Author: nina hovnanian

ANOTHER ARMENIAN DIES IN SYRIA

10:43, 26 June, 2014

YEREVAN, JUNE 26, ARMENPRESS. An ethnic-Armenian soldier of the
Syrian Army died during the clashes with the militants in the Khan
Sheikhun region of Syria’s Idlib province. “Armenpress” reports about
this citing “Damascus-Armenian Herald” Facebook page. The deceased
Armenian is Sevak Eolmesekyan, who was born in 1986. The requiem
service for Sevak Eolmesekyan will be held on June 27 in St. Sarkis
Church of Damascus. The incident occurred on May 25 of the current
year, but the information was confirmed only on June 25.

TURKEY’S ARMENIAN OPENING: TOWARDS 2015

Open Democracy
June 25 2014

Kerem Oktem and Christopher Sisserian
25 June 2014

The approaching centenary of the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman
empire is a moment for Turkey’s civil society to create a new ethical
reality around the issue

The centenary of the Armenian genocide in 1915 is fast approaching.

Much attention will shift towards Turkey, the successor state to
the Ottoman empire. Since its inception, the Turkish republic has
rejected responsibility for the genocide and mobilised its cultural
and educational infrastructure to eradicate Armenians from Turkey’s
history.

In recent years, especially since the murder of Turkish-Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007, an increasing number of
individuals and civil-society organisations has begun to engage with
the heritage and history of the country’s once substantial Armenian
communities and their violent end. This interest in parts of civil
society had little impact on government policy until 23 April 2014, the
day before the genocide’s traditional commemoration, when the office
of Turkey’s prime minister released a letter offering condolences to
the grandchildren of those that perished.

This statement was significant; it was the first time a Turkish
prime minister had addressed the issue of Armenian suffering and
loss. The letter was seen by some as a humane expression of grief
and as a departure from the cold rhetoric of Turkish denialists, who
fetishise numbers and documents in a way that barely conceals their
racist reflexes. A closer look, however, suggests that Recep Tayyip
Erdogan’s words seem less to break with the denialist mindset than
to reframe the existing state position. They do this by shifting the
gaze from the genocide, and relativising the destruction of Ottoman
Armenians through an emphasis on the uprooting and suffering of Turks
during the Balkan war and the first world war. In reality the statement
may have been more about Erdogan’s quest for power than about justice
and atonement with Armenians (whether in Turkey, in the diaspora,
or in the Armenian republic).

Turkey briefly acquired an image as role model for the Arab-spring
countries, which underpinned its attempts at regional leadership. But
after this interlude, Turkey lost much of its international credibility
over both the heavy police violence meted out to the Gezi park
protesters in 2013, and a series of foreign-policy blunders in Syria,
Egypt and Iraq. Erdogan’s AKP government has become isolated, both
domestically and internationally, and is now desperately seeking
to restore its international stature. To Erdogan’s advisers and
foreign-ministry strategists, any goodwill gesture must therefore
have appeared a sensible policy option. As 2015 drew nearer, a
symbolic change in rhetoric over the Armenian issue eventually looked
appealing. Turkey’s breach with Israel, whose camp in the United States
was once enlisted to do the dirty work of lobbying against recognition
of the genocide, meant that this route was no longer open to Ankara.

Hence Erdogan’s letter. It is a masterly work that manages to appear to
talk about the Armenian genocide without actually recognising it; that
insinuates reconciliation without acknowledging injustice; and that
uses words of condolence, while warning its recipients not to establish
“a pecking order of suffering” (i.e. not to insist on recognition).

The role of civil society

1915 means many things to different people. For Armenians it is
overwhelmingly about a sense of justice; for many liberals in Turkey
it is about the country’s democratic future; and, this must also
be said, for the majority of Turks socialised in the notoriously
nationalist education system, it means a plot by western powers to
divide Turkey’s territory.

The liberals’ argument goes like this: only by addressing the country’s
violent past and the authoritarian behemoth of the modern Turkish
state will the republic be able to transform itself into a state of
all its citizens regardless of their ethnic, religious, linguistic
heritage or gender. The Gezi park protests show there is a sizeable
constituency that would subscribe to this argument. But as prime
minister Erdogan’s relentless stance against the protesters and the
police repression against them both demonstrate, power in Turkey is
not in liberal hands. Turkey today is not much more of an inclusive
democracy than it was a decade ago.

Turkey’s civil society has often been at the forefront of the struggle
for a more democratic polity, but not necessarily for the recognition
of genocide. The latter remains a highly contested topic, which only
the most radical of civil-society organisations is ready to tackle.

The centenary of the Armenian genocide therefore presents an
opportunity for Turkey’s critical civil society to confront the
country’s record of state-organised mass violence, as well as to
explore the remnants of what once was a thriving community of Ottoman
Armenians without whose contribution Turkish culture as it is today
would be unthinkable.

Such recognition will not come from this government and probably
not from the next one either. The administration of Recep Tayyip
Erdogan has proven repeatedly that democratisation is not its primary
objective, and that any reckoning with the modern Turkish republic’s
record of violence and destruction – something built into its DNA,
and by no means a record of the past only – is not in its interest.

It is unimaginable that Erdogan, or any other Turkish political leader
in this decade, would kneel down before Yerevan’s genocide memorial
and ask for forgiveness. His letter was above all an attempt to avoid
such a heartfelt expression of grief, commiseration and responsibility
for the crimes of his forefathers’ generation.

But if political Turkey will not kneel down in the foreseeable future,
some civil-society organisations began to do so several years ago. A
series of genocide remembrance events have been held in Istanbul
and several other Turkish cities. In the Kurdish city of Diyarbakir,
a memorial was inaugurated in 2013 that laments all those killed by
injustice. In the steps of Hasan Cemal, a respected journalist and
grandson of one of the key perpetrators of the genocide, hundreds of
Turks have visited Dzidzanagabert, Armenia’s equivalent of Yad Vashem;
many have laid flowers in memory of those who perished.

So where hope can be found, it is not in the realm of strategically
placed and half-hearted swings in rhetoric but in the courageous work
of those facing history, accepting responsibility and moving beyond
enmity. Activists in Turkey have been helped in this quest by members
of the Armenian diaspora, who have moved beyond their own concerns and
fears of re-engaging with people of a country which, for many years,
has been porteayed as the enemy per se.

The position of Armenians in Turkey

Yet this is where Erdogan’s government, embattled as it is, has
also been making a difference. Not through any big strides forward,
but through simple measures such as easing the heavy discrimination
and restrictions on Armenian community life of the kind it has faced
since the foundation of the Turkish republic. Even the recent years’
limited restitution of foundation properties and church buildings,
for example, has helped reinvigorate Armenian life in Istanbul.

Istanbul’s official Armenian population today amounts to 70,000, which
may only be a faint shadow of its larger presence in the 1920s or
even the 1960s. But numbers can be misleading. For the community has
been able to sustain an impressive network of sophisticated schools,
churches and civil-society institutions, which distinguishes it from
many other Armenian communities. It is also growing in less visible
ways, and has culturally related and sympathetic kin groups all over
Turkey and beyond.

Tens of thousands of citizens from Armenia now live and work in
Turkey. Many more “Muslim Armenians” are also beginning to discover
their Armenian heritage; these are people whose grandparents survived
the genocide by forced conversion or marriage, and who are estimated
to number several hundred thousand. Some convert to Christianity,
others explore the possibilities of engaging with Armenian identity
outside the church, and yet others seek to reconcile their interest
in Armenian heritage with their Islamic faith.

Istanbul itself is also a meeting-point between those with an Armenian
connection and members of the Hemsinli community, an Armenian-speaking
Muslim population from the mountains of the eastern Black Sea, many
of whose members have migrated to Istanbul in recent decades. Their
folk songs and laments about loss, grief and survival are mutually
understood.

Istanbul today, with all things considered, therefore hosts much more
of an Armenian presence than might be glimpsed at first sight. It is
there that the genocide was planned and it also there – not in the
republic’s capital, Ankara – that the genuflections are taking place.

And it is there too that civil society will explore to what extent
Turkey can become a multicultural, multi-religious and multilingual
society of all its people: not under the conditions of Ottoman
authority or Erdogan’s authoritarianism, but in the spirit of a free
and inclusive democracy.

This article was inspired by a workshop on Armenian-Turkish relations
at Sheffield Hallam University on 8 June 2014. It was convened
by Joanne Laycock (Sheffield) and Sossie Kasbarian (Lancaster) and
brought together a wide range of academics, activists and civil-society
representatives as well as performers and filmmakers

GERMANS AGAINST NATO PERMANENT BASES IN EASTERN EUROPE: POLL

June 25, 2014 – 13:07 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – Nearly three quarters of Germans would oppose NATO
having permanent NATO military bases in eastern Europe as requested
by Poland and the Baltic states because of a perceived threat from
Russia, reveals to a new poll published on Wednesday, June 25,
according to Reuters.

Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia – all former members of the
Soviet bloc – have been among the loudest voices calling for tough
sanctions on Russia for the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and
have expressed concern about their own borders.

They count on the Western military alliance for support and have
called for a bigger and in some cases a permanent NATO presence.

Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Roivas told Reuters last week that
Western allies must “open your eyes” to the threat.

Russia is an important trading partner for Germany and the source
of more than a third of its gas – a relationship that has encouraged
caution in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s response.

But Germans are also have a broader distaste for overseas military
actions, as demonstrated by a separate Forsa poll for Stern magazine
in which 71 percent of people opposed sending German troops abroad
even when diplomacy or sanctions fail.

NATO has tripled the number of fighter jets based in the Baltics and
NATO’s top military commander, U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove,
said last month NATO would have to consider permanently stationing
troops in eastern Europe.

But some NATO allies argue that permanent basing of large numbers
of troops in the former Soviet bloc is too expensive, not a military
necessity and needlessly provocative to Moscow.

Poland wants NATO to base troops on its territory but Moscow says
this would violate Russia’s 1997 agreement with NATO.

In the Forsa poll for the Internationale Politik magazine’s latest
edition due on Friday, 74 percent of people surveyed were against
the idea while only 18 percent supported it. Opposition to permanent
NATO bases in eastern Europe was higher in former communist eastern
Germany, Forsa said.

HOUSE & SENATE APPROPRIATORS ADOPT U.S. FUNDING TO ARMENIA & THE REGION, MAINTAIN SECTION 907 OF THE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT

By MassisPost
Updated: June 24, 2014

WASHINGTON, DC – The US House Appropriations Committee approved on
Tuesday its Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations Bill, which covers U.S.

economic, humanitarian, and military assistance to the South Caucasus.

Specific funding levels to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Nagorno
Karabakh were not delineated in the bill.

The House bill was similar to the Senate version, which was approved
last week. Both bills maintained Section 907 of the Freedom Support
Act, restating the six customary exemptions for humanitarian and
other assistance to Azerbaijan. Section 907 was enacted in 1992 and
requires the Government of Azerbaijan to take “demonstrable steps
to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force” against
Armenia and Artsakh.

However, the Senate report language, unlike the House, specifically
highlighted funding to Nagorno Karabakh as follows: “The Committee
recommends assistance for victims of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
in amounts consistent with prior years, and for ongoing needs related
to the conflict.”

Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL), who serves on the Senate Appropriations
Committee, told the Assembly that “continued assistance for the people
of Nagorno-Karabakh remains an important priority.” Commenting on
the House bill, Congressman Adam Schiff (D-CA), who sits on the House
Appropriations Committee, stated, “I am disappointed that we could not
reach agreement on language underscoring the need for humanitarian
assistance in Nagorno Karabakh. We must continue to fight for this
assistance as the bill moves through the legislative process to ensure
the best possible outcome for our allies Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.

Given the bellicose language and attacks coming from Azerbaijan
on a daily basis, this aid is absolutely critical for the freedom,
prosperity and self-determination of those in the region,” Schiff
told the Armenian Assembly.

The House and Senate FY 2015 SFOPS bills each totaled approximately $48
billion, which is some $700 million below the enacted FY 2014 level,
and roughly $280 million less than the President’s FY 2015 request.

The Administration’s budget calls for $1.7 million in Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) and $600,000 in International Military
Education Training (IMET) for Armenia and Azerbaijan. This amounts
to a reduction of $1 million for FMF from last year’s budget request,
however IMET funding is consistent with past years and military parity
is maintained between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In addition to FMF and IMET assistance, the Administration’s FY 2015
budget also recommended that Armenia receive $20.7 million in Economic
Support Funds (compared to the FY 2014 request of $24.7 million), and
$1.7 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(compared to the FY 2014 request of $2.8 million). The Administration’s
budget also zeroed out global health funding for Armenia. In total,
the FY 2015 budget provides $24.7 million in U.S.

assistance to Armenia, which is a $6.143 million reduction when
compared to the Administration’s FY 2014 request of $30.843 million.

After both measures pass their respective chambers, the next step in
the legislative process involves the creation of an Appropriations
conference committee, whose members will work out the differences
between the House and Senate versions of the bill before sending it
to the President for him to sign into law.

IF ARMENIA NEGOTIATES WITH WTO, RUSSIA MUST DO THE SAME – OPINIONS

20:59 * 24.06.14

If Armenia has to start negotiations for compensation with the World
Trade Organization (WTO) after joining the Eurasian Economic Union,
Russia should do the same, economic Tatul Manaseryan told Tert.am.

Both the states, as members of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), should harmonize the rules of the game.

“If such a problem exists, Armenia must not be alone. If membership in
the Eurasian Economic Union requires such rules of the game, work is
necessary with both the states, without any restrictions on Armenia,”
Mr Manaseryan said.

According to , First Vice-Premier of Russia
Igor Shuvalov stated that Armenia has to start negotiations for
compensations with the WTO if it successfully joins the Eurasian
Economic Union.

As to whether it could be an artificial barrier to Armenia’s accession
to the Eurasian Economic Union, Mr Manaseryan said:

“If Armenia turns out the only one that needs to negotiate, we can
understand it. The rules of the game must apply not only to Armenia,
but also to Russia. If Russia has already conducted negotiations,
that is quite another matter. However, if it is only Armenia that has
to meet this requirement, the issue needs studying more thoroughly.”

As to possible problems if Armenia resigns its WTO membership, Mr
Manaseryan said that none of the around 200 WTO members has so far
resigned its membership.

“Their membership was not suspended even after repeated violations of
the rules of the game. The WTO prefers resolving problems to creating
them. Armenia has been consistent in meeting all the requirements. Nor
can the issue of ‘either…or’ be raised because it would run counter
to high international standards. Moreover, the other Eurasian Economic
Union member-states have WTO membership problems.”

Economist Vardan Bostanjyan considers absurd the possibility of
Armenia’s negotiating with the WTO.

“Armenia has been a WTO member for more than ten years and has met all
the requirements. In fact, there is no problem of negotiations. Russia
is just offering Armenia to be expelled from the WTO and join the
Eurasian Economic Union as a humble servant.

But, to put it mildly, they say Armenia has to negotiate. But this
is absurd.”

Armenia should initially have been able to conduct itself in such a
way that would have prevented it finding itself in such a situation.

“The process of Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union has
reached a stage when they can play with us the game they have played.

They are humiliating us so that they can do to Armenia whatever they
want,” Mr Bostanjyan said.

Armenian News – Tert.am

WHY DID NOT THE BLACK SEA EVOLVE INTO A ZONE OF COOPERATION?

Journal of Turkish Weekly
June 24 2014

Selcuk Colakoglu

Leaders from 11 countries came together on June 5, 1992, publishing
the Istanbul Declaration, the founding document for the Organization
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). BSEC’s primary goal was
to declare to the world that the Black Sea Basin was no longer a zone
of polarization and rivalry, but one of cooperation and integration.

Uncertainties surrounding the region in the aftermath of the Cold War,
due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc at
large, were to be eliminated in order to establish a solid ground
for cooperation.

Turkey and Russia were historically opposed to each other based
on long lasting tensions, such as the rivalry between the Ottoman
Empire and Tsarist Russia, and the Cold War rivalry between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. A new initiative aimed at enhancing cooperation and
paving the way for peaceful coexistence in the Black Sea Basin was
jointly pioneered in 1992 by Turkey and Russia. Moreover, countries of
the Balkans and South Caucasus were also included under the umbrella
of BSEC, meaning that the organization covered a key region broader
than Black Sea littoral. Turkey even offered Greece, with which it was
experiencing continued tensions over Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea, to
become a founding member of BSEC, a risky move that clearly indicated
a prevailing mood of optimism conducive to enhanced cooperation.

Likewise, Azerbaijan and Armenia also took the plunge and joined
the initiative at the same time, despite the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh.

Indeed, another goal of BSEC was to allow for countries which had
territorial disputes and cross-border minority issues to gradually
sink their differences through peaceful means via regular contact. The
shared hope of all parties was to witness the gradual resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia,
Georgia’s problems with the federal states of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the Chechnian conflict confronting Russia, and the dispute
over Transnistria in Moldova, through efficient diplomacy and joint
efforts in which enhanced cooperation in the Black Sea Basin would
result. Likewise, problems which emerged after the dissolution of
Yugoslavia and the consequent civil war in Bosnia could have been
resolved through the BSEC mechanism. In fact, it was even thought
that such a spirit of cooperation and peaceful dialogue around the
Black Sea Basin could result in a new engagement process between
Athens and Ankara. Moreover, the U.S. and the EU also gave indirect
support to the foundation of BSEC, thus demonstrating their willingness
to assist countries in the region to join forces. Therefore, it is
accurate to say that Turkey and Russia were clearly on the right side
of history when BSEC was founded, as the organization was supported
by all prominent actors in regional and global politics.

Russia’s return to its ‘near abroad’

After a while, the initial mood of optimism that prevailed over the
Black Sea Basin during the first half of the 1990s was replaced by
a context marked by divergent interests and policies. That is, BSEC
and other regional bodies were unable to gain momentum despite all
efforts. Even though BSEC evolved into a regional organization with
a permanent secretariat in Istanbul by 1999, cooperation could not
be deepened.

A major reason why enhanced cooperation could not be achieved was
due to the fact that Russia, which overcame the shock caused by the
collapse of the Soviet Union within only in a couple of years, began to
exert its Soviet-era influence once again. In this respect, Russia did
not wish to see Turkey and other Western countries playing an active
role in a region which it considered its hinterland. Moscow was also
afraid of former Soviet republics pursuing an independent foreign
policy and possibly attaining total economic independence from Russia.

Based on such a perspective, as Moscow recurred its power, Russia
gradually expanded its clout over these newly independent states
thanks to its political, military, and economic capacities, and
managed to balance developed Western countries’ rising influence in
the region. In its close neighborhood, Russia froze the conflicts in
Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, in order
to keep a tight rein on Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.

Furthermore, when the pro-Western government in Georgia led by Mikheil
Saakashvili “crossed the line” and tried to reassert its control over
South Ossetia in 2008, Russia entered into a war with Georgia as an
act of punishment. Seeing that Georgia could not resist Russia on its
own, it was disappointed that NATO and the EU were unable to provide
necessary support. After all, Russia managed to “punish” Georgia once
again by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

>From such a perspective, what is currently going on in Ukraine is a
clear indication of a Russian strategy that is aimed at penalizing
countries in its near abroad which refuse to abide by the rules of
the game set by Moscow.

Independent policies of NATO and the EU

Countries in the region which feel insecure due to Russia’s
resurgence, prefer to engage with NATO rather than counting on regional
organizations like BSEC. This is because they consider NATO a powerful
actor which can shield them from security threats, whereas regional
organizations such as BSEC are rather ineffective. NATO became the sole
organization upon which countries in the region of the Black Sea Basin
relied for maintaining security; for NATO’s capabilities were affirmed
on several key occasions, such as the Civil War in Bosnia and the
crisis in Kosovo, where it intervened successfully. Romania, Bulgaria,
and Albania, which are all BSEC members, became NATO members in due
course in order to guarantee their territorial integrity. Similarly,
the prospects of NATO membership became all the more attractive in
the eyes of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia on the grounds that
these countries could not maintain amiable relations with Russia
after 1990. Correspondingly, the subject of NATO membership acquired
currency in Ukraine when pro-Western governments came to power there.

Under such circumstances, EU membership also became a priority for
countries located in the Black Sea Basin because of the prospects it
offered in terms of economic development and prosperity. The EU became
littoral to the Black Sea after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria
to the Union. Later on, the EU expanded its membership perspective
to cover all Balkan countries. For Turkey, which received candidate
status in 1999, the EU took priority over any other international
organization, including BSEC.

Western countries began to ignore BSEC only one or two years after
its establishment in 1992, despite the fact that they were initially
supportive. Neither BSEC nor any other regional initiatives were
mentioned in the expansion and partnership programs promoted by
the EU and NATO in the greater Black Sea Region. Therefore, BSEC was
unable to develop common strategies with NATO or the EU. Additionally,
unilateral policies formulated and implemented by NATO and the EU with
the aim of eastward enlargement caused Russia to feel threatened,
and as a result Moscow distanced itself from cooperation-oriented
policies. On the other hand, although NATO and the EU enfranchised
some Black Sea countries, they were unable to put forth any tangible
vision with regard to policies to be pursued if Georgia, Ukraine,
Moldova, or Azerbaijan were threatened, consequently exposing these
countries to increased Russian interference.

As a result, Russia’s relentless efforts to expand its influence once
again, in addition to coordinated unilateral enlargement initiatives
put into action by NATO and the EU, inevitably undermined BSEC’s
promise and potential to establish a solid ground for regional
cooperation. Today, it is polarization and war, instead of cooperation
and peace, that characterize the current context around the Black Sea
region. In this respect, the course of the Ukrainian crisis will act
as a serious litmus test that will reveal the true prospects of the
“greater European idea”.

ABRAHAMYAN: IT SECTOR CRUCIAL TO ARMENIAN ECONOMY

CISTran Finance
June 24 2014

June 24, 2014 6:00 AM
By Lawrence Pinkel

Armenian Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan, the prime minister
of Armenia, stressed the importance of the country’s burgeoning
information technology sector as vital to the national economy.

According to a recent study from the World Bank, information technology
is the fastest growing sector of the Armenian economy. The number
of individuals employed in the IT sector doubled from approximately
5,000 in 2010 to more than 10,000 in 2013.

“The IT sector is very important for the economy,” Abrahamyan said
at the Digitec 2014 IT forum in Yerevan, according to ARKA. “It is
our crude oil, gas and sea.”

Abrahamyan said the government will work to provide legislative
changes that would support domestic producers and extend privileges
to small and medium-sized businesses, thereby working to minimize
shadow turnover at larger companies. He also said recently that his
cabinet would be strictly punishing companies for shadow activities.

Abrahamyan held a meeting with the 100 wealthiest business people in
Armenia last month, where a July 1 deadline was set for companies to
stop evading taxes and abusing their market positions.

“We do not look at SMEs as taxpayers-our aim is to ensure level
playing field for all,” Abrahamyan said, ARKA reports.

BRASSEUR QUERIES ARMENIA MOTION AS AZERBAIJAN TAKES CENTRE STAGE IN STRASBOURG

Virtual Press Office
June 24 2014

STRASBOURG, France, June 24, 2014 /PRNewswire/ —

The President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
Anne Brasseur, says a procedural hitch could stall a motion for
sanctions against Armenia over its occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh
and surrounding territories.

Speaking at the start of the PACE summer session in Strasbourg she
said the motion, which seeks to suspend Armenia’s voting rights just
as Russia recently lost its voting rights over Crimea, did not follow
the rules.

“We have a motion tabled by Mr. Suleymanov from Azerbaijan in order
to take sanctions against Armenia,” she said.

“This motion has not been tabled according to the rules because it
does not challenge (Armenia’s) credentials,” she added, pointing out
it will now be referred to Friday’s Bureau meeting.

Her remarks left the motion’s sponsor, Azerbaijani MP and PACE delegate
Elkhan Suleymanov, disappointed but defiant.

“We received 58 signatures from 14 countries in support of this motion
and if we need to work through a procedural issue in order to get it
heard, then we will do so,” he said.

Later the PACE session was addressed by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister
Elmar Mammadyarov who now chairs the PACE Committee of Ministers.

He reaffirmed the Committee’s – and his nation’s – commitment
to finding peace in Ukraine, which he said highlights the often
conflicting issues of self-determination and territorial integrity.

Throughout Europe, he said, self-determination works within existing
boundaries and above all the legal principle of territorial integrity
must remain intact. This is the case for both Ukraine’s Crimea and
Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh.

“It’s a must in Azerbaijan that there should not be any confusion
that territorial integrity was a subject for negotiation. Never ever,”
he told the assembly.

“You can recognise that self-determination does not mean a violation
of territorial integrity.”

Mammadyarov dedicated his nation’s chairmanship of the Committee of
Ministers to the issues of human rights, fighting corruption and a
reassessment of European neighbourhood policy.

SOURCE Azerbaijan Monitor

BERKLEY PROFESSOR DISCUSSES UPCOMING GENOCIDE CENTENNIAL OF THE MASSACRE OF ARMENIANS

History News Network
June 24 2014

Panorama.am interviewed Dr. Stephan Astourian, professor of history
and director of the Armenian studies program at the University of
California, Berkeley. Dr. Astourian commented on a number of issues
related to the Armenian Genocide centennial in 2015.

NVARD CHALIKIAN: Dr. Astourian, how do you assess the current policy
of Armenian leaders towards Turkey as well as the overall program
for the Genocide centennial in 2015?

DR. STEPHAN ASTOURIAN: Armenia’s current policy toward Turkey fits
with, and prolongs, the Armenian-Turkish Protocols signed in Zurich in
October 2009. These protocols, which encompassed massive concessions
on the part of Armenia in exchange for the tentative opening of the
border by Turkey, were “dead on arrival.” They remain so until now.

It is difficult to answer your question about the “overall program
of the Genocide Centennial” because I am unaware of any such program,
assuming it exists. Even though the State Committee dealing with this
matter has met three times, it has not made public any program. All
that we have at this point is a logo and a somewhat vague motto. Being
well aware of the activities of the San Francisco-Bay Area Armenian
Centennial Organizing Committee, I can state that nothing could be
organized on time for the Centennial in our region if our community
leaders had not started planning for it as early as the end of 2013.

N.C.: What is your view regarding the fact that the President of
Armenia has invited the President of Turkey to Armenia to commemorate
the Genocide centennial? What do you think will be the result of this?

S.A.: Inviting Turkey’s President in April 2015 is at best a minor
tactical move which serves public relations goals. Turkish policy is
coherent and it will not be altered because of this invitation. Turkey
is not going to undermine its very strong strategic ties with
Azerbaijan in order to recognize the Armenian Genocide. In addition,
it is unlikely that the latest aggression on Nakhichevan’s border,
which caused Armenian casualties, could have taken place without
prior Turkish knowledge of, or assent to, it. In this context and in
the best scenario, Turkey might make at best some ambiguous, vague
gesture or declaration in 2015…

ARMENIA CUTS RATE 3RD TIME, SEES Q3 INFLATION UNDER TARGET

CountingPips
June 24 2014

June 24, 2014

By CentralBankNews.info

Armenia’s central bank cut its benchmark repurchase rate by 25 basis
points to 7.0 percent, its third cut this year, and said it expects
inflation to continue to ease in the coming months with the rate
dropping below the bank’s lower acceptable limit in the third quarter.

The Central Bank of Armenia (CBA), which has now cut its rate by
75 basis points this year, targets inflation at a midpoint of 4.0
percent within a range of plus/minus 1.5 percentage points.

Armenia’s inflation rate eased to 3.6 percent in May from 4.4 percent
in April and has been on a declining trend in the last nine months.

The CBA, which has forecast inflation this year of 2.5-5.5 percent,
said inflation should improve in the fourth quarter of this year,
helped by an expansionary fiscal policy and easier monetary policy.

The Gross Domestic Product of Armenia, located to the east of Turkey
and west of Azerbaijan, expanded by an annual rate of 3.1 percent in
the first quarter of this year, down from the fourth quarter’s rate
of 5.1 percent. In 2013 the economy expanded by 3.2 percent.

In May the central bank revised downwards it growth forecast for
2014 to 4.1-4.8 percent from a previous forecast of 5.4-6.1 percent,
mainly due to worsening conditions in Russia, Armenia’s major trading
and investment partner, and the delayed commission of the Teghut
copper mine.