Author: Ophelia Vardapetian

Politcom.ru, Russia
July 11 2017
Hot July in Nagornyy Karabakh
 by Sergey Markedonov
[Armenian News note: the below is translated from Russian]
Things are once again unsettled in Nagornyy Karabakh. The latest armed
flare-up has occurred on the line of contact of the parties to the
conflict. Against a background of numerous violations of the
cease-fire regime, the events of 4 and 7 July 2017 stood out
particularly. As usual, Yerevan and Baku give their own version of the
events, and the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group are eager to avoid
unambiguous assessments, stressing the impermissibility of military
incidents and the need for negotiations in point of substance.
The July outbreak of the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation was not
the first of its kind and will most likely not be the last. Military
flareups intermixed with negotiations and diplomatic summits long
since firmly became an important element of the peace process. This
point appears paradoxical only at first sight. Both Armenia and
Azerbaijan derive certain benefits from the armed flareups.
Baku is attempting with strong-arm pressure to alter in its favour the
position of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group. The balancing on the
brink of a big war and permanent military alert is to prompt in
Russia, the United States, and France and also Iran, which is outside
of the Minsk Group, the thought that all-around pressure on Armenia to
coerce it into concessions should be intensified to prevent great
bloodshed and regional instability. And Baku is attempting to
represent Yerevan's readiness for negotiations, despite the regular
violations of the truce, as visible proof that the Armenians intend to
give up their maximalist dispositions. How far this representation
corresponds to reality is another question. Exactly the other way
about, no solid evidence in support of the Azerbaijani version has
been presented as of this time. But it is being vigorously promoted in
the information space not only within the Caspian republic but also in
Russia, the European Union countries, and the United States, hereby
becoming an additional political and diplomatic instrument.
Yerevan, though, is attempting to demonstrate the intractability of
the Azerbaijanis and their exclusive commitment to force instead of
dialogue. Following last year's "four-day war," comparison of
Azerbaijan with the Islamic State terrorist outfit, which is banned in
Russia and a number of other countries, has become a commonplace in
the speeches of Armenian politicians and diplomats. Eduard Nalbandyan,
head of the Armenian Foreign Ministry, employed this metaphor at a
briefing on 10 July 2017 at the outcome of the Chisinau meeting of
foreign ministers of Eastern Partnership states. Neither Baku nor
Yerevan are abandoning the negotiating process in principle here even
after the new outbreaks of violence and casualties on the line of
contact.
To what extent does the July flareup stand out against the background
of previous clashes which have occurred this year? Does it testify to
some new trends in the development of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
or, on the contrary, confirm the old trends? For an answer to these
questions we shall consider briefly the events context. In 2017 we
have observed several outbreaks of armed confrontation on the line of
the contact of the parties to the conflict. The incidents in the early
hours of 25 February, 15-17 May, and 16-17 June were of the largest
scale. It should be noted also that the February flareup occurred a
week after the negotiations with the participation of the heads of the
foreign ministries of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the sidelines of the
Munich Security Conference. The May flareup occurred shortly after of
the working visit of the foreign ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia in Moscow. The June flareup is a special case. It occurred not
before and not after the traditional regional visit of the co-chairmen
of the OSCE Minsk Group but during a short break in their tour. I
would point out that the Caucasus visit of the mediator diplomats
began on 10, continued on 12, and concluded on 19 June. The clashes,
though, occurred 16-17 June, following the visit to Yerevan and
Stepanakert and just prior to the visit of the Minsk Group co-chairmen
to Baku.
The July flareup developed largely per a similar algorithm. On 3 July
2017 the mediator diplomats in Vienna held a meeting (effectually a
presentation of the results of their regional visit) with members of
the Group. The report of the Minsk Group co-chairmen took place
against the background of the preparation of an unofficial ministerial
meeting of the heads of the foreign ministries of the OSCE members n
Austria's Mayerbach. This event was planned for 11 June, "the building
of trust through dialogue and cooperation," primarily in the process
of a settlement of ethno-political conflicts, was declared its main
slogan. You can criticize the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group and the
Minsk Group as a whole for its low level of effectiveness as much as
you like. But the proposition that a stimulation of "negotiations in
point of substance" (not imitation meetings, that is, but a format
which could culminate in the achievement of practical compromise
solutions) should become the attainment of a certain level of trust
between the antagonists sounds as the recurrent theme in its
statements. The mediators may help achieve this goal, but they cannot
substitute for the parties to the conflict themselves.
Meanwhile, all that we had already seen in February, May, and June has
been repeated in July also. Incidents outside the village of Alxanli
of Fizuli District, as a result of which there were casualties among
the peaceful citizens also, occurred literally the day after the
presentation of the results of the regional tour of the OSCE Minsk
Group co-chairman. The Azerbaijanis represented the subsequent actions
of 7 July as revenge for the victims of Alxanli, the Armenian
military, in turn, spoke of the other side's employment of the
civilian population as a "living shield". The week between the Vienna
report and the ministerial meeting in Mayerbach (at which negotiations
of the heads of the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan,
Eduard Nalbandyan and Elmar Mamedyarov, had been anticipated) thus
took in a new flareup. It should be noted here that the
representatives of both Baku and Yerevan were in no hurry to
dissociate themselves either from participation in the informal
meeting in the Eastern Partnership format in Moldova or from the OSCE
ministerial meeting in Austria. The books are not being closed on the
negotiating process. But a no less important storyline, aside from the
mere fact of diplomatic dialogue, is the substance of the
negotiations. Yet on the fundamental points of a settlement no
progress has been observed. The status of Nagornyy, the de-occupation
of the adjacent areas, and the refugee problem remain
stumbling-blocks. There are no hints of a possible compromise on these
issues. We are thus observing a "flight from substance". And this
policy is entirely rational and consistent. Both parties fear a
withdrawal into isolation, with which a total renunciation of peace
negotiations is fraught. But they are no less (if not more) afraid of
a solution of the core issues. Putting them on the current agenda is
practically impossible if each time the latest round of meetings and
diplomatic consultations is followed by a violation of the truce and
accusations against the other side of perfidy and an unwillingness to
make concessions. Simply because after new armed exacerbations the
peace process would need to be "salvaged". And this "salvage" would
take some time. Both other provocations and casualties in this time
are not ruled out.
Once again, as in February, May, and June, there has been talk in July
of the need to comply with the accords arrived at during last year's
negotiations in Vienna and Saint Petersburg and last year's
ministerial meeting in Moscow. Their common spirit is the proposition
concerning stabilization of the situation in the conflict zone as the
base prerequisite for passage to substantive negotiations. But without
effective mechanisms of the prevention of military incidents, progress
in this direction is practically impossible. But there are many
obstacles to the creation of an effective set of instruments for
preventing new flareups. Naming each time the party guilty of having
incited the confrontation? A certain disbalance in this case is not
ruled out, and with this the mediators' negative perception of one
party to the conflict would grow. This is fraught with alienation from
the negotiations as such and, in consequence, the de-legitimization of
the present format, even an "unfreezing" of the confrontation.
Increasing the political will? But without a fundamental improvement
in relations between Russia and the West this is hardly possible,
considering that the significance of Karabakh for Moscow and
Washington today cannot be compared with Syria or Ukraine.
The Karabakh trends in July 2017 also thus remain as before:
maintenance of the peace process for the prevention of a large-scale
war and the incitement of regular flareups for pressure on the
opponent and the mediators at the negotiating table.

Armenpress News Agency , Armenia
 Monday
Armenia's Ombudsman expresses concern over Azerbaijani actions to
Office of CoE Human Rights Commissioner
YEREVAN, JULY 24, ARMENPRESS. Human Rights Defender of Armenia Arman
Tatoyan held a phone conversation with the representative of the
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (CoE) over the
shelling of bordering villages of Armenia’s Tavush province by the
Azerbaijani forces on July 20-22, 2017, the Ombudsman’s Office told
Armenpress.
Ombudsman Tatoyan expressed concern that the Azerbaijani armed forces
are targeting mainly civilians and their property, shell the schools,
kindergartens, houses of the village, especially at the times of the
day when the possibility of causing danger to civilians’ life and
health is higher.
The Ombudsman stated that the international community must publicly
condemn the targeted actions against civilians.
According to the agreement reached between the Ombudsman and the
Office of the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, the data on the
recent shelling towards bordering Chinari, Barekamavan villages of
Tavush province and their consequences will be summed up and submitted
to the Commissioner.

Press TV, Iran
July 14, 2017 Friday
Turkey to pay $2.5bn for Russian S-400 missiles: Official
Russia's S-400 Triumph medium and long-range surface-to-air missile
systems ride through Red Square during the Victory Day military parade
in the capital Moscow, May 9, 2017. (Photos by AFP)
Turkey has agreed to shell out $2.5 billion in order to purchase
Russia's most advanced missile defense system S-400, provided that
Moscow agrees to transfer the technology as well, an official says.
"For Turkey, the key aspect of any deal is transfer of technology or
know-how. The Russian agreement to allow two of the S-400 batteries to
be produced in Turkey will serve that aim," the unnamed official told
Bloomberg on Thursday.
Under the deal, Russia would send two S-400 systems to Turkey within
the next year and then help the country to domestically produce two
more batteries.
If true, the deal would be a slap in the face for NATO. The US-led
military alliance has tried to prevent Turkey—as a strategic member—
from forging close ties with Russia.
However, Turkey's drift towards Russia seems to be a direct result of
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's growing frustration with the
West and in particular with America.
Ankara has been upset with Washington's lack of respect for its
demands on extraditing key opposition figure Fethullah Gulen, whom
Turkey accuses of staging last year's botched coup in the country.
The Turkish government says it has "85 boxes of concrete evidence"
that prove Gulen was behind the coup attempt on July 15 last year,
which killed some 250 people and injured over 2,100.
Erdogan has also been disappointed with the US' support for some
Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, which he deems a threat for his
country's national security.
The move has also been described by experts as Turkey's response to
Washington's decision in 2015 to withdraw its Patriot surface-to-air
missile system from Turkey's border with Syria.
Before turning to Russia, the Turkish military walked out of a
$3.4-billion contract for a similar Chinese system under pressure from
the US.
Neither the S-400 nor its Chinese equivalent, FD200, are compatible
with other NATO military systems, meaning that they are not bound by
NATO's instructions that prevent Turkey from placing such weapons on
the Armenian border, Aegean coast or Greek border.
According to the official, the Turkish S-400s would not be equipped
with a friend-or-foe identification system, allowing them to be used
against all targets without any restrictions.
Designed to detect, track and destroy aircraft, drones or missiles as
far as 250 miles away, the missile defense system has only been sold
to China and India so far.

ARMINFO News Agency, Armenia
July 13, 2017 Thursday
GeoProMining - ten years of work for the benefit of the country, at
the forefront of gold mining
 Yerevan July 13
Emmanuil Mkrtchyan. One of the largest investors in Armenia, the
Russian group of mining companies GeoProMining celebrates its 10th
anniversary of work in our country. In 2007, the company acquired the
first major asset in Armenia, GPM GOLD, which is developing the Sotq
gold mine and managing the Ararat gold plant, and a little later
Agarak Copper-Molybdenum Combine. In connection with this date, the
general director - ArmInfo analyst Emmanuil Mkrtchyan spoke with the
president of the group Roman Khudoliy
GeoProMining - ten years of work for the benefit of the country, at
the forefront of gold mining
One of the largest investors in Armenia, the Russian group of mining
companies GeoProMining celebrates its 10th anniversary of work in our
country. In 2007, the company acquired the first major asset in
Armenia, GPM GOLD, which is developing the Sotq gold mine and managing
the Ararat gold plant, and a little later Agarak Copper-Molybdenum
Combine (AMMK). In connection with this date, the general director -
ArmInfo analyst Emmanuil Mkrtchyan spoke with the president of the
group Roman Khudoliy
Roman Nikolayevich, sum up the results of these 10 years of work in
our country. How effectively did the company manage to work, taking
into account the fact that soon after the acquisition of assets a
global financial and economic crisis broke out? Due to what you
managed not only to survive it, but also to practically reach the
level of profitability of production?
In 2007, the assets we acquired in Armenia were in a completely
horrible condition, the equipment were almost completely depreciated,
the organization and culture of production, to put it mildly, desired
the best. The efficiency of production was very low, our predecessors
accumulated huge debts and not only for payments to the budget,
suppliers, other contractors, but also for staff salaries. Arrears in
wages was 9 months, and employees were on forced vacations. But that's
not all, the former owners of the company developed all the oxide ores
at the Sotq deposit, leaving only persistent sulphides, for the
enrichment of which it was necessary to build a new plant, since the
old technology in Ararat was not for this purpose. Therefore, after
the acquisition of the asset, we have set a very serious task of
developing the project and constructing a plant for processing
sulphide resistant ores. Together with the engineering companies Cors
Resource and Extract Technologies, we have come a long way in
designing, building, implementing the most modern technology for
processing sulfide ores - Albion. To start the plant it was necessary
to prepare a mine. We conducted a global modernization, buying from
the Japanese company Komatso 22 units of equipment - dump trucks,
excavators, loaders ...
On Agarak copper-molybdenum combine was, actually, the same situation.
In total, for our assets in Armenia, taking into account their
acquisition and technological modernization, we spent about 500
million USD for this period. I think, despite the crisis risks, the
difficult technological and managerial decisions, we have passed this
way very dignifiedly.
What are the company's medium-term plans for the strategic development
of its two Armenian assets? We, of course, are not going to dwell on
this, although I can say that the investment return has just begun,
literally the last year. The return on investment (ROI) is still
minimal in terms of the amount invested, but, nevertheless, the
process has started. After all, when an investor decides to enter an
asset, he first of all thinks about how long he will be able to repay
the investment and what profit he can expect. After the acquisition of
the Sotq asset in 2008, GPM Gold extracted and processed only 136 kg
of gold in marketable products. In the current year, we will produce
about 4 tons. The difference, as you can see, is enormous, we managed
to make such a leap. Today we process about 1.3 million tons of ore at
the Ararat factory, in the medium term we intend to bring the volumes
up to 1.5 - 1.7 million tons and set a goal to produce gold up to 5-6
tons per year. This will require additional investment, which we now
carry out through our own and attracted funds.
Similar is about the Agarak. We are well aware that with such a low
content of ore base in copper deposits, in conditions of low world
prices, it is possible to bring production to an acceptable level of
profitability only through scaling. Strategically, we plan to increase
the productivity of the copper- molybdenum asset from 3.5 million tons
of ore processing to 6 million tons at the initial stage. These
actions will make it possible, even at low prices, to work without
interruption. This is a serious task, requiring significant additional
investment. Only this year GeoProMining sent over $ 3 million to
further technical re-equipment of Agarak Copper-Molybdenum Combine.
You work in Russia, other countries, once worked in Georgia. What
makes Armenia different, does our country have its own strengths that
make it attractive for foreign investors?
You know, Armenia has become for us a native, because 10 years - a
considerable time. Yes, in relation to other countries, here there are
advantages, the main of which are historical mining competencies,
hardworking and professional workers.
One must have a big risk appetite to invest such significant
investments in the crisis period of uncertainty.
Yes, these 10 years were quite difficult for us, as for many. We
invested our own money, borrowed money, invested in technology,
production and all this in the crisis of 2008, then in 2012 a new
crisis broke out, which has not ended yet. That is, we, figuratively
speaking, "caught" all the crises, and when they ask me how I work in
such conditions - I answer that, frankly speaking, in other conditions
we almost did not work. Management and the team have coped with this
task, we are developing steadily, unlike many companies.
It is interesting to know your expert opinion on the issue of the
transition of the country's mining industry to the deeper processing
of raw materials through the construction of its own smelting
production, the project of which was already developed in Zangezur
before the crisis of 2008-2009 and the possibility of creating a small
refinery?
The theme of the construction of a smelting plant for the processing
of copper, molybdenum concentrates periodically appeared during these
10 years. I know that the Chinese have made an offer to build a copper
smelter and it is now being studied. But in order for the smelter for
copper to be effective, it is necessary to process not less than
80-100 thousand tons of copper in concentrates. Probably, such a
volume, taking into account the commissioning of new capacities, can
be achieved in Armenia, and this will be beneficial for extractive
companies with high logistics costs. However, nevertheless, it is
necessary to weigh all the pros and cons again, because we are all in
the market and the local auditor should not yield to existing
processors.
As for the refinery, the alloy Dore, to date, only GPM Gold produces
in Armenia. For the construction of the refining factory, resource
capacities are needed. Even if we increase production to 6 tons of
gold, this plant will be unprofitable. When other fields are put into
operation, and in general gold production will reach 30 tons and
higher in bars Dore, this issue is worth considering. But we must take
into account that there are a large number of refining industries in
the world, only 11 plants in Russia - and almost all of them are
under-loaded. If it is difficult to build a plant in Armenia to reach
a competitive cost, I do not see such opportunities in the near
future. Some have already gone bankrupt, for example, the Kolyma plant
in Russia. This topic is quite subtle, Dore's producers, unlike
concentrates producers, do not have logistics problems, transportation
costs are minimal.
And the last question. "Resources for good" is the motto, apparently
chosen by your company for the purpose of implementing its social
policy, taking into account the fact that the enterprises in Vardenis,
Ararat and Agarak, in fact, are city-forming, providing jobs for up to
70% of the local able-bodied population?
Realizing that our enterprises have a city-forming nature, in 2011 the
company moved from disparate projects to a system approach to
corporate social responsibility and launched a comprehensive program
covering all aspects of social life, from attentive attitude towards
employees and ending with minimizing the impact of production on the
environment. We constantly interact with state authorities and local
administrations, which allows us to react as sensitively as possible
to the needs of the inhabitants of the regions, to send charitable
funds to those projects that are most relevant to the local
population.
We are long-term and honest investors, when we bought GPMGold, there
worked 550 people, now the team consists of 1050 people, an increase
of almost 2 times. Over $ 170 million was paid to the budget of the
Republic of Armenia. As for wages, at our enterprises it is one of the
highest in the industry.
So, we invest in social projects: development of infrastructure, in
the areas of fire safety and security, energy supply, water supply,
repair hospitals, schools, kindergartens. Support for socially
vulnerable groups of the population is also traditionally one of the
priorities of the social work of GPM. We also render all possible
assistance to local authorities in carrying out various environmental
measures, improvement and creating comfortable conditions for the
residents of Vardenis, Ararat and Agarak. In total, for these 10 years
we have invested about $ 8 million in the implementation of various
social programs and charity.