Author: Takmazian

PRESIDENT SARGSYAN’S CONGRATULATION ON KNOWLEDGE DAY

armradio.am
01.09.2008 12:38

Dear pupils and students,
Dear teachers and parents,
I warmly congratulate you on the occasion of the Knowledge and
School Day.

The aspiration for new knowledge and education has turned among us
into a national character, and today, at this important point for our
country, our state and public are destined to reinforce the bases of
this value system, to root the respect for teachers and the devotees
of education, and try their best to establish a public founded on
education and knowledge.

Greeting everyone on this great day, I extend my congratulations
to our first-grade pupils and the young people who entered higher
educational establishments this year.

Once again congratulating everyone, I wish you new achievements and
a productive academic year."

The Australian, Australia
Sept 1 2008

Russia to absorb breakaway states

Tony Halpin, Moscow | September 01, 2008

THE Kremlin moved at the weekend to tighten its grip on Georgia’s
breakaway regions as South Ossetia announced it would soon become part
of Russia, which will open military bases in the province under a deal
to be signed tomorrow.

The Deputy Speaker of the South Ossetian parliament, Tarzan Kokoity,
announced that the region would be absorbed into Russia soon so its
people could live in "one united Russian state" with their ethnic kin
in North Ossetia.

The declaration came less than a week after Russia defied Western
criticism and recognised South Ossetia and Georgia’s other separatist
region of Abkhazia as independent states.

South Ossetia’s leader, Eduard Kokoity, agreed it would form part of
Russia within "several years" during talks with Russian President
Dmitri Medvedev in Moscow at the weekend.

The disclosure will expose Russia to accusations it is annexing land
regarded by the West as part of Georgia. Until now, Moscow has
insisted its troops intervened in the region to protect South Ossetia
and Abkhazia from Georgian aggression.

The Interfax news agency quoted a Russian official as saying Moscow
planned to establish two bases in Abkhazia.

Abkhazia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Shamba, said an agreement on
military co-operation would be signed within a month.

The Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed that agreements on "peace,
co-operation and mutual assistance" with Abkhazia and South Ossetia
were being prepared on the orders of Mr Medvedev. Abkhazia said it
would ask Russia to represent its interests abroad.

Georgia announced it was recalling all diplomatic staff from its
embassy in Moscow in protest at the continued Russian occupation of
its land, saying this was in defiance of the ceasefire agreement
brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

The parliament in Tbilisi declared Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be
under Russian occupation. Vice-Speaker Gigi Tsereteli dismissed South
Ossetia’s claim to become part of Russia, saying: "The world has
become different, and Russia will not long be able to occupy sovereign
Georgian territory.

"The regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia should think about the fact
that if they become part of Russia, they will be assimilated, and in
this way they will disappear."

Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze scrapped agreements that
permitted Russian peacekeepers to operate in the two regions after
fighting between separatist and Georgian forces in the early 1990s,
and called for their replacement by international troops.

Moscow’s ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, described
Tbilisi’s decision to sever relations as "a step towards further
escalation of tensions with Russia, and the desire to drive the
situation into an even worse deadlock".

Russia criticised the Group of Seven after the US, Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan condemned its "excessive use of
military force" in Georgia. In a joint statement, they called on
Russia to "implement in full" the French ceasefire agreement.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said the G7 was "justifying Georgian acts
of aggression" and insisted Moscow had met its obligations under the
six-point peace agreement.

Having been rebuffed on Thursday by China and four central Asian
states, Russia will seek support next week from the Collective
Security Treaty Organisation for its recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.

The CSTO comprises Russia and the six former Soviet republics of
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The signing of the military agreement with South Ossetia will take
place the day after a summit of European Union leaders to discuss the
crisis.

Russia lashed out at NATO, saying it had "no moral right" to pass
judgment on the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Meanwhile,
the US confirmed that the flagship of its Sixth Fleet, the USS Mount
Whitney, would deliver humanitarian aid and supplies to Georgia next
week. Two other US warships are already moored off Georgia’s Black Sea
port of Batumi.

Mr Medvedev has accused the US of shipping weapons to Georgia along
with aid.

Interfax, Russia
Aug 29 2008

Armenian president hopes for speedy settlement of Nagorno Karabakh conflict

The Armenian president hopes that the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh
will be settled soon.

"The June 6 meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in St.

Petersburg was fruitful. Both sides bound their foreign ministers to
continue work on the basis of the Madrid principles. Three meetings
have been held. I hope we will find a solution in the nearest future,"
President Serzh Sargsian said in an interview with a Turkish
newspaper, the presidential press service reported on Thursday.

Speaking of the time of the settlement he noted that it would be wrong
to make any forecasts before the residential elections in Azerbaijan.

"It would be wrong to make any forecasts about the settlement before
the presidential elections in Azerbaijan. Let’s see how the situation
will be unfolding after the elections," he said.

ml

Panorama.am

15:14 30/08/2008

`Zvartnotz’ airport to become a regional center

Deputy Prime-minister, the head of the ministry of Territorial
Admininstration Armen Gevorgyan has welcomed the participants of
European Civil Aviation 57-th Conference (ECAC) which continues its
works in Yerevan.

During his speech at ECAC A. Gevorgyan mentioned the development and
investment programs made by RA Government in the sphere of civil
aviation pointing out the fact that Armenia now has international
airport which has modern technical equipment and security systems
satisfying all international requirements.

Gevorgyan also suggested that `Zvartnotz’ international airport should
become a regional center and due to its fine geographical situation
develop transit aviatransfers.

The government of RA is monitoring the signing process of the
documents concerning RA and European Community air contacts in its
effort of meeting the EU proposal, the Deputy Prime-minister has
added.

Note that the Conference has 50 participants from 40 countries and is
ending on 1 September.

Source: Panorama.am

WILL TURKEY ABANDON NATO?
By Zeyno Baran

Wall Street Journal
Aug 29 2008

Will Turkey side with the United States, its NATO ally, and let more
U.S. military ships into the Black Sea to assist Georgia? Or will it
choose Russia?

A Turkish refusal would seriously impair American efforts to support
the beleaguered Caucasus republic. Ever since Turkey joined NATO in
1952, it has hoped to never have to make a choice between the alliance
and its Russian neighbor to the North. Yet that is precisely the
decision before Ankara. If Turkey does not allow the ships through,
it will essentially be taking Russia’s side.

Whether in government or in the military, Turkish officials have
for several years been expressing concern about U.S. intentions to
"enter" the Black Sea. Even at the height of the Cold War, the Black
Sea remained peaceful due to the fact that Turkey and Russia had
clearly defined spheres of influence. But littoral countries Romania
and Bulgaria have since joined NATO, and Ukraine and Georgia have
drawn closer to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Ankara has expressed
nervousness about a potential Russian reaction.

The Turkish mantra goes something like this: "the U.S. wants to
expand NATO into the Black Sea — and as in Iraq, this will create
a mess in our neighborhood, leaving us to deal with the consequences
once America eventually pulls out. After all, if Russia is agitated,
it won’t be the Americans that will have to deal with them."

Nonetheless, Ankara sided with fellow NATO members in telling Georgia
and Ukraine that they would be invited to join the alliance — albeit
without any time frame. But now that Russia has waged war in part over
this decision, the Turks will have to pick sides. Deputy chief of the
Russian general staff Anatoly Nogoivtsyn already warned Turkey that
Russia will hold Turkey responsible if the U.S. ships do not leave
the Black Sea. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will travel to Ankara
on Monday to make clear that Russia means it.

Russia is Turkey’s largest trading partner, mostly because of Turkey’s
dependence on Russian gas. More important, the two countries share what
some call the post-imperial stress syndrome: that is, an inability
to see former provinces as fellow independent states, and ultimately
a wish to recreate old agreements on spheres of influence. When
Mr. Putin gave a speech in Munich last year challenging the U.S.-led
world order, Turks cheered. The Turkish military even posted it on
its Web site. President Abdullah Gul recently suggested that "a new
world order should emerge."

Turkey joined Russia at the height of its war on Georgia in suggesting
a five-party "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform." In other
words, they want to keep the U.S. and the EU at arm’s length. Both
Russia and Turkey consider Georgia’s American-educated president,
Mikheil Saakashvili, to be crazy enough to unleash the next world
war. In that view Turkey is not so far from the positions of France
or Germany — but even these two countries did not suggest that the
Georgians sign up to a new regional arrangement co-chaired by Russia
while the Kremlin’s air force was bombing Georgian cities.

Two other neighbors — Azerbaijan and Armenia — are watching the
Turkish-Russian partnership with concern. Azeris remember how the Turks
— their ethnic and religious brethren — left them to be annexed by
the Soviets in the 1920s. Armenians already fear their giant neighbor,
who they consider to have committed genocide against them. Neither
wants to have to rely on Iran (once again) as a counterbalance to
Russia. Oh, and of course, Iran had its own sphere-of-influence
arrangements with the Soviets as well.

Though Turkey and Iran are historic competitors, Turkey has broken with
NATO countries recently by hosting President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad on a
working visit. As the rest of NATO was preoccupied with the Russian
aggression in Georgia, Turkey legitimized the Iranian leader amidst
chants in Istanbul of "death to Israel, death to America."

A few days later, Turkey played host to Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, who is
accused of genocide by the rest of NATO — but not by Russia or Iran,
or by the Muslim-majority countries who usually claim to care so much
about Muslim lives.

Where is Turkey headed? Turkish officials say they are using their
trust-based relations with various sides to act as a mediator between
various parties in the region: the U.S. and Iran; Israel and Syria;
Pakistan and Afghanistan, etc. It may be so. But as more American
ships steam toward the Black Sea, a time for choosing has arrived.

Ms. Baran is senior fellow and director of the Center For Eurasian
Policy at the Hudson Institute.

TURKISH COMMANDERS DENY VIOLATING MONTREUX CONVENTION

Anatolia News Agency
Aug 27 2008
Turkey

Ankara, 27 August: The chief of the General Staff, Gen Yasar Buyukanit,
has said, "Current situation in the Black Sea is not against the
Montreux treaty. It is as simple as that."

Responding to questions put by reporters during an official reception
which followed a ceremony held at the headquarters of the Land Forces
Command for the inauguration of the new chief of the Land Forces as to
whether the passage of warships through the Straits was permissible
under the Montreux Convention, Buyukanit said, "Some people write
about the Montreux Convention in spite of the fact that they have
not actually read it. I urge them to read it, for God’s sake. They
are making various allegations about ships. The Montreux Convention
is being strictly implemented. Current situation in the Black Sea is
not against the Montreux treaty. It is as simple as that. But they
imply that the Montreux Convention has been seriously violated. Some
countries are not pleased with the Montreux Convention. This is
unavoidable. But the Montreux Convention is of crucial importance
to us. The Black Sea is the most stable sea in the region. But they
have begun to stir trouble there. I have also emphasized this in
the symposium. They attempt to ascribe all problems in the region,
including those facing Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova and Armenia to the
Black Sea. Turkey should, therefore, be extremely cautious about the
Black Sea. Stability in the Black Sea should not be undermined."

The chief of the Navy, Adm Metin Atac, for his part, stressed that
the passage of US ships through the Straits was consistent with the
Montreux Convention. He said, "We examined all minute details of the
issue before their passage."

RUSSIA TAKES ONE STEP CLOSER TO A NEW COLD WAR
by Taras Kuzio

Kyiv Post
Aug 26 2008
Ukraine

The Russian parliament’s unanimous endorsement of the independence of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia is a dangerous step towards conflict in
the former Soviet Union and another step towards a new Cold War. In
both instances Russia loses.

Western and Ukrainian apologists of Russia’s new imperialism can no
longer say, as they did until recently, that the Russian parliament
undertook policies that were not always endorsed by the president.

This was the argument that was used under President Boris
Yeltsin. Under President or Prime minister Vladimir Putin this
argument is bogus. The Russian parliament is no longer an independent
institution and, since Russia’s last two elections, both houses of
parliament are controlled by the executive as part of Russia’s managed
democracy and militocracy.

After recovering from its nationalistic hangover Russia, in promoting
territorial expansionism towards Georgia, will lose the new Cold War.

Russia’s de facto annexation opens up a pandora’s box among former
Soviet republics and within the Russian Federation itself. If South
Ossetia and Abkhazia can be independent, then why not Transdniestr,
Nagorno-Karabakh or Chechnya?

Russia’s relations with its Commonwealth of Independent States
neighbors will deteriorate, leading to a negative impact on Russia’s
hopes for CIS integration. The loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
will make it easier for Georgia to enter NATO, just like the loss of
Kosovo has made it easier for Serbia to join the European Union.

Russia’s imperialism in Georgia will also return support levels in
Ukraine for NATO membership to their pre-Iraqi invasion levels when a
third of Ukraine’s population backed membership. Obtaining 51 percent
in a referendum is easier to accomplish when your starting base is 33
percent, rather than 20 percent. Any attempt at repeating the Putin
Doctrine in the Crimea would increase support in Ukraine for NATO
membership to over a third.

Russia will lose out in any Cold War confrontation with the West,
as the USSR lost in the 1990s when it competed with Ronald Reagan’s
USA. Russia’s highly corrupt autocratic regime has neither the
resources, ideology nor allies that the USSR possessed, factors which
still did not prevent the Soviet Union from losing the Cold War and
disintegrating. Perhaps Russia’s new rulers should be advised to
watch the recent U.S. film "Charlie’s War" on U.S. support to the
Afghan freedom fighters in the 1980s.

Russia’s new imperialism will increase the chances that U.S. Sen. John
McCain will win this year’s U.S. elections, the candidate least liked
by Moscow.

The near unanimous Western criticism of Russian imperialism in Georgia
(even the passive EU has called an extraordinary meeting on Sept. 1)
has pushed many non-committal NATO members towards support for
Ukrainian and Georgian inclusion into NATO Membership Action Plans
at the December review meeting.

Russia’s new imperialism is the last stage of the disintegration
of the Soviet empire that was delayed during the Yeltsin era by
many years of alcoholism, mass corruption and a brutal invasion of
Chechnya. As in the 1980s, Russia will ultimately lose again and face
its own disintegration.

Desicritics.org
August 22, 2008 Friday 2:01 AM EST

Book review: The Stone Woman by Tariq Ali

by Vinod Joseph

Aug. 22, 2008 ( delivered by Newstex) — The Stone Woman is the third
book in Tariq Ali?s Islam Quintet. Set at the turn of the twentieth
century as the six hundred year old Ottoman Empire slowly flickers
out, the Stone Woman revolves around the family of Iskander Pasha, who
live in a remote palace ?

not too distant from Istanbul?. Iskander Pasha is a retired diplomat
who had once graced the French court and the salons of Paris and is
the descendent of Yusuf Pasha, a courtier at the Ottoman court.The
novel derives its name from an ancient rock in the palace garden,
roughly shaped like a veiled woman, probably once worshipped by pagans
as a goddess. Ali has each of his main characters make their way to
the Stone Woman and pour out their feelings and emotions. In that
sense, the Stone Woman is a collection of various personal tales of
the various members of the cast. Unlike the first two books in the
Islam Quintet, the Shadows of the Pomegranate Tree and the Book of
Saladin (, there is no single strand of storyline that runs from
beginning to the end.The Stone Woman gives its readers a feel of
Ottoman society as it existed then. Iskander Pasha?s family cannot be
classified as commoners, and just as in the case of the Shadows of the
Pomegranate Tree , aristocrats and their servants form the main
cast. Ali tells us of a dying empire where the Sultan and the mullahs
or the ?beards? are in control and where innovation is frowned
upon. Not just the printing press, but even clocks have been banned.

The muezzin?s call to prayer is the only means of knowing the
time. The reader is forced to wonder, can this be the same Ottoman
Empire which in 1453 captured Constantinople (or Istanbul) from the
Byzantines using the most advanced cannon of those times? The Ottomans
were definitely the masters of innovation then. Tolerant Sunnis, they
managed to run an inclusive empire where Arabs, Turks, Kurds,
Armenians, Bedouins, Greeks and Slavs were all invited to the party.In
the course of telling his tale, or rather collection of tales, Tariq
Ali makes references to various historical events. The increasing
animosity between the Kurds and the Armenians (which would later lead
to the massacre of 2 million Armenians during the First World War) is
brought out very well. To start with, it?s a simple case of the
Armenians having some of the best land and the Kurds coveting the
land. The inception of the Young Turks movement is also built into the
storyline. A young officer named Kemal Pasha makes a few cameo
appearances. The Young Turks have contempt for the decadent Ottomans.
They want to create a pure Turkish state where there will be no place
for Armenians or Greeks. Some of the minor stories are not really
relevant to this story, but they are interesting as well, such as the
rivalry and differences between the Ommayads and the Abbasids and the
reasons for the defeat of the Ottomans at Vienna in 1683.The main or
rather only the problem I have with this story is the same problem I
had with the Shadows of the Pomegranate Tree and the Book of Saladin
. In this story, Ali?s cast lead a life that would be called ?liberal?
by even modern-day standards. Iskander Pasha?s brother Mehmed and his
gay partner, a German Baron, have an open relationship. Iskander?s
third wife is Sara, a Jewish woman. Sara was in love with Suleman,
another Jew, but could not marry Suleman. After she was betrothed to
Iskander, she made sure she became pregnant with Suleman?s child
before marrying Iskander. Iskander eventually gets to know of this,
but does not really mind, because he is a man for whom ?blood
relations don?t matter in the least?. Iskander loves Sara?s daughter
Nilofer as much as any of his biological children. For the same
reason, when Iskander gets to know that woman he had an affair with in
France (during his diplomat days) had his child, he does not
particularly want to meet that child.Nilofer is allowed to marry
Dmitri, a Greek school teacher. Nilofer?s love for Dmitri cools after
a few years and she abandons him for her father?s palace. When Nilofer
is at the Palace, she has an affair with Selim, the family barber?s
son. At that time, Dmitri who is alone in Konya, is killed by Turkish
fanatics. Very soon, Nilofer marries Selim (who made an officer in the
army by her brother, a senior army officer) and they seem to be all
set to live happily ever after. One of Nilofer?s brothers marries a
Coptic Christian in Cairo and another brother marries a Shia
Muslim. Also, in the course of the story, when Iskander Pasha loses
his voice (please read this book to find out how and why) and later
regains it, he thanks August Comte and not Allah.I am not too sure if
families as liberal as the one described in this story ever lived in
the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the twentieth century. May be they
did. If they did, Ali would have done well to have told his readers
the source of his information.

President of Armenia: Nowadays military bases are a symbol of efficient
cooperation and not hegemony

2008-08-23 21:17:00

ArmInfo. Like any other state, Armenia benefits from efficient
sovereignty, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan said in his interview
with the Austrian newspaper "Der Standard" when replying to a question
that a Russian base is dislocated in Armenia and whether Armenia
benefits from Russian hegemony in the South Caucasus.

"Nowadays sovereignty includes also participation in efficient
international and regional security systems", the president noted. He
recalled that in this respect Armenia took a decision on membership in
the CSTO. "The fundamental document of this organization stipulates
that aggression against one of the CSTO member countries is aggression
against all CSTO member countries. I think that nowadays military bases
are a symbol of efficient cooperation and not hegemony", Sargsyan
pointed out.

COMMENTARY BLAMES "WAR PARTY" OF SILOVIKI, NOT "KREMLIN", FOR OSSETIAN WAR
by Dmitriy Butrin

RedOrbit
Aug 20 2008
TX

"A specific Kremlin"

The confidence that Russia’s actions in the war over South Ossetia
were controlled from start to finish by the Kremlin and the White
House [Russian Government] would make it possible to speak of
the start of radical changes in foreign policy and the transition
from unprincipled dealings with the theoretical world community to
certain principles. Unfortunately no such firm confidence exists. And
there are doubts as to whether the Tskhinvali episode was dumped on
Medvedev’s and Putin’s desks by people whom the heads of state simply
cannot afford not to talk with. These people are not Rice or Angela
Merkel. Whether or not the Russian Federation Army will leave Georgia
on schedule depends on them. And only to a lesser extent on Putin’s
subordinate, Defence Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov.

This is the position of the state

Russia’s position in this war seems attractive by any not-too- strict
standards. The motive force of the conflict in South Ossetia was
and is nationalism – first and foremost Georgian nationalism. The
concept of the territorial integrity of any nation state burdened
with ethnic minorities, whether it be Russia, Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, or France, presupposes that the nation that forms the
state has state borders that are historically established. A change
to those borders must be recognized by the state itself or by the
world community. Despite the widespread popular belief that Mikheil
Saakashvili’s regime is more or less based on anarcho- capitalist
principles, Georgia has dreamed of regaining its territorial integrity
ever since losing it in 1991-1992.

The majority of the 70,000 inhabitants of South Ossetia, since
1991, would have preferred to live within the State of the Russian
Federation on their own land, within the bounds known by three
generations. Nonetheless Russia, for its own reasons, maintained the
status quo, formulated as follows: In South Ossetia, Ossetian villages
live under local self-government as part of the Russian Federation,
and Georgian villages live as part of Georgia.

The tripartite commission consisting of the military from Georgia and
the Russian Federation and the local self-government of the Russian
part of South Ossetia monitors the situation to ensure that everything
stays as it is until such time as something different can be agreed on.

In this sense all the events in South Ossetia are logical. The
forcible incorporation of the South Ossetian villages and the urban
settlement of Tskhinvali into Russia, with legal recognition by the
Russian Federation, no matter how they may arm themselves, is hardly
conceivable. The incorporation of the Georgian villages of South
Ossetia into Georgia has been obvious for a long time.

Despite having almost unlimited opportunities to resolve the South
Ossetian issue in its own favour, Russia has not resolved it since
1992.

In August 2008 Georgia tried to do just that, and was punished.

Claims that the Kokoiti [Kokoyty] bandit gang is operating in
Tskhinvali under Russian patronage, shelling peaceful Georgian
villages, are feeble. It should be assumed that similar bandit gangs
are also operating in Georgian villages and cities; this can be
assumed not only on the grounds that in recent years there have been
shootings and bombings on both sides, but rather on the grounds that
Kokoiti’s accomplices could only engage in smuggling and car theft
if they had partners on the Georgian side – the region is primarily
a transit region. Fine, so Russia armed Kokoiti’s provocateurs with
grenade launchers. And who armed the Georgians?

There is no point in offering emotional definitions: The aggressor is
whoever disrupts the equilibrium with violence, no matter how he may
have been provoked. As long as Russia controls the Ossetian villages
and Georgia the Georgian villages, the situation can be described as
normal. Here it really does not matter who started it first, if it all
started back in 1919. Of course Russia did not resort to international
mediation over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: As a party to the conflict,
it would inevitably have lost out in this situation. The "frozen
conflicts" were frozen by none other than the Russian Federation,
in the awareness that it simply does not know how to resolve them.

The present position proclaimed by President Medvedev is also fitting.

Basically what that position amounts to is that everything is returning
to normal in South Ossetia.

Talks about the status of the separatist regions of Georgia are
being launched at an international level (at the Russian Federation-
Georgia level they are now pointless and dangerous), and the only
ones to suffer are the Georgian military, who are unable to station
their subunits in the Georgian part of South Ossetia and in Kodori. In
fact, even before, they did not have the right to do that, or no right
that was recognized outside Georgia. So in effect not much will have
changed as from Monday.

This is the private war of Eduard Kokoiti’s patrons

All these considerations are evidently entitled to exist if there is a
satisfactory answer to the question: When we say "Russia" whom do we
have in mind? If "Russia" in this case means the "power hierarchy,"
the state apparatus, or at least the Kremlin, it would be possible
to drop the idea that they were the ones who provoked the war over
South Ossetia. Within the "six principles" format it is not very clear
what Russia as a state might have gained, apart from international
problems, dead citizens, and the strengthening of the pro-Russian
regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These last were anyway facing
no particular threats before the incidents. In this case Russia has
shown a principled approach for the first time in foreign policy,
and that will pay for itself.

But I suggest that it was certainly not Russia that plunged into a new
Caucasus conflict, but only a small section of its state apparatus,
the section that gained from it – that is obviously what Mrs Rice is
hinting at when she expresses the hope that the Russian Federation’s
military formations will fulfil President Dmitriy Medvedev’s
instruction to leave Georgia’s territory.

There is reason to believe that the provocations in South Ossetia
to which the ordinary nationalistic politician Mikheil Saakashvili
succumbed were not the responsibility of an abstract Kremlin, but of
people in the Russian Federation’s security agencies who continue to
control the Eduard Kokoiti regime. That is, the "security cover" of
Ossetian South Ossetia, which makes no great secret of its provenance
from among Russian military and special service cadres. Proceeding on
the basis of what we know about what happened previously in the Russian
part of the North Caucasus, support for the ideas of separatism and
irredenta is somewhat unexpected for a state with the experience
of Chechnya. It is possible to find an explanation that is much
simpler and much worse than one might assume, simply by analysing
the international situation.

For states, wars are a headache, because they make national
currencies collapse, frighten off investors, and do long-term damage
to politicians’ popularity ratings.

For the Russian siloviki [security chiefs], who since 1995 have grown
accustomed throughout the North Caucasus to accumulating resources
for the stabilization of the situation, the restoration of damage,
and the maintenance of the security level, war is a feeding ground.

In this light there is nothing surprising about Chechen President
Ramzan Kadyrov’s delight at the events or about the absence of any
rejoicing at the Ossetians’ liberation among the governments of the
fraternal North Caucasus peoples within the Russian Federation. For
Kadyrov, a new field of activity for the counterterrorist staff for the
North Caucasus, headed by the FSB, means a lessening of pressure on him
in Chechnya and less competition for his people. But for Ingushetia,
for instance, which has been in a state of conflict with what is now
de facto a united Ossetia for as long as Ossetia has been in a state
of conflict with Georgia, there is no reason to be pleased if that
territory is turned from a war zone into a border zone. The same is
true for Ossetia. The only winners are those who accumulate the funds
for the restoration of South Ossetia and for regional security under
the protection of the siloviki, who since the victorious pacification
of Chechnya in 2000 have seen their feeding ground shrink year by
year. Now that ground is widening.

This is a silovik group that has sufficient political influence to
insist on the replacement of the General Staff leadership in the summer
of 2008, to effectively rebuff all attacks on Ingushetian leader Murat
Zyazikov, and in many conflicts to successfully oppose the official
siloviki in the Putin government, including Minister Serdyukov. Happily
for us, they are not very interested in international policy or
official power.

Very little indeed is known about this "combat brotherhood" – at
least since February 2004, when I wrote in this column about the
military-criminal economy surrounding Chechnya, these people have
not become public.

Everything that is more or less known indicates that they are
interested almost exclusively in money and in guarantees of the
preservation of their feeding ground in their base regions. These are
mainly border territories, as well as parts of the Volga, Far East,
and Nonchernozem. I will not even venture to say whether they are
united: Maybe their coordinated actions are based on a coalition
deal between individuals in uniform. But the fact that they exist
can hardly be disputed anymore.

The "war party" in the Russian political spectrum is invisible, but
its presence is required in order to explain what has been happening
in the regime in recent years.

Those who are customarily regarded as siloviki in the present White
House, including [Deputy Prime Minister] Igor Sechin, not infrequently
come into conflict with this "war party."

One day – and quite soon – these people will want more than
noninterference in their affairs on the part of Medvedev. It was no
accident that Condoleezza Rice expressed the hope that the Russian
troops will leave Georgia anyway, but where will they want to go
in a year or two? Into the mining industry? To Crimea? Into North
Kazakhstan? To Tbilisi again? Or to Staraya Square [headquarters of
Presidential Staff]?

But that is the internal affair of the Kremlin, which is prepared to
recognize them as equal partners in its domestic political game.

[Description of Source: Moscow Gazeta.ru WWW-Text in Russian – Popular
website owned by pro-Kremlin and Gazprom-linked businessman Usmanov
but still often critical of the government; URL: ]