CONTEMPORARY TURKISH DIPLOMACY IN THE RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA BUILT ON PRINCIPLES OF THE MIDDLE AGE AND THE 19TH CENTURY
David Stepanyan
ArmInfo
June 19 2009
An interview with Hayk Demoyan, Director of the Armenian Genocide
Museum-Institute at the Armenian National Academy of Science, Candidate
of Science (History), specialist in Oriental Studies
Mr. Demoyan, over the last two months the Armenian-Turkish process has
been slackening in the background of the visits by Turkish high-ranking
officials to Azerbaijan. What is the reason of such slowdown and what
generally takes place in the given process?
I think one of the scenarios laid by the Armenian and Turkish
parties at the very beginning of this process is implemented at
present. Actually, Yerevan’s stand regarding establishment of relations
with Ankara without preconditions is not bluff. But Ankara evidently
has faced serious problems in this way. I’d not say that Turkey pursued
the scenario of dropping this process or trying to reveal the stand or
the level of opposition by Azerbaijan to it. What is currently taking
place in Turkey is the weighting of benefits and implications, which
is well reflected against the background of the isolated interests of
various forces in the Turkish political spectrum. These are, first of
all, the interests of servicemen, Islamists, nationalists, secularists
and ultra-nationalists. In this case t he process exceeds the frames
of the context of the negotiations between Armenia and Turkey. A
superficial analysis of the domestic political situation in Turkey
will show that servicemen, which are still afraid of something, play
the role of the first fiddle. The general officers of that country
are already an institution, which has exhausted itself and does not
meet the norms of the international law of the 21st century.
Turkish officers have still preserved the mark of the ‘cold war’
heritage, which is displayed at the internal pressing of servicemen
on the civil authorities of Turkey.
This is evidence of the fact that just servicemen are the main
obstacle on the way of democratization of Turkey and its European
integration. And the process of settling relations with Armenia,
which they are also against, is one of the episodes in the domestic
political contradiction in Turkey.
Do general officers fight mainly to counteract the party of Erdogan
and Gul?
Naturally, the fight of general officers is chiefly leading to
contradiction against the party of Erdogan and Gul. The contradiction
has been already displayed, as servicemen being against foreign
political course of the Party of Justice and Development, show that
they are the opposition to the top of the Turkish political iceberg.
What about the role of first fiddle in the slowdown of the
Armenian-Turkish process? Are these the domestic factors, you have
mentioned, or it is thundering Azerbaijan?
Actually domestic political factors in Turkey play the role of in
the slowdown of the Armenian-Turkish process, though Azerbaijan’s
role in this process is not secondary either.
Armenia’s step towards Turkey could not but affect the mutual interests
of the two friendly states: Azerbaijan and Turkey. Such was the power
of that step that could not but bring certain disagreement between
Azerbaijani and Turkish political elites although it had no initial
goal to drive a wedge between those states.
In this context, the ruling elites in Turkey and Azerbaijan are very
likely to take certain well-developed measures regarding Armenia,
which has already been observed. But opening of the border will
have a psychological effect on the Azerbaijani public and on Turkey
anyway. Nevertheless, the latest statements by Davutoghlu have not
made clear what the political maneuvers of Turkey are aimed at in the
context of no specific terms exiting for resolution of the problem
in the Armenian-Turkish relations.
What’s behind the statements by Ahmed Davudoghlu regarding the end
of the cold war between Armenian and Turkey?
I do not understand well enough what he means under this statement. If
the also includes international recognition of the Armenian Genocide,
I will have to disappoint him – the process has always been and
will go on despite any impulses in the process of establishment of
re lations between Armenia and Turkey. The Armenian-Turkish process
on establishment of relations cannot proceed due to the historical
memory of the Armenians, as well as refusal of the policy aimed at
international recognition of the Armenian Genocide
Turkey’s interests are clear. What will Armenia gain from the formal
continuation of the process when there is no real consensus between
Armenia and Turkey?
Nothing. Therefore, Armenia puts quite a strict pre-condition against
Turkey.
It is known that Turkey puts forward three pre-conditions. But stemming
from the logic of the Armenian-Turkish process, in fact, another
pre-condition of the Armenian party is also becoming visible. Armenian
President Serzh Sargsyan mentioned it in one of his interviews, when
he said that if the Armenian-Turkish border does not open till October,
he will not visit Turkey for the joint watching of the football match.
Does it mean that we have nevertheless put Ankara within the frames?
Yes, it does. And this make even more unclear Davudoghu’s statement
that it will be wrong if Serzh Sargsyan does not arrive in Turkey
because of the shut down borders.
In this context, Turkish Minister should remember of diplomatic
ethics, which does not allow such a high-ranking diplomat to make
statements and recommendations dictating any steps to the president
of another country.
Analysis of Davudoghlu’s statements makes clear that the logic
of continuation of the Armenian-Turkish process without any results
for this year has been exhausted. All this leads to the moment when
the Turkish party will open it since we make no obstacles to this. In
addition, symbolically, it has already been opened.
This means that the process has already become the headache for
Ankara, a problem that is no longer considered a joint problem with
Armenia. Actually, Turkey has torpedoed the negotiating process for
certain momentary interests. All this makes clear that Turkey is
simply unable to open the border to Armenia for certain short-term
and long-term interests>, Damoyan said.
Don’t you think that this problem will become general again if the
president of Armenia does not leave to watch the football match given
the despair of the Turkish and, first of all, Azerbaijani propaganda?
I don’t think so. Refusal of the president of Armenia to visit Istanbul
will aggravate Ankara’s state in the Armenian-Turkish negotiations as,
in this case, all the affirmations of Turkey, including identification
of the ‘Road-map’ about the two countries’ intentions, will turn
out just a fiction, a game, which Armenia will finish with the
least losses. Someone naive will surely claim that as a result of
these negotiations Barack Obama did not mention the word ‘Genocide’
in his April 24 speech. However, it is not as important as it seems
to them. Our relative victory in this ca se will be to demonstrate
and prove to the world that our neighbour Turkey is negotiating with
Armenia applying diplomatic methods of the 19th Century, despite the
fact that those times passed long ago.
Contemporary Turkish diplomacy in the relations with Armenia contains
two principles. The first principle is inherited from the Middle Age
and the second from the 19th century. The first principle is based on
the slogan ‘one nation – two states’, though such a tribal approach
does not suit a state aspiring for the European Union. Let’s imagine
a situation where Germany and Austria block Czech Republic basing on
common ethnic origination of Austrians and Germans. Such an approach is
simply inadmissible to a country striving to join the European family.
As regards the policy of the 19th century Turkey applies in the
relations with Armenia, it is the policy of blockade, military methods
and pressing through the border shut down. Leaving alone that Turkey
trying to ‘return the occupied territories’ to Azerbaijan has itself
occupied a part of the European Union. It is not even the policy of
dual standards; it is the policy of the 19th century.
The Armenian opposition believes that possible establishment of the
joint commission of historians will mean Armenia’s refusal from the
policy of international recognition of Armenian Genocide. What is
the reason of such radical approach?
The reasons are to be sought in th e domestic political fight in
Armenia. Setting up a Commission of Armenian-Turkish historians
will become another argument for transferring of the problems in
the Armenian-Turkish process to Turkey. First of all, Turkey, which
made such initiative, has no moral right to do it. I imagine this
initiative as free discussion of the Genocide problem at the academic
level. However, Turkey has been in rather vulnerable situation from
the very beginning because of Article 301 of the Criminal Code of
Turkey. Therefore, I believe that a Turkish historian unable to
say anything that contradicts the state policy of Turkey on the
Genocide denial will not feel himself comfortable. At the same
time I think there are historians striving to tell the truth in
Turkey. Nevertheless, it is a big question if they will be involved
in the commission since it is not a compulsory condition for Turkey
to be represented by Turks in the commission.
Does it mean that Turkey voiced this idea just to get Armenia’s ‘no’?
Naturally, it does. Actually, Turkey did it just for this purpose,
but Armenia’s "yes" as a reply to the suggestion on setting up of
the commission of historians led Turkey to the situation when certain
mechanisms in this commission may fail. For this reason Turkey should
have other reserve steps.
Therefore, I am sure that from the moral as well as political point
of view Armenia has no problem in the negotiating proce ss, but Turkey
does, as it persecutes its own scientists for dissidence.
That is to say, the idea of setting up the commission damages
Turkey. But it also endangers Armenia, as these ideas on setting up the
commission may lead to the domestic political clashes in Armenia, which
testifies to maturity or immaturity of the political fight in Armenia.