Russia as a `Caucasian Power’
November 1, 2008
By Sergei Markedonov
Special to Russia Profile
Russia’s interests in the region are historically rooted in the
country’s own security, global image, and its leadership’s popularity
ratings.
`Security’this word has both a private and a public meaning. A collapse
of security in both spheres has occurred in the Caucasus region in the
last few years,’ said Tomas de Waal, an expert at the London Institute
of War and Peace. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this
region has become one of the most unstable in Eurasia. The association
of the Caucasus with conflicts (just like with ethnic cleansing,
refugees and terrorism) has become standard in post-Soviet history.
Unfortunately, the five-day-long war in South Ossetia in August only
underscored this tendency.
Five out of the seven armed interethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet
arena have taken place in the Caucasus. Specifically, these include the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, the Georgia-Ossetia
and Georgia-Abkhazia conflicts, and the Ossetia-Ingush and
Russia-Chechnya conflicts. Moreover, in some parts of the Greater
Caucasus some conflicts are `defrosting.’ `Frozen’ implies the absence
of any momentum in the development of the conflict, but following the
five-day war in South Ossetia, the old formats of peaceful regulation
no longer apply.
So far, none of the interethnic conflicts in the Caucasus has been
fully settled. On August 26, two former Georgian autonomous regions,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, received formal legal recognition from
Russia. However, this decision is not recognized by Georgia itself, or
by most of the world community. Conflict settlements in Karabakh, South
Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Prigorodny region of the Republic of North
Ossetia are not inevitable. In 2007 alone, the number of violations of
the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh (put it place in May 1994) increased
threefold, and on March 4, the heaviest fighting was recorded between
the two sides since the inception of the truce.
Since the early 2000s, there has been markedly increased activity by
Islamic radicals (jihadists) in the Russian North Caucasus, for whom
the separatist idea of building a nation-state is not the true goal.
They are working toward the creation of a Caucasus-wide Islamic
movement, actively using subversive and terrorist methods of combat.
Thus, the force factor is still one of the main themes in political
processes in the Greater Caucasus.
In addition to actualized conflicts, certain latent ones also develop
in the region, occasionally switching to an `open phase.’ It is the
Caucasus that became the original `purveyor’ of non-recognized
governmental entities in the post-Soviet arena. Unlike the two
`partially recognized’ entities that have recently emerged,
Nagorno-Karabakh remains unrecognized, even by the leadership of
Armenia. However, in addition to the unrecognized states, there still
exist certain uncontrollable territories (`grey zones’) that do not
even have an unrecognized governmental institution.
Today’s Greater Caucasus is one of the most militarized regions in the
world. Independent states of the Southern Caucasus have military
capabilities comparable to the capacity of an average European country.
In addition to the military capabilities of these three nations, there
are the military machines of semi-recognized and unrecognized entities.
The combined potential for military conflict in the North and South
Caucasus is comparable to that of the Middle East. In the Russian North
Caucasus, the major challenge to regional security is posed by illegal
armed groups (today, they are no longer Chechen separatists, but the
subversive and terrorist Jamaat). In addition to these forces, there
are also the semi-legal `paramilitaries’ (from various bodyguards,
security, and safety services of senior officials in the national
republics to the neo-Cossack entities of the `Russian Caucasus’).
Dear to the Russian heart
For Russia, the Greater Caucasus is of particular internal and foreign
policy significance. Russian dominance in the South of the Caucasus is
not a matter of `imperial revival.’ Ensuring stability in the former
republics of the Caucasus is a fundamental prerequisite for peaceful
development within Russia itself, for preserving its national
integrity. Russia is a Caucasian state, and this is not just a
beautiful metaphor. Seven entities of the Russian Federation are
located directly on the territory of the North Caucasus. They are:
Adygea, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia,
North Ossetia, and Chechnya. Another four regions are located in the
Ciscaucasian steppe (the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, the
Rostov Region, and Kalmykia). Additionally, the Black Sea coast of the
Krasnodar Territory and the Caucasian mineral water region of the
Stavropol Territory are part of the Caucasus. The territory of the
Russian Northern Caucasus is larger in size than that of the
independent states of the Southern Caucasus put together.
The characterization of Russia as a `Caucasian Power’ is not limited to
geography. Most of the conflicts in the Russian Caucasus are closely
linked to the conflicts in the former Soviet republics of
Transcaucasia, and vice versa. The Ossetian-Georgian conflict is
closely linked to the dynamics of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict. The
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict has contributed to consolidating the
Adygean ethno-national movements in Kabardino-Balkaria and
Karachayevo-Cherkessia. And today, the `Circassian World’ is one of the
major participants in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.
The Armenian-Azerbaijani opposition over Nagorno-Karabakh led to a
significant movement of Armenian immigrants into the Krasnodar and
Stavropol Territories of the Russian Federation. Thus, the `Armenian
question’ became one of the most important socio-political factors in
Kuban and Stavropol, while anti-Armenian (xenophobic) rhetoric became a
method of political legitimization by the regional elite, who wrote off
their own failures on the migrants.
The squeezing out of the Kvarelia Avars from Georgia in the early 1990s
tied the north of Dagestan up in conflict. Avars (themselves of the
mountainous economic-cultural model) moving into the Kizlyarsky and
Tarumovsky areas of Dagestan came into conflict with the Russians and
the Nogai (of the flatland economic-cultural type). This resulted in
the outflow of Russian population from Northern Dagestan. The governing
elite of Dagestan, as well as the socio-political movements of various
ethnic groups of the republic, pay acute attention to the challenges of
ethno-national development by the Azerbaijani people in Dagestan. The
`Chechen factor,’ as well as the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh
throughout the 1990s, substantially impaired bilateral
Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Finding a solution to the `Chechen
issue’ at least partially depends on stabilizing the situation in the
Akhmeta region of Georgia (more often referred to as the Pankisi
Gorge).
It is difficult to overstate the significance of the Greater Caucasus
in recent Russian history. In the past eight years, the Caucasus region
has more than once become a landmark symbol for both the ideology and
political practices of the Russian state. Vladimir Putin’s political
star rose in the Russian sky precisely on the `Caucasian wave.’ Prior
to Shamil Basayev and Khatab’s militias’ incursion into Dagestan, the
former prime minister (and future successor to Boris Yeltsin) had a low
popularity rating, and a reputation as a `surrogate of the Yeltsin
family.’ However, movements by Islamic fundamentalists in the Botlikh
and Tsumadinsk districts of Dagestan in August of 1999, supported by
Chechen field commanders, caused panic in Moscow and brought forecasts
of imminent accession by the Caspian republic into the then de facto
independent Chechnya. Against this backdrop, the willingness of the new
prime minister to `drown the terrorists in toilets’ led to his
popularity skyrocketing in Russia. In many ways, the legitimacy of
Putin’s first term had been due to his hard-line stance in the North
Caucasus. The fact that Chechnya had ceased to be a zone of active
hostilities (ideas of separatism ceased to be popular among the
Chechens) helped strengthen the authority of the Russian president and
eased his re-election in 2004.
Political success came to Dmitry Medvedev in August (as witnessed by
the rapid growth of his popularity among the population, as well as his
presence in the media). The tough stance of the Russian president
during and after the five-day war made him a legitimate leader of
Russia, allowing him to emerge from Putin’s shadow.
However, for Russia, the significance of the Greater Caucasus is not
confined to domestic politics. In 2001, framing Chechnya in the context
of fighting international terrorism contributed to a substantial
adjustment on behalf of the United States and the EU member states in
their approach to evaluating Russia’s actions in the North Caucasus.
But on the other hand, Moscow’s tough stance on the situation in South
Ossetia caused an ideological confrontation with the Western world,
unprecedented since 1985. This enabled experts and journalists to talk
about `Cold War 2.0.’ Using the Caucasus, Moscow declared itself an
alternative center of power in global politics, thereby supporting the
notion of `multipolarity’ with some content. For the first time in many
years, Russia was able to successfully defend its allies, while the
United States and NATO allowed defeat for Georgia (considered to be the
most pro-Western country not only in the region, but throughout
Eurasia).
A new agenda
Today, the Russian state has to solve many complex problems. Even after
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali,
Moscow will not be able to get away from the trend of the
internationalization of the South Caucasus and the appearance of new
players in the region. This includes the United States with its
`Greater Middle East’ project, as well as the EU with its `Wider Black
Sea’ and `New Neighbors’ projects. Moreover, on the basis of the
five-day war, Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus have become more
clearly defined. Thus competition for the Caucasus will not shrink,
although after the events of August and September, Russia’s position
looks quite impressive.
In any case, with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow
set a precedent of successful ethno-political self-determination. Now,
in the context of the Northern Caucasus, the national and religious
policy of the Russian Federation needs to be much better thought out.
Today, there is a marked decline in the ethno-separatist and
nationalist sentiments in the region. At the same time, the growth of
Islamic radicalism in the Northern Caucasus is a worrying factor.
Complex problems are also created by regional particularities (the
growth of both the political and managerial ambitions of Ramzan
Kadyrov, his desire to have control over the proceeds of oil extraction
and processing, and Mural Zyazikov’s closed regional regime in
Ingushetia).
In the Northern Caucasus of the 2000s, the nature of threats has
fundamentally changed. Firstly, the ethnic diversity of the region, in
practice, makes radical ethno-nationalism into a political utopia.
Secondly, the struggle for ethnic supremacy actually leads to victory
by the ethnic elite, which quickly becomes corrupted and gets stuck on
its own selfish aspirations. The folk masses are content to play the
role of foot soldiers. As a protest ideology, `Pure Islam’ (Salafi) has
never been better suited to conditions in the Caucasus. Belonging to a
certain people or ethnic group does not matter to its supporters, hence
the possibility of horizontal links between activists from different
Caucasian republics. In the absence of a clear ideology of Russian
nation-building, Salafi Islam became the integrating factor for
socio-political protest in the Caucasus.
It would also be a great mistake to consider all the protest movements
in the Northern Caucasus as Islamist. In Ingushetia and Dagestan there
is also secular opposition whose criticism is directed against the
republican government. And whereas in Ingushetia the secular opposition
includes people of very different political backgrounds and views
united by a rejection of the current regional power, in Dagestan it is
made up of activists from a number of nationwide parties. Although in
2007-2008 their power and influence was severely weakened, they are
still present. The so-called intra-apparatus opposition in all states
of the region does not speak with public slogans, nor does it conduct
public debate. However, its role in framing policy and making
administrative decisions cannot be underestimated.
Therefore, Dmitry Medvedev is faced with the difficult task of
rejecting imperial (in effect) management of the North Caucasus, where
the main challenge is not the integration of the region into a legal
Russian socio-cultural space, but overcoming the tradition of internal
control and external loyalty to Moscow on the part of local elites.
Today the main task of federal authorities in the North Caucasus is the
`Russification’ (in a civic sense of the term) of its inhabitants, who
barely `imagine themselves’ to be citizens of a single country’the
Russian Federation. The region’s population generally puts ethnicity,
religion, and birthplace first and foremost, rather than a general
countrywide Russian identity. In order to overcome this situation, it
is imperative to overcome the intra-regional apartheid. To that end,
the Russian government requires a fundamentally different personnel
policy.
As paradoxical as it sounds at first, the recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia could open up new possibilities for this effort. First of
all, with this decision Moscow suspended the inertial scenario, whereby
maintaining the status quo was thought of as the peak of strategic
planning and political practice. By creating a new reality, Russia is
creating new challenges and seeking new answers for them. Of course,
all of this involves serious risks, both inside and outside the
country. Reflecting on these realities and developing the best
solutions will require new ideas and new people who can think in a
non-standard fashion. Thus the modernization that so many in Russia
hope for can begin precisely in the Caucasus.
It would be fundamentally wrong to view the inhabitants of the Russian
Caucasus as either wild mountain men or noble freedom-fighters, merely
dreaming of a `flight from Russia.’ The region’s population, en masse,
is largely far from overarching policy decisions, busy with solving
`routine’ problems, rather than reflecting on Shamil’s imamate or the
`great Cherkessia.’ And in general, one should not overestimate the
separatist capacity of the Northern Caucasus. Over the years, the
residents there have been linked to Russia by thousands of ties` from
culture and education to business. Indeed, in which regions of Russia
are young men avoiding military service, and who considers it a
necessary part of `male initiation’ and an honorable duty? Based on
this criterion, Moscow, rather than the North Caucasus, would be the
most `separatist’ region. The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
was, to some extent, a positive message to the Russian Caucasus. Russia
came to the aid of the minority inhabitants of the region. This is
precisely the positive backdrop against which Russia has the necessary
capital that is required for internal political transformation.
Sergey Markedonov, Ph.D., is the head of the Interethnic Relations
Department at Moscow’s Institute of Political and Military Analysis.