Turkologist Says Obama Not To Utter The Word "Genocide" This Year As

TURKOLOGIST SAYS OBAMA NOT TO UTTER THE WORD “GENOCIDE” THIS YEAR AS WELL

ARMENPRESS
MARCH 27, 2012
YEREVAN

YEREVAN, MARCH 27, ARMENPRESS. No rapprochement in Armenian-Turkish
relations is expected in near future, Turkologist Hakob Chakryan
told reporters on Tuesday. “For doing anything Turkey must wait for
the speech of U.S. President Barack Obama on April 24. Taking into
consideration the situation in the world and particularly developments
over Syria, I do not think the international community will interfere
in the issue,” the Turkologist said. According to him, Obama will
not utter the word genocide this year as well. In Syria”s issue the
cooperation between Turkey and the United States will be continuative.

Expert of “Noravank” scientific-educational foundation Aristakes
Simavoryan said Turkey is trying to display a new status of a state.

“It is more connected with Davutoglu. He is quite clever man who
is too preoccupied with himself,” the expert said. In his opinion,
many failures of Turkey are connected with making hasty decisions.

Simavoryan expressed conviction that Turkish foreign minister not only
wants to see Turkey as leading country in the region but a super power.

Artsakh – One Of The Most Interesting And Picturesque Places Of The

ARTSAKH – ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING AND PICTURESQUE PLACES OF THE WORLD

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
2012-03-26 18:43

According to the data of the NKR MFA Consular Service, in 2011, the
number of foreign citizens visiting the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in
2011 amounted to 11,362 showing an increase of more than 3000 tourists
as compared with the previous year.

The geography of the tourists is quite broad and it continues expanding
every year. In 2011, citizens of the Russian Federation, the USA,
France, Iran, Canada, Germany and the Ukraine, Malaysia, Bangladesh,
Cambodia, Gabon, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, SAR, Cuba, Singapore, Hong Kong,
Indonesia and other countries visited the NKR.

The fact that the country is more often included in the ratings of
the most attractive tourist countries of the world testifies to the
increasing interest of the foreigners to Nagorno Karabakh.

Arriving in Artsakh, the guests mostly visit the monastery complexes of
Gandzasar (XIII century), Amaras (IV century), Dadivank (IV century),
the excavations’ zone of the ancient town of Tigranakert (I century
BC), the ancient Azokh cave, a great number of antique Armenian
fortresses etc.

Tourists visiting Artsakh are not only motivated by the historical
monuments, virgin nature, and sound ecology but also by friendliness,
good will and hospitality of the Artsakh people and original Karabakhi
kitchen.

All this is reflected in the film Karabakh: a hidden treasure.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ub1y2T30qo

Yerevan State Medical University Student Attempts To Commit Suicide

YEREVAN STATE MEDICAL UNIVERSITY STUDENT ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT SUICIDE – NEWSPAPER

news.am
March 27, 2012 | 08:43

YEREVAN. – A second year dentistry student at Yerevan State Medical
University tried to end her life, on Monday, by cutting her veins,
Zhoghovurd daily writes, referring to its well-informed sources.

“Our information was also corroborated by the University’s Rector
Derenik Dumanyan, who added that the girl had gone to the University’s
bathroom and cut her veins for yet unknown reasons. Subsequently,
she was taken to the University Hospital.

Even though the Police assured Zhoghovurd that they have not recorded
such incident, Dumanyan informed that they had called the police. And
we learned from the Hospital that the girl is now in satisfactory
condition,” Zhoghovurd writes.

Turkey’s Democratic Dilemma

Turkey’s Democratic Dilemma

Letter from Istanbul

By Piotr Zalewski
March 21, 2012

Journalists and activists rally for press freedom in Ankara, March 19,
2011 (Umit Bektas / Courtesy Reuters)

During a town hall meeting organized as part of Barack Obama’s 2009
visit to Istanbul, a Turkish student expressed his disappointment with
the president’s inability to implement substantial changes to U.S.
foreign policy. `Moving the ship of state is a slow process,’ Obama
explained. Not so in Turkey. Since the spring of 2011, Ankara has
performed a remarkable volte-face. A country that engaged and appeased
Middle East dictators for the better half of the past decade now urges
them to undertake democratic reforms — or risk regime change. There
is just one problem: If Turkey is serious about exporting democracy,
it will have to do a much better job of nourishing its own.

Turkey’s renewed focus on the Middle East began in the 1990s but hit
full swing with the election of the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) in 2002. Trade with the region boomed, visa restrictions with
neighboring countries disappeared, and feel-good bilateral visits
abounded. (By his own account, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
DavutoÄ?lu, billed as the architect of Turkey’s renewed engagement with
the Middle East, visited Damascus more than 60 times in the past eight
years. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an, meanwhile, vacationed in
Turkey with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his family.) Things
were going so well that a 2010 free-trade agreement among Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey immediately bred talk of a Turkish-led
Middle East union.

Doing business with authoritarian regimes always involved a trade-off,
however: Pushing economic interdependence, AKP officials foreswore any
talk of meddling in their neighbors’ internal affairs. In the interest
of stability and expanding commercial links, Turkey repeatedly looked
the other way in the face of authoritarianism and human rights
violations. Ankara downplayed the genocide in Sudan, made no mention
of Syria’s dismal human rights record, and ignored the violence that
followed the 2009 presidential election in Iran. Where most Western
governments at least paid lip service to the need for democratic
change in the region, Turkey gave precious few hints that it was
uncomfortable with the status quo. ErdoÄ?an himself saw nothing wrong
with accepting a human rights award from the Libyan dictator Muammar
al-Qaddafi in late 2010.

But the Arab Spring left this approach in tatters. Suddenly, the AKP
government awoke to find that what it had valued most — stability in
its neighborhood — could no longer be served by pampering the
region’s autocrats. What the Turks (and everyone else) realized was
that the Arab world was bound to go up in flames without fundamental
reforms. Assad and Qaddafi were hardly placed to deliver them. Another
realization soon followed: `Zero problems with neighbors,’ the guiding
principle of the AKP’s foreign policy, may have reaped economic gains,
but it was not so useful at effecting political change.

The deterioration of Turkey’s once-prized relationship with Syria, in
particular, laid bare the limits of Ankara’s previous approach.
ErdoÄ?an and DavutoÄ?lu had expected their friendship with Assad to
translate into political leverage. It did not. As Syrian tanks rolled
onto the streets of Hama, Turkish pleas for an end to the violence
went largely ignored. ErdoÄ?an should have learned his lesson: The same
scene had played out in Libya only months earlier. ErdoÄ?an had been
convinced that he had Qaddafi’s ear, only to be rebuffed by the Libyan
strongman.

Lately, AKP policymakers and pro-government media have been struggling
to rewrite the narrative of the past few years, insisting that Turkey
had been on the side of democratic change all along. In his February
2011 speech calling for former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to
step down, ErdoÄ?an boldly proclaimed that `not only in Turkey but
everywhere in the world, the [AKP] has shown no fear or hesitation in
siding with the oppressed and the victim. It has always taken a
position against the status quo.’ ErdoÄ?an’s speech not only marked an
attempt to revise history; it also heralded what has since become a
genuine overhaul of Ankara’s foreign policy. One year later, `zero
problems’ is out; in is a policy that is more assertive, willing to
take sides, and ready to take risks.

Today, Turkey no longer hesitates to play hardball with its neighbors.
During a September 2011 trip to Cairo, ErdoÄ?an disappointed many of
his admirers in the Muslim Brotherhood by publicly praising the
virtues of secular rule. Having belatedly endorsed outside
intervention in Libya, he warned earlier this year that the situation
in Syria is `heading toward a religious, sectarian, and racial civil
war’ that `must be stopped.’ In late January, the Turkish leader
scolded Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for stoking sectarian
conflicts. Two weeks later, Bülent Arınç, Turkey’s deputy prime
minister, lambasted Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon for remaining silent in
the face of the bloodshed in Syria. `If they do not raise their
voices,’ he said, `then they have to remove the word `Islam’ from
their names.’

Particularly with regard to Syria, Ankara’s new posture has involved
more than just words. Turkey, which shares a 550-mile border with
Syria to its south, has made it clear that its doors are `open to all
Syrians who want to flee from oppression,’ as DavutoÄ?lu put it last
month. Refugee camps inside Turkey are already home to over 16,000
Syrians, with many more expected to arrive in the coming weeks. Ankara
has provided a haven not only for refugees but for scores of Syrian
activists and leaders of the rebel Free Syrian Army. Earlier this
month, government officials said Turkey was weighing the possibility
of arming the rebels, setting up humanitarian corridors in Syria, and
even deploying troops.

Even if it implies a commitment to a more principled foreign policy,
Turkey’s decision to throw its lot with the Arab revolutionaries also
reflects the realpolitik of the `zero problems’ era. Without a doubt,
the images of bloodied protesters in Cairo, Homs, and Tripoli have
galvanized Turks, both on the street and in the government, to make
the case that dictators who turn their guns on their own people have
no right to govern. Whenever possible, however, ErdoÄ?an’s government
has done all it can to hitch its newfound enthusiasm for democracy to
Turkish interests. After all, when it came to Libya, with $15 billion
worth of Turkish contracts on the line, Ankara initially opposed
outside intervention. When it shifted course, dispatching five navy
ships and a submarine to help enforce the arms embargo against
Qaddafi, evacuating and treating wounded fighters from Benghazi, and
committing $300 million to Libya’s National Transitional Council,
Turkey made sure to capitalize on its aid. By the time of ErdoÄ?an’s
triumphant visit to Libya in September 2011, a month after the rebels’
capture of Tripoli, Turkish companies were in pole position in the
race for new contracts — and had received assurances that old ones
would be respected.

If Turkey’s support for regime change in Libya was anchored to
economic interests, then its support for the Syrian opposition is more
bound to geopolitical ones. Having calculated that Assad’s days are
numbered, Turkey wants to reap strategic dividends should the
opposition take power. When the time comes to draw up a post-Assad
Syria — and to accommodate the aspirations of the country’s Kurdish
minority in particular — ErdoÄ?an will be waiting on the doorstep.

But there is a catch. All of this pushing for democratic change will
ultimately ring hollow so long as Turkey’s own democracy continues to
show signs of rot. Turkey’s reform process, once propelled by the
promise of EU accession, has sputtered. The Kurdish conflict, largely
dormant just a few years ago, has once again flared up, largely
because of the AKP’s failure to deliver on a highly touted `Kurdish
initiative,’ which would have granted the community some measure of
local autonomy and new cultural rights. And even with the March 12
release of two reporters, Ahmet Å?ık and Nedim Å?ener, Turkey continues
to have more journalists in jail than any other country in the world,
according to the Turkish Journalists Union. In this year’s Press
Freedom Index, the country placed 148th worldwide, down from 102nd in
2008 and behind the likes of Zimbabwe, Russia, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Beset by internal divisions and competing
loyalties, the justice system is a growing black hole. In the last
three months alone, prosecutors tried to launch an investigation
targeting the leader of the parliamentary opposition, subpoenaed the
head of the national intelligence agency in a terror probe, and had a
former military chief arrested on conspiracy charges, raising fears
that parts of the judiciary have become tools in the hands of rival
political and ideological forces.

Unless Turkey gets its house in order, its ability to influence
regional politics will suffer. For one, a more authoritarian Turkey
would put itself at odds with the West and bury its already
diminishing chances for EU membership, making it a much less
attractive partner, politically and economically, to its neighbors.
The contradiction between Turkey’s new foreign policy posture and the
state of its democracy at home may also engender backlash. In January,
after ErdoÄ?an skewered Iraq, Maliki openly accused the Turks of
hypocrisy. `If it is acceptable to talk about our judicial authority,’
Maliki said, `then we can talk about theirs, and if they talk about
our disputes, we can talk about theirs.’

At the same time, Turkey’s flirtation with authoritarianism threatens
to erode international confidence in the viability of democracy in the
Muslim world. For better or worse, the notion of a `Turkish model’ —
shorthand for the successful marriage of democracy and political Islam
— has become an indispensable reference point for supporters of
systemic change in the Middle East. It is no secret that the West’s
faith in the course of the Arab revolts has already been tested.
Should Turkey continue to backslide away from democracy, it will be
dented further.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/turkeys-democratic-dilemma?page=show

Azerbaijan has always tried to change Minsk Group Format

Azerbaijan has always tried to change Minsk Group Format

Saturday,
March 24

`Baku uses its EU supporters to change the format of the NKR conflict
settlement in order to replace Franc with EU,’ said Alexander Manasyan
today to the journalists.

Manasyan noticed that the solution of the Karabakh issue does not
depend on its format.

According to him Azerbaijan tries to find a corresponding format in
order to solve the Karabakh issue within its interests.

The political scientist says that the mediators are not allowed to
force to agree with this or that solution and it is supposed that the
Minsk Group mediators should be objective; however the speaker says
that it is impossible to find objective mediators today.

According to A. Manasaryan the NKR conflict solution depends on the
fact whether the mediators will be able to find solutions that will
consider the prehistory of the NKR conflict and its truthfulness.

Manasaryan also noticed that the Azerbaijani propaganda machine tries
to do everything to force out the NKR from the negotiation process.
They, however, do not succeed as the mediators visit Stepanakert thus
showing that the NKR is included in negotiations.

TODAY, 15:22

Aysor.am

BAKU: Establishment of diplomatic relations with Tuvalu by Armenia c

Trend, Azerbaijan
March 24 2012

Azerbaijani ruling party: Establishment of diplomatic relations with
Tuvalu by Armenia causes only laughter

Azerbaijan, Baku, March 24 / Trend, I.Isabalayeva /

Establishment of diplomatic relations with a small island state in the
Pacific Ocean for official recognition of the so-called
“Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” causes only laughter, MP from the ruling
party New Azerbaijan Party, Aydin Mirzazade told Trend on Saturday.

He said Tuvalu is an island, which is ready to recognize any state,
even non-existent country for a small amount of money.

“Apparently, Tuvalu’s budget is replenished with such political
adventures. This state openly stated about recognition of the
unrecognized regimes of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Now Armenia tries
to go down the same path. I believe that by this Armenia has caused
even greater blow to its authority,” Mirzazade said.

In the international arena Armenia is known as a frivolous country,
not fulfilling international legal norms and creating hotbed of
tension in the South Caucasus. Now its desire for the island state to
recognize “sham” regime for money, will further heighten Armenia’s
negative image, Mirzazade said.

He said according to a statement made by the OSCE Minsk Group
co-chairs from Russia and the United States, the parties are
substantially approximate to solving the problem. The statement
reflects the serious moments, such as the withdrawal of Armenian
troops from the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and determination of its
status in the next phase. Along with this, it should be taken into
account that economic situation in Armenia is quite heavy, wages are
low in the country, there are no jobs, and from an economic point of
view, today Armenia becomes a dead zone.

“In this case, spending certain funds for political adventure causes
laughter. This amount could be successfully spent for addressing
social problems of any Armenian region’s population,” Mirzazade said.

He said most of Armenia’s budget consists of grants received from
abroad. Therefore, they easily spend unearned money to such issues.

According to Mirzazade, such steps have no prospect and the
international community can not accept it.

The conflict between the two South Caucasus countries began in 1988
when Armenia made territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Armenian
armed forces have occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijan since 1992,
including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and 7 surrounding districts.

Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994. The
co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group – Russia, France, and the U.S. – are
currently holding the peace negotiations.

Armenia has not yet implemented the U.N. Security Council’s four
resolutions on the liberation of the Nagorno-Karabakh and the
surrounding regions.

Iran unrelated to Yerevan blast, public figure says

Fars News Agency . Iran
March 23 2012

Iran unrelated to Yerevan blast, public figure says

The managing-director of Iran-Armenia Friendship Association, Mirqasem
Mo’meni, has said that “the explosion in a restaurant in Yerevan had
nothing to do with Iran” and “it happened due to a family disagreement
between the owner of the restaurant and the attacker”, Fars reported
on 23 March.

Mo’meni said that nine Iranians were only slightly injured in the
blast and that all of them were treated at an outpatient clinic, the
agency said.

[translated from Persian]

The View from Zabel Yesayan’s The Gardens of Silihdar, Part II

ianyan magazine
March 24 2012

The View from Zabel Yesayan’s The Gardens of Silihdar, Part II
Features – By Jennifer Manoukian

Yesayan was drawn to the freedom that France represented. By living in
Paris, she could escape many of the social conventions that she had
resisted, especially the restrictions placed on women in the larger
social context. According to Anne Paolucci in her afterword to Zabel
Assadour’s play `The Bride,’ the lives of many Armenian women in the
late Ottoman Empire could be summarized in this way:

In Anatolia and Constantinople, as in other parts of the world at that
time, women were expected to live within a rigorously limited
environment; a house- and family-oriented structure where marriage and
children were the only respectable and desirable ends. Women were
expected to be modest, retiring, subdued in dress, speech and manners
generally. Their voice carried no authority; their accomplishments
were the efficient handling of servants, embroidery, sewing and
carefully restricted public appearances in which they were expected to
follow certain rules of social behavior.

Although in her autobiography Yesayan comments on her father’s
open-mindedness and encouragement of her literary aspirations, in her
daily interactions she was nevertheless confronted with the prejudices
of the larger community to which she belonged, but in which she felt
intellectually stifled:

`Never did women, girls or even children allow themselves to act
spontaneously. Everything was formal and well measured; there was what
was done and there was what wasn’t done.’

Intently determined to lead her life differently, Yesayan was prepared
to defend herself against any and all social restrictions that she
encountered:

…I was used to struggling against every obstacle as soon as it
presented itself, but the liberalism of my father was not enough to
divert my path from all the barriers that the backward-minded
bourgeoisie imposed. Life taught me that I have to put up a fierce and
perpetual fight.

In the excerpt above, she represents her community as an adversary
with whom she would always be in conflict. With this outlook, leaving
for France allowed Yesayan to avoid a struggle by settling in a
country with a long tradition of women writers to hone her craft.

The conditions for women writers in France at the time of Yesayan’s
arrival were certainly an improvement over those in the Ottoman
Empire. In France, there had been many well-respected women writers
throughout the nineteenth century, which made women’s participation in
literary life much less of a rarity than in Constantinople.

According to the 1901 French census, 36.5 percent of French women
lived an `active’ life – in other words, they played a role in the
public sphere. Women writers composed a large portion of this
percentage since, women began to publish their works in larger
numbers. In 1894, writer Octave Uzanne estimated that there were
approximately 2,133 women actively writing and publishing in Paris. In
1907, the number of women writers increased to over 5,000 – their work
representing 20 percent of the total literary production in Paris.

This fertile period for women writers in France suited Yesayan’s
ambitions remarkably well, especially coming from a place where the
number of published women writers could be counted on two hands.
Although there were certainly restrictions placed on women in
France – for example, there was a law that forbade women from publishing
their work without written consent from their husbands – the crucial
difference between the two groups was that French women published
despite these restrictions, whereas the majority of Armenian women did
not.

There are many socio-cultural reasons for the scarcity of writing by
Armenian women, including the absence of widely accessible schools
outside urban centers and the sheer novelty of the modern literary
tradition; but Yesayan, armed with an education that rivaled many of
her male counterparts, was ideally situated to reverse this trend
among Armenian women.

Being far from Constantinople in her late adolescence also allowed
Yesayan to escape the social convention that would have most directly
prevented her from leading the independent life of a writer that she
had envisioned: marriage. For young Armenian women, marriage was the
path their lives were naturally expected to take. Since Armenian
society did not actively encourage women’s participation in the public
sphere, marriage was a way for families to ensure that their daughters
would be supported financially.

In her autobiography, Yesayan presents her readers with portraits of
various women emotionally devastated by miserable marriages. With a
grandmother who `constantly pregnant, cursed her husband and her fate’
and an aunt who `patiently endured the drunkenness and disdainful
tyranny of her husband,’ the young writer bore witness early in her
life to the plight of these women and began to view the institution of
marriage with a critical eye.

In Armenian villages, girls were normally married between the ages of
14 and 18 and boys between 16 and 21; oral histories tell us that the
average marriage age for Armenians in urban areas like Constantinople
was higher. Among Turks living in the Ottoman capital at the end of
the nineteenth century, the average marriage age was relatively high:
20 years old for women and 30 years old for men. More research is
needed to determine if this trend also characterizes marriage customs
for Armenians in Constantinople.

Despite implicit critiques, Yesayan does not categorically reject
marriage, but implies that women should not willingly accept a
convention that validates abuse and teaches them to quietly accept
mistreatment, if they find themselves in this situation.

In the series of unhappy marriages that she sees as a child, female
servility in the face of male disregard is a quality that particularly
disturbs her. Spending time with a friend of the family, Yesayan sadly
notes the way in which the wife devotes all of her time and energy to
please her indifferent husband: `When he was ready to leave, his wife
scurried behind him and, with her husband’s umbrella in hand, waited
for him to take off his slippers and put on his shoes.’

This denigrating daily ritual symbolizes the voluntary oppression that
women of her social milieu unnecessarily endured.

However, a similar fate awaited French women during the same period;
as in the Ottoman Empire, marriage in France was understood as a
financial arrangement between two families. Love between spouses – an
idea that Yesayan defended – was rare in both societies. Yet it is
important to note that the average marriage age for French women was
much higher than for Armenian women: according to the 1881 census, 60
percent of women were unmarried at the age of 25. The French society
that welcomed Yesayan was not free of its own problems regarding
marriage, but her years in Paris and her status as a foreigner enabled
her to focus exclusively on her studies and on her writing without
being bombarded by social pressures.

Throughout her autobiography, it is clear that Yesayan did not hold
most women in very high regard, describing them, almost universally,
with an extraordinarily scornful tone. She creates an explicit
dichotomy between men and women, showing men as noble and enlightened
and women as simple-minded and frivolous.

In general, men were liberal minded and loyal to the ideas of the
French Revolution. These ideas formed the basis of their moral
principles. Women, on the other hand, were conservative and
traditional, loyal to aggressive virtues that succeeded, as my father
said, in tormenting not only other people but themselves too.

In a curious, but not entirely surprising way, she reveals in this
passage that she does not readily identify with her gender, distancing
herself from other women and dismissing them as uninformed and
benighted. Her description illustrates that she considers herself an
exception to the norm – viewing other women critically and
condescendingly for incarnating, rather than defying, the very
stereotypes used to justify their inferiority. Even as a young girl,
Yesayan mocked the concerns of these women, considered them mindless
and inconsequential:

For these people, Parisian fashion dominated and they closely
followed – or at least they thought they did – the rules that they learned
from the special fashion magazines. And once the conversation moved to
this topic, all the women, especially the very young girls, spoke
about it with passion

During Yesayan’s childhood, the Ottoman Empire and, by extension, the
Armenian community were experiencing dramatic social, political and
cultural change; yet, despite these transformations, she notes that
the women around her were uninterested and unaware. The fact that the
women that she knew had no desire to educate themselves on these
issues further alienated the burgeoning young writer from women in her
own community.

For her, these women were not functioning in reality. Perhaps this
artificial reality was deliberately constructed to repress the despair
in their marriages or the thought of their thwarted ambitions, but,
from a very young age, Yesayan vowed to live in a world that was not
always pleasant or painless, but which was, first and foremost, real.

Yesayan developed this consciousness due in part to a jarring
experience in her childhood. As a child, she spent time with a family
friend named Santoukht. Once day, Santoukht took Yesayan to a room
where she kept her dolls: dolls that she treated like real
children – speaking to them, scolding them, tending to them. This
imaginary world inhabited by this woman profoundly disturbed the young
writer and produced an immediate understanding of the consequences of
living in an artificially constructed world.

This world was quite possibly the result of intellectual inactivity
and social marginalization – a room of her own in a society where women
were expected to sacrifice everything for their families to the point
of losing their own identities. In her article on `The Gardens of
Silihdar,’ Seta Kapoïan describes Santoukht’s room as a false escape
because while she resists reality, she is still dependent on the
environment around her, particularly on her indifferent husband, and
therefore must always be conscious of what exists outside it.

The relegation of women to the private sphere where their aspirations
was not respected or cultivated undoubtedly contributed to this
situation, but Yesayan, who had a chance at an education and had
encouragement within her family to pursue her ambitions, recognized
the danger of losing herself in the imaginary and was determined not
to ensnare herself in this world.

This essay is part of a series written in honor of International
Women’s Day and Month. Part I can be found here.

Jennifer Manoukian is a recent graduate of Rutgers University where
she received her B.A. in Middle Eastern Studies and French. Her
interests lie in Western Armenian literature and issues of identity
and cultural production in the Armenian diaspora. She also enjoys
translating and has had her translations of writer Zabel Yesayan
featured in Ararat Magazine. She can be reached at
[email protected]

http://www.ianyanmag.com/2012/03/24/the-view-from-zabel-yesayan%E2%80%99s-the-gardens-of-silihdar-part-ii/

OSCE MG is useless – expert

OSCE MG is useless – expert

news.am
March 24, 2012 | 22:44

OSCE Minsk Group on Karabakh conflict settlement is a unique case when
Russia, the USA and France want the same thing. Alas, this is the only
uniqueness about it, political analyst Alexander Khramchikhin told
Armenian News-NEWS.am.

Speaking about the results the OSCE MG has achieved during this past
20 years, Khramchkhin stated that the fact that no war broke out for
settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict might be prescribed to the
efforts of that structure but other than that it has done nothing.

According to the political scientists, delaying the war was
hypothetically the only goal OSCE has reached so far.

`Yes, delaying, because the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not to be
settled with peace. In this regard OSCE MG is useless. War will break
out,’ Alexander Khramchikhin concluded.

To note, OSCE MG was created in March 24, 1992, 20 years ago.

Armenia, the USA, Russia, France, Germany, Belarus, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Sweden, Azerbaijan and Turkey participated in the
creation of the structure. The aim of the structure became to reach a
ceasefire and to start political negotiations in order to find a final
status for Nagorno-Karabakh. Belarus offered its capital as a place of
final negotiations and thus the name Minsk Group was born.

Since then OSCE MG is the mediator of the Karabakh conflict settlement.

Sumgait pogroms behind Armenia’s non participation in Eurovision

Expert: Sumgait pogroms behind Armenia’s non participation in Eurovision

March 24, 2012 – 15:04 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – Armenian expert Alexander Manasyan noted the
bleeding wound of Sumgait and Baku pogroms as the key reason behind
Armenia’s refusal to participate in 2012 Eurovision song contest, and
not the insignificant excuses or safety requirements.

`I don’t’ understand why representatives of the show-business and mass
media don’t voice the actual reason of non-participation in the
contest. We should remind the world of the atrocities committed
against Armenians in Azerbaijan, until the whole world recognizes the
fact,’ Mr. Manasyan said.

On February 24, Armenian singers refused to participate in Baku-hosted
Eurovision 2012 song contest, following the February 23 death of an
Armenian soldier in Azeri sniper attack. On March 7, Armenian Public
Television officially informed the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)
of Armenia’s withdrawal from the contest.

42 countries will take part in the contest, each semi-final featuring
18 participants. The final will be held on May 26.