GOOD POLICIES SHOULD MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS
By Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs
The Moscow Times
March 19 2008
Russia
At his first news conference following his election victory,
President-elect Dmitry Medvedev touched upon only one foreign relations
topic. He said Moscow’s priority was the Commonwealth of Independent
States, and he promised that his first state visit would be to one
of the CIS countries.
That would have not have been such a noteworthy remark were it not
for the interesting events that are unfolding in the CIS countries,
altering the region’s political landscape once again.
The former republics of the Soviet Union for the most part have
completed the process of becoming independent states. These countries
have achieved full-fledged statehood and are not at risk of losing
that status in the foreseeable future.
The post-Soviet states are entering a new stage of development.
During the first phase, each tried to decide which ideological
stance would be most advantageous. That is now giving way to a more
pragmatic approach. In other words, these countries are reconsidering
the previous stereotype that Russia is the bogeyman and that Europe
is some kind of paradise.
In the 1990s these countries were focused on resolving problems of
basic survival and could not look far beyond their borders. Once
that was accomplished, the political elite, comprising nationalist
and nomenklatura elements, have turned their attention to finding a
place for their countries in the greater political picture.
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 was a turning point in the
policies of all post-Soviet countries. Moscow’s aggressive stance
during that period turned out to be so counterproductive that it
decided to switch tactics.
>From the spring of 2005, the Kremlin took the following approach:
Inasmuch as it was powerless to change the political situation in
the countries along its borders, there was no point in trying to do so.
But it would not lift a finger to help any state that departed from
the approved path. Further, those states would automatically be given
"least-preferred" status and would not be able to count on economic
or other indulgences from Moscow.
>From that point on, the Kremlin distanced itself from the passions
simmering in neighboring states. Although this did not protect Moscow
from getting blamed for every misdeed — the result of its dominating
role in the region — it did enable it to save resources and lower
tensions.
Naturally, Russia’s mercantilist approach did not make it very popular
in the world community, especially among the former Soviet states,
which hope for a more benevolent and promising patron.
But Moscow’s new course has clearly highlighted the objective limits
to these opportunities — to both the CIS countries and their would-be
benefactors on both sides of the Atlantic. A host of former Soviet
republics has felt deeply dependent upon Russia. And the politicians
of the European Union, for example, have demonstrated that their
readiness and desire to actively participate in transforming these
newly independent states is fairly limited.
That realization forced each country to make a choice.
The first option available to each country is to continue distancing
itself from Russia and gradually move into the orbit of a different
global power, as Georgia is doing.
The second option is to try to follow a separate and independent
course — a viable option only for countries blessed with abundant
natural resources.
The third option is to strengthen relations with Moscow and to use
its help in solving domestic problems, as Moldova has done.
Ukraine serves as a unique example. During the last gas crisis, the
two leading players of the Orange Revolution tried to draw Russia into
the role of refereeing their mutual disagreement. Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko have butted
heads over the role of Gazprom and intermediaries in the natural gas
trade, which have been stigmatized for interfering in the affairs of
Russia’s sovereign neighbors.
Changes were also brought about by another external factor — the
West. Elections have become a national pastime in many countries.
Wherever there is the slightest degree of political freedom, the
opposition accuses the authorities of widespread election fraud. But
until now, it has been an unwritten rule that the arbiters in such
disputes are election observers from international organization,
such as the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. When
OSCE observers express doubt regarding an election’s fairness and
validity, this mobilizes opposition forces to organize an election
campaign against the ruling elite. In some cases, this results in
a change of leadership. If, however, the observers certify that an
election meets democratic standards, efforts to contest the results
quickly lose steam.
The recent presidential election in Armenia proved an exception to this
rule. International observers confirmed that the election met European
standards. But the opposition, led by former Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrosyan, ignored their verdict and continued to demand that his
"stolen victory" be returned.
The OSCE’s reputation also suffered in Georgia, where the observers’
mission made a quick initial conclusion that the vote had been
honest, then expressed some doubts, and finally confirmed the original
opinion. By the way, the final verdict released a few days ago, which
was more critical in tone than the one issued immediately after the
election, strengthened the impression that conflicting motives were
behind the group’s evaluation. The result is that the Western standard
no longer appears as unbiased as it was before.
The primary question of post-Soviet regional politics in the coming
years will be how each of the CIS member countries defines its
relationship to Moscow.
If Russia is interested in expanding its influence, it will have to
make corrections to the course it has been following since 2005.
Countries that are willing to develop closer relations with Moscow
will be more responsive if the Kremlin offers attractive economic
and political incentives.
There are already signs that Moscow is making efforts toward change.
These include a willingness to sell arms at domestic prices to members
of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and a clear change
in Russia’s approach to Abkhazia and South Ossetia — threatening to
apply the Kosovo precedent on the one hand and developing a settlement
plan for the Transdnestr territorial problem on the other.
But Russia’s policy should be based on well-defined principles
and should be designed not for short-term effect, but for creating
long-term, partnership relations with other countries. For that,
Russia might have to renounce some short-term gains, but pragmatism,
after all, does not always mean maximizing profits.