Oil-for-food: Annan’s job on the line

BBC News

Last Updated: Monday, 28 March, 2005, 13:32 GMT 14:32 UK

Oil-for-food: Annan’s job on the line

By Paul Reynolds
World Affairs correspondent, BBC News website

The future of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan will be on the line with the
publication on Tuesday of a report into the connections between his son,
Kojo, and a company monitoring the Iraqi oil-for-food programme.

The UN leader is already vulnerable

If the report, by a panel headed by Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the
US Federal Reserve, criticises the secretary general, he will come under
renewed pressure to resign, though there is no mechanism to sack him.

His second term runs until the end of next year and he has indicated that he
will not seek an unprecedented third term.

But his aides are hoping that the report will reveal no wrongdoing on Mr
Annan Sr’s part – and that he will survive this episode and go on to lead a
plan to reform the UN laid out in his speech on 21 March.

The issues to be examined by the report, an interim one pending collection
of final figures, are the relationship between Kojo Annan and Swiss company
Cotecna Inspection, and whether Mr Annan himself played any role. He has
denied doing so.

‘Disappointed and surprised’

Cotecna was awarded a contract by the UN in 1998 to monitor the oil-for-food
programme under which Iraq, then under Security Council sanctions, was
allowed to sell oil in order to buy food and medicine.

Cotecna replaced Lloyd’s Register Inspection Ltd as the monitoring agency
checking that only humanitarian supplies were allowed into Iraq.

Interim report into oil-for-food Programme (3.26 MB)
Q&A: Oil-for-food scandal
Annan reform speech

Mr Annan Jr worked for Cotecna before it won the contract, though both he
and the company say that his work was in West Africa and had nothing to do
with Iraq.

A Cotecna spokesman, Seth Goldschlager, was quoted by the Associated Press
on 25 March as saying that Kojo Annan became a consultant to the company
after it was given the UN contract – but that again, this had nothing to do
with oil-for-food.

Kojo Annan was paid the consulting fee, Mr Goldschlager said, after agreeing
not to work for a competing firm in West Africa.

One problem was that Kojo Annan did not tell his father about the continuing
arrangement. Mr Annan himself has said that he was “very disappointed and
surprised” when he learned that his son had continued to be paid by Cotecna
after 1998.

The total amount earned by Kojo Annan was said by the Cotecna spokesman to
be about $365,000.

So far, the revelations about his son have been an embarrassment to Mr Annan
– but the report will indicate whether they become something more serious.

‘Less lynch mob’

The UN leader is already reeling from an earlier report in February by Mr
Volcker that detailed the corruption in the oil-for-food programme.

The report said Benon Sevan’s conduct was “ethically improper”

The Volcker team concluded that the UN official in charge of the programme,
Benon Sevan, from Cyprus, “solicited and received on behalf of AMEP [African
Middle East Petroleum] several million barrels of allocations of oil” from
Iraq and that this “presented a grave and continuing conflict of interest.”

Mr Sevan denied any wrongdoing but Mr Annan said he was “shocked” by the
finding.

It later transpired that funds for Mr Sevan’s legal defence, to the moment
when the Volcker report came out, had themselves come from the residue of
the oil-for-food-project.

The accumulation of scandal and allegation has undermined Mr Annan’s
position.

Some Republicans in the US have been calling for his resignation for some
time. These calls were heightened when Mr Annan, in an interview with the
BBC, called the Iraq invasion “illegal”.

Minnesota Senator Norm Coleman has chaired a Senate committee investing
oil-for-food and said in December: “One conclusion has become abundantly
clear: Kofi Annan should resign.”

Senator Coleman said that his investigation found that “Saddam turned this
programme on its head. Rather than erode his grip on power, the programme
was manipulated by Saddam to line his own pockets and actually strengthen
his position at the expense of the Iraqi people. All of this occurred under
the supposedly vigilant eye of the UN.”

Among Mr Annan’s defenders has been the former British UN ambassador, Lord
David Hannay.

“The United States has many traditions, some good and some bad,” he said.

“The worst of the bad is the lynch mob. The best of the good is due process.
We need more due process and less lynch mob.”

Who lost the Russian empire? History will keep seat warm for Putin

Who lost the Russian empire? History will keep seat warm for Putin
by Christopher Boian

Agence France Presse — English
March 27, 2005 Sunday 1:09 AM GMT

MOSCOW March 27 — When history looks back coldly to determine “Who
lost the Russian empire?” it will surely reserve a seat for Vladimir
Putin, a leader propelled into the Kremlin on vows to revive a great
power but who by his own admission faces unforeseen challenges in
doing so.

Mikhail Gorbachev is still blamed by many Russians for the demise
of the Soviet Union, the 20th century’s incarnation of the Russian
empire. Boris Yeltsin is still reviled by many Russians who believe
he carelessly sold his country down the river in the decade that
followed the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Yet though still widely popular, it is Putin who during his five
years in power has presided over a precipitous decline in Russia’s
ability to influence the course of events in the part of the world
it has long dominated and continued to overshadow for more than a
decade even after the Soviet collapse.

And few seem more acutely aware of this irony of destiny than the
Russian president himself who has in recent months all but spelled
out that his country faces a paradox in which the only way to restore
its own power for the future is to consign the power long lorded over
neighbors to the past.

On Friday, the 52-year-old Putin, commenting on the regime change
in the ex-Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan following a revolt there,
went further than perhaps any Russian leader has in the past three
centuries in admitting that Moscow’s capacity to impose its will in
the vast portion of the planet once occupied by the Soviet Union was
more limited today than thought even a decade ago.

He said the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the body set up
in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union
and regarded to some degree by Moscow and its allies as a loose
replacement for the bloc, was really only a “useful club” designed
to facilitate the “civilized divorce” of ex-Soviet republics.

“If someone expected particular achievements in all areas of the
CIS, they have not occurred and could not have occurred,” Putin said
Friday at a news conference in Yerevan, the capital of the former
Soviet republic of Armenia.

“The processes following the breakup of the Soviet Union were different
than the goals that were initially declared” for the CIS, which groups
12 of the 15 former Soviet republics (the three Baltic states did not
join) and which until recent years held regular policy-coordinating
summits.

Through much of the 1990s and the early years of the present decade,
Russia in particular sought to use the CIS as a forum for promotion of
Moscow-directed plans for retaining close policy coordination among
members on everything from defense and economic issues to social and
political reforms.

“The CIS did not cope” with that objective, Putin admitted bluntly.

Other leading political voices in Russia and elsewhere in the former
Soviet Union are mindful of the rapidly-loosening bonds between Russia
and its once tightly-controlled republics stretching from the borders
of the European Union to the borders of China, though their views
vary widely.

Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Russian communist party, warned
Saturday that if something were not done quickly then the currents
today eroding the vestiges of Russia’s empire will soon go to work
on dissolving the coherence of Russia itself.

“If we don’t do something, this process will spread throughout
the post-Soviet space and will eventually break up Russia itself,”
Zyuganov was quoted by RIA Novosti news agency as saying at the start
of a congress of communists from Russia and the ex-Soviet republic
of Belarus.

Yulia Tymoshenko, the new prime minister of Ukraine and a key leader
of the “orange revolution” there that ousted a pro-Moscow regime late
last year, saw things differently, asserting that more revolutions in
the former Russian empire lay ahead and would only enhance people’s
ability to “live free”.

“When and in what country it will occur next is difficult to predict,”
Tymoshenko told reporters in Kiev. “But it will definitely happen
again.”

The Soviet Union, a political-social experiment unprecedented in scale
that survived for 74 years, was however only the latest incarnation
of a Russian empire whose foundations date back to the 16th century
and that comprised much of the Caucasus and Central Asia, strategic
regions where great powers have for centuries competed — and continue
to compete — for control.

Perhaps the most telling public comments from Putin on the monumental
challenge his country faces as it cedes influence outside its borders
in order to retain control within came last September 4, the day
after the horrific Beslan school massacre.

“There have been many tragic pages and painful events in the history of
Russia,” Putin said in a nationally-televised address then. “We have to
admit that we have failed to understand the complexity and the danger
of the processes emerging in our country and in the entire world.”

Statement of center of public relations of minister of Nat’l Securit

AzerTag, Azerbaijan
March 25 2005

STATEMENT OF THE CENTER OF PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF
NATIONAL SECURITY
[March 25, 2005, 20:50:37]

On March 28, employees of the Ministry of National Security will mark
their professional holiday, 86th anniversary of establishment of
security bodies. Before this date, with a view of increase of the
efficiency of public relations and more full informing of the society
on bodies of national security, there has been created official
website of the Ministry of National Security – .

The Internet-site of the Ministry is provided with catalogues on the
corresponding areas, useful information resources and links. On the
site with use of arguments is widely covered the history of
establishment of the security bodies of Azerbaijan and the
autobiographical data concerning various directions of their
activity, and also the persons supervised the security bodies, the
legislative base making ground for activity of bodies of special
service, the steps undertaken in the field of combat against
international terrorism and various displays of the organized crime,
the international cooperation in this sphere, the selflessness shown
by employees of the Ministry of National Security in fights for
independence and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, its history,
legal aspects, consequences of the Armenia-Azerbaijan,
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the political line pursued at the
present stage on the way of settlement of the conflict, essence of
the policy carried out by Armenia against our country and the
Armenian state terrorism. Users can familiarize with the information
interesting them in the following sections: public relations,
library, Academy of MNS, a museum, a picture album. Besides, for
maintenance of efficiency of public relations on official site of
MNS, are stipulated special addresses of contacts.

Since March 28, of this year users of the official website of the
Ministry of National Security can receive the objective and unbiased
information on activity of the Ministry from the primary source.

www.mns.gov.az

Benon Sevan: No money has been paid

Pravda.RU:World:More in detail

Benon Sevan: No money has been paid

10:36 2005-03-24

Leading members of the United Nations Security Council yesterday
demanded to know why the UN secretariat had offered to use Iraqi oil
revenues to pay the legal fees of Benon Sevan, the disgraced former
head of Iraq’s oil-for-food programme.

The UN said on Tuesday that it had promised to pay Mr Sevan reasonable
legal fees to ensure his co-operation with the Volcker Commission
(IIC), which is investigating allegations of fraud and mismanagement
in the multibillion dollar programme. It had proposed to cover the
costs from a special account funded by Iraqi oil revenues to administer
the oil-for-food programme, informs FT News.

Iraq and the United States questioned on Wednesday why the United
Nations offered to use Iraqi oil money to pay legal fees of the
U.N. official in charge of the scandal-tainted oil-for-food program.

At issue is a U.N. announcement on Tuesday saying it had offered to
pay Benon Sevan, the former head of the program, reasonable legal
fees to ensure his cooperation with a probe conducted by Paul Volcker,
former head of the Federal Reserve.

No money has yet been paid to Sevan. The United Nations said it
was questioning some of his reimbursement claims and would not pay
anything after Feb. 3 when the Volcker commission accused Sevan of
steering oil contracts to an Egyptian trader.

Mark Malloch Brown, the new U.N. chief of staff, told a news
conference the decision to pay the fees was made because of Sevan’s
responsibilities as head of the program and before any allegations
were made against him.

The Volcker commission also disputed a U.N. statement that it had
offered to pay legal fees to Sevan to get his cooperation, saying
Sevan was permitted to have an attorney because of the seriousness
of the allegations against him, publishes Reuters.

NR

Chess champ Kasparov announces retirement

The Republican, MA
March 22 2005

Chess champ announces retirement

By ROZA EYNULLAYEVA
The MacDuffie School

Garry Kasparov, the world’s top ranked chess player, has announced
his retirement from competitive chess at age 41.

Kasparov became the youngest world champion in chess at age 22 and
made news for his games against IBM supercomputer Deep Blue and his
six-month match in the mid-1980s against Anatoly Karpov.

“It is very difficult to quote one reason,” Kasparov is quoted as
saying on ChessBase.com when asked by journalists why he decided to
retire.

“But if I try I could tell you that, as you know, I am a man of big
goals. I have to achieve something, I have to prove something, I have
to be determined. But I no longer see any real goal in the world of
chess.”

Kasparov added that “I haven’t lost my passion for the game. That is
why from time to time I may play for fun, maybe in some rapid
tournaments. But it will only be for fun.”

Kasparov’s announcement came after his ninth win in the prestigious
Linares tournament earlier this month in Spain.

Kasparov indicated his plans include work on several writing projects
including a book tentatively titled, “How Life Imitates Chess,”
expected to be released in several languages by the end of the year.

“It is a very important project because I want to demonstrate to a
mainstream audience how the game of chess can explain the
decision-making process in many walks of life,” Kasparov is quoted as
saying on ChessBase.com

Kasparov, who lives in Russia, also indicated he plans to continue to
devote time to Russian politics.

“As a chess player, I did everything I could, even more. Now, I want
to use my intellect and strategic thinking in Russian politics,”
ESPN.com quotes Kasparov as saying in a statement cited by Interfax
news agency.

“I will do everything in my power to resist Putin’s dictatorship. My
opinion is that the country is headed down the wrong path now.”

Kasparov is a member of Committee 2008: Free Choice, a group formed
by liberal leaders opposed to Russian President Vladimir Putin whose
term ends in 2008.

One can only wonder what effect Kasparov’s resignation will have on
chess players throughout the world.

Kasparov, who was born in what was then the Soviet republic of
Azerbaijan, entered chess school at the age of 10 in 1973. He became
the world’s junior chess champion at the age of 16 and a year later
attained the title of grandmaster.

Kasparov was a true genius in many aspects of the game: he had the
greatest command of the board; had a superb capability of calculating
moves at least 15 moves ahead without moving any piece; and his
passion for competitive chess led him to compete in tournaments for
over 30 years.

Kasparov became so huge on the board as well as off the board that he
was invited to play two matches against the strongest computers at
the time: Deep Blue in 1997 and Deep Junior in 2003, which could
calculate well over a million moves each second.

Southern Caucasus: prisoners particularly vulnerable to TB epidemic

ICRC (press release), Switzerland
March 23 2005

Southern Caucasus: prisoners particularly vulnerable to TB epidemic
Every year, three million people die of tuberculosis (TB).

Prisoners are particularly exposed: they tend to come from society’s
poorest and hence more vulnerable sectors, and prison conditions
foster the spread of the disease.

Through its TB-control programme for prisons in the southern
Caucasus, the ICRC works with the national authorities to help them
meet their objectives, namely to reduce TB morbidity and mortality,
to prevent the development of drug-resistant TB and to curb and
ultimately stop TB transmission within the prison system by
implementing the strategy recommended by the World Health
Organization (WHO).

In Georgia, 3,020 prisoners infected with the disease have received
treatment since the ICRC programme was launched in 1998. In Armenia,
where the programme started in 2002, 270 patients have been treated.
In Azerbaijan, the programme has been running for ten years and
treated 5,500 patients. The programme owes its success to the
involved commitment of the medical staff who work daily to improve
the prisoners’ health.

As a result of the programme’s successful implementation, TB
mortality in prisons in the southern Caucasus has dropped
drastically. In another major achievement, the number of
newly-detected infectious cases has fallen.

This does not mean the problem has been solved, however. The
conditions of detention are difficult: the prisons are often
overcrowded and the prisoners lack light and proper nutrition. What
is more, it is difficult for released prisoners to continue to have
access to treatment. The ICRC is working to facilitate links between
TB services in prisons and outside.

Another major challenge is the high rate of multi-drug resistant
(MDR) TB patients. Improper treatment in the past (treatment
stoppages, incorrect dosage and length of treatment) has lead to the
emergence of MDR-TB, the deadliest form of the disease. The ICRC is
working with the authorities concerned to develop an MDR
case-management strategy in line with international recommendations.

Standards of health care for prisoners should be at least equivalent
to that of the society as a whole. This is why the ICRC is helping
the national authorities to ensure all sick prisoners have access to
proper TB services. What is more, prisons are porous, and the
implementation within their walls of effective TB-control programmes
contributes to effective TB control in the wider community.

Six Possible Traps in Georgia-Russia Troop Withdrawal Agreements

SIX POSSIBLE TRAPS IN GEORGIA-RUSSIA TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENTS
by Vladimir Socor

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, March 15, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 51

The Georgian Parliament passed a resolution on March 10 that requires
Russia unconditionally to withdraw its forces from Georgia no later
than January 1, 2006 — unless Moscow reaches agreement with Tbilisi
before May 15, 2005, on a “reasonable timeframe” for the troop
withdrawal (see EDM, March 14).

Georgia will be safer if the troop withdrawal timeframe remains as
defined by the parliamentary resolution, without political conditions
or linkages to other issues. Georgia would, however, run serious
risks if it tries negotiating a complex political agreement with
Russia on troop withdrawal and allow it to become linked to other
issues. In that case, Moscow would again drag out the negotiations
while trying to pressure or lure Tbilisi into signing an agreement
filled with traps and conditionalities.

Based on 14 years of experience in the Baltic states, Moldova, and
Georgia itself, at least six traps can be expected to be laid by Moscow
into the text of a political agreement with Georgia on troop withdrawal
and related agreements. Those traps would be designed to negate the
goal of military withdrawal, ensuring a military presence instead.

1. Legalization

Whatever “reasonable timeframe” is ultimately agreed for troop
withdrawal — 3 years as Tbilisi hopes, 7 years as Moscow demands,
or a compromise — Russia wants the presence of its troops to be
legalized for the duration. If this is done, Moscow will have a
tempting incentive to pressure Georgia to accept prolongation of
the term upon expiry. The Baltic states were aware of this risk
when they refused to legalize the presence of Russian troops on
their territories for any “temporary” or “transitional” period. Such
legalization by Georgia would: a) undermine the irreplaceable argument
of national sovereignty for the ridding the country of Russian troops;
b) enable Russia, under the CFE Treaty and in other contexts, to cite
“host-country consent” by Georgia; c) weaken international sympathy
and support for Georgia’s ultimate goal of terminating Russia’s
now-unlawful military presence; d) retain, instead of removing, a
potential time-bomb of a political-military nature inside the country;
and e) interfere with Georgia’s national goal of integration with
NATO. Like the Baltic states, Georgia must never legalize Russia’s
military presence for any length of time.

2. Re-labeling

Russia hopes to retain the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases and its
Tbilisi general headquarters by re-labeling them “anti-terrorist
centers.” Georgians originally came up with this idea in 2004 in order
to re-start the Russian-blocked negotiations and to provide Moscow
with a face-saving way to withdraw the troops. Tbilisi had envisaged
the formation of one joint Georgian-Russian analytical anti-terrorist
center, under Georgian sovereign control and not located at any
existing military base, to be created in the wake of the garrisons’
departure, and to include several score of Russian officers, without
troops or armaments. Moscow, however, seized Tbilisi’s goodwill gesture
and turned it against Georgia. Last month, Moscow proposed to rename
the existing bases as “anti-terrorist centers” and even to augment
their garrisons; and when Tbilisi refused, Moscow publicly blamed
Tbilisi for blocking the negotiations. Georgia may have outsmarted
itself with that offer in the first place. With anti-terrorism an
international concern for many years to come — and, sometimes, a cover
for any use of coercion — it is easy to envisage Russia demanding
to retain “anti-terrorist centers” in Georgia into the future,
while propagandizing (as it already does) that Georgia tolerates
“international terrorism.” Moscow has grossly abused Georgia’s
face-saving offer. This is not its first use of re-labeling for
cheating. Three years ago, Russia re-labeled its Gudauta military
base as “peacekeeping” and retains it to this day, in breach of its
1999 commitment to have closed down that base by 2001. The lesson
from all this to Tbilisi is that it must require the withdrawal of
Russian troops unambiguously, without the risky and time-wasting
complications of tinkering with their labels. The Baltic states were
successful because their position was never less than straightforward.

3. Ratification

Russia will try to require parliamentary or some other type of
ratification of a troop-withdrawal agreement with Georgia. The
experience of Moldova is instructive on this point. In 1994,
then-prime ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin and Andrei Sangheli signed an
intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from
Moldova within three years (by October 1997). A Russian-added codicil
stipulated, however, that implementation would be “subject to the
states’ internal procedures,” not further specified. The Kremlin then
interpreted this as requiring parliamentary ratification. Moldova’s
parliament quickly ratified the agreement; but Russia’s Duma never
did. Instead, the Russian government for years thereafter presented
additional conditions just for submitting the agreement to the Duma for
debate, and the Duma piled up additional conditions for examining the
document, with still more conditions for ratifying the agreement, which
it never did. Ultimately, the main condition was Moldova’s acceptance
of Transnistria’s separation with Russian troops in place. As Moldova
could not accept such terms, Russia has since 1997 simply ignored
that agreement. With this experience in mind, Tbilisi must insist on
an executive agreement with Russia on troop withdrawal, fully binding
from the inception, and providing for effective international oversight
(other than by the OSCE) of its implementation.

4. Istanbul formula

Moscow wants to retain the OSCE Istanbul 1999 formula, because it does
not require the closure of the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases. It merely
stipulated, “during the year 2000 the sides will complete negotiations
regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian
military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and the Russian military
facilities within Georgia.” This formula must finally be cast aside
because Moscow has breached it — along with many other points of the
OSCE Istanbul 1999 agreements — constantly and massively throughout
these years. The Istanbul formula was patently inadequate in the
first place because it failed to stipulate the goals of base closure
and troop withdrawal regarding Batumi, Akhalkalaki, and other Russian
military installations. Any new agreement with Russia must precisely
stipulate the binding obligation to close the bases and installations
and withdraw the troops by a date certain.

5. Georgian obligations

Russia will try to saddle Georgia with obligations to create proper
conditions for the reduction and withdrawal of Russian troops,
facilitate the functioning of bases and movement of personnel, vouch
for a secure environment in the base areas, and so on. Moscow will
formulate some conditions very broadly in order to abuse them later,
but will also advance some very specific conditions that Georgia
might be unable to fulfill in time or at all. Thus, Russia refused to
hand over Gudauta to Georgia — and has since blocked any meaningful
international inspection — on the excuse that Georgia is unable
to provide security in the area, which happens to be controlled by
Russia’s Abkhaz proteges. In Akhalkalaki, Moscow can well orchestrate
demonstrations by local Armenians in favor of retaining the Russian
base, then claim that it could not and would not act against the
will of the local population. Russia has already played this game
for years in Transnistria as an excuse for keeping its troops in
place. With this in mind, Georgia must not accept any obligations
of a kind that Russia or some local clients might prevent Tbilisi
from fulfilling. Tbilisi must also decline to vouchsafe (if only
“temporarily”) for the operation of Russian bases. Such an obligation
would deprive Georgia of leverage later on, in the likely event that
Moscow tries yet again to renege on its troop-withdrawal commitments.

6. Linkages

The Kremlin has managed to tie up the military negotiations
with the negotiations on a new interstate political treaty. As a
precondition to a troop-withdrawal agreement, Moscow now demands
that the political treaty rule out the hosting of third-party troops
and military installations on Georgia’s territory, and generally
constrict Georgia’s independent military cooperation with other
countries. As a further precondition to withdrawal of its troops
(other than the “peacekeepers”), Moscow wants the political treaty
to enshrine a special role for Russia in settling the Abkhazia and
South Ossetia conflicts and protecting the [newly-minted] “Russian
citizens” there. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that
such clauses are necessary in order to persuade the Duma to ratify
an interstate treaty with Georgia, if one is signed. This claim is
implausible in view of the Kremlin’s control of a comfortable majority
in the Duma. For its part, Tbilisi must reject any linkages between
a troop-withdrawal agreement and extraneous political issues. It can
simply offer a commitment that Georgian territory would not be used
by a third party against Russia. However, Georgia’s international
security arrangements and internal constitutional setup do not belong
in a bilateral treaty with Russia. Nor should Georgia legitimize those
“peacekeeping” operations as part of an agreement with Russia.

At this point, Tbilisi must initiate consultations with the three
Baltic states regarding their experience with practical arrangements
for the withdrawal of Russian forces.

Vladimir Socor

BAKU: FM to make official position known toward OSCE fact-findinggro

Azerbaijan News Service
March 21 2005

FOREIGN MINISTRY TO MAKE OFFICIAL POSITION KNOWN TOWARD OSCE FACT
FINDING GROUP REPORT
2005-03-21 17:53

Head of foreign policy of Azerbaijan Elmar Mammadyarov satisfied of the
report prepared by the OSCE fact finding group on illegal settlement
of Armenian families in occupied regions of Azerbaijan around Daqliq
Qarabaq. Mr. Mammadyarov told in his interview with ANS that official
Baku will release statement regarding the report on March 22. Foreign
minister considers the report as objective in general at the same time
outlining some contradicting points. There are some issues that we can
not accept. The report says that official Yerevan is not engaged in
illegal settlement policy. But we have information about it. That’s
hwy the fact finding group needs to carry on its activity and prove
Yerevan’s hand. As to regular breach of the ceasefire recently on
the front line Mr. Elmar Mammadyarov doesn’t rule out that it serves
interests of Armenia. We have already made our position known. We are
accepting ceasefire violation as a provoking attempt by Armenia while
there are peaceful negotiations. Mr. Mammadyarov hardly believes
that such provocative attempts may affect negotiation process.

Remarks by (Former) Ambassador Eric S. Edelman

Remarks by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman
US-Turkey Relations: Opportunities for Cooperation in a Changing World
Bilkent University, Ankara
September 29, 2003
“General Babaoglu, General Bir, distinguished guests: I would like to thank
you, General Bir, very much for that introduction, and thank the Turkish
Armed Forces Foundation and CNR for sponsoring this important seminar and
for giving me the opportunity to participate in the International Defense
Industry, Aerospace and Maritime Fair (IDEF).

As many of you know, although I have only recently arrived in Turkey, I am
fortunate to have family roots that date back decades. My grandmother fled
from Russia and troubled times 84 years ago. Turkey sheltered her, made her
feel at home, and it was here that my mother was born a few years later.
Later still, my great uncle taught for 11 years at Ankara University. So I
come to Turkey as someone with close and long-standing ties to this great
nation.

I’d like to address my remarks today to the broad context for opportunities
for U.S.-Turkish cooperation in a changing world. I hope that those
opportunities can build on fifty years of strong cooperation, of strategic
partnership and relations, close military to military relations, and close
industrial cooperation. I’d like to begin my formal comments with a very
direct statement about U.S. interests in Turkey. Among our several strategic
interests here, our most important one is that Turkey be successful – it’s
as simple as that. We want to see a dynamic, prosperous, democratic Turkey,
just as Turks do. Although our countries may not always agree, we are
confident that a strong, vibrant Turkey will be a positive force for freedom
and prosperity in the region and in the world, and will be a country with
which we can work on a wide variety of challenges and opportunities.

The U.S. cannot make Turkey successful – only the people of this nation can
do that. However, I can assure you that my primary focus – and the primary
focus of the U.S. Mission here in Turkey during my tenure – will be to
support Turkey’s efforts to achieve the ambitious economic and political
goals that the Turkish people have set, because in doing so we will also be
advancing America’s interests.

During the Cold War, Turkey was a key bulwark on the southern flank of NATO.
No less today, Turkey’s position in a difficult neighborhood offers the
opportunity to contribute to the major endeavors of U.S. global strategy and
gives it a major interest in the success of our strategy. The United States
of America is committed to promoting freedom and dignity throughout the
world, to working with others to battle the scourge of terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to combating poverty and
deadly diseases. Because we believe in peace, we are engaged in many places
in the world to achieve solutions to regional conflicts. We do so not out of
simple benevolence, but because recent history has demonstrated that we
cannot practice our democracy and guarantee our citizens’ security and
prosperity if we have regions of the world where citizens are oppressed or
without hope for a better life. Our domestic foreign policy debate in the
United States is no longer about whether the United States can stay isolated
from the world, but rather how the U.S. should engage with the world.

September 11, the Global War on Terrorism and Afghanistan

September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed the way Americans view the world.
>From that day forward, we recognized that developments in far corners of the
globe are relevant to our lives. President Bush’s overriding objective has
been to rid the world of terrorists and make it safe for peace-loving people
and nations everywhere. No stranger to terrorism, Turkey was one of the
first countries to publicly condemn the attacks of September 11 and to offer
widespread support, including airspace, bases and troops. Turkey
successfully commanded the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul
and participated in the initial training of the Afghan National Army – two
examples of the leading role Turkey is capable of playing beyond its borders
in contributing to regional peace and stability. Much progress has been made
and much remains to be done in Afghanistan, but let me assure you that
President Bush remains deeply committed. The President’s recent request to
Congress for $11 billion in additional funding for Afghanistan reflects his
long-term commitment to bringing peace and stability there. He seeks a
stability not based on military might but on economic development and
openness based on things like the construction of the Kabul-Kandahar road
that U.S. and Turkish companies are building together. So far Turkish
companies have won an astounding $300 million dollars in contracts for
reconstruction in Afghanistan, showing their competitive advantage in this
kind of reconstruction work.

Middle East

The Middle East is and will remain a central focus of America’s objective of
helping create a peaceful, prosperous world devoid of terrorism. Last
spring, President Bush unveiled a roadmap for peace and stability in the
region. In our view, the roadmap is the only viable and effective way to put
an end to the suffering and violence there. Despite the inherent
difficulties and recent setbacks, we continue to believe that the
implementation of President Bush’s vision of a two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict offers the best chance for achieving the goal
of Israeli and Palestinian people living side by side in peace, security,
and freedom.

Both sides must do much more to advance the process and to fulfill their
commitments to implement the roadmap. The Palestinian Authority must
dismantle the terror apparatus in the territories. The US remains committed
to working with a fully empowered Palestinian Prime Minister who has full
control of all security forces and the finances of the Palestinian Authority
to stop terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. As this
happens, we will continue to encourage Israel to make good on its
commitments and work towards conditions that will allow a peaceful
Palestinian state to emerge. While there are certainly no quick fixes or
easy answers to this decades-long problem, let me assure you the President
remains firmly committed to doing everything possible to encourage the
parties to end the violence and take steps to bring about peace. And I would
add that the Turkish-Israeli relationship remains an important underpinning
of the entire process.

Iraq

The U.S. is helping the Iraqi people create a unified, stable, democratic
Iraq. It should become a country where all ethnic and religious groups have
their civil and political rights, and are given the opportunity to
participate and contribute to the political and business life of a new
country. We remain committed to an Iraq whose unity, territorial integrity
and existing borders are preserved, and we will continue to help foster
friendly political, economic and commercial ties between Iraq and its
neighbors.

As President Bush recently made clear during his September 7 address to the
American people, our present objectives in Iraq are three-fold: first, to
rid Iraq of the terrorist threat; second, to expand international
cooperation in the reconstruction and security of Iraq; and third, to
encourage the orderly transfer of sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi
people.

The President’s commitment to ridding Iraq of the terrorist threat includes
the PKK/KADEK. The U.S. has been and will continue to be Turkey’s strongest
partner in its efforts to eradicate terrorism. We welcome the Parliament’s
passage of a re-integration and repentance law and look forward to its full
implementation to encourage maximum surrender. The U.S. will follow through
on the President’s pledge as well. We have sent an inter-agency team to
Ankara earlier this month for detailed exchanges and discussions on how our
two countries can work together to eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat, and the
State Department’s Counter-Terrorism Chief, Ambassador Cofer Black, will be
in Ankara soon to continue those discussions. Make no mistake about it: the
United States and Turkey are on a path together to actively eliminate the
PKK/KADEK threat in northern Iraq.

The U.S. will also continue to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq. Stability in
Iraq is good for Iraq, good for Iraq’s neighbors, and good for the region.
We are working with the United Nations, the Iraqi Governing Council and key
allies to expand participation in the stabilization and reconstruction of
Iraq. This represents an historic opportunity for the larger international
community to support Iraqis in their quest for a peaceful, democratic
country.

The U.S. is also working hard to encourage the orderly and rapid transfer of
sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi people. Iraqis are on their way to
democratic self-rule. Iraq has its own Governing Council that for the first
time in history represents Iraq’s diversity. The Governing Council recently
appointed cabinet ministers to run government departments, and more than 90
percent of towns and cities have functioning municipal governments. The U.S.
is helping to establish a civil defense force to keep order, an Iraqi police
force to enforce the law, a new Iraqi army to defend the country, and Iraqi
border guards to help secure the borders. The Governing Council is turning
its attention to the process of drawing up a democratic constitution for
Iraq.

We have also made significant progress in helping Iraq renew its electric
grid, water treatment facilities, and other infrastructure and social
services that were run down, destroyed and neglected during the years of
Saddam’s misrule and systematic disinvestment. Electrical generation now
averages 75% of pre-war levels, and that figure is rising every day. Last
week there was a ceremony in Silopi celebrating a recent agreement between a
Turkish company and officials in Baghdad to provide electricity from Turkey
to Iraq. Telephone service is being restored to hundreds of customers, and
dilapidated water and sewage treatment facilities are being modernized.

Let me be clear on one point: the U.S. will not abandon Iraq or the Iraqi
people. We will remain engaged and committed for as long as it takes. How
long will we stay? In the words of Secretary Powell: “We will stay as long
as it takes to turn full responsibility for governing Iraq over to a capable
and democratically elected Iraqi administration. Only a government elected
under a democratic constitution can take full responsibility and enjoy full
legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people and the world.” We believe a
democratic Iraq will benefit Turkey too. Research and experience demonstrate
that democratic neighbors make better trading partners, are more likely to
adhere to their commitments, and are less likely to fight one another.

Proliferation: Iran, Syria

Stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a key component
of the President’s objective of creating regional peace and stability. In
Iran, the IAEA has expressed serious concerns about a clandestine program to
develop nuclear weapons and the country’s repeated denial of full,
unfettered access to its nuclear program. Syria continues to cooperate with
terrorist groups, to develop weapons of mass destruction, and to let armed
militants slip into Iraq.

Despite all that Iran, Syria and other countries have done, it is not too
late to halt and reverse their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We
must keep the pressure on. Turkey recently joined forces with the United
States and other countries to support an IAEA Board of Governors resolution
calling on Iran to halt its programs and urging Iran to comply with its
nuclear non-proliferation treaty obligations. We will continue to work with
the international community to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and, at the same time, support efforts by our allies to obtain
the necessary defensive capability to defend their countries and peoples
against possible WMD attacks.

Syria and Iran should heed Foreign Minister Gul’s call in Tehran during the
30th session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers to act with “a
refreshed vision – a vision in which good governance, transparency and
accountability will reign, and the fundamental rights and freedoms as well
as gender equality are upheld.” A vision where “there would be no place for
blunting rhetoric and slogans;” one that “addresses the underlying causes of
violence,” and one that “encourages political participation.”

Cyprus

The U.S. is also strongly committed to efforts to bring about a
comprehensive solution to Cyprus. The people of Cyprus on both sides of the
island were denied a historic opportunity earlier this year when their
leaders failed to reach an agreement on a comprehensive settlement. In the
U.S. view, the plan put forth by UN Secretary General Annan provides for the
safety and continuing security of the Turkish Cypriot community and the
security interests of Turkey, and remains the best basis for a satisfactory
solution for all parties. In the wake of last spring’s confidence-building
measures on the island – including the opening of the border and the travel
of hundreds of thousands of Cypriots from the north to the south – the will
of the people on both sides of the island for a comprehensive settlement has
become manifest.

President Denktas should not continue blocking progress. We will continue to
encourage political leaders on both sides of the island to seize this
opportunity and seize it soon, because time is running out. We attach great
importance to making sure that the December election in the northern part of
the island – preferably with the presence of international observers — are
free and fair. May 2004 will bring Cyprus accession to the European Union at
just about the same time the leaders of NATO will be meeting in Istanbul for
a summit. We need a renewal of attention now to search for a comprehensive
settlement. In the end, a comprehensive Cyprus settlement will benefit not
just Cyprus, but its neighbors and the region as a whole.

Caucasus and the Balkans

The U.S. remains committed to working with the governments and peoples in
the Caucasus to ensure peace, stability and prosperity. Together with our
friends in the region, we will continue to work to bring about a peaceful
transition to power in Azerbaijan and help bring an end to conflict over
Nargono-Karabakh. In Armenia, the U.S. will continue to work to improve
relations between Armenia and its neighbors – something we believe is key to
the long-term stability of the region.
It is past time for Turkey to open the border with Armenia, and for Armenia
to confirm its recognition of Turkey’s territory.”

Executive Director Of Kh-Telecom to Guarantee Hi-Quality Connection

AZG Armenian Daily #049
19/03/2005

Telecommunication

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF KH-TELECOM TO GUARANTEE HIGH-QUALITY CONNECTION

No Promise Concerning Fees

Karabakh-Telecom, mobile phone operator that won the contest last year, is
already importing its equipments to Armenia. Ralf Yeriqian, executive
director of the company, answers our questions concerning the future
activities of KH-Telecom.

– What’s the connection between Karabakh-Telecom and KH-Telecom? People
think it’s the same company. Do the companies belong to one owner?

– The owner of the company operating in Nagorno Karabakh is Pier Fetush but
he is only a shareholder of KH-Telecom. The other shareholders are also
Lebanese.

– Are there Armenians among them?

– No

– Are you only the executive director?

– Yes. I am not the owner.

– What will be the company’s investment program in Armenia?

– We have an investment program. I will not go into details but can say that
we are ready to satisfy all demands.

– How many subscribers will your company have the most?

– The whole territory of Armenia will go under the company’s coverage
despite the fact if there is our subscriber in a given area or if there is a
settlement at all.

– Do you see it possible that ArmenTel subscribers will trade it with
KH-Telecom as soon as it starts operating?

– Everything is possible in a competitive market. It’s possible that they
will turn to us but the opposite is also likely.

– Are you going to promise better conditions to the consumers?

– What we can promise is the best modern service. Let’s wait a little till
we set out and you will see the results. Hopefully we can fulfill our
promise.

– Can your future subscribers expect a high-quality connection and available
fees?

– I should say yes to the high-quality connection. But concerning the fees I
can give neither a positive nor a negative answer. I cannot say anything
definite before our contract with ArmenTel is signed and we know the terms
of our agreement. But we guarantee a high-quality connection. The equipments
we transported lately are not all. They will keep on arriving.

– Do you mean there will be no difficulty with getting through from the
first try or with losing connection amid conversation?

– There will be no such problem. We imported the newest equipment from
Alcatel.

– There is an opinion that the Armenia’s political elite has a hand in
Karabakh-Telecom and KH-Telecom.

– I told you they are two separate companies. I told you also who the owners
of Karabakh-Telecom and KH-Telecom are. They are Lebanese. No Armenian
politician has a share in the company.

– Let’s return to KH-Telecom’s talks with ArmenTel. What’s the Transport and
Telecommunications Ministry’s stance in this issue?

– The Ministry is a regulator in this issue. We have turned to the Ministry
and are sure that it takes necessary steps to come out of this situation.

– So, do you consider realistic minister’s statement that the second
operator will start its activities from May?

– I hope so, or perhaps it will set out sooner.

By Ara Martirosian