of petrol and gas for a long time. In front of the stores, the queues are getting longer. To hold out despite the shortages, particularly in fresh produce, the Artsakh authorities have established a rationing system. Sugar, rice, pasta, fruits and vegetables, or even eggs are available according to a specific schedule. Some prices have exploded. “You could find strawberries from 900 drams before (2.20 euros), they are now at 5000-8000 (12-19 euros)!Vadim explains.

Electricity is also missing. The only supply line that came from Armenia, and passed through Azeri territory, was sabotaged. The authorities have introduced daily cuts to save energy. Since May 26, they have gone from 3 to 6 hours a day. “In Stepanakert, in the streets, the electricity is cut from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m., from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m., then from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. Exact meal times. I have six children, I let you imagine the complications“says Siranush, 39 years old and mother. The hospital is also affected by the breakdowns. The generators are just enough to supply the emergency and resuscitation services.

Life in Artsakh has turned bleak. “When evening comes, the streets look like a ball of ghosts: it’s people walking through a pitch-black city. When you ask them, people will tell you: if it’s just a lack of light and a little food, it’s fine. But nobody knows what will happen to us tomorrow“. Siranush’s voice chokes on the phone. “We are very worried. For us, but also for our children…“.

On the international scene, the silence is heavy. In Washington, then in Brussels with Charles Michel, and finally this Thursday in Chisinau, Westerners are trying one after another to mediate between Azerbaijani President Aliev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. “Westerners put pressure on Armenia to cede Nagorno-Karabakh. For them it’s the only way forward“, says a diplomatic source from Artsakh. “France is the exception. I would even say, the French president is the exception. But when Westerners go under the same European banner, France is forced to review its position. She can’t afford to be offside“.

If the inhabitants of Artsakh are accustomed to the virulent threats of the Azerbaijani president, more surprising were the remarks slipped by the Armenian prime minister during a press conference on May 22. Nikol Pashinian declared himself ready to recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over the enclave with a view to a bilateral peace agreement. “Armenia is ready to recognize the territorial integrity of 86,600 km of Azerbaijan“, declared the leader, specifying then that “the 86,600 km also include Nagorno-Karabakh“.

Coming from the protective country which has always condemned the imminent risk of a “ethnic cleansingby Baku in Nagorno-Karabakh, these words resonated like a betrayal in Artsakh. In a terse statement, the authorities expressed their “feeling of indignation and anger“. Concession of a cornered leader, abandoned by his allies? Several times in recent months, Azerbaijan has unleashed volleys of fire on the territory of Armenia itself. No international reaction followed. Abandoned by Russia, faced with the silence of Westerners, Yerevan is more isolated than ever.

“What is being asked of Armenia is an impossible choice. What would you do if you were asked to choose between your two children?asks another Armenian source. “The mistake is to believe that Aliyev will stop there. It did not respect the tripartite declaration of November 9, 2020, it did not respect the orders of the International Court of Justice requiring the reopening of the Lachin corridor. No peace agreement will satisfy him. It’s the war he wants».

In France, the Armenian diaspora is mobilizing. On Sunday, the CCAF, which coordinates the Armenian organizations in France, called for demonstrations in Paris, from the Trocadéro to the Azerbaijan embassy.

Thank you for your interest in us“Slipped Siranush, a resident of Stepanakert, at the end of the exchange. “We feel like we’ve been forgotten. Every morning I wake up and I ask myself the same question: what will happen to us, to our future? I have this anxiety all the time. Where is the United Nations? The European Union ? International organizations? They know who Aliyev is, but they keep talking about possible integration… Agreeing to hand us over to Azerbaijan is putting a lamb in the mouth of the wolf and saying, go ahead, have fun“.

https://morningexpress.in/nagorno-karabakh-six-months-of-blockade-and-dwindling-hopes-for-forgotten-armenians/

Syria accuses Israel of air strike near Damascus

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 10:12,

YEREVAN, MAY 29, ARMENPRESS. Israel fired missiles at targets in the vicinity of Damascus, the Syrian state media reported citing a source in the military.

Some of the missiles fired in the “Israeli act of aggression” were intercepted by Syrian air defenses, SANA news agency reported citing a statement released by the source.

Israel didn’t immediately comment on the accusation.

Only material damages were reported.

Warring parties turned to spyware in Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict

POLITICO
May 25 023

An investigation by Access Now, Citizen Lab, Amnesty Internationalʼs Security Lab and independent Armenian mobile-security researcher Ruben Muradyan found the Israeli-made spyware tool on phones of then-Armenian official ombudsman Kristinne Grigoryan, two journalists from Radio Free Europe, a United Nations official and a former spokesperson for the country’s foreign ministry.

“Inserting harmful spyware technology into the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict shows a complete disregard for safety and welfare, and truly unmasks how depraved priorities can be,” said Natalia Krapiva, tech-legal counsel at digital rights group Access Now and one of the authors of the report, told POLITICO.

Nagorno-Karabakh is a disputed territory in Azerbaijan, where the country has been in a protracted conflict with Armenia since the 1980s, with open war breaking out in 2020.

Thursday’s report found infections with Pegasus software — one of the most sophisticated spyware tools created by Israel’s NSO Group — in Armenia as early as 2020, during some of the most intense fighting of the war, and again when peace talks were taking place in October and a cease-fire was struck in November 2020. Overall, between 2020-2021, the researchers recorded over 30 successful Pegasus infections. The groups behind the research — which include some of the world’s most renowned forensic analysts on spyware — said it was the first known case of spyware being used in an active conflict.

“This is the first documented evidence of the use of Pegasus spyware in an international war context,” the researchers wrote.

While there is no unequivocal evidence linking a specific government to the hack, the timing and the victims “strongly suggest” the intrusions were part of active warfare on Azerbaijan’s behalf, the report suggested. However, it added that because the victims also included members of civil society that have been critical of Armeniaʼs government, it is possible Armenian services conducted the hack themselves.

Both governments were previously found to have purchased spyware; Azerbaijan-linked domains were identified in Pegasus one-click SMS infection infrastructure. Meta’s December 2021 “Threat Report on the Surveillance-for-Hire Industry” also identified an Armenia-based customer of mercenary spyware firm Cytrox.

The Armenian and Azerbaijani government did not respond to a request for comment.

One of the victims of the hacking, Anna Naghdalyan, served as spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time her device was hacked. Her work “put her squarely in the middle of the most sensitive conversations,” researchers wrote.


Pashinyan reveals parts of 2020 trilateral statement which Armenia rejected during drafting

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 16:12,

YEREVAN, MAY 22, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has revealed the terms of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh ceasefire agreement which Armenia rejected during the drafting phase.

“Yes, there were items which we removed, and we said that we won’t sign it no matter what. One of the items pertained to the enclaves, the other pertained to a corridor through the territory of Armenia,” Pashinyan said on Monday.

Pashinyan said that there were officials who were in favor of signing the agreement with the clause on enclaves. “In the future, some of those people accused us of treason and demanded our resignation, but this is a fact. I regret that these conversations weren’t recorded, because in that case many people wouldn’t have the option of speaking,” he said.

PM Pashinyan said he held a discussion with various officials before signing the 9 November 2020 trilateral statement. Pashinyan said that during the meeting he told those present that the matter wouldn’t be put up for vote in order not to place responsibility on others. After the discussions he decided to sign the document.

Some of those present emotionally didn’t want the document to be signed. Pashinyan said he himself didn’t want to sign it emotionally.

Armenpress: Armenian Prime Minister participates in 4th Council of Europe Summit in Reykjavík

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 09:39, 17 May 2023

YEREVAN, MAY 17, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan participated in the opening ceremony of the 4th Council of Europe Summit in Reykjavík, Iceland on May 16.

Heads of State and Government, and heads of delegation from over 40 countries attended the event, the Prime Minister’s Office said in a press release. 

Prime Minister of Iceland Katrín Jakobsdóttir and Council of Europe Secretary General Marija Pejčinović Burić welcomed the visiting leaders.

French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and others delivered remarks at the opening ceremony.

The Armenian Prime Minister participated in a roundtable discussion on democracy as part of the summit.

The summit is held May 16–17.

Armenian Prime Minister discusses humanitarian crisis in Nagorno Karabakh with Romanian President

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 16:38,

YEREVAN, MAY 17, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has met with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis within the framework of the 4th Council of Europe Summit in Iceland.

Pashinyan and Iohannis discussed “issues related to the ongoing processes in the South Caucasus region,” the Prime Minister’s Office said in a readout.

The Armenian Prime Minister also spoke about the humanitarian crisis in Nagorno Karabakh resulting from the illegal blockade of the Lachin Corridor.

Views were exchanged around other issues of mutual interest.

Yerevan Accuses Baku of Deliberately Derailing U.S., EU and Russian Mediation Efforts

An Armenia border patrol soldier in Gegharkunik


After Azerbaijan launched a heavy offensive against Armenia on Thursday, Armenia’s foreign ministry blasted Baku accusing its leadership of deliberating derailing mediations efforts by the United States, the European Union and Russia to settle relations between the two countries.

“These repeated violations of one of the fundamental principles of international law – the non-use of force or the threat of force – demonstrate contempt of the Azerbaijani side for the agreements, including the obligations assumed by the Trilateral Statement of Sochi on October 31, 2022,” said the foreign ministry referencing an agreement reached last fall in Russia whereby Armenia and Azerbaijan pledged to respect each other’s territorial integrity.

“Azerbaijan’s actions that are aimed at destabilizing the situation, are also an open disregard for the meeting held in Washington, the meetings planned in Brussels and Moscow, to normalize relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the efforts made by international partners interested in stability and peace in the South Caucasus,” Yerevan said in accusing Baku.

The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhum Bayramov, held talks for four days last week in Washington mediate by Secretary of State Antony Blinken. On Sunday, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan are scheduled to meet in Brussels to resume talks mediated by Council of Europe President Charles Michel. Yerevan announced Wednesday that Mirzoyan and Bayramov will meet in Moscow on May 19 in discussions hosted by Russia.

Thursday’s massive attack is a continuation of Azerbaijan’s aggressive policy, which has included the blockade of Artsakh since December 12 and cutting off energy supplies to Artsakh. The situation was exacerbated on April 23, when Azerbaijan set up a checkpoint at the Lachin Corridor entrance, effectively blocking all access into Artsakh, including vehicles operated by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Russian Peacekeeping contingent stationed in Karabakh.

Pashinyan said on Thursday that by launching this latest attack Azerbaijan was aiming to nullify the progress made during the Mirzoyan-Bayramov talks in Washington and has effectively tainted any progress in the upcoming Brussels talks.

He said there was “little chance” that an agreement will be signed in Brussels, adding that despite Thursday’s attack he planned to attend the meeting in the EU’s capital.

“Today’s provocation also seeks to disrupt the trilateral format talks in Brussels on Sunday,” Pashinyan said. “Experience has shown that Azerbaijan needs the negotiations process only for advancing its arguments for escalation and war, while escalations are used exclusively for nullifying any progress achieved in the talks. This is what’s happening now.”

Pashinyan accused Azerbaijan of using lies as a pretext to attack Armenia positions, directly hitting at Baku, which falsely claimed that Armenian sources violated the ceasefire on Wednesday evening.

He also called into question Azerbaijan’s commitment to agreements and statement signed by Aliyev, specifically the ones reached in Prague and Sochi last October, in which Armenia and Azerbaijan pledged to recognize each other’s territorial integrity.

“If Azerbaijan recognizes Armenia’s territorial integrity, then why does it fire on the sovereign territory of our country, especially when the sides should refrain from the use of force or the threat of force under the 2022 Sochi trilateral statement. Today, Azerbaijan again grossly violated these written, public agreements and generally it is difficult to recall any joint document that Azerbaijan hasn’t violated so far,” Pashinyan told his cabinet ministers on Thursday.

Applying International Environmental Law Conventions in Occupied Territory: The Azerbaijan v. Armenia Case under the Bern Convention

Introduction 

On 18 January 2023, Azerbaijan announced that it had launched against Armenia an inter-state case under the dispute settlement provision in the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention).  Azerbaijan notified the Bern Convention Secretariat of the dispute by letter on 27 March 2023, stating that negotiations would have failed to resolve it and that the dispute had been submitted to arbitration. This is another episode in a fiery exchanges of legal proceedings between the two states, in particular in relation to the contested area of Nagorno-Karabakh. At the time this post is written, there is a pending case brought by Azerbaijan against Armenia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a pending case brought by Armenia against Azerbaijan before the same Court,  a number of inter-state proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, and, most recently, an arbitration initiated by Azerbaijan under the Energy Charter Treaty.

Azerbaijan’s Bern Convention initiative has reached mainstream media not only because it is a new chapter in the legal battle on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (which has sparked several international law commentaries over the years), but because it pertains to environmental damage in armed conflict. According to its January 2023 press release, Azerbaijan seeks an order that Armenia cease all ongoing violations of the Bern Convention, and pay full reparation for environmental destruction in the formerly occupied territories. This is the first time that the inter-state dispute settlement provision under the Bern Convention has been invoked.  This blog post analyses the relevance of this case in relation to the applicability of multilateral environmental agreements in occupied territory. Using the lack of explicit rules on the protection of the environment in occupied territory as a starting point, we will explore whether environmental treaties such as the Bern Convention are applicable to occupied territory, and their potential to enhance the protection of the environment in occupied areas. We will also discuss under which conditions the specific inter-state mechanisms under the Bern Convention can be activated.

The Law of Occupation and the Environment 

The area of Nagorno-Karabakh has been under Armenian occupation between 1994 and 2020 (see e.g. RULAC). The rules governing occupied territory (so-called law of occupation) are customary in nature and are mainly codified by the 1907 Hague Regulations (HR), the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV), and the 1977 First Additional Protocol (API). In contrast to the law on the conduct of the hostilities, which offers some protection to the environment (see e.g. Articles 35(3) and 55 API), the law of occupation contains no explicit reference to the protection of the environment.

The limited protection offered by the law of occupation to the environment is limited and indirect. For instance, under Article 43 HR, the occupying power must take ‘all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and civil life, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.’ There is a mutual relationship between the occupant’s responsibility under the first part of Article 43 to maintain public order and civil life on the one hand, and the protection of the environment in the occupied territory. The more the environment is protected, the more civil life of the local population is guaranteed. Moreover, the duty to respect ‘unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’ prior to the occupation encompasses the duty to respect the local environmental legislation.

Moreover, indirect protection of the environment under the law of occupation can be provided through the rules on property and objects indispensable to the survival of civilians. The rules on both public and private property in the law of occupation focus on the illegality of aspects of the occupying power’s conduct such as unjustified destruction and pillage of property in the occupied territory, as recently affirmed by the 2023 French Military Manual (section 4.4.2.5). For example, Articles 46(2) and 55 HR, Article 53 GCIV, and Article 54 API can be applied to those elements of the environment that are private or public property. For instance, in 2005, the ICJ has recognised the responsibility of Uganda for the illegal exploitation of some components of the natural environment in occupied DRC in light of the applicable rules of the law of occupation on property (paras 219 and 245); later in 2022, the Court awarded to DRC reparations for damage to flora and fauna caused by Uganda in the occupied region of Ituri (paras 328-363).

However, not all the components of the environment are either public or private property. In part to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the protection of the environment in armed conflict, since 2013, the ILC has been working on codifying the rules on the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, with significant attention devoted to occupied territories.

The Applicability of the Bern Convention in Occupied Territory

Although scholars have debated for decades whether international environmental treaties apply to armed conflict and occupied territories (see e.g. Bothe et als; Dam-de Jong; Sjostedt; Longobardo; Dienelt), no international court or tribunal has provided an answer to whether these conventions apply to occupied territory (Abegón Novella, section IV.III). Accordingly, if the proceedings launched by Azerbaijan against Armenia result in an arbitral award on the merits, this would be an important precedent with potentially significant repercussions in this field.

Although in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, the ICJ avoided the question affirming that ‘the issue is not whether the treaties relating to the protection of the environment are or are not applicable during an armed conflict, but rather whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were intended to be obligations of total restraint during military conflict’ (para 30), the International Law Commission (ILC) has confirmed that the existence of an armed conflict does not suspend or terminate the application of a treaty (Article 3 2011 Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties). Rather, the ILC considered that ‘treaties relating to the international protection of the environment’ are among those treaties whose ‘subject-matter … involves an implication that they continue in operation’ (ibid, Article 7 and Annex, g).

The analysis of whether the Bern Convention applies to occupied territory can be performed taking into account the twofold test devised to assess whether international human rights law conventions are applicable to occupied territory (see e.g. Ben-Naftali and Shany; Vité; Lubell; Gutiérrez Castillo): first, it is necessary to explore whether a certain convention is applicable to situations of armed conflict given that occupations are situations of armed conflict; and second, one has to explore if the convention applies extraterritorially, the occupied territory being located outside the sovereign territory of the occupying power. The analogy with the applicability of international human rights law conventions is logical: the legal issues at hand are similar (i.e., the applicability of peacetime conventions in armed conflict outside the territory of a state). Moreover, international human rights law is relevant per se to the protection of the environment in occupied territory e.g. in the field of the right to health (see Hulme).

The Bern Convention does not include any provision regarding its application to situations of armed conflict and occupation, nor does it address its extraterritorial scope of application. However, that does not mean the Convention is not applicable to situations of occupation. The applicability of the Bern Convention to occupied territory can be compared to the applicability of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which, similarly, does not contain any clause on its application in armed conflict and on its extraterritorial scope. In 2004, the ICJ affirmed in its Wall opinion that the ICESCR is applicable to occupied territory (para 112). There is no reason why such an approach should not be employed by the arbitral tribunal created under the Bern Convention in relation to the application of the Bern Convention to Nagorno-Karabakh: nothing in the Bern Convention excludes its applicability during armed conflict and denying its applicability to situations of extraterritorial jurisdiction (i.e., occupations) would frustrate the object and purpose of the Convention itself. In this vein, in relation to the 1971 Ramsar Convention, the Conference of the Contracting Parties in 2022 confirmed that its obligations are applicable to Ukrainian territory under Russia occupation.

In light of the above, we consider that the Bern Convention is applicable to the occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh, along with international humanitarian law. Accordingly, there is no reason that the arbitral tribunal should decline to hear the case because of the inapplicability of the Bern Convention.

Procedural Issues under the Bern Convention

The arbitral proceedings have been commenced by Azerbaijan under Article 18 of the Bern Convention. This provision refers first to the role of the Convention’s Standing Committee in facilitating a friendly settlement of any difficulty to which the execution of the convention may give rise. Where a dispute between contracting parties cannot be settled through the endeavours of the Standing Committee or by negotiation, then Article 18 provides for arbitration at the request of one of the parties to the dispute.  It is not uncommon for multilateral environmental agreements to provide for arbitration of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of their provisions, either at the request of one party to the dispute or with the agreement of both parties. In such instances, the agreement often incorporates  a set of arbitration provisions, while providing for the tribunal to determine its own rules of procedure (see for example, Convention on Biological Diversity, Annex II; OSPAR Convention, Article 32). Article 18 of the Bern Convention does not contain a full set of arbitration rules. It sets out the rules governing the appointment of arbitrators, and the tribunal is then to draw up its own rules of procedure. Each party to the dispute should designate one arbitrator, and the two party-appointed arbitrators should appoint a third.

Article 18 contains a default appointment procedure, so that the arbitral tribunal can be constituted even if one of the parties does not designate an arbitrator. This could be a time-consuming process. If a party fails to designate an arbitrator within three months of the request for arbitration, the other party may request the President of the European Court of Human Rights to designate an arbitrator within the next three months. The same procedure applies if, within three months of their designation, the two designated arbitrators cannot agree on the choice of the third arbitrator.  If Armenia rejects Azerbaijan’s complaints and objects to them being formulated in the terms of compliance with the Bern Convention, one might anticipate a lengthy process for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, and, in due course, objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

Besides the applicability of the Convention to the dispute, a further jurisdictional hurdle might be whether prior recourse to negotiation or to the friendly settlement role of the Convention’s Standing Committee constitutes a prerequisite to commencement of arbitral proceedings under Article 18 (in ICJ, see Georgia v Russian Federation and Ukraine v Russian Federation, and see Nakajima).

Should the arbitral tribunal be established, there are plenty of examples of inter-state arbitration rules upon which the tribunal might draw, including those established by other MEAs, and the optional rules published by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which include specific rules for arbitrating disputes between states, and rules for arbitrating disputes relating to natural resources and the environment. Any use and adaptation of such rules would generally be made in consultation with the parties to the dispute.  Given the nature of Azerbaijan’s claims, rules relating to scientific evidence and the possible appointment of experts in respect of the identification, attribution and assessment of environmental damage are likely be of particular importance. Such issues have proved challenging for international courts in recent cases involving compensation for damage to the environment, including in the context of armed conflict (on assessment of compensation, see for example, Certain Activities (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Armed Activities (DRC v Uganda)and see Desierto, Bendel). Further, arbitration rules relating to the failure of a party to appear or make submissions in the proceedings may also be of significance.

Under Article 18 of the Bern Convention, decisions of the tribunal may be taken by majority vote, and the arbitral award is final and binding. Parties are to bear the expenses of their designated arbitrator, and share the expenses of the third arbitrator and other costs entailed by the arbitration. The designation of the registry and provisions for the administration for the arbitration are also not addressed in Article 18. The Permanent Court of Arbitration has been selected as the registry for most inter-state arbitral proceedings in recent years, but it may also be that this role could be fulfilled within the Council of Europe institutions.

Conclusions

This post has explored the potential for the pending arbitral proceedings between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the Bern Convention to offer an authoritative clarification on whether multilateral environmental treaties conventions apply in occupied territory. We argued that this is possible. Accordingly, the outcomes of these proceedings should be closely monitored since they offer the possibility to finally conclude that international environmental law complements the law of occupation in relation to the protection of the environment in occupied territory.

The dispute also has implications for the evolution of the Council of Europe’s approach to environmental protection in armed conflict. In early 2023, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution and a recommendation, which  propose, among others, consideration of further measures under the Bern Convention and/or under a separate regional legal instrument on the protection of the environmentally during armed conflicts.