Turkey recognized the independence of Armenia in the 1990s. But the diplomatic and economic relations between the two neighbors, sharing a border of 311 km, have been blocked since 1993.
In fact, with the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the occupation of Azerbaijan by Armenia in 1993, Turkey closed its shared land borders. The first attempt at normalization started in 2010 via football diplomacy, then protocols were signed, but deep contradictions and serious challenges between the two belligerents engendered an ultimate rapprochement failure.
The second major attempt to restore bilateral ties took place in the summer of 2021, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan citing “positive public signals from Turkey.”
In fact, special representatives were appointed for the dialogue and the start of normalization talks.
The agreement on the continuation of negotiations without preconditions resulted in four meetings of special representatives, including the meeting of the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey in Antalya; the meeting of Erdogan and Pashinyan on the sidelines of the EU summit in October 2022. All these meetings have been important steps in developing the normalization of relations.
In the past months, important developments contributed to accelerating the normalization process. After the earthquake in Turkey, for the first time in 30 years, the Turkish border was opened to allow Armenian humanitarian convoys to enter the country. A delegation led by the Armenian Foreign Minister went to Ankara to “demonstrate support for Turkey”.
In fact, Armenia declared its readiness to improve bilateral cooperation, regulate foreign relations, establish diplomatic ties, and fully open borders. Ankara also relied on the agreement to “accelerate measures to normalize relations”. In this context, the process of normalization accelerated due to multiple agreements: direct air traffic, cancellation of the ban on direct air transportation of goods by Turkey in January 2023, and plans to open the border for citizens of third countries in the summer of 2023. Both countries have also jointly agreed to repair the Ani Bridge on the border between Armenia and Turkey.
Yerevan and Ankara have various reasons to reduce divergence and start the process of normalization.
After Ararat Mirzoyan’s second visit to Turkey in February 2023 (which was the second visit from March 2022), Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has paid attention to the great opportunity to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey. This will provide more chances for peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, optimal use of normal potentials, and a great opportunity to strengthen Armenia’s economy.
By normalizing relations with Yerevan, Turkey also foresees positive advantages such as reducing pressure from the European Union, the United States Congress, and President Biden… Benefits such as the reopening of transit and regional trade routes are considered to be in Turkey’s favor.
Although positive signs emerge, there are also worrying factors that hinder communication between the two parties. Armenia suffered a bitter defeat in the recent major war against the Azerbaijani army supported by Turkey.
After Azerbaijan’s victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey signed the anti-Armenian Shusha declaration with Baku. The agreement addresses coordinated and joint Turkish-Azerbaijani activities in the event of a threat or aggression by a third state or states against the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, internationally recognized borders, or security of both countries.
The US and Russia have declared their support for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey. However, unresolved issues such as the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan-Turkey corridor project (Zangezur corridor), and the ongoing conflict on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, may speed up the normalization process or block definitely all talks between the two parties. On the other hand, nationalists, Armenian opponents, and opposition factions in Armenia are fierce critics of Turkey and express their concerns about the normalization process.
Negative views and divergent narratives regarding the Armenian genocide and the events of 1915 are some of the main obstacles to pursuing normalization.
The Armenian diaspora has a profound economic impact on Armenia.
The Armenian diaspora ( more than 7 million people) doesn’t accept the denial of the Armenian Genocide and continues to exert pressure in order to obtain international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and sovereignty over Western Armenia, and these crucial issues are grant conditions for normalization.
In a pragmatic and step-by-step approach toward normalization, the Armenian and Turkish governments did not put the Armenian genocide on their negotiation agenda like in 2009. It seems that, unlike the previous round, Azerbaijan is in harmony with Turkey in the field of normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia.
Also, Yerevan is doing its best to pursue peace talks with Turkey. In fact, avoiding preconditions can promote the normalization process and expand sports games and national football teams, diplomatic relations, and mutual trade. In the meantime, although the result of the upcoming general elections in Turkey will have an impact on normalization, even if the Turkish opposition wins, Baku’s role in the normalization process will decrease.
Expecting complete and immediate normalization is not realistic. In fact, negotiations require serious efforts to launch the peace process, such as keeping borders open, increasing the number of crossings and mutual political will, increasing economic, cultural, and social interactions, civil society participation, and stronger international support.
What is clear, however, is that a slow, step-by-step normalization process now has a much better chance than before. The opening of the borders will have a gradual and positive effect on people’s relations, reducing historical tensions between Turkey and Armenia.
However, the opening of the borders in the near future is not an all-around reconciliation, and the territorial and historical disputes between the two neighbors remain unsettled. In other words, reopening the embassies and crossings can be reached in the short term, but resolving major issues and removing historical obstacles requires a multi-stage dialogue and medium-term steps.