Open Democracy
Aug 10 2014
Azerbaijan: a dual offensive
Vicken Cheterian 11 August 2014
Azerbaijan’s strategy over the disputed, Armenian-held territory of
Karabakh is also aimed at eliminating domestic opposition. But the
country’s rising troubles make this a self-defeating strategy.
The frontlines between Azerbaijan and Karabakh, as well as with
Armenia, are seeing renewed military escalation. The Azerbaijani
defence ministry says thirteen Azerbaijani soldiers have died during
military operations, while Armenian official sources recognise the
death of five Armenian servicemen.
The clashes are the most serious since May 1994, when a ceasefire was
signed between the three parties and stop military operations in the
Karabakh war. The conflict started in the late Soviet years, when the
Armenian majority of the Karabakh autonomous region demanded on 21
February 1988 to be detached from Soviet Azerbaijan and be attached to
Soviet Armenia. The Soviet as well as Azerbaijani leadership not only
rejected this demand but attempted to repress the popular
mobilisation, including via a series of anti-Armenian pogroms in
Azerbaijani cities. As the Soviet Union collapsed the two sides fought
a war, at the end of which Karabakh Armenian forces supported by
Armenia not only controlled Karabakh proper, but also occupied seven
surrounding Azerbaijani provinces. An estimated 35,000 people died
from all sides of the conflict, while nearly a million people became
refugees.
While it is difficult to indicate who initiated the military attacks,
the come in a larger context of escalation from the Azerbaijani side.
The latest, moreover, serves Azerbaijani political objectives. After
years of negotiations under Azerbaijan’s then president Heydar Aliev,
his successor (and son) Ilham Aliev took a bellicose position on the
issue of Karabakh. This was influenced by the completion in 2005 of
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which was capable to transport a million
barrel of oil per day. Since, Azerbaijani state budget exploded, and
so did its military spending, which increased form $175m dollars in
2003 to over $3.6bn dollars in 2013. Azerbaijani leaders repeat that
their military budget is equal to the entire budget of the Armenian
government.
Parallel to the dramatic increase in military expenditure, the
Azerbaijani position hardened. The number of military incidents
increased on the Karabakh front, as well as along the
Armenian-Azerbaijani borders.
The opposition under fire
The latest military escalation on the war-fronts comes in the same
moment as a massive attack by Azerbaijani authorities against
independent-minded individuals including political experts,
human-rights defenders and NGO workers. The latest in a long series
was Arif Yunusov, a sociologist specialising in migration, refugees,
Islam and other topics. Yunusov was arrested on 5 August, accused of
collaboration “with representatives of Armenian special services.” A
few days earlier, Leyla Yunusova his wife and human-rights activist
was arrested with similar charges reminding the glorious days of
Joseph Stalin. On 2 August the authorities arrested another
human-rights activist, the 29-year-old Rasul Jafarov, under
accusations of “tax evasion, illegal entrepreneurship, and abuse of
authority.”
The Azerbaijani presidential advisor Ali Hasanov made a revealing link
between the arrests and the escalation of the conflict, when he
commented on the arrest of Leyla Yunusova: “It is clear that there’s
an anti-national group within Azerbaijan directed by external forces,
with big suspicions of having ties with the Armenian lobby.”
The massive arrests of opposition figures, journalists and
human-rights activists started in early in 2014, parallel with
escalation on the frontline. Tofig Yagublu, deputy chair of the major
opposition party Musavat was arrested in March and thrown into jail
with a seven-year sentence. In April, Turkish authorities arrested
Rauf Mirgadirov, an Azerbaijani journalist and writer who was living
in Turkey, and deported to Baku where he was immediately arrested and
jailed. In July, another human-rights activist and educator from
Ganja, Hasan Huseynli, was condemned to six years’ imprisonment for
attacking and “stabbing a man.”
Oddly, Azerbaijan from May-November 2014 chairs the Council of Europe,
the European institution in charge of democracy and human rights. It
suggests that the international political organisations have a sense
of humour equal to Samuel Beckett’s theatre of the absurd.
The arrests and intimidations against all freethinkers in Azerbaijan
has taken a massive dimension in the last months. This is not anymore
selective intimidation to spread fear and self-censorship among the
society. The current wave of repression aims to destroy any
independent capacity of the Azerbaijani society to voice critical
thinking.
The source of tension
Azerbaijan accuses the Armenian side of being no more than a pawn in
the hands of the Kremlin. Yet, in their policies, Baku has done
everything possible so that Armenian reliance on Russia does not
decrease. For example, in 2008 as Turkey initiated a rapprochement
with Armenia, aiming to end its blockade, open the common borders, and
establish diplomatic relations, it was the vehement opposition of
Azerbaijani officials which resulted in the failure of Turkish
diplomatic move.
In 2013, as the European Union was proposing its association project
to Armenia, Baku received Vladimir Putin who announced arms contracts
of $4bn dollars to Azerbaijan. This was a clear sign that Putin was
angry, and ready to shift the military balance in favour of
Azerbaijan, and succeeded in preventing Armenia from joining the
European project. Any rapprochement between Armenia with Turkey or the
EU would have reduced Armenian reliance on Russia. This time too the
tension in the south Caucasus seems likely to help Moscow. The two
presidents, Ilham Aliev and Serzh Sargsyan, travelled to Sochi on 10
August to meet with the Russian leader; in the aftermath, Russian
media are full of reports highlighting Putin’s role in moderating the
dispute, though the only sign of this is that the leaders are quoted
in favour of negotiation to sttle the dispute.
Yet the main objective of the Aliev regime from the military
escalation is internal. In spite of its aggressive discourse, the
Azerbaijani administration is torn by similar tensions as the ones
which exploded by the Arab spring. Ilham Aliev came to power in 2003
by transforming a republic into dynastic rule. The only other such
success was in Syria three years earlier when Bashar al-Asad succeeded
his father Hafez, and (again like Syria) the Azeri regime is composed
of a specific sub-group – the “Nakhichevan clan” – although their
group cohesion is nothing to compare with Syrian ruling clan.
Azerbaijan has an exploding demography, with youth unemployment a
serious issue. The oil revenues are in decline, an omen for times of
trouble.
Public dissatisfaction can be measured by the large number of Azeri
jihadis fighting with ISIS in Syrian and Iraq. This is a new
phenomenon; there were almost no Azeri combatants in the Chechnya wars
or in Iraq. In 2013, over 200 Azerbaijanis were fighting with jihadi
formations against the Syrian army, and thirty had died. Entire
families, including large numbers of children are moving to the Middle
Eastern battlefronts, as videos posted on the internet reveal.
With the emergence of a salafi-jihadi current in Azerbaijan, there is
a parallel increase in sectarian tensions. The country has a Shi’a
majority with nearly two-third of the population, and a one-third
Sunni minority, historically marginalised, and originating from the
mountainous north of the country. In July, a mob attacked a mosque in
Sabirabad in south Azerbaijan, targeting religious Sunni Muslims,
beating them and forcibly shaving their beards. Few days later salafis
attacked Shi’a believers in a Baku suburb. Azerbaijan, after decades
of Soviet atheism, is newly discovering religion, importing all of its
contradictions from neighbouring Middle Eastern countries including
sectarian tensions.
The increasing internal repression reflects the Aliev administration’s
fear. Yet its actions can backfire. The threat to its stability comes
neither from Karabakh Armenians nor Azerbaijani civil society. By
attacking those two targets Aliev will eventually strengthen
salafi-jihadi trends; by destroying civil society will disarm the
Azerbaijani people against the new danger. In this context, Aliev’s
choice to deepen the tension over Karabakh hands a further cause to
the radicals.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/vicken-cheterian/azerbaijan-dual-offensive