Author: nina hovnanian

The Vancouver Sun (British Columbia)
February 7, 2013 Thursday
Final Edition

Armenian cellist makes Canadian debut in Vancouver; Narek Hakhnazaryan
proves he is a great ambassador with program of composers close to his
heart

by: David Gordon Duke, Special To The Sun

Yo-Yo Ma’s superstar status as the world’s favourite cellist has the
unfortunate side-effect of making it easy for other cellists to get a
bit overshadowed – even wonderful ones like Jean-Guihen Queyras or
Steven Isserlis.

And, cello being cello, it’s that much harder for up-and-coming
soloists to receive the attention they deserve. Which makes the
Canadian recital debut of Narek Hakhnazaryan all the more interesting.

Hakhnazaryan plays for the Vancouver Recital Society in a program of
Romantic and contemporary work on Sunday. Last month I caught up with
him in Boston to chat about his life, his career and the music he will
bring to Vancouver.

Hakhnazaryan was born in Yerevan, Armenia in 1988, the son of two of
that city’s celebrated musicians. At the age of 11 he moved to Moscow
with his mother to pursue advanced education. He went from being a
local phenomenon with well-known parents to just one of many fine
young musicians.

“It was tough,” he said. “Although Yerevan is the capital, it is not
so big and crazy as Moscow. In the beginning it was hard, but we both
got used to it. The playing was very different. First of all, there
were so many more people, and many more things going on; of course
there was much more competition.”

Beyond the high level of teaching and other advantages to life in
Moscow, there was another important connection for the young cellist:
The opportunity to meet and then learn from the great cellist Mstislav
Rostropovich, who was finally re-acquainting himself with his homeland
after years in exile.

“I saw his master class when I was 12 or 13 at the Moscow
Conservatory, and this was an amazing, big public event. He was
telling so many funny stories about all the composers he knew. I have
a photo of him with me as a very small boy; I didn’t play for him, but
we had a good chat. My studies with him came later; many times his
assistants would call me and say, ‘He will be in Moscow in a few days
and would like to see you.’ ”

Hakhnazaryan was even able to work with Rostropovich on compositions
written for the great cellist by some of the 20th century’s most
renowned composers.

“I was extremely lucky. Sadly, we never did any of the Britten cello
suites, which I love now. I played No. 3 in Boston a few years ago. If
you show what Britten actually writes, very precisely, it is very
impressive for audiences.”

Another of the great figures of the contemporary Russian musical world
figures large in Hakhnazaryan’s career: conductor Valery Gergiev.
“I’ve played with him many times, and he seemed to be very happy with
the results.”

But Hakhnazaryan admits that working with the mercurial maestro isn’t
for the faint of heart. “His life is so crazy now, he never has time
to rehearse, so for many soloists this is a tough problem. I’m lucky
to be one of the musicians who doesn’t need to rehearse so much, and
this saves me when I’m playing with Gergiev. He is a true genius –
invariably some magic happens in the performance and everything
becomes perfect, phenomenal. He’s an amazing personality.”

Like Gergiev, Hakhnazaryan is an ambassador for new work by
contemporary composers from his part of the world. Along with music by
Tchaikovsky, Franck and Chopin, Hakhnazaryan will present the music of
Mikhail Bronner in his Vancouver recital.

Born in 1952, Bronner is celebrated at home, but I can’t recall any
previous Vancouver performances of his work. According to
Hakhnazaryan, “He’s one of the most talented composers right now in
Moscow of his generation.”

Hakhnazaryan doesn’t thinks Bronner’s work The Jew: Life and Death
requires a lot of talk or preparation.

“This is a very deep and touching piece. As soon as you hear it, you
will understand completely.”

Originally we were scheduled to hear a solo work by György Ligeti, but
there is a new development which Hakhnazaryan hopes will please North
American audiences.

“I have a small change in the program, a work by Adam Khu-doyan, an
Armenian composer, a very deep, very emotional, very Armenian piece.
Hopefully I can do the Ligeti in Vancouver next time!”

Narek Hakhnazaryan, cello; Noreen Polera, piano

Sunday, 3 p.m. Vancouver Playhouse Information: vanrecital.com

RES news agency website, Tskhinvali, S. Ossetia
Jan 11 2013

Russian expert views Georgia’s military potential, relations with neighbours

[Translated from Russian]

The following is the text of article by V. Y. Soshestvenskiy,
candidate of pedagogical sciences and senior academic staffer of the
Centre for Systemic Regional Studies and Prognosis of the Southern
Federal University’s Retraining and Qualification Improvement
Institute and the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, published on the South Ossetian
separatist government-run Res news agency website on 11 January
headlined “Restoration of Georgia’s Armed Forces and likelihood of
deterioration of military and political situation in the South
Caucasus”:

The majority of experts who have analysed the likelihood of an armed
confrontation in the South Caucasus in the near future have identified
several scenarios of how events could unfold. The first one, which is
not new and is the most pleasing one to the Georgian political
leadership, is linked to the “Russian military threat.” Meanwhile,
although Georgian politicians have made a series of blunt statements
regarding the imminent military aggression against Georgia (Endnote
1), international experts believe that this scenario of developments
is an unlikely one (Endnote 2). In this context, the political
demarches by [President Mikheil] Saakashvili, [former Foreign Affairs
Minister Grigol] Vashadze, and [Paata] Zakareishvili [minister of
state for reintegration], who have accused Russia of aspiring to “turn
Georgia into a ‘failed state,'” obstructing the realization of its
European and Euro-Atlantic choice, and “bringing Georgia back into the
Russian orbit by force,” (Endnote 3) were rather part of the
propaganda aiming to reinforce Georgia’s image as a country “whose
territories have been occupied.” These actions by the Georgian
political leadership appear to be aimed at securing political,
economic, and military benefits from the “Western partners.” It is
clear that, in the current international political situation, Russia
is interested in preserving its “status quo” in the South Caucasus,
rather than destabilizing the situation. Meanwhile, Georgia would
clearly benefit from intensification of armed confrontation in the
region as this would make it easier to retain the international
community’s attention to the problem of Georgian-Russian disputes.
While Georgian politicians have been making peace-loving statements
saying that Georgia will aspire to resolve the problem of the
“occupied territories” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by peaceful means
only, they would like a hotbed of armed conflict to emerge as it would
confirm that Russia’s foreign policy in the Caucasus is an aggressive
one. Armed confrontation in the region would force the Western
counties to be more accommodating during the discussion of the
question of Georgia’s accession to NATO, as well as the provision of
other types of military and political aid to the country. Meanwhile,
the question of responsibility for triggering the conflict would
become less significant. The August 2008 events [Russia-Georgia war
over South Ossetia] clearly showed that the current level of
development of the means of waging information wars makes it possible
to mislead the international community and persuade it that the
aggressor is not at fault. Thus, the powerful misinformation campaign
that the Georgian leadership carried out in 2008 resulted in the
shifting of attention from the mistakes it had made during the
implementation of its internal ethnic policies to foreign policy
issues. At the same time, having declared the territories of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia occupied “as a result of the Russian Federation’s
military aggression,” (Endnote 4) the Georgian political leadership
was able to ensure that the international community viewed the
Georgian-Abkhazian and the Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts primarily
as parts of the unresolved Russian-Georgian conflict. Meanwhile,
although Georgian politicians have repeatedly stated that preserving
the country’s territorial integrity is a fundamental and principal
issue on which Georgia will not make concessions under any
circumstances (Endnote 5), they understand very well that further use
of force against Tskhinvali and Sokhumi will prompt retaliation from
Russia. In this situation, it appears that the preservation of peace
in the region will depend largely on Russia’s political self-restraint
as the side that is not interested in the destabilization of the
military and political situation in the South Caucasus, as well as its
ability to react appropriately to the possible provocations in the
diplomatic, informational, and military spheres, including those
organized by the Georgian special services.

The combat readiness of the Georgian Army is interesting in this
context. A number of military experts believe that Georgia was able to
restore the combat potential of its Army within a year of the defeat
in August 2008. At the same time, the number of servicemen increased
from 32,000 in 2008 (Endnote 6) to 37,800 in 2009 (Endnote 7).
Compared to August 2008, the ground component of the Georgian Army
increased by one regular infantry brigade and one artillery brigade.
For this reason, taking into account the two Army reserve brigades
that are being formed, as well as the National Guard forces, one could
assume that its size has increased by a factor of 1.5 to 2.

Despite the fact that, because of the economic crisis, the budget
allocations to the Georgian Defence Ministry have decreased
considerably (from 1bn dollars, i.e. approximately 9 per cent of GDP
in 2008, to 406m dollars in 2012), these have actually been converted
into combat power during the postwar period when weapons and military
equipment (for example, the Turkish Ejder armoured personnel carriers)
have been delivered through contracts signed earlier (Endnote 8). For
this reason, one can argue that the Georgian Army’s postwar level of
equipment (excluding the navy) is higher than that of August 2008,
even if one takes into account the weapons and the military equipment
lost during the combat operations. The expanding military cooperation
between Georgia and the NATO countries has contributed significantly
to this. It is worth noting that military cooperation between Georgia
and the United States has intensified lately. For example, Washington
handed two coastal guard patrol boats worth 2m dollars to Georgia as a
gift before Hillary Clinton’s visit to Georgia (the United States
allocated a total of 10m dollars for the improvement of Georgia’s
coastal guard infrastructure in 2012). In June 2011, the US Department
of Defence gave Georgia for free 30 Hummer M1151 vehicles and 10
Hummer M1151A1 armoured vehicles worth a total of 5m dollars. In April
2012, an official statement was made regarding the transfer of 28
armoured vehicles with enhanced protection against mines. Moreover,
the United States is training Georgian Army units both on Georgian
territory and at the US Army training centre in Hohenfels (Germany).
Joint exercises by the armies of Georgia and the NATO countries are
also held regularly.

France, Turkey, Israel, Bulgaria, and other countries have been
actively involved in the postwar rearming of Georgia along with the
United States. A wide range of [armaments] has been delivered,
starting with firearms and their munitions and ending with heavy
armoured vehicles and modern antitank and antiaircraft systems. The
imported military equipment’s share in the Georgian Army’s stocks
increased to 50 per cent after the 2008 war.

The balance of interests in the region appears to be as follows:
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are resolving the problems of their
state-building and are therefore not interested in the deterioration
of the military and political situation. Such deterioration would also
be disadvantageous for Russia as it is interested in preserving its
“status quo” in the region. Georgia, meanwhile, continues to
strengthen its Armed Forces but presently still does not have
sufficient military power to solve the problem of reclaiming the
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force on its own.

In this context, it seems appropriate to discuss the question of how
the Georgian leadership is planning to use its Armed Forces.

The Georgian leadership considers the participation of Georgian Army
units in the US (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan very important. Before
September 2012, it involved 900 Georgian servicemen who were deployed
as part of the US Army force in the Afghan province of Helmand (at the
Shukvani military base) and the French force in Kabul. This was the
second largest force among the countries that are not members of NATO.
The situation changed in October 2012, when the Georgian leadership
sent an additional battalion to Afghanistan. As a result, the number
of Georgian servicemen increased to 1,700, which made it possible for
Georgia to claim a leading position in terms of “supplying the
overseas partners with soldiers.”

The Georgian leadership has thus deployed approximately 5 per cent of
all Georgian troops in the NATO operation in Afghanistan. Meanwhile,
the Georgian military themselves are not eager to go through the
“Afghan school.” According to the Tbilisi-based Kviris Palitra
newspaper, Georgia has encountered problems in terms of recruiting
contractors for service in Afghanistan. It has been reported that, in
the first quarter of 2012, some 100 servicemen filed written refusals
to serve in this Islamic republic. Those who have refused have not
even been deterred by strong punitive sanctions (28,000 lari which is
approximately 17,000 dollars) established for the violation of
contract terms (Endnote 9). At the same time, the involvement of the
Georgian military in the NATO operation in Afghanistan has come under
increasingly frequent criticism from the political opposition. For
example, in March [ 2012], Georgia’s current opposition parties signed
a joined declaration whereby they informed the alliance’s command of
their indignation at Georgia’s disproportionately high contribution to
security in Afghanistan against the background of the reduction in the
forces of other countries (Endnote 10).

Despite all this, the current political leadership of Georgia still
considers the participation of the Georgian military in the US
operation in Afghanistan a priority objective. There is the impression
that, by sending its soldiers to the “hot spots” and effectively
“trading” in their lives, the Georgian leadership hopes to receive
certain bonuses from the United States in terms of political,
financial, and military-technical support. Protection of sovereignty
and restoration of the country’s territorial integrity are the next
priority objectives of the Georgian Armed Forces. Since Georgia has
unresolved territorial disputes with all its neighbours (except for
Turkey), one can only ask where the Georgian president is planning to
use his favourite creation -the Armed Forces?

Most of Georgia’s grievances are targeted at Russia which it accuses
of occupying the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and also
considers the primary threat to its national security. This was
confirmed by the results of the vote on the adoption of the new
National Security Blueprint (Endnote 3) in December 2011. It is
noteworthy that the Georgian Parliament adopted the blueprint with 111
votes in favour and three against it. The opposition’s criticism only
focused on the need to use tougher language concerning Russia which is
mentioned 44 times in the document. However, despite the crisis of
interstate relations between Georgia and Russia which the Georgian
leadership has sustained artificially, the Georgian Armed Forces,
judging by the main characteristics of their combat potential, are
unlikely to be able to effectively confront the Russian Army and
conduct successful offensive combat operations against it in the
foreseeable future. At the same time, Georgia has unresolved
territorial disputes with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The village of
Erisimedi and part of the Davit Gareji monastery complex are the
disputed territory with Azerbaijan and the controversy over this led
to a serious border conflict between Azerbaijan and Georgia in May of
last year. Commenting on these developments, Georgian Deputy Foreign
Minister Nino Kalandadze said that the Georgian side “has no intention
to give up its lands” and that all controversial questions between
Georgia and Azerbaijan would be resolved “through an agreement between
friendly countries.” However, she also emphasized that “…the
question of giving up the monastery complex will never be discussed”
(Endnote 11).

The territorial disputes between Armenia and Georgia appear to have
deeper roots. For example, a 96-km section of the (206-km-long)
Armenian-Georgian border is still disputed. Georgia has laid claims on
the village of Bavra in Armenia’s Shirak Province (located near the
Armenian-Georgian border in Samtskhe-Javakheti Province) and the
adjacent area. Territorial disputes over this village already
triggered an incident between the border troops of the two countries
in November 2009 (the Armenian National Security Council has confirmed
that the incident did take place). The Armenian side attempted to put
up border posts in response to the Georgian side’s actions but
encountered resistance by Georgians (Endnote 12). Georgia also claims
ownership of Armenia’s Lori Province. Moreover, the Georgian side is
making active efforts at different levels to “reclaim” it. For
example, the Georgian media have initiated a discussion of the
question of returning all churches located on this territory to
Georgia, as well as of the (July 2012) address by the Georgian
diaspora of Lori-Tashir demanding revision of the state border between
Georgia and Armenia and unification of Lori Province with Georgia
(Endnote 13). Earlier, in September 2010, the question of border
delimitation was discussed during Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol
Vashadze’s visit to Armenia. The visit was followed by a meeting of an
intergovernmental commission, but the sides have so far been unable to
reconcile their positions (Endnote 14). Considering the contemporary
trends in the development of interstate relations between Georgia and
Azerbaijan, as well as the fact that the Georgian National Security
Blueprint recognizes relations with Azerbaijan as “strategic,” the
likelihood of an armed confrontation between these countries appears
to be negligible. The development of Georgian-Armenian relations seems
to be less predictable. For example, the Georgian National Security
Blueprint describes Armenian-Georgian relations merely as “close
partnership.” The Georgian side has not reacted appropriately to the
years of attempts by the Armenian leadership to establish closer ties.
This is likely to be the result of Georgia’s unwillingness to consider
a state engaged in a strategic partnership with Russia as its own
strategic partner. It is possible that the formation of this vector of
Georgian foreign policy is influenced by the existence of an
anti-Armenian narrative in Georgia. For example, in 2011, the
Internews organization conducted monitoring of printed media in order
to study the level of social tolerance and questions concerning the
protection of human rights in Georgia. The general figures concerning
ethnic groups are the most noteworthy ones. The survey showed that 60
per cent, i.e. the majority, of the publications in the printed media
were devoted to Armenians (and were mostly negative). Only 11 per cent
of the materials were devoted to the Abkhazians whom Georgians have
fought on two occasions during the years of independence. The rest of
the materials were distributed as follows: Azerbaijanis and Meskhetian
Turks -7 per cent, Ossetians -5 per cent, and so on. Among the
religious minorities, Armenians were once again the most frequently
mentioned group (47 per cent), while, for example, Muslims, whose
number in the country is constantly rising, have been overshadowed as
only 24 per cent of the materials were devoted to them (Endnote 15).
The conflict that has emerged between the goals of the Georgian
leadership’s policy of building a mono-ethnic society in the country
and the aspiration of the Armenian diaspora to preserve its national
identity appears to be the main cause of this situation.

Meanwhile, given the tension in interstate relations between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, the August 2011 statement by the Georgian
president that “Azerbaijan’s enemies are also enemies of Georgia” and
the subsequent anti-Armenian speeches by Azerbaijani politicians
appear controversial (Endnote 16). All this, coupled with
Saakashvili’s general tendency to resolve territorial disputes by
means of military force (as was the case with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia) would prompt one to predict a possible intensification of the
Armenian-Georgian disputes (should certain geopolitical circumstances
arise).

For these reasons, military confrontation in the South Caucasus
appears unlikely in the short run. However, as the military potential
and combat power of the Georgian Armed Forces grow, and provided
certain geopolitical conditions and circumstances arise, the Georgian
leadership is very likely to once again attempt to resolve the
political disputes with its neighbours by military means. It is
possible that, as a result of the (2013) presidential election,
reasonable politicians, who are not willing to resort to violent
methods in relations with the neighbours, will assume power in the
country and these predictions will, hopefully, prove to be inaccurate.
However, the future of Georgia and of the whole region has not been
determined yet. It is necessary to be prepared for the future
developments today, including the readiness to restore peace after
those developments. [Prominent Russian writer] A. P. Chekhov was right
when he said that “if there is a gun hanging on the wall in the first
act, it must fire in the last.”

Endnotes

1. Georgian Experts Consider Kavkaz-2012 Exercises Threat of Russian
Federation’s Attack on Georgia, 24 April 2012,
[1]

2. Chitidze: United States Recognizes Russian Threat to Georgia but
Does Not Want To Anger Russia, 6 June 2012, [2]

3. National Security Blueprint of Georgia, 23 December 2011.

4. Law on Occupied Territories (23 October 2010), [3]

5.
[4][fipEoBOD YIND]

6. Tseluyko V. Force Development and the Armed Forces of Georgia under
Saakashvili, Moscow Defence Brief, 3, 2008, pp 14-15.

7. Official website of the Georgian Defence Ministry, [5]

8. Aminov S. Georgia’s Air Defence in the War with South Ossetia,
Moscow Defence Brief, 3, 2008.

9. Georgian Contractors Do Not Want To Go to Afghanistan, 20 March
2012, [6]

10 . [7][fi
pBODYIND]11. Tbilisi’s Illusions,
[8][fip
BODYIND]12. Armenia and Georgia: Border Tension Grows, REGNUM, 12
September 2011, [9]

13. Batyyev B., Edisher Gvenetadze: “You Will Not Find Single Georgian
Who Doubts This,” VESTI.az,
[10][fipBOD
YIND]14. Armenia and Georgia: Border Tension Grows, 12 September 2011,
[11]

15. Tabagari Giorgi, Chachua Diana, Monitoring of Media Coverage
Ethnic, Religious and Sexual Minorities in Georgian Printed Media,
Internews Georgia, 1 May 2011 -31 July 2011.

16. Parliament Member: “Armenia Has Territorial Grievances Against All
Its Neighbours,” 3 September 2011, [12]

[Translated from Russian]

Interfax, Russia
Feb 6 2013

Karabakh forces prevent Azeri attempts to infiltrate their rear lines
– Armenian media

YEREVAN. Feb 6

Military servicemen from the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh
prevented an attempt by Azeri servicemen to infiltrate into their rear
lines in the early hours of February 5, Armenian media reported on
Wednesday citing unnamed sources.

“Azeri servicemen attempted to infiltrate into the rear lines of the
Armenian units from different directions. There were armed clashes at
several sections of the contact line between Azeri forces and the
forward troops of the Nagorno-Karabakh army,” they said.

“None was harmed on the Armenian side, and preliminary reports
indicate that three or four Azeri servicemen were killed and several
more injured,” the media said.

The Armenian Defense Ministry and Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Ministry
declined comments on these reports.

The Azeri Defense Ministry reported on Tuesday that an officer and a
soldier of the Azeri armed forces had been killed as a result of
Armenia violating the ceasefire agreements.

The incident occurred near the village of Kuropatkino in the Xocavend
district, the ministry said. “As a result of the violation of the
ceasefire agreement on the Armenian part, Azeri soldier Senan Alizade,
born in 1994, was killed,” it said.

It said also that Azeri lieutenant Tural Askerov was also shot and
killed from the Armenian side. It did not say where Askerov was
killed.

va jv

Unification of three candidates not to stop hunger-striking candidate

TERT.AM
18:58 – 10.02.13

Hunger-striking presidential candidate Andrias Ghukasyan does not
consider real the unification of three presidential candidates Paruyr
Hayrikyan, Hrant Bagratyan and Raffi Hovhannisian. Speaking to
Tert.am, he said that even if so he is not going to change his
position.

`My position is clear and I think that either they unite or not, they
cannot have any influence on the outcome of the elections,’ Ghukasyan
said.

The changing decision of Hayrikyan to apply to the CC or not witnessed
about uncertainty. He was in uncertain political situation and was not
able to orient.

`I am more concerned with the criminal element of Hayrikyan’s case.
Now I view it as a tool in the hands of the authorities as I see a
danger that the ruling party is free in accusing any political figure
who it considers dangerous,’ the candidate said, convincing that
regarding it there will a regular unexplainable criminal case.

Asked how he treats the different opinions voiced about his
hunger-striking, the candidate said, `People saying my demands are not
realistic agree to live under the administration of unconstitutional
party. I do not want it, and I am fighting against it.’

The presidential candidate is hunger-striking from the first day of
election campaign – January 21 – demanding annulment of Serzh
Sargsyan’s candidacy by the Central Election Commission and removal of
international observers from Armenia.

Columnist made a racist assumption

February 08, 2013

Share on emailShare on printShare on redditMore Sharing Services

Ron Kaye just doesn’t get it. He tries to make hay of some very poorly
alleged `racial profiling’ of Armenians (`The Gatto plot thickens,’
Feb. 3) but then assumes that the Armenian American community is
monolithic and spoken for by only one entity.

Are Kaye and your editors really that clueless as to assume the
Armenian National Committee speaks for all Armenian Americans? Does
Kaye not know how racist that assumption is?

Dan Mansourian
Glendale

ARMENIE
L’Arménie aura le meilleur prix du gaz dans la CEI

L’Arménie aura « le meilleur prix du gaz naturel dans la Communauté
des États indépendants (CEI) » a déclaré le ministre de l’énergie et
des ressources naturelles Armen Movsisyan aux journalistes après la
séance du Cabinet.

Il a dit que le gouvernement va annoncer prochainement le prix révisé
à la hausse après la fin des pourparlers avec Gazprom. Il a nié les
allégations selon lesquelles les négociations sont closes depuis
longtemps et que le prix du gaz n’est pas annoncé en raison de
l’élection présidentielle.

Certains journaux arméniens ont annoncé que le prix du gaz fourni par
la Russie à l’Arménie va augmenter à partir du 1er Avril 2013 à 240
dollars les 1000 mètres cubes contre actuellement 180 dollars. Ils ont
allégué qu’un accord relatif a été signé et sera annoncé qu’après les
élections présidentielles en Arménie, qui se tiendront le 18 février.

dimanche 10 février 2013,
Stéphane ©armenews.com

ARMENIE-AZERBAÏDJAN
Un soldat arménien tué hier à la frontière arméno-azérie au nord-est
de l’Arménie

Le ministère arménien de la Défense a annoncé hier en milieu de
journée que le matin, samedi 9 février à 9h05 sur la position de
défense frontalière N entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan, au nord-est de
l’Arménie, un soldat arménien avait reçu une blessure mortelle suite à
un tir de l’ennemi azéri. La victime est un soldat engagé, Mhér
Yeghchadian, né en 1976 à Bert. Le ministère arménien de la Défense a
présenté ses condoléances à la famille du soldat. Par ailleurs notons
que la semaine écoulée a vu le régime du cessez-le-feu violé à 250
reprises par l’Azerbaïdjan.

Krikor Amirzayan

dimanche 10 février 2013,
Krikor Amirzayan ©armenews.com

ARMENIE
Arménie : la violence domestique sans réponses

De plus en plus la question de la violence domestique en Arménie est
un sujet de débat public.

Cependant, une plus grande attention à la question n’est pas encore
traduite par une expansion des programmes en vue de soulager la
souffrance et les insuffisances des politiques à ce sujet.

En 2012, l’Arménie a établi un sombre record de violences domestiques
avec six femmes, dont l’ge varie de 21 à 50 ans, qui sont décédées
sur six mois lors d’incidents impliquant leur mari ou leur beau-père.
Collectivement, les six femmes mortes ont laissé 12 enfants. Aucun
registre officiel des attaques de violence familiale n’existe en
Arménie. Mais une enquête de 2008 sur 1000 femmes arméniennes par
Amnesty International a constaté que plus de trois sur 10 ont subi des
abus physiques, et 66 pour cent de la violence psychologique.

Le tollé provoqué par les récents décès a invité les militants à
croire que le gouvernement allait commencer à rendre des fonds publics
disponibles pour la protection et le traitement des victimes de
violence domestique. Mais le 21 janvier, le gouvernement a bloqué le
passage de ce qui aurait été la première loi du pays sur la violence
familiale en disant que des révisions devaient être apportées à la
législation existante, ou au projet de loi lui-même.

En l’absence de financement du gouvernement, des organisations non
gouvernementales (ONG) ont du mal à répondre aux besoins. « Il y a de
nombreux cas, les efforts des seules ONG ne suffisent pas », a
commenté Susanna Vardanian, directrice du Centre des droits des
femmes, une ONG basée à Erevan, qui est à l’origine du projet de loi
qui est au point mort.

À l’heure actuelle, trois accueils privés pour les victimes de
violence familiale (deux abris à Erevan et un dans la région d’Armavir
à proximité), ainsi que plusieurs hotlines gérés par des ONG sont tout
ce qui existe pour les femmes victimes de violence conjugale. Au cours
des deux dernières années, le Centre des Droits des Femmes, qui gère
deux lignes, quatre centres de crise régionales et un abri, a reçu
quelques 2557 appels de femmes cherchant de l’aide, selon Susanna
Vardanian.

Dans un établissement géré par la fondation caritative « Lighthouse »
dans le village de Ptghunts, les 55 résidents sont le plus souvent des
femmes au chômage et enceintes ou qui élèvent des enfants. Le refuge
offre une formation professionnelle de base, ainsi que des conseils
psychologiques.

Pendant des décennies, la violence domestique est un sujet qui non
seulement de la part des femmes battues, mais aussi des fonctionnaires
et des forces de l’ordre n’a pas été reconnu ou discuté. Mais
maintenant, ce qui a commencé à changer c’est que les gens commencent
à être tenus pour responsables des actions abusives . Par exemple,
Haykanush Mikayelian a reçu une peine de 10 mois en 2012 pour son rôle
dans les violences contre sa belle-fille de 23 ans, Mariam Gevorgian,
sur une longue période à partir de 2009. Selon les témoignages au
procès, Mikayelian brûlé le corps de Gevorgian avec un fer à repasser
et un briquet, la battait régulièrement et l’a maintenu enfermé à
l’intérieur sous clé.

Bien que les agents de police soient sans doute aujourd’hui plus
conscients du problème de la violence familiale qu’il y a quelques
années, ils restent souvent déconcertés par le manque de refuges gérés
par l’État et les mécanismes juridiques pour prévenir l’abus continu
d’une femme par un mari ou un parent.

« Dès qu’il s’agit de prendre des mesures effectives, nous semblons
être confrontés à la même résistance », a souligné Lara Aharomian,
directrice du Centre de ressources des femmes, une autre ONG basée à
Erevan active dans la lutte contre la violence domestique.

Le projet de loi sur la violence familiale que le gouvernement a
rejeté plus tôt en janvier aurait essayé de renforcer les mesures
officielles de protection des victimes en introduisant des ordonnances
et accroître le nombre de centres d’accueil parmi l’ensemble des
mesures.

Les militants estiment que les six cas mortels de violence familiale
en 2012 aurait pu être évitée si l’Arménie avait eu une loi décrivant
les réponses à la violence, et, par conséquent, fournir une aide de
l’État pour les refuges. « [La] loi propose la création d’un certain
nombre d’installations, et [la] formation de la police, qui sont des
mesures préventives » a déclaré Anna Nikoghosian, un chef de projet
pour l’organisation non gouvernementale « une société sans violence ».
Si les abris avaient existé à proximité du domicile des six femmes
assassinées, qui ont tous vécu en dehors d’Erevan, « certaines
seraient. . . peut-être encore en vie aujourd’hui ».

« Il y a beaucoup de difficultés dans le besoin de soutien, mais il
est impossible de loger toutes les femmes dans seulement trois abris
», a convenu Naira Muradian directrice de « Lighthouse »

Lala Ghazarian, responsable du Département de la famille, des femmes
et des questions de garde d’enfants au ministère du Travail et des
Affaires sociales a souligné que le projet de violence familiale n’est
pas enterré. « Il a juste besoin de quelques changements » pour le
mettre en conformité avec le droit pénal en vigueur, a-t-elle dit. «
Nous sommes tous bien conscients que nous avons besoin d’une loi,
d’abris, de policiers formés, d’outils fonctionnels, mais cela
implique d’importants travaux pour modifier la législation, et ce sera
fait ».

Certains membres du gouvernement ont déclaré que le Parlement,
désormais contrôlé par le Parti Républicain d’Arménie, pourrait
adopter une loi sur la violence familiale d’ici 2014 ou 2015, une fois
que des amendements en cours du code pénal seront complets.

Pendant ce temps de nombreux Arméniens affirment ouvertement qu’ils
sont désireux de trouver des solutions. Dans le village de Burastan, à
30 kilomètres d’Erevan, les femmes en 2006 ont dit à EurasiaNet.org
que les questions de la violence domestique « détruisent les familles
traditionnelles arméniennes ». Sept ans plus tard, ils ont admis que
la violence est une question qui « doit être pris en compte ».

« Nos enfants ont grandi dans une atmosphère de coups et bagarres » a
commenté, Karine Galstian, 67 ans, mère de quatre enfants. « Ce n’est
que maintenant nous nous rendons compte combien il est mauvais de
garder le silence, car il faut au moins apprendre à nos filles que le
mari doit respecter sa femme, ne doit pas la battre, ne devrait pas
l’humilier devant les enfants ». En l’absence de mesures
gouvernementales supplémentaires contre la violence domestique, de
telles réalisations peuvent faire une grande différence. Note de
l’éditeur :

Gayane Abrahamyan est journaliste pour ArmeniaNow.com à Erevan.

EurasiaNet.org

dimanche 10 février 2013,
Stéphane ©armenews.com

Interfax, Russia
February 4, 2013 Monday 2:53 PM MSK

Baku does not expect breakthrough in Karabakh settlement this year

BAKU. Feb 4

Azeri Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov thinks this year will not
see significant progress in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict due to presidential elections in Azerbaijan and Armenia.

“It is most likely that cochairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, in keeping
with the tradition, will wipe out 2013 from the negotiating process
given the presidential elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan,” he told
the press on Monday.

However, he noted that time is going and the outstanding problem
troubles not only Azerbaijan but also countries and international
organizations supporting the republic.

“There are no new proposals on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict on the part of the cochairmen, but there are efforts aimed at
breaking the stalemate,” he said.

“As you know, in 2010 Armenia rejected the draft key principles
compiled by the three cochairmen. Russia’s mediation attempts of two
years did not produce any results either. One should leave the
negative point which [Armenian President] Serzh Sargsian created in
2010,” he said.

“Gradually, Armenia is becoming isolated and a peace agreement with
Azerbaijan would be a way out of this situation,” he said.

He added that the recent meeting of the foreign ministers of
Azerbaijan and Armenia in Paris “did not differ from previous ones in
any way.”

ml jv

The Toronto Star
February 2, 2013 Saturday

Iraq’s minority Christians still searching for a home

ERBIL, Iraq

ERBIL, Iraq-“They held me captive for five days, without food or
water, constantly beating me. One day, I felt a cold blade under my
neck, and someone told me, ‘If you become a Muslim, we will not kill
you.'”

Sitting in the living room of his home in Erbil, capital of the Iraqi
Kurdistan region, 63-year-old Rostom Sefarian stops talking,
struggling to hold back the tears. It was July 2006 and Sefarian, an
Armenian Christian living in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, had
been kidnapped by a group of Islamic fundamentalists – the latest
victim in a series of abductions and killings of Iraqi Christians that
continues to this day.

Sefarian was released five days later, when his family agreed to pay a
$72,000 ransom. It was the second time Sefarian had been kidnapped;
his family paid $12,000 to free him after one day in captivity the
previous January. His wife’s cousin, also a Christian, was not as
lucky: three days after being kidnapped, he was found dead by his
family.

Sefarian is one of 35,000 Christian refugees from across Iraq who have
found shelter in Kurdistan, the autonomous northeastern part of the
country and its only stable region.

But what was once a safe haven for Christians is rapidly turning into
the departure point for tens of thousands who feel they don’t have a
future in their own country. Hampered by a lack of economic
opportunity, linguistic and cultural barriers, and with no proper
political protection, more and more Christians are now abandoning
Kurdistan – and Iraq.

The Iraqi Christian population has shrunk to between 300,000 and
500,000, down from a high of 1.3 million people in 1991, according to
recent estimates, raising fears about the possible extinction of one
of the most ancient Christian communities in the world.

A recent report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
shows that the number of displaced Christian families in the four
northern governorates of Iraq (three of which are in Kurdistan) has
decreased from 1,350 to fewer than 500 in 2011. Meanwhile, the same
year, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in neighbouring Turkey
recorded an increase in Iraqi refugees, half of them (around 1,700)
Christians.

Proudly calling themselves the original inhabitants of Iraq,
Christians are now facing a challenge: numbering just a few hundred
thousand people out of more than 30 million Iraqis, they have been
politically sidelined in a country organized along sectarian and
ethnic lines, dominated by the far bigger Shia, Sunni and Kurdish
communities.

“We are the weakest link in the Iraqi mosaic,” says Keldo Ramzi, the
Christian secretary of the Chaldo-Assyrian Youth Union in Erbil. “If
anyone wants to send a message to the U.S.A., he targets Christians or
bombs churches.”

The worst attack happened in October 2010, when a series of suicide
bombings hit the Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad, killing 58
people. According to a recent report published by the Assyrian
International News Agency, 71 churches have been attacked or bombed in
Iraq since 2004.

In Kurdistan, home to a Christian population that numbers roughly
160,000, local authorities boast that all religions are protected,
according to the spirit of the new Iraqi constitution. “We respect
Christians, and Christians respect us (Muslims),” says Kamil Haji Ali,
the Kurdistan Regional Government’s minister of religious affairs.

But even if Christians can profess their faith in relative safety
here, many, like Sefarian, claim their civil and economic rights are
not respected.

After selling his four-storey house in Mosul in August 2006, Sefarian
moved with his wife and son to Erbil, where he now rents a small
apartment in Ankawa, a Christian enclave on the outskirts of the city.

But without a pension or other forms of assistance from the Iraqi
government, Sefarian is forced to rely on his son’s wage. “In Mosul, I
was living like a king,” he says. In Erbil he has to renew his
residence permit every year, which takes time and money. “I can’t find
a job at my age. I don’t speak (Kurdish) and don’t have any means to
survive.”

While the region has registered an impressive economic boom driven by
oil since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, many Christians claim to have
experienced only the worst part of it.

“They are building a few very expensive apartment towers that nobody
here will be able to afford,” claims Naurad Youssif, a 41-year-old
Christian from Ankawa working at the local post office. “Christians
here are a poor community, and those apartments will not be for us.”

Taking advantage of the Christian nature of the area, nightclubs and
restaurants selling alcohol have opened, attracting people from all
over the city and bringing problems such as brawls and prostitution.

“Many of the prostitutes here are girls coming from other parts of
Iraq, with no jobs or opportunities,” says Father Tariq Eissa, parish
priest at the local Saint George Chaldean Catholic Church. “We
understand their problems, but we are not happy about the situation.”

Eissa says Christian land has been seized by the government to build
business towers and housing complexes around Erbil and Ankawa. “In the
rest of Iraq they are killing us with guns, here they are doing it
with money.”

Faced with a constant hemorrhaging of people, some Assyrian parties
are proposing the creation of an autonomous region in the Nineveh
plains, an area of 4,000 square kilometres east of Mosul, where
Christians could live as a self-governing majority. But the idea has
been rejected by many Christians.

“It’s a project the Catholic Church has always opposed,” says Afnan de
Jesus, 43, an Arab Chaldean nun who converted to Christianity. “I
think it would be very dangerous to live just among ourselves,
isolated from the others.”

Yet, if the majority of local Christians seem resigned to choose
between a life in exile and an uncomfortable existence here as
second-class citizens, a young and active wing of the Christian
population is trying to fight this passive mentality. Globalized and
English-speaking, many Christian youngsters are employed by foreign
companies working in Kurdistan. They are aware of their rights and are
willing to keep on living in Iraq, no matter what.

To do so, they are ready to break the circle between religion and
politics that, in their opinions, has created so many problems. “If we
reclaim our rights under the name of Christianity we will be very
weak, because churches cannot interfere with governments,” says
22-year-old Savina Rafael Daoud.

Taking advantage of the good relations between Kurds and Christians,
some youngsters are willing to engage the local society. “Christians
are not very brave here. Yes, there are problems to solve, but this
doesn’t mean we should leave this country,” explains Salim Kako, an
Assyrian politician. “We cannot look for the shadow all our life. We
have to go under the sun and fight for our rights.”

Matteo Fagotto last wrote about Nigeria’s religious clashes.