THE OBAMA VISIT AND AFTER CHANGING STYLE & SUBSTANCE IN US-TURKISH RELATIONS
Ian O. Lesser*
Today’s Zaman
April 16 2009
Turkey
WASHINGTON — By almost any measure, US President Barack Obama’s
visit to Turkey was a success. Obama’s open, informal style offered
a striking contrast to the wary and often hectoring tone of the last
eight years.
In his speech to the Turkish Parliament, in particular, Obama managed
to convey genuine appreciation for Turkey’s regional role — and
some sensitivity to Turkey’s own national interests. To be sure, the
president came to Turkey with a set of requests and preferences, not
least on Afghanistan and Iran. But the demanding and closely measured
discourse of the post-2001 period seems to have been set aside in
an effort to repair the United States’ very badly damaged image
with the Turkish public and policymakers, and a pervasive climate
of mutual suspicion. In the wake of the Obama visit, leaderships on
both sides of the Atlantic should look to turn this public diplomacy
success into an operational advantage. Some new thinking will be
needed before old habits reassert themselves.
Context matters
The fact that President Obama scheduled a visit to Turkey so early in
his administration is significant. Just as significant is the fact that
the visit came as part of a high-profile European tour. To an extent,
the timing and context for the visit may have been driven by scheduling
realities — above all, the need to minimize the president’s time spent
abroad during a period of economic crisis. But symbolism also counts,
and the geopolitical symbolism of visiting Turkey after the G20 meeting
in London and the NATO summit in Strasbourg was meaningful. In subtle
ways, the nature of the itinerary has shaped interpretations of the
visit. The comparisons drawn over the week-long tour have been European
comparisons, and this is significant in the context of Turkey’s own
ongoing debate over the country’s orientation. The implications
should not have been lost on European audiences, either. Many of
the key topics on the bilateral agenda may have been Middle Eastern
or Eurasian, but the policy dialogue in Ankara and Istanbul was a
dialogue with a transatlantic partner.
The importance of this can be demonstrated by a simple thought
experiment: Imagine the discussion that would have surrounded a
presidential visit to Turkey as part of a Middle Eastern tour —
Saudi Arabia, Baghdad, Cairo, Jerusalem and Ankara. An itinerary of
this kind might be fine, even useful at the working level, but it
would have sent a very different message about the overall character
of US-Turkish relations and Turkey’s place in Western institutions.
The Turkish domestic lens
Not surprisingly, Turkish observers, including the Justice and
Development Party (AK Party) government and opposition parties,
are interpreting the Obama visit according to their own preferences,
and to support differing visions of Turkey’s role and identity. This
is not necessarily a bad thing. Turkey’s heated debate about secular
and religious identities, geopolitical priorities and international
affinities can be a minefield for bilateral relations, even under
normal conditions. In the context of a high-profile visit — only
the second strictly bilateral visit of the Obama presidency —
the risk of a serious political misstep was greatly magnified. But
Obama managed to steer a skillful course between the widely disliked
"Turkey as model for the Muslim world" discourse of the Bush years and
the equally unrealistic notion that Turkey’s cultural and religious
background are irrelevant to the country’s international role. Was
this an exercise in conflict avoidance at the cost of a more deliberate
policy approach? Perhaps. But to spark a new controversy over identity
questions at a time when Washington and Ankara have a great deal of
deferred maintenance to undertake in bilateral relations would have
been a mistake. Above all, the language of the visit should have been
reassuring to Turks across the political spectrum sensitive to any
sign of external interference in Turkey’s domestic affairs.
The only evident misstep — at least in Turkish eyes — was Obama’s
reference to Turkey’s Kurdish population as a minority. In Western
political vocabulary this is a straightforward observation; not so
in Turkey, where the term "minority" has a specific constitutional
meaning. On the Armenian issue, the approach was nuanced and
non-committal, and therefore open to interpretation by Turks seeking
reassurance that the new administration will oppose passage of an
Armenian "genocide" resolution now pending in Congress. Obama’s remarks
rightly made the evolution of Turkish-Armenian relations the central
factor. In all likelihood, the White House has not yet made a specific
policy decision on the resolution and perceptions developed during the
visit may well shape the US administration’s stance. If Ankara had
been able to produce definite and transforming news about improved
relations with Yerevan, including a specific date for opening the
Turkish-Armenian border, the nature of the administration’s response
might have been clearer.
Same agenda, different priorities
The United States and Turkey may have a common policy agenda, but
priorities within this agenda continue to differ when seen from
Washington and Ankara. In the context of the visit, and looking
ahead, several core issues illustrate this point. On Iraq, Ankara
will continue to seek assurances regarding cooperation against the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), including the provision of actionable
intelligence and renewed pressure on the Kurdish regional government
to constrain or end PKK activities in northern Iraq. For Washington,
the key concern will be Turkish cooperation in support of American
disengagement, including contributions to Iraqi political stability
and reconstruction, and continued access to the Incirlik airbase and
Turkish port facilities for logistical support.
On Iran, Turkey will seek to confirm that the Obama administration is
serious about dialogue with Tehran. Ankara has suggested that it could
play a role in this process. In reality, it is difficult to imagine
Washington giving Turkey more than a marginal facilitation role in an
initiative of tremendous potential significance to American foreign
policy interests. Seen from Washington, the Iran agenda with Turkey is
more narrowly focused on addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Given
Turkey’s rotating seat on the UN Security Council, US policymakers
will undoubtedly give first priority to securing Ankara’s support
for additional sanctions and to bringing Turkey’s relatively close
relations with Tehran to bear on the problem. Turkish policymakers
certainly have no interest in seeing the emergence of a nuclear-armed
Iran, but the extent to which the AK Party government is willing to
deliver tough messages on this score to Tehran is an open question.
Analysis
On Afghanistan, Turkey is no more willing than most of its NATO
counterparts to contribute new forces for combat missions. Even with a
revamped and refocused strategy, Turkish public opposition to combat
operations in Afghanistan will place strict limits on what can be
expected in this sphere. This aspect of Turkish policy is very much in
the European mainstream, and it is not surprising that the Obama visit
failed to produce any significant new commitments from Ankara. Turks
will argue, with some reason, that they have already made substantial
contributions to coalition operations in Afghanistan since 2001. With
others, Turkish policymakers and observers are anticipating a general
allied "rush to the exits" in Afghanistan over the coming years.
* Dr. Ian O. Lesser is a German Marshall Fund senior transatlantic
fellow in Washington, where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs,
Turkey, and international security issues.
This article, originally published on April 14, was taken from the
German Marshall Fund’s "On Turkey" series.Fund’s "On Turkey" series.