Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Jan 4 2009
Joe Biden: A realist cold war liberal
Joe Biden was selected as Barack Obama’s vice presidential candidate
largely because of his expertise in foreign policy. Traditionally, in
U.S. politics, Dick Cheney-like strong vice presidents are exception,
not the rule.
It is wiser to focus on Obama’s foreign policy outlook rather than
Biden’s, which would benefit Turkey in the long run with its realistic
tendencies. Biden’s voting pattern, as it is displayed in three
different issues (Cyprus-Armenian Issue-Iraq) does not seem friendly
to the Turkish position. However, Biden as a statesman would not
create extra problems for Turkey at the expense of U.S national
interests. In all of these issues, the person that should be watched
carefully is Obama, not Biden. Spending more energy to analyze Obama’s
geopolitical priorities can benefit Turkey in the long run.
Presidential elections in the U.S. always draw attention from the
world because of their potential to create new tensions, change
balances and shift policies. Turkey is one of the countries that has
been carefully observing the positions of presidential and
vice-presidential candidates regarding contentious issues such as
Armenian Genocide claims, the possible partition of Iraq, Cyprus, and
broader issues related to the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and
the Middle East. With the emergence of Senator Barack Obama, a
politician who identifies the events of 1915 as genocide and who
advocates a phased withdrawal from Iraq, as the democratic
presidential candidate, Turkey turns its focus to the potential
vice-presidential candidates, hoping that the second powerful
political figure would balance Obama’s policy preferences which have
been perceived as against the Turkish position. Nevertheless, Obama’s
choice of the veteran Delaware senator Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. has
disappointed Turkish politicians, policy makers and diplomats. Joseph
Biden, whose Senate career spans thirty-five years, has become known
for his pro-Armenian, pro-Greek ideas and voting record, and is also
famous for his proposal of the `Biden Plan’ ` a plan that defends a
soft-partition in Iraq. Turkey had crucial reserves about this plan
and finds it unacceptable. Considering the political careers and
positions of the democratic candidates, if the Obama-Biden ticket
makes its way to the White House, how will this team affect
Turkish-American relations? How should Turkey react to the positions
the team holds?
Biden’s Career and Political Position
To begin with, it is almost a conventional wisdom that 2008
presidential elections will be a foreign policy election. Joe Biden,
one of the 2008 presidential hopefuls just a couple of months ago,
contributes to Obama’s career on this issue as a foreign policy
expert. Biden completes some of Obama’s weaknesses with his private
life and political career. As a Catholic, white politician, Biden’s
seniority and his extensive knowledge on foreign policy issues makes
him a vital catch for Obama. In his long career, Biden has generally
followed the voting pattern of the George McGovern- Ted Kennedy wing
of the Democratic Party, i.e. the liberal left. However, as a
`cold-war liberal’ who supported harsh policies against Soviets, Biden
did not refrain from voting yes to military interventions whether it
seemed humanitarian or not. This makes him a trusted politician in the
eyes of the Washington insiders, or establishment; in fact, he is one
of the standard-bearers of the establishment.
In his career, Biden voted yes to the invasion of Iraq to overthrow
the so-called inhumane Saddam regime even though he later changed his
position and became a fierce critic of the invasion. Biden’s voting
record and political career proves that Biden is a realist in his
foreign policy preferences rather than a moralist or liberal; in other
words, even though he favors humanitarian positions, Biden sees issues
as a balance of power, not merely a calculus of moral
preferences. Another important aspect that is extremely significant
for our discussion is Biden’s close relations with the ethnic lobbies
present in the U.S. Although sometimes harshly criticized, Biden has
maintained enduring and very supportive relations with Greek,
Armenian, Israeli and even the new emerging Kurdish lobbies. As long
as it does not clash with national security issues, Biden votes in
line with those ethnic lobbies.
However, it would be wrong to portray Biden as dependent on ethnic
lobbies; rather, he gives priority to American interests[1].
The Cyprus Issue
Senator Biden was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1973 at the age of 29,
and found himself facing Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus. This was the
time in which the politically divided and socially dispersed Greek
community in the U.S. began to form what later came to be called the
Greek lobby.[2] The Cyprus controversy merged Biden’s career with the
rise of this new lobby and made him work with leading figures in the
lobby including Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri and Congressmen
John Brademas of Indiana, Paul Sarbanes of Maryland and Benjamin
Rosenthal of New York. In return, throughout his career, Biden has
felt the support of the powerful Greek lobby in Washington. In his 35
years in the Senate, Biden has been one of the key figures behind the
resolutions energized and provoked by the Greek-American lobby, which
has managed to halt or delay arm sales to Turkey. Working closely with
Greek-origin senator Paul Sarbanes, Biden came to be known as a valued
member of the pro-Greece lobby.
Biden has voted pro-Greece on issues such as the Aegean Sea, Cyprus,
FYROM (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), the Patriarchate, the
Greek Orthodox Theological School in Heybeliada, and so on. His
support for Greece is not limited to Greece vs. Turkey issues, but
rather toes a steady line in Greece-Macedonia or Greece-Albania
disputes. Thus, Biden cannot be simply seen as anti-Turkish as some
argue, but should be seen as pro-Greek-lobby, or a Hellenophile. In
the beginning of his career, in fierce opposition to the Turkish
intervention in Cyprus, Senator Biden supported the U.S. weapons
embargo against Turkey, which passed the U.S. Congress in the fall of
1974. However, in 1978, during the Carter administration when the
president asked him (and others) to vote to lift the embargo, worrying
that Turkish armed forces were deteriorating, which would weaken the
southern flank of NATO, and that the U.S. stood in need of military
bases in Turkey, which enabled the U.S. to monitor Soviet activities,
Biden did not resist the President. It is therefore clear that Biden
has consistently chosen the pro-Greek position only when it does not
clash with U.S. national interests, as in the case of the weapons
embargo. Biden’s position on arm sales to Turkey reappeared in
November 2000. When Turkey wanted to buy eight CH-53E Super Stallion
heavy-lift attack helicopters from the U.S, Biden placed a hold on the
sales. As a ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Biden’s reason was again the Cyprus issue. Nevertheless, under heavy
pressure from the administration, he quickly changed his position and
lifted the hold on the helicopter sale. Biden, then, supported
Cyprus’s ascension to EU, even though the Greek Cypriots voted against
the Annan Plan.
Armenian Claims
Another important issue that worries Turkish policy-makers is Biden’s
consistent support for Armenian Genocide claims. Beginning in 1990,
Biden actively supported almost all the pro-Armenian resolutions in
the Senate. Those resolutions included aid to Armenia, political
support for the invasion of Karabagh by the Armenians, opening the
Turkish side of the Turkish-Armenian border, genocide claims, the
appointment of ambassadors to Armenia, Hrant Dink’s assassination,
article 301 etc. Even though Biden seemed pro-Armenian, however, he
did not refrain from changing his positions and votes when he felt
that the vote was against the national interests of the United States.
Biden supported the resolution that seeks the recognition of Armenian
Genocide claims by the president in 1990. In 1992, he supported the
Freedom Support Act that aimed to restrict U.S. Assistance to
Azerbaijan. His voting pattern has followed this course throughout. In
May 2006, when U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, John Evans, used the word
`genocide’ to describe the events of 1915, in opposition to official
U.S. policy, he was forced to resign. Biden was among the leading
senators who wrote a very strong letter to Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice in favor of Evans, urging Rice to reconsider her
policy. Senator Biden, at that time, argued that the final goal of the
claims of genocide is not U.S recognition of genocide claims, but
rather to make Turkey recognize the events of 1915 as genocide. In
2007, he opposed Richard Hoagland’s appointment to Yerevan to replace
Evans as Ambassador. During the Senate hearings, Hoagland refused to
use the word genocide to describe the events. Biden delayed the
committee vote on Hoagland, but eventually voted in his favor. Again
in 2007, Biden cosponsored the Armenian Genocide Resolution
(S.Res.106) and authored a resolution to honor Turkish-Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink. Eventually, after the negotiations, Biden
accepted the proper changes in the resolutions’ language to a degree
that does not disturb the official Turkish position[3]. Finally, in
2008, Biden urged the new appointment of Marie Yovanovitch as an
Ambassador to replace Evans. Even though he questioned Yovanovitch’s
position, and criticized her non-preference of the word genocide, he
did not use his veto power to block the appointment. These voting
patterns support the idea that Biden makes a clear distinction between
his personal political position and the national interests of the U.S.
Iraq: soft partition or exit strategy?
One of the most important contributions Biden may make to U.S.
politics is his exit plan from Iraq, which urges the establishment of
`three largely autonomous regions with a viable central government in
Baghdad’ that are Kurd, Sunni and Shiite[4]. Based on Leslie Gelb’s
2004 `three-state solution’ article[5], this plan was prepared and
perfected by Biden and Gelb. The so-called `Biden Plan,’ sometimes
referred to as `soft-partition,’ restricts Baghdad’s function to a
federal zone that mainly deals with three issues: national defense,
foreign relations, and the distribution of oil money. The plan was
crafted at a time when the U.S. situation in Iraq seemed hopeless,
with the highest number of casualties and the country on the brink of
civil war. Modeled according to the Dayton Accord, the Biden Plan
argued that the only way to stop the violence was to divide the
country into three autonomous zones with a federal and weak capital.
As an alternative to Bush’s position of `staying the course,’ as well
as to the liberal imperative `bring the troops home now!’ the Biden
Plan offered a third, middle-way alternative. Had the plan been
adopted, U.S. troops would have been redeployed or withdrawn from Iraq
by 2008. Rather than being seen as the most complicated and refined
strategy, the Biden Plan was an exit strategy that the U.S. needed at
the time.
The Biden Plan was widely discussed in Washington as a third way and
as a plausible exit strategy. In fact, the only problem with the plan
was it was more popular in Washington than in Baghdad. Drawing sharp
criticism from Iraqi politicians and Iraq’s neighbors ` including
Turkey and Iran ` the plan was never taken seriously and was dismissed
by the related interlocutors. At the height of the search for new
direction and need for a new strategy, Iraqi Study Group funded by the
Congress and led by veteran diplomats James Baker and Lee Hamilton,
assessed the Biden plan and concluded that `The cost ¦. would be
too high'[6]. The plan disturbed Turkey, supported anti-American
feelings in Turkey, and was seen as an evidence of U.S. intentions to
remain over-involved in the region both in Iraq and in Turkey. When
George W. Bush’s `surge strategy,’ that strongly committed to
territorial integrity of Iraq, worked out well in Iraq to reduce
violence there, even Biden himself did not propose his plan
again[7]. During his presidential bid, he used the plan to display his
difference from the other democratic candidates. However, especially
after September 2007, he was careful not to bring the plan into the
front. In fact, the website devoted to the plan is not available
anymore and the plan is hidden from the eyes in Biden’s own website.
Now, Biden’s plan for Iraq is no different than Barack Obama’s `phased
withdrawal’ plan that urges the U.S. not to withdraw abruptly, which
would lead to a regional war that could continue for generations.
Instead, Biden proposes a 16-month plan, starting from inauguration
day, to withdraw the combat brigades to redeploy them in Afghanistan.
He also advocates leaving some brigades for training, operational, and
intelligence purposes. As different from Obama, Biden opposes
permanent U.S. bases in Iraq.
Conclusion
Joe Biden was selected as Barack Obama’s vice presidential candidate
largely because of his expertise in foreign policy. His function is to
balance Obama’s so-called inexperience in foreign policy. The logic
behind the selection process does not aim to reshape U.S. foreign
policy but rather to play out the internal political dynamics of the
U.S. Therefore it is not realistic to exaggerate Biden’s potential
influence on a possible Obama presidency[8].
Traditionally, in U.S. politics, Dick Cheney-like strong vice
presidents are exception, not the rule. If elected, Biden will take
responsibilities when it is seen as appropriate by Obama. The
president makes the hardest decision on his own, even if this
president is George W. Bush as it is seen in Annapolis process,
engagement with Iran and Iraq strategy. Therefore, it is wiser to
focus on Obama’s foreign policy outlook rather than Biden’s, which
would benefit Turkey in the long run with its realistic tendencies.
In the U.S. public administration, the Vice President is not the
person who makes the decisions on foreign policy issues. Following the
President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and
National Security Adviser have more power and authority in shaping the
foreign policy. Even though Biden is a strong character with expertise
in foreign policy, it will be virtually impossible for him to make
those critical decisions by himself. It will be a better strategy to
wait for the names of those who will fill out those mentioned
positions and, in the meantime, to focus on Obama’s general
positions. Those possible names should be carefully followed and their
positions should be studied.
Biden’s voting pattern, as it is displayed in three different issues
does not seem friendly to the Turkish position. However, the shifts
and changes in Biden’s same voting pattern prove that rather than
being a huge moralist or a humanist, Biden gives priority to national
interests over his personal preferences. Biden as a statesman would
not create extra problems for Turkey at the expense of U.S national
interests.
When Biden started voting against the Turkish positions, Turkey’s
human rights record was not in good shape. When Turkey’s human rights
record began to improve, it is possible to detect a slight change in
his voting behavior in favor of Turkey. For instance in the 2007 Hrant
Dink/article 301 resolution, Biden mentioned Turkey’s reaction to the
assassination as a positive step and showed appreciation for Prime
Minister R. Tayyip ErdoÄ?an’s words of condemning the
assassination. Therefore, Turkey should keep its human rights record
clean to avoid any further surprises.
Turkey has changed its official position on the issues of the events
of 1915. Turkey’s proactive steps should carry these issues to a point
where ethnic lobbies in Washington should be rendered almost
ineffective. There are things to be done in Washington and in the
U.S. on a social level, such as cultivating a politically united
diasporic Turkish community that could encounter the negative effect
of ethnic lobbies, but these efforts take very long time. Alongside
with the lobbying efforts in Washington, which would be totally
ineffective in a possible Obama presidency, in the short run, the
solution should be sought in the new Caucasus Platform that Turkey has
initiated. The crises in Caucasus may create a unique opportunity for
Turkey. As Georgia is under occupation, U.S will urge to gain Armenia
for the West; the only way to achieve this goal is to engage Armenia
through Turkey. This opportunity would give leverage to Turkey on
Armenia. If used effectively, the genocide resolutions issue could be
solved forever by making an agreement with Armenia, with the help of
U.S., in the interest of stable relations between Turkey and
Armenia. Such a move would save Turkey from any further worry on this
subject, and would allow Turkey to focus on other vital issues in
Washington.
Biden’s oldest and most favorite subject, the Cyprus issue, is already
frozen and far from creating urgent problems for Turkey after the
Turkish Cypriot’s `yes’ vote to the Annan plan. The negotiations on
September 3rd in the UN between the Greek and Turkish sides of Cyprus,
may help the situation go in a better direction.
Rather than narrowly hiding behind pretexts and slogans such as
`anti-Turkish Biden,[9]’ the new dynamics of the change in Washington
should be carefully examined. Even though it seems that a potential
Obama presidency would be against Turkey’s interests, Obama’s overall
position in favor multi-lateralism, the primacy of international
organizations, energy policies and diplomacy over unilateralism and
the use of force would create wider opportunities and render ethnic
lobbies useless, or at least less effective.
In Iraq, soft partition or the Biden Plan have faded away and is not
an option for the U.S., at least for now. Therefore, instead of
highlighting an already dead-plan, it would be wiser to work on better
plans for further social, cultural and political engagements with
Northern Iraq, and to foster stable and equal relations with other
political players in Iraqi politics. The process shows that Turkey’s
plan to solve Iraq’s problem by means of engagements with its
neighbors is more viable and workable. Therefore there is no need to
revisit the `Biden Plan.’
Turkey should correctly reassess its leverage on Iraq and U.S. in
reference to Biden Plan. As it is mentioned in Iraqi Study Group Plan,
one of the worries of U.S. about the viability of the Biden Plan was
the risk of `destabilization of neighboring states, or attempts by
neighboring states to dominate Iraqi regions’ i.e. possible
intervention of neighboring states namely, Turkey and Iran, which was
openly mentioned by Biden, during the Democratic presidential debate
in August 2007. Therefore, it is clear that Biden Plan did not die a
natural death, but it was forced to death by various efforts including
threats coming from the neighboring countries. Without over- or
under-estimating its leverage, Turkey should support the efforts that
foster the central government in Iraq without loosing time on trivial
issues to enhance its hand for a unlikely potential revival of Biden
Plan.
In Iraq, Biden opposes to permanent U.S. bases, which fits into
Turkish position. As it is seen in the discussions on SOFA agreement
that aims to regulate U.S. presence in Iraq, even once-seemed-weak
Iraqi central government has an incredible effect on U.S. internal
politics. Turkey should analyze the sources of Iraqi government’s
leverage to take advantage of Biden’s position on permanent
bases. Offer. To be able to do that, more cooperation and engagement
with Democrats are needed more than ever to further and deepen the
relations.
Biden’s position on Iran is also very close to Turkey’s
position. Being against Iran’s nuclear ambitions to acquire nuclear
arms on the one hand, Biden is for more engagement with Iran. In at
least for decade, starting from an effort to launch a dialogue with
Iran’s ex-president Mohammad Khatami, Biden has been advocating more
engagement, more dialogue even to a degree that he has been portrayed
as the sole responsible for Bush’s failed Iran policy[10]. Since the
Iran and Iraq issues are closely related to each other, a position
seeking for engagement with Iran would not risk instability in Iraq by
supporting a partition plan. In addition to that, engagement policy
would help Turkey to have better relations with U.S. in seeking for
alternative natural gas sources for both herself and for filling the
Nabucco project.
The Georgia crisis proved that a democratic president would seek to
build bridges, craft new alliances and work for more stability in the
broader region as opposed to a potential Republican president who
would take the risk of military encounter with Russia. If not a war, a
republican president would force turkey to take side whereas a
democratic president is more likely to leave a space for turkey for
more diplomacy with the neighboring countries. A possible clash in the
region, whether it is against Iran or Russia, will force Turkey to
take sides against its will. Such a policy will be detrimental to
Turkish foreign policy efforts launched and build in the last 6 years
and will force Turkey to be a frontier state again as it was during
the Cold War era, rather than a regional power. Therefore a democratic
foreign policy vision, supported by both Biden and Obama, would favor
a more diplomatically active Turkey that would benefit for both the
U.S. and Turkey.
In all of these issues, the person that should be watched carefully is
Obama, not Biden. Biden, as a pragmatic vice president, would not
capable of creating more problems for a Turkey that has been working
effectively with its neighbors and has a better human rights record
than ever before. Spending more energy to analyze Obama’s geopolitical
priorities can benefit Turkey in the long run.
[1] Bülent Ali Rıza, `Obama’nın
BaÅ?kanlı&#x C4;?ı Türkiye’yi Nasıl
Etkiler?,’ Interview with Anatolian Agency, 27 August, 2008.
[2] `New Lobby in Town: The Greeks,’ Time Magazine, July, 14, 1975.
[3] For the rewritten text of the resolution:
/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:sr65 rs.txt.pdf
[4] Joseph Biden and Leslie H. Gelb, `Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq,’
New York Times, May 1, 2006
[5] Leslie H. Gelb, `Three-State Solution,’ New York Times, November
25 2003.
[6] The Iraqi Study Group Report, p. 39. Vintage Books, New York,
December 2006. The reasons of the objection were possible `mass
population movements, collapse of the Iraqi security forces,
strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization of
neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate
Iraqi regions.’
[7] The last time the plan was discussed through the Biden’s
non-binding resolution that passed the Senate on September 26, 2007
with a bipartisan support 76-23 including Sen. Hillary Clinton formal
and Sen. Barack Obama’s verbal support who missed the
vote. ( ES.37:).
[8] Ali H. Aslan `Obama’nın Tercihi ve Türkiye’ye
Yansımalar,’ Zaman, August 25, 2008.
[9] Semih Ä°diz, `Türk DüÅ?manı
Biden’Ä&# xB1;n Pelosi Açmazı,’ Milliyet, August 25,
2008.
[10] Michael Rubin, `Biden’s Blink on Iran,’ Washington Post, August
28, 2008.
Nuh Yılmaz is a research assistant in Foundation for Political,
Economic and Social Research.
02 September 2008, Tuesday
NUH YILMAZ
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