KOSOVO AND THE CAUCASUS: A DOMINO EFFECT
In Serbia, Serbia
Dec 5 2013
After February 2008 when Kosovo Albanian-dominated Parliament
proclaimed Kosovo independence (without organizing a referenda)
with obvious US diplomatic support (unilateral recognition) with
explanation that the Kosovo case is unique in the World (i.e., it will
be not repeated again) one can ask the question: is the problem of the
southern Serbian province of Kosovo-Metochia really unique and surely
unrepeatable in some other parts of the World as the US administration
was trying to convince the rest of the international community?
Domino effect
The consequences of recognition of Kosovo independence by one (smaller)
part of the international community are already (and going to be in the
future) visible primarily in the Caucasus because of the very similar
problems and situation in these two regions. At the Caucasus region
(where some 50 different ethnolinguistic groups are living together)
a self-proclaimed state independence is already done by Abkhazia
and South Ossetia only several months after the self-proclaimed
independence of the “Republic of Kosova”, following the pattern
of both the Nagorno-Karabakh (formally a province in Azerbaijan)
in 1991 and Kosovo in 2008.
The experts from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed in
2007 their real fear that in the case of the USA and the EU unilateral
recognition of Kosovo independence the same unilateral diplomatic
act could be implied by Moscow by recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia as a matter of diplomatic compensation and as a result of
domino effect in international relations. It is also known and from
official OSCE sources that Russian delegates in this pan-European
security organization have been constantly warning before 2008 the West
that such scenario is quite possible, but with one peculiarity: from
2007 they stopped to mention possibility of the Russian recognition of
the Nagorno-Karabakh’s self-proclaimed independence (on September 2nd,
1991). It is most probably for the reason that Moscow does not want
(up to now) to deteriorate good relations with Azerbaijan – a country
with huge reserves of natural gas and oil.
Why the South Ossetia could be different?
On the first glance it can be said that the Orthodox South Ossetians
are equally separatist as the Muslim Kosovo Albanians. However,
the South Ossetians are having sympathies towards the Serbs (not for
the reason that both of them are the Orthodox Christians), but not
towards, as we could expect, separatist Kosovo Albanians. The real
reason of such sympathies is similar legal state rights applied by
both the Serbs in Kosovo and the South Ossetians.
Historically, the South Ossetia was never really integral and authentic
part of sovereign Georgian state, in contrast to Kosovo-Metochia
which was not only integral, but culturally and politically the
most important region of the medieval Serbian state (called as the
Ancient Serbia or Serbia proper) till 1455 when Kosovo-Metochia became
occupied by the Ottomans. The present-day territory of Georgia was
never before it entered Russia a firmly united state territory in
contrast to Serbia which before it lost independence in 1459 was
having a long period of experience of the unified state territory
with Kosovo-Metochia as its center.
When Serbia de facto regained its independence from the Ottoman Empire
at the beginning of the 19th century (de iure confirmed by the European
Great Powers at the Berlin Congress in 1878) it was known for her
rulers and politicians which historical territories belonged to her
with Kosovo-Metochia on the first place. The present day territory
of Georgia entered the Russian Empire in parts – segment by segment.
Ossetia as united territory (i.e., not divided into the Northern and
the Southern Ossetia as today situation is) became (according to the
Russian historiography) voluntarily part of the Russian Empire in
1774. In the other words, the Russian Empress Catherine the Great
(1762â~H’1796), in order to be surely convinced that the Ossetians
are really independent, before incorporation of this province into the
Russian Empire sent a special commission which informed St. Petersburg
that “the Ossetians are free people subordinated to no one”.
Georgia itself became part of the Russian Empire in 1804 (27 years
later then Ossetia). This fact is the most important argument used
by the South Ossetians in their dispute with the Georgian authorities.
The Southern part of Ossetia was given to be administered by Georgia
only in the USSR by decision of three Georgian Communists – J. V.
Stalin, Sergei Ordzonikidze and Avelj Enukindze. It has to be also
stressed that the border between two parts of Ossetia (the Northern
and the Southern) never existed before 1994.
Regarding the Kosovo Albanian case, it is known that the Albanians
started to settle themselves in the region of Kosovo-Metochia from
the present-day Northern Albania only after the First Serbian Great
Migration from the region in 1689, i.e., before the Ottoman occupation
of Serbia there were no Albanians in Kosovo-Metochia in any significant
number (only 2% according to the Ottoman census in 1455).
It should be also said that, according to several Byzantine and Arab
sources, the Balkan Albanians are originating from the Caucasus
Albania – in the 9th century they left the Caucasus and have been
settled by the Arabs in the West Sicily (and the South Italy) which
they left in 1043 and came to the Balkans.
The borders of Kosovo-Metochia were established for the first time
by the Yugoslav Communist authorities in 1945, who in fact separated
this province from the rest of Serbia together with the Province of
Vojvodina. In addition, the Yugoslav Communist People’s Assembly
issued the decree according to which it was forbidden for about
100.000 expelled Serbs from Kosovo-Metochia during the Second World
War by the Albanian authorities to return back to the province. That
was the beginning of a great change of the population structure of
the province in the Albanian favour in the Socialist Yugoslavia.
The people of the South Ossetia on the referendum about the future
of the USSR on March 17th, 1991 voted for existence of the Soviet
Union (like the Serbs upon Yugoslavia, but and Kosovo Albanians on
referendum to become an independent from Serbia like Georgians from
the USSR). The referendum on March 17th, 1991 was organized two months
after Georgian army started the war against the South Ossetia in which
till September of the same year 86 Ossetian villages have been burned.
It is calculated that more than 1.000 Ossetians lost their lives
and around 12.000 Ossetians emigrated from the South to the North
(Russia’s) Ossetia. This is the point of similarity with expelled
around 250.000 Serbs from Kosovo by the Albanian the so-called Kosovo
Liberation Army after the NATO peace-keeping troops entered and de
facto occupied this province in June 1999.
A state independence of the Republic of South Ossetia was proclaimed
on May 29th, 1992. However, this legal act has not been understood
as a “separatist” one for the reason that at that time Georgia was
not recognized by no one state in the world as an independent one and
Georgia was not a member of the United Nations. However, in contrast
to the case of the South Ossetia, the unilateral proclamation of
the state independence of Kosovo by Albanians on February 18th, 2008
cannot be treated by the international community as a legitimate act
(without permission by Belgrade) as Kosovo by the international law
and agreements is an integral part of Serbia (the same legal reason was
applied by the international community to the case of self-proclaimed
the Republic of Serbian Krayina in 1991 from Croatia).
Differently from the case of Georgia, when the South Ossetia proclaimed
the state independence in May 1992, Serbia in 2008, when the Albanian
dominated Parliament of Kosovo proclaimed the state independence,
was an internationally recognized independent state and a member of
the United Nations. This is a common point of similarity between the
Ossetians and the Serbs as the nations: both of them are fighting
against separation of one part of their national body and the land
from the motherland. However, Tbilisi is doing the same like Belgrade,
from this point of view, i.e. claiming that the South Ossetia (and
Abkhazia) is historical and state part of Georgia. In this point, there
is a similarity between political claims of both states – Serbia and
Georgia with one significant difference: historical rights of Serbia
over Kosovo-Metochia are much more stronger in comparison with the same
rights of Georgia over the South Ossetia (and Abkhazia). In the other
words, Kosovo-Metochia was all the time, from historical, cultural,
state and identity point of views, a central/proper part of Serbia,
while both the South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been just borderland
provinces of Georgia.
International system of governing and separation
The main argument for the western politicians upon Kosovo independence,
as “unique case” of Kosovo situation, is the fact that according
to “Kumanovo Agreement” between MilosheviÄ~G’s Serbia and the NATO
signed on June 10th, 1999, and the UN Resolution of 1244 (following
this agreement), Kosovo is put under the UN protectorate with
imposed international system of governing and security. However,
such “argument” does not work in the case of the South Ossetia as
the Ossetians are governing their land by themselves and much more
successfully in comparison with “internationally” (i.e., the NATO)
protected Kosovo.
It was quite visible in March 2004 when international organizations
and military troops could not (i.e., did not want to) protect the
ethnic Serbs in Kosovo-Metochia from violent attacks organized by
the local Albanians when during three days (March 17â~H’19th) 4.000
Serbs exiled, more than 800 Serbian houses are set on fire and 35
Serbian Orthodox churches and cultural monuments were destroyed or
being severely damaged.
The “March Pogrom” of 2004 revealed the real situation in the
region of Kosovo-Metochia. The position of the South Ossetians in
an independent Georgia from 1991 to August 2008 could be compared
with position of the Serbs in Kosovo-Metochia after June 1999 under
the total Albanian domination. The fact is that the South Ossetia,
Abkhazia and Pridnestrovje showed much more political-legal bases and
capabilities to be recognized as an independent for the reason that
they showed real ability to govern themselves by only themselves,
but not by the international organizations as it is in the case of
the Albanian-governed Kosovo (the “Republic of Kosova” from February
2008) after June 1999 up today. They also proved much more democracy
and respect for human and minority rights in comparison with the
Albanian-ruled Kosovo.
The Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo
There are several similarities, but also and dissimilarities between
conflicts in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo. In both cases the
international community is dealing with autonomy of a compact national
minority who is making a majority on the land in question and having
its own national independent state out of this territory. Both the
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and the Kosovo Albanians do not want
to accept any other solution except separation and internationally
recognized independence. Both conflicts are in fact continuations
of old historic struggles between two different civilizations: the
Muslim Turkish and the Christian Byzantine. In both conflicts the
international organizations are included as the mediators. Some of
them are the same – France, the USA and Russia as the members of both
Contact Groups for ex-Yugoslavia and the Minsk Group under the OSCE
umbrella for Azerbaijan.
Serbia and Azerbaijan were against that their cases (Kosovo and the
Nagorno-Karabakh) will be proclaimed as the “unique” cases as in
this case it would be a green light to both Albanian and Armenian
separatists to secede their territories from Serbia and Azerbaijan
without permissions given by Belgrade and Baku (what in reality
already happened).
However, there are significant differences between Kosovo-Metochia
and the Nagorno-Karabakh cases. Firstly, Kosovo-Metochia was internal
conflict within Serbia (which is after June 1999 internationalized),
but in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh there is external military
aggression (by Armenia). Secondly, in difference to Armenia in
relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh, Albania formally never accepted
any legal act in which Kosovo was called as integral part of a state
territory of Albania (with historical exception during the Second
World War when Kosovo-Metochia, the Eastern Montenegro and the Western
Macedonia have been included into Mussolini’s the so-called “Greater
Albania”). Delegation from Albania did not take any participation in
the talks and negotiations upon the “final” status of Kosovo-Metochia
between Prishina and Belgrade in 2007â~H’2013, while Armenia has
official status of “interested side” in the conflict in regard to
the Nagorno-Karabakh.
However, the Armenians from the Nagorno-Karabakh such status did not
obtain. While the Armenian army (i.e. from the Republic of Armenia) was
directly involved in the military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh,
officially part of an independent state of Azerbaijan, in the Kosovo
conflict of 1998â~H’1999 the official regular army of the Republic
of Albania was not involved (differently from a great number of
the volunteers from Albania). As a result, Armenia occupied 1/5 of
Azerbaijan territory and the victims of ethnic cleansing are only
the Azerbaijani. A military weaker Azerbaijan side in comparison to
Armenia, which was supported by Russia in arms and other war material,
did not apply to the NATO for the military help, but military weaker
Kosovo Albanian side in comparison to Serbia’s police and the Yugoslav
army forces did it during the Kosovo conflict of 1998â~H’1999.
Conclusion
It can be concluded that the Albanian unilaterally proclaimed Kosovo
independence in February 2008 is not “unique” case in the world without
direct consequences to similar separatist cases following the “domino
effect” (the South Ossetia, the South Sudan…). That is the real
reason why, for instance, the government of Cyprus is not supporting
“Kosovo Albanian rights to self-determination” as the next “unique”
case can be easily the northern (Turkish) part of Cyprus which is
by the way already recognized by the Republic of Turkey and under de
facto Ankara’s protection and the occupation by the regular army of
the Republic of Turkey from 1974 onward.
The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely
those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of InSerbia.
http://inserbia.info/news/2013/12/kosovo-and-the-caucasus-a-domino-effect/