UKRAINE’S WHIRLWINDS: CAUCASUS REPERCUSSIONS
Politkom.ru , Russia
Feb 26 2014
by Sergey Markedonov, assistant professor in the Department of Foreign
Regional Studies and Foreign Policy at the Russian State Humanities
University
The Ukrainian internal political crisis has been resolved by a
revolutionary change of regime. This event has turned Ukraine into
a zone of heightened interest, not to mention high risks. Not only
internal but also geopolitical. “Such states are going through a period
of searching for stability arising from a compromise between the ethnic
and civil concepts of the state and the nation,” the historian Aleksey
Miller rightly considers. The revolution in Ukraine has actualized in
the extreme Ernest Renan’s well-known contention about a nation as a
“daily plebiscite.” It cannot be ruled out that this metaphor might
acquire not only an abstract ring but also practical materialization
in the very near future.
Ukraine’s significance in the European security system cannot be
underestimated. It is determined by a whole number of factors. First,
Ukraine is Europe’s second largest territory (603,700 square meters)
and fifth largest country in terms of population (slightly more
than 46 million). Its area comprises 5.7 per cent of all European
territory. Consequently, along with the unification of Germany, its
appearance on the world map as an independent state has been one of the
most important geopolitical changes in Europe since 1945. And if, God
forbid, it was to collapse, this event would have a claim to being a
conflict comparable in scale to the Yugoslav confrontations. It should
not be forgotten that the Balkan republics were not the home of the
Russian Black Sea Fleet’s infrastructure. Nor was such an important
factor as gas transit from Russia to Europe involved in the process
of the disintegration of Yugoslavia (no matter what people might be
saying today about a potential decline in Ukraine’s significance as
a transit country).
Second, Ukraine is part of the Black Sea region, which is
conventionally regarded as an important element in the so-called
“instability belt” (stretching from the Balkans through the Dniester
region to the South Caucasus). In a southwesterly direction Ukraine
is immediately adjacent to one of the unresolved conflicts on the
territory of the former USSR – the Moldova-Dniester region conflict
(405 kilometres of the Ukrainian border skirts the unrecognized
Dniester Moldovan Republic). Hitherto official Kiev has been involved
in settling this confrontation as a guarantor. And at least as of
today none of the participants in the peace process has had any
intention of revising this role.
And although Ukraine cannot be described as a leading player in the
Greater Caucasus, its significance in the processes in this region
cannot be ignored. In this connection it is expedient to examine the
influence of “Maydan-2” on the Caucasus region, which is one of the
most problematical and unstable territories on the expanses of the
former Soviet Union. Ukraine is of special interest for each of the
Transcaucasus countries.
Georgia was one of the first post-Soviet republics to sign a
“Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Treaty” with the Ukrainian
state (in April 1993). A great deal has changed since then. Kiev’s and
Tbilisi’s relations with Moscow and the West have changed. But their
predisposition towards strategic cooperation remained unaltered. The
Georgian political class saw Ukraine as a potential new “elder
brother” capable of playing the role of an alternative to Moscow and
its aspirations.
This is also the source of the occasional debates about the deployment
of Ukrainian peacekeepers in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict zone and of
the attempts to impart impetus to various integration projects without
Russian involvement (GUAM). Today, however, the Ukrainian crisis and
revolution are being seen within various groups of the current Georgian
elite, and particularly the expert and journalist community, less as
a domestic policy problem for that country and more as a particular
manifestation of the great geopolitical confrontation between Moscow
and the West. As a result, many issues on the Ukrainian agenda are
often transposed to Georgian soil without the requisite critical
consideration. With this approach Georgia is seen as the next likely
“candidate” for Moscow’s displeasure while Russia itself is seen as
some kind of inherent threat to all of its neighbours.
Some Georgian politicians and public figures (particularly
representatives of the United National Movement) saw in a defeat of
“Maydan-2” the prospect of an increase in Russian pressure on Tbilisi.
By contrast, they see in its victory hope that the West’s position
will be strengthened, although this is debatable. Post-Soviet history
has repeatedly shown that attempts to force the Russian Federation
out of those regions where it has a direct interest backfire.
And it is not even a question of military-political demonstrations
of some kind by Moscow but of a strengthening of negative attitudes
towards US and NATO policy, and also the anti-Western discourse in
Russian society. If some people in Washington are afraid of an increase
in Putin’s popularity, ignoring Moscow’s interests and motives only
leads to his position being strengthened. Experience has repeatedly
proved the absence of direct interconnections between Russia’s actions
in Ukraine and in Georgia.
We recall how after the “five-day war” of 2008 the Kremlin proceeded
to extend the Grand Treaty with Ukraine despite the fact that its
president at that time was Viktor Yushchenko, who was not only an
associate but also a friend of [former Georgian President] Mikheil
Saakashvili. But the perceptions of Russia as an irrational force
still cherishing a dream of restoring the USSR are tenacious. This is
also the reason for the extremely fashionable debates about Russia’s
“Crimean weapon” and parallels between the peninsula and Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. At the same time, in both cases the conflict situations
disregard numerous nuances and are viewed almost exclusively in
the context of Russian intervention without consideration for the
responsibility of the Georgian and Ukrainian central authorities
themselves.
The attitude towards the Ukrainian events in Azerbaijan is a special
case. On the one hand, Kiev is a long-standing partner of Baku. The
priorities in this partnership include developing “energy alternatives”
and minimizing dependence on Russia in this regard. In November
last year, immediately before “Maydan-2,” Viktor Yanukovych (now the
ousted president) said: “Ukraine is a reliable energy transit country,
while Azerbaijan is a reliable energy supplier. Cooperation in the
energy sphere is a priority matter, and our countries have all the
conditions for pooling their efforts in the matter of transporting
fossil fuels in the direction of Europe.”
And irrespective of the strength of the antipathy that Ukraine’s new
authorities felt for Yanukovych (incidentally, the issue of “newness”
requires separate detailed examination because the extent of it will
depend on the criteria that we apply), there are big doubts that they
will pursue a different course in this area. But to the “question of
any revolution” has still not been resolved in Ukraine.
And it is here that we come to another aspect of the Azeri attitude
towards the problem. Official Baku is highly sceptical about
revolutionary techniques for changing a regime. Incidentally,
the now popular term “Maydan” first became a symbol of civil and
political activism not in Ukraine but in Azerbaijan in the course
of an 18-day protest rally (from 17 November through 8 December
1988). Subsequently 17 November was declared to be “Revival Day”
(“Dircelis”). The Azerbaijan “Maydan” (which dragged on for more than
three years) led to the coming to power of the People’s Front (its
nominee Ebulfez Elcibey was victorious in the June 1992 presidential
elections), whose short time in office almost led to the total collapse
of the new independent state.
Today many Azeri critics of the regime berate it for exerting
administrative pressure, leaning on the opposition, and curbing
the media. While forgetting that the Aliyev regime in this Caspian
republic was a response to the witless bureaucracy and paralysis
of power wrought by the revolutionaries of the early 1990s. And it
is not only on the grounds of authoritarianism that people today
do not want to vote for them and their successors (nobody apart
from overt apologists and propagandists has any doubts about this
characteristic of theirs). But that is the price to be paid for
widespread revolutionary activity by the popular masses and a decisive
role of the street in the political process.
Meanwhile, there have also been subsequent “mini-Maydans” in Azerbaijan
(as a rule they have coincided with election campaigns, as was the
case in 2003 and 2005). This is also the reason for the cautious
reaction to the change of regime in Kiev. It is believed that Baku
(like other capitals) will wait for the emergence of some kind of
centre of power and authority with which it will be possible to have
dealings in the future too. But, unlike Tbilisi, the Azeri regime is
not going to support Ukrainian revolutionary aspirations. Business
of course, territorial integrity and recognition of Karabakh as part
of this Caspian republic, but not a “revolutionary International.”
It is hard to see Armenia as an important partner of Ukraine. Some
attempts to promote bilateral relations were made specifically during
Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency (the Armenian leader visited Kiev in
July 2011 after a 10-year gap!). Yerevan has the reputation of being
a strategic partner of Moscow. And this is not the best recommendation
for the notional new rulers of Ukraine.
Incidentally, Armenia’s decision to join the Customs Union is seen
as part of Russian pressure on a strategic partner. And, it has to
be said, official Yerevan is not fighting such an interpretation too
much. Armenia has always shied away from a tough-choice situation,
preferring foreign policy complementarism [term coined to describe
Armenia’s nonjudgmental pragmatism].
Last September’s decision provoked a strengthening of “Eurasian
scepticism” in expert and journalistic circles. It was already
present among the ranks of oppositionists anyway. The authorities
do not openly support this trend, voicing allegiance to the Customs
Union and integration projects under Russian auspices. But at the
same time they would regard a return to complementarism as the best
option for themselves. In the opinion of many influential experts
and diplomats (this approach is not always advertised), Moscow
brought pressure to bear on Yerevan over Eurasian integration under
the influence of background factors, primarily Ukraine’s intention
to sign an association agreement with the European Union. And after
President Viktor Yanukovych and the Mykola Azarov government failed
to sign, and then failed themselves, there is an opportunity either
to extract certain concessions from Moscow or to de facto return to
complementarism in some packaging or other. And in this case the
Ukraine card could be utilized in arranging the configuration of
Russian-Armenian relations.
Incidentally, “Maydan-2” also has other consequences. Following
the change of regime in Ukraine it is becoming a specific kind
of pattern for the post-Soviet area. And if Russia is currently
regarded as a country oriented towards a conservative, status-quo,
and even anti-revolutionary model, Ukraine is seen as a state in which
“shaking the foundations” is possible. Of course, revolutions and
protest movements are not transmitted with the aid of a virus. For
the Ukrainian experience to work in Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Georgia
certain preconditions are needed (the characteristics of the political
elite and of socioeconomic development, opportunities for outside
interference). But the very model whereby a politically active section
of society, mildly or ruthlessly breaking the law and invoking in the
process the people’s right to oust an authoritarian regime, itself
seeks this objective, is seen as extremely attractive. Especially
since each country has experience of its own (successful and abortive)
“Maydans.”
Armenia experienced the upheavals of 1996, 2003, and 2008. And
last year’s election results were even disputed in the streets,
albeit on nothing like the scale of 2008. It is interesting to note
that in this republic the same personages have been opponents and
supporters of “Maydan techniques” in various situations. For example,
in 1996 President Levon Ter-Petrosyan imposed a state of emergency
after his opponents attempted to storm the parliament. In 2008 Levon
Ter-Petrosyan, who was by now an oppositionist, called in the streets
for people to fight [second Armenian President Robert] Kocharyan’s
“anti-people regime” and dishonest elections. The results of the
confrontation in Armenia are today known as “Bloody Saturday.”
But if we are talking about Georgia, only last fall supreme power in
that country changed hands as a result of competitive elections rather
than a colour revolution (which put an end to Eduard Shevardnadze’s
term of office) or a military putsch (which resulted in the ousting
of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first president to be elected by universal
suffrage).
So “Maydan-2” is being studied and analysed. From various positions and
with diametrically opposed conclusions. As Leonid Kuchma, the second
Ukrainian president, said “it all depends on your vantage point.” So
long as it does not turn into the starting point of a race to oblivion.
[Translated from Russian]