Congressional Documents and Publications
December 5, 2012
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia Hearing
“Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and the Surrounding Region.”;
Testimony by Michael Rubin, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
An Iranian attempt to assassinate Israeli diplomats in Georgia last
February and a subsequent plot to target Americans in Azerbaijan
demonstrate the reality of the Islamic Republic’s terror sponsorship
and reach. This should not surprise. The Islamic Revolution was about
ideology. Infusing the speeches of revolutionary leader Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini and written into the founding statute of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is the call to export revolution. In
recent years, senior Iranian officials have reinforced the notion that
the Islamic Republic cannot limit itself to soft power strategies as
it tries to influence neighbors. For a number of reasons, both
strategic and historical, the Caucasus is front-and-center in the
Islamic Republic’s attempts to expand Revolutionary Guards operations.
Iranians proudly trace their country’s lineage back to the Persian
Empire, yet most Iranians feel history has been unkind. In the last
two centuries – a flash in the pan to the Islamic notion of history –
Iran has lost half its territory. The 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay
confirmed the loss of what today are Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia
to the Russian Empire. From an Iranian perspective, these collectively
constituted not a peripheral province but rather the second most
important region, one over which the crown prince would always rule as
governor. This does not mean that the Iranians seek to reacquire lost
territory; they do, however, see it as their near abroad and believe
they a natural right to dominate the Caucasus economically,
politically, and diplomatically.
Iranian Strategy and Soft-Power
Export of Revolution remains a core Iranian goal. In 2008, former
President Mohammad Khatami suggested that Khomeini’s push to expand
the Islamic Revolution beyond Iran’s borders was more symbolic than
real, and geared more to building Iran up as an example to emulate
rather than a call for subversion abroad. “What did the Imam want, and
what was his purpose of exporting the revolution? Did he wish us to
export revolution by means of gunpowder or groups sabotaging other
countries?” Khatami asked rhetorically, before declaring that Khomeini
“meant to establish a role model here, one in which people should see
that in this society, the economy, science, and dignity of man are
respected…. n1
Iranian authorities were furious. Not only had Khatami tacitly
acknowledged that the regime sanctioned Iranian terror support, but he
also diluted a pillar of the revolution. Seventy-seven members of
parliament demanded the Intelligence Ministry punish Khatami for his
comments. n2 Lest anyone accept Khatami’s revisionism, then-Judiciary
Chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi reinforced Tehran’s
commitment to export revolution. Speaking to the armed forces, he
declared the IRGC to be “the hope of Islamic national and Islamic
liberation movements.” n3 The Iranian government has even been so bold
as to include a line-item for “resistance” in its budget. n4
This does not mean that the Supreme Leader and the IRGC will not
sometimes check the drive to export revolution. Iranian officials, for
example, give Islamists in both Chechnya and Dagestan a wide berth so
as to avoid antagonizing Moscow, whose support Tehran values for its
nuclear program. Still, the State Department should not assume that
pragmatism means Iran’s leadership is open to compromise for peace.
For the Islamic Republic’s ideologues, pragmatism involves temporarily
subordinating certain ideological goals to pursue others. Rather than
identify formulas for peace, the regime uses pragmatism to find new
and creative ways to undermine enemies.
While journalists focus on headlines involving violence and terrorism,
the Iranian strategy is more sophisticated, especially in its use of
soft-power. Too often, American policymakers misconstrue soft-power.
When Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, Jr., coined the term, he did not
suggest soft power should be exclusive of hard power. The Islamic
Republic provides a useful example of how adversaries can combine hard
and soft power strategies.
Beyond head-grabbing bombings and assassination plots, the Islamic
Republic seeks to expand its reach through education and with
charities. Iran provides educational scholarships in order to
indoctrinate clergy in surrounding states and to radicalize the next
generation. Charities not only serve as a mechanism to win hearts and
minds, but the IRGC will also often leverage Iranian aid organizations
to support terror operations.
Afghanistan provides a useful example to demonstrate how Iranians
leverage education. In Kabul, Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, a figure
beholden to Tehran because his religious credentials are not
recognized in Najaf, founded Khatam al-Anbia University. Its
professors are trained in Iran, Iranian officials set its curriculum,
and regime-approved publishers supply its library. In 2010, the budget
for that single Iranian-backed university was greater than the Afghan
government’s entire higher education budget. While the Armenian
government is more opaque, the Iranian government operates a branch of
the Islam Azad University in Armenia and may subsidize other programs.
Subverting Azerbaijan
Within the Caucasus, the Islamic Republic concentrates its subversion
efforts at Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is one of only three countries
beyond Iran–Bahrain and Iraq being the others–which is majority
Twelver Shi’ite. Because these countries’ success challenges the claim
that the Islamic Republic’s rule is divinely-inspired, Tehran subverts
them.
Azerbaijani success is especially threatening to the Islamic Republic
of Iran because of the links between the two peoples. Millions of
Azeris reside in Iran–more than twice as many as live in independent
Azerbaijan. Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, is ethnically Azeri.
Baku’s rejection of religious populism and its mosque-state separation
contrast sharply with Iran’s theocracy. The fact that Azerbaijanis
enjoy a greater life expectancy than Iranians, are more literate, and,
because of recent sanctions on Iran, enjoy greater purchasing power
embarrasses the Iranian clergy. It is hard for the Supreme Leader to
claim that he presides over a near perfect Islamic system as the
deputy of the messiah on earth when secular governments perform
better.
Beyond outright terrorism, such as the recent alleged Iranian plot to
attack the Eurovision finals in Azerbaijan, n5 the Islamic Republic
has employed a number of strategies to undercut Azerbaijan’s
pro-Western and secular orientation. Even prior to Azerbaijan’s
independence from the Soviet Union, Iranian missionaries operated in
rural Azerbaijan. Iranian authorities helped support the fiercely
anti-American Islamic Party of Azerbaijan in the early years of
Azerbaijani independence but, after that group–true to the Hezbollah
model so often employed by Iranian proxies–began sponsoring a
militia, Azerbaijani authorities cracked down, arresting party leaders
and banning Iranian broadcasting from Azerbaijani territory. n6
The Iranians may have been down, but not out. To reverse the old
saying, if they could not bring Muhammad to the mountain, they instead
would bring the mountain to Muhammad. Instead of sending missionaries
to Azerbaijan, they arranged scholarships to bring young Azerbaijani
students to Qom where they could indoctrinate them into the Iranian
regime’s interpretations of Shi’ite Islam. This has been a tactic
which has paid long-term dividends to the Islamic Republic. Because
Saddam Hussein made it so difficult for foreign students to study in
Najaf in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, a generation of Bahraini
clerics traveled to Qom for study. Many of these same clerics today
are at the forefront of the Bahraini Shi’ite uprising against the
Bahraini royal family.
At the height of the Armenia-Azerbaijan war over Nagorno-Karabakh,
Iranian authorities sought to exploit and radicalize many Azerbaijani
refugees seeking refuge in Iran. Perhaps because training clerics and
indoctrinating refugees pays only long-term dividends, Tehran has
turned to other strategies to undercut Azerbaijani stability; Azeri
authorities accuse Iran of promoting separatist ambition among
Azerbaijan’s Talysh minority. Iranian academics have, for example,
sponsored an International Talysh Association to support “oppressed”
Azerbaijani Talysh. n7
Iranian authorities also utilize charities to expand their influence.
Of myriad Iranian charities, the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC)
is the regime’s chief aid organization abroad. With assets supplied by
the Supreme Leader, the Committee sponsors programs similar to those
conducted by Western NGOs for orphans, the disabled, and the elderly,
and it also provides food aid, blankets, fuel, sponsors medical
clinics, and offers interest-free loans. n8 It also spreads influence
in a way few Western organizations could, sponsoring mass weddings for
those for whom the price of weddings would otherwise put marriage out
of reach. n9
While IKRC’s activities might look benign, its track record is more
sinister. In 1997, its office provided cover for surveillance against
the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan. n10 In 2010, the U.S. Treasury
Department designated the IKRC branch in Lebanon to be a terrorist
entity for its aid and assistance to Hezbollah. n11 With both the IRGC
and IKRC funded from the same trough, it is likely that IKRC offices
in Azerbaijan, n12 not only in Baku but also in provincial towns like
Lankaran, Ganja, and Goychay, may also provide cover for IRGC
operations.
The United States can take solace in the fact that Azerbaijan remains
a steady ally. While fears of Iranian encroachment should not derail
U.S. pressure to support democratization and respect for human rights
in Azerbaijan, U.S. officials should also recognize that the Islamic
Republic will seek to hijack legitimate protest, as it does in
Bahrain. Nevertheless, Iranian penetration of Azerbaijan remains
unfulfilled, largely because of Baku’s recognition of the Iranian
threat and also because Iran’s oil dispute with Azerbaijan in the
Caspian Sea remains a major irritant in bilateral relations. The
Azerbaijani people remain largely pro-Western and unwilling to accept
Iranian domination.
Is Armenia is the weak link?
The same cannot be said for Armenia. Ties between Iran and Armenia run
deep, and predate Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Armenians form the bulk
of Iran’s sizeable Christian community. While the Islamic Republic
will broker no Sunni mosque in Tehran, an Armenian cathedral sits in
the heart of the city. The southern Isfahan neighborhood of Julfa is a
veritable “little Armenia” with Armenian churches and schools dotting
roads and alleys. Even Iranian soldiers, when they fancy a drink
stronger than the local Coca-Cola knock-off, will head into Armenian
pizzerias for some homemade vodka. Anti-Turkish posters and banners
are a fixture of many Armenian neighborhoods, in Isfahan and
elsewhere. In 2011, Armenian television purchased Iranian soap operas
from Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. n13
There is nothing necessarily wrong with cultural links between Iran
and Armenia. The problem for the United States is that Armenia
provides the central pivot for a Russia-Iran Axis which increasingly
undermines both U.S. interests and national security. In 2007, Yerevan
State University awarded Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad its
gold medal. “Armenia and Iran will be relatives eternally,”
Ahmadinejad declared upon receiving his honorary doctorate. n14
In 2008, U.S. diplomats concluded that Armenia shipped Iran weaponry,
which the Islamic Republic used to kill Americans. John D. Negroponte,
then deputy secretary of state at, expressed his “deep concerns about
Armenia’s transfer of arms to Iran which resulted in the death and
injury of U.S. soldiers in Iraq” to Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan.
n15
Whereas the Armenian government has long sought to keep its banking
cooperation with Iran outside the limelight, Armenia’s warm embrace of
Iran is readily apparent. Indeed, sanctioned Iranian banks operate in
Yerevan. n16 Other Iranian businesses continue to dot the Armenian
capital. While Iranians can get visas on demand upon arrival in
Armenia, the Iranian Foreign Minister now pressures his Armenian
counterpart to allow completely visa-free travel for Iranians into
Armenia. This could greatly facilitate Iranian efforts target Western
interests not only in Armenia, but also in neighboring Georgia. In
October 2011, a member of Armenia’s Nuclear Energy Organization
suggested that Iran had enticed several Armenian nuclear scientists to
work in Iran’s nuclear program. n17
While the Armenian-American community is vibrant, it is unfortunate
that organizations representing the Armenian Diaspora in the United
States and the congressmen who partner with them do not do more to
encourage change in the Armenian government’s behavior. They need not
drop their advocacy for recognition of the Armenian genocide but by
ignoring Armenia’s pro-Iranian orientation, the Armenian-American
community squanders an opportunity to build a true strategic
partnership between Washington and Yerevan.
Could Georgia and Turkey Shift into Tehran’s Camp?
The strategic situation has never been more perilous. The victory of
Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream party in October 2012 elections
threatens to radically reorient the Republic of Georgia which, under
President Mikheil Saakashvili has been reliably pro-Western. While
Western press has focused on the antipathy between Saakashvili and the
Kremlin, a reorientation of Georgia’s relationship with Iran might
accompany its shift to Moscow. It is conceivable that Tbilisi could
become in the near future an uninviting and perhaps even dangerous
city for Western interests.
Georgia is not the only country in play. While there remains sectarian
tension between Turkey and Iran, it would be a mistake for American
policymakers to assume Turkey will cooperate with the West regarding
Iran. To dismiss Turkish outreach to Iran–such as Turkey’s recent
gold for gas scheme–as simply economic opportunism misses the point.
Likewise, the dispute between Turkey and Iran over the situation in
Syria is temporary. Just three years ago, Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan was hosting joint cabinet meetings with Syria, and
inviting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to vacation with him on the
Turkish Mediterranean coast.
Today, Turkey and Iran share many interests: They are both supporters
not only of Hamas, but also of its most militant faction, and both
embrace increasingly extreme rhetoric toward Israel. Turkish and
Iranian leaders coordinate closely on international efforts to
restrict free speech to prevent criticism of Islam. Turkey is almost
alone in joining Latin America’s increasingly anti-American alliance
of Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia in providing Iranians
visa-free entry. The United States should not count on Turkey’s
intelligence service to monitor and report upon Iranian operatives
traversing Turkey. Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s intelligence chief, makes
little secret of his preference for Tehran over Washington, raising
questions both about the wisdom of U.S. intelligence sharing with
Turkey, and the possibility that technology shared with Turkey–such
as F-35 Joint Strike Fighter coding and software–might leak to
American enemies. In 2010, the Turkish daily Hurriyet reported the
Turkish and Chinese Air Forces had conducted joint war games without
first alerting the Pentagon or NATO. Such exercises would not have
been possible without Tehran’s cooperation; the Chinese fighters had
refueled in Iran. n18
Conclusion
Iranian officials often quip that they play chess while Americans play
checkers. The IRGC and Qods Force have global reach, and will confront
the United States wherever they can, so long as they can do so an
maintain plausible deniability. As Iran’s nuclear program increases
tension and sanctions strain the Iranian economy, the Caucasus and
surrounding regions will increasingly become targets for Iranian
influence and, perhaps, Iranian terrorism. Not only will the Islamic
Republic continue to target the Republic of Azerbaijan and exploit its
warm ties with Armenia, but Iranian authorities will also increasingly
try to leverage leadership changes and ideological solidarity in
Georgia and Turkey. Across administrations, U.S. strategy is too often
reactive rather than proactive. Alas, the absence of a coherent U.S.
strategy to counter and roll back Iranian influence in the Caucasus
increasingly proves the Iranian quip correct.
n1 “Khatami: Dar Zamineh-e tahrif andisheh-ha-ye hazirat-e Imam ‘alam
khatar mikonam” [Khatami: I Find Danger in the Distortion of His
Excellence the Imam’s Thoughts], Emrooz (Tehran), May 3, 2008.
n2 “Jamayeh-i Avari Imza ‘Alebeh Khatami,” [“Gathering Signatures
Against Khatami,”] E’temad (Tehran), May 7, 2008
n3 “Iran’s Forces Are Models of Resistance,” Press TV (Tehran), May 22, 2008.
n4 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998),
n5 “Azerbaijan Jails 4 for Eurovision Plot,” Hurriyet Daily News,
December 3, 2012.
n6 Igor Rotar, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Azerbaijan: Myth or
Reality?” Jamestown Foundation Prism, Aug. 31, 2000.
n7 Jonathan Eric Lewis, “Replace Turkey as a Strategic Partner?”
Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006; Vladimir Socor, “Talysh Issue,
Dormant in Azerbaijan, Reopened in Armenia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor,
May 27, 2005.
n8 Ali Alfoneh and Ahmad Majidyar, “Iranian Influence in Afghanistan:
Imam Khomeini Relief Committee,” AEI Middle East Outlook, July 2010.
n9 “Jashan-e Komiteh-e Emdad Baraye zawjha-ye Afghan,” (“Relief
Committee Celebration for Afghan Husbands,”) Fararu.com, May 24, 2012.
Author was an intern based at the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan at the time.
n11 “Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for
Terrorism Treasury Announces New Sanctions against Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force Leadership,” U.S. Treasury
Department, August 3, 2010.
n12 “Hamayat az Moharoman-e Jomhori Azerbaijan,” “Support for the
Disadvantaged of Azerbaijan,” Imam Khomeini Relief Committee,
(Accessed
December 3, 2012).
n13 “Kodam Keshvarha Moshtare Saryarha-ye Irani Hastand?” (“Which
Countries Are Customers of Iranian Soap Operas?”), Alef.ir (Tehran),
August 9, 2011.
n14 “Ahmadinejad YSU Guest,” Yerevan State University, October 22, 2007.
n15 Eli Lake, “WikiLeaks: Armenia sent Iran arms used to kill U.S.
troops,” The Washington Times, November 29, 2010.
n16 “Recent OFAC Actions – June 16, 2010,” U.S. Treasury Department,
n17 “Eda’ye Mohajerat-e Daneshmandan-e Hasteh-aye Armenisten beh
Iran,” (“Alleged Emigration of Nuclear Scientists from Armenia to
Iran”), ‘Asr-e Iran, October 30, 2011.
n18 “Chinese Warplanes Refueled in Iran en route to Turkey,” Hurriyet
Daily News, October 11, 2010.
Read this original document at:
http://www.emdad.ir/beinolmelal/dafater/azarbayjan.asp
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20100616.aspx
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA14-WState-RubinM-20121205.pdf