Prime Minister Ends His Visit To The United States

PRIME MINISTER ENDS HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

Hayots Ashkharh Daily
Oct 23 2007
Armenia

Prime Minister Serge Sargsyan and his official delegation participated
in the annual conference session of the International Bank and the
International Monetary Fund in Washington, October 22.

This was followed by Prime Minister Serge Sargsyan’s meeting with
Karo Armenyan, member of the ARFD Bureau. During the meeting, the
activity of the American-Armenian organizations was also discussed
in line with other issues of mutual interest.

The same day the Prime Minister had a meeting with Kan Wallak,
Chairman of the National Democracy Institute.

On October 22 the Prime Minister had a meeting with Senators Harry
Rid, leader of the Senate majority and Richard Derbin, coordinator
of the Democratic faction. The meetings took place in the Capitol,
the main building of the US Congress.

During the meeting held in a warm atmosphere the parties recorded the
high level of the Armenian-American relations and discussed the main
trends of their further development.

Senator Rid introduced to PM Serge Sargsyan the process of discussing
the Armenian Genocide Resolution in the US Congress and the attitude
of the US legislative body towards the issue.

The Prime Minister expressed gratitude to the US Congress on behalf
of the Armenian authorities and the Armenian people for providing
assistance to Armenia since gaining independence and paying constant
attention to the problems faced by the country. Regional security
issues were also discussed during the meeting.

At the end of the day, PM Serge Sargsyan gave an interview to the
correspondent of "Associated Press" information agency, where he
particularly touched upon the political, economic and security
aspects of the Armenian-American relations, introduced the current
stage of the Karabakh peace settlement process, and the relations of
Armenia with the neighboring states; he also spoke about our country’s
participation in the anti-terrorist coalition.

Yesterday the Prime Minister had a tete-a-tete with the US State
Secretary Condoleezza Rice and Deputy State Secretary Rouben Jeffery
in the US State Department; he participated in the sitting of the
Armenian-American working group and then left for Paris.

BAKU: Armenian Police Arrest Supporters Of Levon Ter-Petrosyan

ARMENIAN POLICE ARREST SUPPORTERS OF LEVON TER-PETROSYAN

Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Oct 24 2007

Armenian law-enforcement bodies arrested the oppositionists calling
people to rally.

APA reports that editor-in-chief of Haykakan Zhamanak newspaper
Nikol Pashinyan, Democratic Fatherland party leader Petros Makeyan,
Conservative Party leader Mikael Hayrapetyan, editor-in-chief of
Fourth Power opposition newspaper Shoher Matevosyan and some others
are among the detainees.

They delivered leaflets calling people to participate in rallies to
support Armenia’s first President Levon Ter-Petrosyan.

There was a confrontation between the oppositionists and the police.

20 were injured as a result of it. The detainees were released after
they gave a written undertaking not to leave the country.

Ter-Petrosyan’s supporters will hold a sanctioned rally in Yerevan
on October 26.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Stepan Demirchiyan and Aram Sarkisian are expected
to deliver speech. The ruling party organized a free concert with
participation of Armenian stars in Yerevan Republic stadium on the
same day.

Rajab Safarov: Turkey Is Not Iran’s Friend

RAJAB SAFAROV: TURKEY IS NOT IRAN’S FRIEND

PanARMENIAN.Net
23.10.2007 13:50 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Iran is cautiously watching developments in Turkey,
General Director of the Center of Studies of Modern Iran, Rajab
Safarov said when commenting on Turkish parliament’s approval of a
measure that clears the way for its military to cross Iraq’s northern
border to root out Kurdish insurgents there.

"Iran’s doesn’t back Turkey’s decision and rates it as "unjustified
and not meeting international norms" and prepares for flows of
refugees. Turkey is not a friendly state for Iran. It’s an opponent
and economic rival. Presently, western states can get access to Iran
through Turkey only," Safarov said, the Russian News Service reported.

Armenia’s Foreign Policy Must Be Based On A Comprehensive Reponse To

ARMENIA’S FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

AZG Armenian Daily #193
23/10/2007

Genocide Recognition

The process of the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide
is at the threshold of a new phase: it is very possible that the
U.S. House of Representatives (and the Senate, with lesser likelihood)
will adopt the Resolution 106 on the Armenian Genocide, introduced
in the U.S. Congress in January. If it were to happen, many other
countries would adopt similar resolutions in a chain reaction.

However, what will follow then? That is the principal question,
which unfortunately has not been answered by the Armenian political
structures. And where could such an answer come from if the currently
achieved and discussed recognitions were not subjected to a more or
less adequate analysis? We are facing serious problems.

Above all is the problem of information and analysis (including
elementary awareness). The media reports daily on the process of
international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. However, who
in Armenia has seen or read the text of the very recent R106? Has
the Armenian press printed the actual resolution to enable its
serious and professional study by political forces, experts and
the public in general? Where is its official Armenian translation
provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia? Where is
the comparative analysis of this and previous resolutions adopted by
the U.S. Congress in 1975 and 1984 (the 148th and 247th resolutions,
respectively)? Nothing of this sort has been undertaken. Here, it will
only be noted that the R106 qualitatively differs from the 1975 and
1984 resolutions in its thorough historical and legal formulation (it
consists of 30 articles well supported by the facts and arguments). It
confirms the historical truth. It outlines the chronological framework
of the Armenian Genocide more comprehensively: from 1915 to 1923
(unlike the resolution adopted in 1975, which only noted the year of
1915). It clearly states the number of victims: 2 million deportees,
of whom 1.5 million were killed.

The resolution underscores a circumstance that is very important from
political and legal perspectives: "the Armenian Genocide… succeeded
in the elimination of the over 2,500-year presence of Armenians in
their historic homeland."

The problem of correct and sober assessment is particularly
sensitive. What would the adoption of this resolution mean to
Armenia? For example, Italy, Canada, Poland recognized the Armenian
Genocide, but what changes took place in their policies towards
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, or the problem of Artsakh? In reality,
nothing changed. Most importantly, to what extent can such resolutions
contribute to the most urgent task – the guarantee of the security
of Armenia?

The question of Genocide recognition was raised even before the
independence of Armenia and for decades it was the main field of
political activity of the Armenian Diaspora – the Spyurk. However,
today the situation of Armenia and Armenians has changed radically:
there is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the situation in Javakhq,
the Azerbaijani-Turkish blockade, the danger of the resumption of
war. In short, the problem of the physical security of Armenia is a
very real one.

However, the genocide recognition campaign, conducted without serious
research and planning, still remains the main aim of political activity
of the Diaspora, consuming huge amounts of national resources and
human potential at the expense of efforts on other important national
fronts. In their activities the Diaspora’s organizational structures
give an obvious priority to the international recognition of the
Genocide over current security problems of Armenia.

Armenia itself still separates the Karabakh problem from the process
of international recognition of the Genocide, and considers it apart
even from the Armenian Question at large. But the possible universal
recognition of the Genocide in the not-so-distant future will not
mean the vanishing of the Armenian Question from the international
political arena. Since the essence of the Armenian question is not
the international recognition of the Genocide, but the creation of a
mature Armenian state on such a territory, which would insure a safe,
viable existence and development of the Armenian civilization. From
that perspective there are no developed plans on further activities
of the Armenians.

In short, the Armenian political elite and society on the whole
display an irresponsible, almost childish approach to the question
of international recognition of the Genocide, one that resembles the
whimsical game "she loves me, she loves me not", in this case with
the refrain "she recognizes, she does not recognize".

In the meantime, a correct reorientation (regardless how difficult)
of this process may give immense political capital to Armenia and
the Armenians in general.

It is long overdue that Armenia and Armenians evaluated similar
resolutions with their own (still not formulated) criteria, which
would correspond to the historical reality as well as national and
state interests. Below are five main criteria for such assessment:

Accurate indication of the chronology of the Genocide: 1894-1923;

Necessary mentioning of the fact that the Armenians were annihilated
in their homeland – the western part of Armenia;

Unambiguous indication of the state, which committed this crime against
humanity, i.e. Ottoman Turkey, as well as the direct condemnation of
its legal successor, the Republic of Turkey, for denying the Armenian
Genocide and committing hostile acts towards present-day Armenia
(the blockade, the refusal to establish diplomatic relations, the
information warfare, the military aid to Azerbaijan, etc.);

Recognition of the responsibility of the Turkish state before the
Armenian state, the ultimate representative of the interests of the
Armenian nation, and the necessity of compensating, particularly,
the Republic of Armenia (implying, above all, the territorial
compensation);

Mandatory linkage of the consequences of the Genocide with the current
geopolitical situation in the region.

In other words – the acknowledgement of the foremost effect of the
Genocide on the security of Armenia and the region.

The truth is that the Genocide created a territorial problem by
decreasing the historical area of habitation of Armenians to a
critically dangerous scale, threatening the very existence of the
nation.

It is exactly in this context that one must view the issue of
liberation of Artsakh (thanks to which the borders of Armenia acquired
defensibility and minimally necessary strategic depth), as well as
the provision for the secure development of the Armenians of Javakhq.

The task of Armenian diplomacy is to skillfully tie the international
recognition of the Armenian Genocide to a just resolution of the
Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the achievement of lasting security in
the region.

By recognizing the Genocide, the international community is obligated
to make the next logical step and recognize the right of Armenians
to Artsakh, including all of the liberated territory. Meanwhile,
in parallel with the increase in attention to the issue of the
Genocide in the publications of western media as well as in the
politics of certain countries, recently, there is a notable tendency of
strengthening pro-Azerbaijani positions regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. This may completely devalue the process of international
recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

The above-mentioned criteria regarding responsibility and compensation
have not yet been included in any of the resolutions adopted by
international institutions.

The R106 is not an exception either. It does not contain a clear and
unambiguous condemnation of the current Republic of Turkey. Though by
accepting the timeframe of the Armenian Genocide between the years of
1915 to 1923, the resolution necessarily implies the responsibility
of the founders of this republic as well (they were in control of
the most of current territory of Turkey since 1920).

It is true that the last section of the resolution calls upon the
US President "to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States
reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues
related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in
the United States record relating to the Armenian Genocide and the
consequences of the failure to realize a just resolution." However,
the fair statement about "the consequences of the failure to realize
a just resolution" is ambiguous. A direct referring to the current
geopolitical predicament of Armenia as a consequence of the Genocide
is absolutely needed.

Moreover, after meeting with the Turkish Ambassador on October 10th
of 2007 the second-ranking Democrat in the House, Majority Leader
Steny Hoyer, a supporter of the R106, expressed hope that Turkey would
realize it is not a condemnation of its current government but rather
of "another government, at another time." The Democratic Representative
Tom Lantos, the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
in turn, said he would soon propose a second resolution reaffirming
the US-Turkish alliance and friendship.

Anyway, time does not wait. It is today that Armenia must begin
the development and realization of the next phase of the policy for
overcoming the consequences of the Genocide. Tomorrow, when it will
have on the one hand the universal recognition of the Genocide and,
on the other, a dwindled and weakened Diaspora (as a result of an
accelerated process of assimilation) it will be too late.

The pragmatism of the foreign policy of Armenia means not the blatant
ignoring of the apparent animosity of Turkey, but a comprehensive
response to the Armenian Question, first of all with the help
of realistically thought out propositions regarding territorial
compensations to Armenia.

By Armen Ayvazian, Ph.D. in Political Science, Director of the "Ararat"
Center for Strategic Research

BAKU: California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger Vetoes California-Ar

CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER VETOES CALIFORNIA-ARMENIA TRADE CHAMBER

Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Oct 23 2007

Governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed the law for the
authorization for a privately-financed California state trade promotion
office in Yerevan, Armenia. APA’s US bureau reports that the activity
of the trade office will be suspended as from the first day of 2008.

Representatives of the state had adopted the law ensuring the operation
of Armenian Trade Office until 2010.

Business, Transportation and Housing Agency said that the office in
Armenia provides no tangible benefit to the state’s economic growth.

Garrett Ashley, undersecretary for international trade of the agency
said that the office’s sales reached only $40,000 last year. On the
other hand, among the Post Soviet countries, trade office operated
only in Yerevan. Ms. Ashley said that Armenia holds the last place
in the Caucasus for GDP per capita.

"The website of Central Intelligence Agency shows that GDP in
Armenia increased only by 13%. This figure is 34% in the neighboring
Azerbaijan, the record set in the world," she said.

Undersecretary said that the office did not meet even minimal
requirements.

One of the office’s branches is located in Yerevan and the other in
Glendale, South California, compactly-settled by Armenians. /APA/

Turkey’s Identity Crisis

TURKEY’S IDENTITY CRISIS
By Ralph Peters

USA Today
Oct 23 2007

Domestic conflicts are steering the country toward a battle with Iraq’s
Kurds. The fallout could hurt not only Ankara and the United States,
but the entire region.

The eastern quarter of Turkey isn’t Turkish. It’s inhabited by Kurds,
the descendents of tribesmen whom the Greek soldier and author Xenophon
encountered in those mountains 2,500 years ago – more than a thousand
years before the first Turk arrived.

If a referendum on independence were held today, Turkey’s Kurds,
who make up about 20% of its 73 million people, would vote
overwhelmingly to secede from the shrunken empire Ankara inherited
from the Ottomans. That’s part of what Turkish saber-rattling on the
border with northern Iraq is about – the fear that even an autonomous
Kurdistan-in-Iraq threatens Turkey’s territorial integrity because
the region’s Kurds might view it as the core of a Kurdish state.

(Illustration by Sam Ward, USA TODAY)

For its part, Washington fears a Turkish-Kurdish conflict that would
further destabilize the entire region – just when Iraq shows glimmers
of hope.

No regional government ruling over a Kurdish minority has ever allowed
an honest head count, but estimates give the Kurds a population of 27
million to 36 million, spread across portions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran,
Syria and the Caucasus. Up to 14 million of these people without a
state reside in Turkey.

In addition to its determination to preserve its eastern frontier,
Turkey faces internal political challenges that propel the huge
Turkish military – with more than 500,000 active-duty troops – toward
an intervention in northern Iraq.

The immediate justification for a parliament-authorized move across
the border is Turkey’s allegation that the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers’
Party), a Marxist organization that has employed terror, continues
to attack soldiers and civilians inside Turkey. The remnants of
the defeated PKK, a few thousand men and their families, have taken
refuge in Iraq. Turkey claims it wants them handed over – knowing
such a course is politically impossible for any Kurdish leader.

PKK a weak threat

Ankara’s allegations suffer under scrutiny. One need have no sympathy
for the PKK to recognize that the organization has been shattered
by Turkey’s anti-terror campaign. Its aging members encamped in
Iraq have begged asylum from their fellow Kurds (who find them
an embarrassment). With pressure from all sides for Iraq’s Kurdish
officials to "do something" about the rump PKK, the last thing most of
its members intend is to give the Turks an excuse to cross the border.

Why attack now?

Because Turkey’s generals are desperate to revitalize their image
at home. Humiliated by the repeated electoral successes of Turkey’s
Islamist party the AKP, the army, which views itself as the defender
of the secular state, has seen its stock decline in the political
marketplace.

In the past, the Turkish military would have staged a coup. That
remains a longer-term possibility, but there’s now a sense that popular
support for military rule would not be as strong as in the past,
when Turkey’s economy was moribund and terrorism haunted the streets
of Istanbul. The military has been a victim of Turkey’s success.

The generals view a foray into Iraq as a double win – a body blow to
Kurdish aspirations and a chance to rally Turks around the flag.

Though an invasion would anger the United States, Ankara feels it has
Washington over a barrel, given the United States’ need for access
to Incirlik Air Base and the criticality of Turkish supply routes
and airspace to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

As for Europe’s reaction, the Turks believe it would amount to no
more than a few white papers filed away in Brussels.

Over the years, I’ve personally found Turkish generals and diplomats
irrational on two subjects: The Armenian genocide (as we saw again in
the recent fuss about the House resolution) and the rights of Kurds
anywhere to enjoy independence. These topics invariably ignite fiery
lectures from Turkish officialdom: The mouths are open, but the ears
are shut.

Turks face embarrassment

Yet, a potential problem that the Turkish military does not appear
to have grasped is that a move into northern Iraq might not go as
smoothly as the generals intend. Well-armed and determined, Iraq’s
Kurds would resist any major invasion, and the mountainous region is
ideal for defensive fighting. For all the on-paper strength of the
Turkish military, it could suffer a significant embarrassment in Iraq.

A military disappointment – it needn’t be a debacle – in Iraqi
Kurdistan would profoundly alter Turkey’s internal balance of power.

The army has thrived on the perception of its invincibility. A botched
cross-border move would damage its all important image, further
empowering the political Islamists, who’ve already subverted many of
the laws and values the military inherited from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
(the father of modern Turkey).

Success would fail

On the other hand, should a Turkish military operation succeed,
it could excite a land-grab mentality that could draw in Iran,
further destabilizing the region. And a Turkish attack on Iraqi
Kurdistan – a remarkably successful experiment in self-government –
would incite waves of anti-Turkish terrorism, rather than reduce the
terrorist threat.

For their parts, Iraq’s Kurdish leaders seek to build good relations
with Ankara, by policing the PKK and granting concessionary terms to
Turkish businessmen in the hope that shared profits will reveal shared
interests. Nobody – not the PKK, other Kurds, the Iraqi government
or the United States – wants to see a Turkish military adventure.

In the end, such an invasion wouldn’t really be about the future of
the PKK – which has none – but the future of Turkey. Ankara’s military,
pledged to defend the state that Ataturk built from the Ottoman ruins,
could thoughtlessly hasten its deterioration and decline.

Ralph Peters is a member of USA TODAY’s board of contributors and
the author of the recent book Wars of Blood and Faith.

Iran’s Amhadinejad Criticized at Home

The New York Times
October 23, 2007

Iran’s Amhadinejad Criticized at Home

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Filed at 9:50 a.m. ET

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cut short a
two-day visit to Armenia to return home Tuesday, an Armenian spokesman
said, at a time when the Iranian leader’s has come under criticism
even by fellow conservatives for his replacement of the top nuclear
negotiator.

It was not known if the interruption of the visit was linked to the
controversy. Ahmadinejad may have sought to avoid angering Turkey by
visiting a genocide memorial in Armenia.

The Iranian president told Armenian President Robert Kocharian late
Monday that he needed to skip Tuesday’s planned events because of
unexpected developments in Iran that needed immediate attention,
Armenian presidential spokesman Viktor Sogomonian said. The spokesman
gave no details.

Landing in Tehran on Tuesday, Ahmadinejad insisted the trip was not
cut short, saying it had been scheduled to last 22 hours and in fact
went 90 minutes over. He called the visit ”good.”

While the president was in Armenia a day earlier, he was facing
increasing criticism at home over the surprise resignation of top
nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, who was replaced by a close
Ahmadinejad loyalist.

The resignation over the weekend has been widely interpreted as a
victory for Ahmadinejad because it could lead Iran to take an even
tougher stance in ongoing nuclear talks with the West. Though a
conservative, Larijani was considered more moderate than Ahmadinejad
within Iran’s hardline camp, and the two men had previously clashed on
how to approach the talks.

But Larijani’s removal could further undermine Ahmadinejad in Iran.
While the Iranian president has drawn tremendous worldwide attention
for his fiery rhetoric, he faces criticism at home, including from
past supporters, who say he has failed to improve Iran’s economy and
unnecessarily worsened the standoff with the West. Even some in top
echelons of the clerical leadership headed by Iran’s supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have expressed concern.

On Monday, 183 lawmakers, most of them conservatives, passed a measure
praising Larijani’s performance as nuclear negotiator, a clear sign of
displeasure with his departure. A parliamentary group wrote a letter
of complaint to Ahmadinejad for failing to inform them of the
resignation in advance or consult with them on Larijani’s successor.

Saeed Jalili, a little-known deputy foreign minister for European and
American affairs considered loyal to Ahmadinejad, is the new
negotiator. He, along with Larijani, is due to talk about the nuclear
program with the European Union’s foreign policy chief Tuesday in
Rome.

Conservative lawmaker Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh criticized the
changes, saying ”the calamity of repeated dismissals and replacements
has become a policy in this government, a move that not only has not
brought any improvements but also has damaged progress both in the
domestic and foreign arenas.”

The U.S. and its allies accuse Iran of seeking to develop nuclear
weapons. The United Nations has already imposed two rounds of limited
sanctions over Iran’s refusal to suspend enrichment, and Washington is
pressing for a third. Oil-rich Iran says its program is for peaceful
purposes including generating electricity.

Larijani backed Iran’s uranium enrichment program, but favored
diplomacy to resolve the standoff. He negotiated a deal with the U.N.
nuclear watchdog agency to explain outstanding questions over the
nuclear program.

On the other hand, Ahmadinejad has vowed not to suspend uranium
enrichment even for a single minute and not give up ”one iota” of
the right to enrich uranium, a technology that can be used to produce
nuclear fuel or materials for a bomb.

Mohammad Reza Bahonar, a prominent conservative and Ahmadinejad
supporter, praised Larijani as an ”outstanding figure,” in an
indirect criticism of the president, and suggested Ahmadinejad had
pushed him out.

”Larijani had almost reached a deadlock in working with the
president. Both of them had come to the conclusion that they could not
work together,” several newspapers quoted Bahonar as saying.

According to Bahonar, Larijani had tendered his resignation three
times in the past but Ahmadinejad accepted the resignation the fourth
time after Larijani’s insistence.

The move also adds to questions over how much support Ahmadinejad has
>From Khamenei. Larijani reported directly to Khamenei, who has final
say in all state issues, and his replacement could not have occurred
without Khamenei’s consent.

But that consent may not necessarily be a sign of the supreme leader’s
backing for Ahmadinejad.

Some observers said Khamenei, who has been silent over the changes,
may be giving the president more leeway on the nuclear dossier to be
in a better position to reel him in if his policies lead to a new
round of U.N. sanctions.

”Larijani’s replacement leaves no pretext for Ahmadinejad to justify
his failures in the future. His failures, despite being given a free
hand, will only facilitate his humiliating exit from Iranian
politics,” political analyst Hamid Reza Shokouhi said.

Ahmadinejad was elected on a populist agenda in 2005, promising to
bring oil revenues to every family, eradicate poverty and tackle
unemployment.

But under his rule, Iran has seen dramatic price increases in housing
and basic commodities, fueling criticism of the president. Inflation
further worsened after a 25 percent hike in fuel prices in May. Some
protesters burned down gas stations in June when fuel rationing was
imposed.

Source: ear-Ahmadinejad.html

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Iran-Nucl

Area Man Watching Congressional Action Closely

AREA MAN WATCHING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION CLOSELY
By Wanda Freeman

Fort Smith Times Record, AR
Oct 22 2007

A Fort Smith man whose first language was his parents’ native Armenian
had strong English words for waning congressional support of a House
resolution declaring the mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turks
in 1915 a genocide.

"If (this resolution) doesn’t pass, I will have lost all respect for
the Senate and the House," said Leo Stepanian, 77. "Turkey is not
our ally. Turkey wants what Turkey can get from this country."

Stepanian is a first-generation Armenian American, born in Racine,
Wis., to parents who survived the World War I-era deaths of about
1.5 million Armenians. He grew up in Providence, R.I., joined the Air
Force and served in Japan and Korea, married in 1954 and moved from
Texas to Arkansas in 1988 after retiring as a crash-rescue firefighter
with the Defense Department.

Both of Stepanian’s parents were forced to march out into the Syrian
desert during a deportation campaign in 1915. His father, 16 at the
time, "took off running" and escaped the death march.

His mother, segregated into a group of girls age 12 to 16, was
passing through what is now eastern Turkey when she and one other
girl were grabbed and rescued by an American missionary. She became
a nanny to a consulate official in Alexandria, Egypt, before meeting
Stepanian’s father in Cuba, where the mayor of Havana presided over
their arranged marriage.

Stepanian said the antagonism between the Muslim Ottomans and
Christian Armenians began with aggressions by the Turkish sultan
in the 1890s and came to a head in 1915. While he and many others
view the massive killings as the first genocide of the 20th century,
Turkey today maintains the deaths resulted from the wartime fall of
the Ottoman Empire.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee this month approved the genocide
resolution – the latest of several that have come up over the past
two decades – paving the way for a House vote. But last week the vote
fell into question when eight backers, including Reps. Marion Berry,
D-Gillett, and Mike Ross, D-Prescott, co-sponsors of the resolution,
withdrew their support under growing pressure from the White House
and the Turkish government.

About 70 percent of supplies and equipment used by U.S. troops in Iraq
passes through Turkey, according to Ross, and the Bush administration
is concerned that Turkey might make good on its threats to restrict
U.S. access to its airspace and military bases if the resolution
passes.

"I feel bad that our government is kowtowing to the Turks," Stepanian
said. "Why do they listen to foreign nations like that?"

Rep. John Boozman, R-Rogers, voted against the resolution in committee;
he said he would support appointing a commission to study the issue.

"Mr. Boozman, our illustrious congressman, voted nay," Stepanian
said. "He’s just spouting Bush’s GOP party line; he’s not an
individual. I won’t vote for him again."

Although the fast-slipping support for the resolution appears to
be bipartisan, Stepanian insists that all of those backing away are
speaking the party line.

"I don’t care what they say. There’s no excuse to condone genocide,"
he said.

The resolution is meant to "inform the people of the world what a
horrible atrocity" occurred, Stepanian said.

He recalls family stories of specific atrocities: How his 94-year-old
aunt, now in a nursing home, was bashed in the face with the butt
of a Turkish soldier’s gun as a small child; how his mother used to
wake up screaming from nightmares, having seen her brothers hung by
the heels and used for bayonet practice.

"They threw babies in the air and let them come down on bayonets.

They cut open pregnant women, tore out their fetuses and bashed them
against the rocks," Stepanian said.

A fact sheet on the events produced by the Armenian Research Center
at the University of Michigan at Dearborn states that during the
forced march, prisoners were often denied food and water and many were
"brutalized and killed" by guards. Armenians near the Black Sea Coast
were loaded onto barges that were sunk out at sea, according to the
fact sheet.

Stepanian said Germany admitted the Holocaust happened, and Turkey
should do the same about the Armenian genocide.

"If they want to be known as a democratic country, then they should
say, ‘Yes, the Ottoman Turks did this.’ … What’s so hard about
admitting the Ottomans did this? It’s not them now. But it happened."

In 2001, Stepanian persuaded then-Gov. Mike Huckabee to issue
a proclamation recognizing April 24 as Armenian Martyrs Day in
commemoration of the day in 1915 when the Turkish government began
a deportation program with the arrests of hundreds of Armenian
intellectuals.

He said he did it for his parents and grandparents, family members
he will never know, and all Armenian Americans. And he wants the
genocide resolution to pass for the same reason.

"I just want my family and the Armenian people to be honored by this."

Stephens Washington Bureau reporter Aaron Sadler contributed to
this report.

Turkish President To Be Elected By Popular Vote

TURKISH PRESIDENT TO BE ELECTED BY POPULAR VOTE

PanARMENIAN.Net
22.10.2007 13:27 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ With 69.4% of votes ‘for’ and 30.5% ‘against’,
Turks have backed the constitutional reforms. The appearance made
64.8%, AFP reported quoting the Turkish Supreme Election Committee.

The law on "Making Amendments in Some Articles of the Republic of
Turkey’s Constitution," envisaging the election of the president
directly by the people instead of Parliament, will give rise to major
changes in the Turkish political system. The law will decrease the
seven-year term of the president to five years and allow a president
to be elected twice, while stipulating the holding of general elections
every four years instead of the current five and decreasing the quorum
required to hold a parliamentary session to 184. This last article
provides a very clear answer to the Constitutional Court’s condition
of a 367-member quorum.

Meanwhile, critics say the reform will complicate the work of state
bodies, Lenta.ru reports.

Turkey gets what it wants

Mideast Mirror
October 19, 2007 Friday

Turkey gets what it wants

Now that the Turkish government and parliament have made a decision,
and after the Turkish military establishment’s warm embrace of a
strike against PKK positions, Iraq – that is, the governments in both
Baghdad and Arbil – has no alternative but to act quickly, and by all
means to convince the PKK to end its military operations – Faryad
Rawanzi in Iraqi al-Ittihad

Turkey will (eventually, if not already) get what it wants. Even
before a single Turkish soldier is deployed, steps are already being
taken to curb the PKK. More importantly, this crisis has brought the
Turkish political and military establishments closer together,
despite their obvious differences – ‘Abdelbari ‘Atwan in pan-Arab
al-Quds al-Arabi

Now that the Turkish parliament has authorized the government to
enter Northern Iraq in response to any future Kurdish Workers’ Party
[PKK] attacks, the central Iraqi government and the Kurdish
provincial government in Arbil must convince the PKK to end its
attacks on Turkey, maintains an Iraqi Kurdish commentator. Otherwise,
Arbil will have to take action against the PKK. But, in addition to
steps already underway against the PKK in Northern Iraq, the crisis
has brought the Turkish political and military establishments closer
together, argues the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab daily.

REFRAIN FROM THE MILITARY OPTION: "After the Turkish government
decided to attack the PKK’s positions in the rugged mountain range
between Iraq and Turkey, voices were raised demanding that [Turkish
PM] Recep Tayyip Erdogan should resort to political and diplomatic
means, and refrain from any military action," writes Faryad Rawanzi
in the Iraqi daily organ of the Kurdish Patriotic Union, al-Ittihad.

Action of this nature could undermine the stable security situation
in Iraqi Kurdistan. It may anger the U.S., Ankara’s traditional ally.
And it may make it more difficult for the EU to open the door for
negotiations with Turkey to join the Union.

Erdogan is known for his great pragmatism. The PM who is ‘Bush’s
partner in the Greater Middle East project,’ as he described himself
in 2006, has changed his tune to a military march that differs little
from that of his chief of staff or retired military commanders,
demanding that the government change its strategy and join a
coalition with Iran, Syria, and Moscow against NATO and the U.S.
policies in the region – despite the fact that Turkish forces rely on
U.S. weapons and equipment for 80% of their needs.

Erdogan’s patience seems to have run out. He no longer cares for the
dire consequences for Turkey’s EU future, or for its relations with
Iraq – which has been the weaker of the two states ever since it was
founded in 1921.

Despite the voices clamoring against any military action on Iraqi
territory, Turkey’s decision seems final. Erdogan will lead his
military campaign and infiltrate Iraqi soil. But he may not
infiltrate too deeply. Instead, he is expected to try to compensate
for this by striking at some strategic and vital sites belonging to
the government of Iraq’s Kurdistan Province, in a manner similar to
that followed by NATO in its preemptive strikes in Kosovo, or by
Israel in its preemptive strikes against Syrian sites, or by the U.S.
in its preemptive strikes against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

The U.S., which is opposed to Turkish incursions across the Iraqi
borders, may not be too angered by this. Its reactions will not be
too harsh if Ankara confines itself to a limited incursion in the
border area, and if it uses its air force to bomb PKK sites. This is
something that officials in Baghdad and Arbil should expect.

Now that the Turkish government and parliament have made a decision,
and after the Turkish military establishment’s warm embrace of a
strike against PKK positions, Iraq – that is, the governments in both
Baghdad and Arbil – has no alternative but to act quickly, and by all
means to convince the PKK to end its military operations.

Baghdad and Arbil must also move on another front and adopt another
position that stops the Turkish decision in its tracks, and prevents
it from being implemented, by putting an end to the PKK nuisance.
This nuisance is no longer acceptable for the security, economic, and
political future of the Kurdish entity in Iraqi Kurdistan which
cannot withstand any painful Turkish strikes.

Iraq and Turkey have sufficient time to discuss this crisis. The PKK
also has sufficient time to review its positions and its policies,
even its presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. If, however, the bomb goes off
and burns the Kurdish fields in Iraqi Kurdistan, everyone will bear
responsibility.

"Rather than bear responsibility for such destruction, we must all
act to avoid it, even if this is to be achieved at the cost of harsh
and painful concessions on the part of the PKK, or harsh and painful
decisions made by the Iraqi Kurdistan government should the PKK fail
to respond to its patriotic and national call," concludes Rawanzi.

BIGGEST WINNER: "If the current standoff between Turkey and the
Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq is seen from a viewpoint
of winners and losers, then it could be said that the Turkish
government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be the biggest winner
whatever the outcome," writes ‘Abdelbari ‘Atwan editor-in-chief of
the pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

The United States and its Iraqi allies (Arabs and Kurds alike) will
come out the losers.

Erdogan displayed admirable statesmanship in dealing with the current
crisis. He dealt with it with great intelligence, casting the ball
into the American court while sitting back waiting to reap the
benefits.

American confusion was obvious in the way the Bush administration
repeatedly called on the Turks to show restraint and not carry out
their threat to invade Northern Iraq to destroy PKK bases there.
Iraqi officials (the latest was vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi)
hurried to Ankara seeking a diplomatic solution.

Turkey will (eventually, if not already) get what it wants. Even
before a single Turkish soldier is deployed, steps are already being
taken to curb the PKK. More importantly, this crisis has brought the
Turkish political and military establishments closer together,
despite their obvious differences.

For the first time since Erdogan’s AKP won its first election, the
party finds the army backing it. Turkey’s generals have always been
skeptical of the Islamist oriented AKP, seeing it as a threat to the
secular ideals of the republic founded by Kemal Ataturk.

Most importantly, the Turks proved yet again that their own interests
are more important to them than their relations with the United
States, and that they would not hesitate for one second to assert
their independence and sovereignty if those interests came into
conflict with their superpower ally. They already did this once when
they prevented U.S. forces from using Turkish territory to attack
Iraq in 2003 – in sharp contrast to the many Arab states that allowed
the Americans to use their bases and airspace to invade a supposedly
sisterly Arab nation.

America is the biggest loser in this crisis. The shortsighted U.S.
policy in Iraq has unified the Turkish people behind their
government; it has also unified two erstwhile enemies – Sunni Turkey
and Shiite Iran – against the U.S. and its occupation of Iraq. This
was inconceivable only a few months ago. Should this rapprochement
prove durable, it would complicate any American effort to take out
Tehran’s nuclear installations.

Should the Turkish army decide to invade Northern Iraq, America would
be put in a very delicate situation. The U.S. would have to make some
very hard choices, of which it would not have many anyway.
Confronting a Turkish invasion would spell the end of a fifty-year
old alliance and would cause the Turks to join the anti-American
camp. If, on the other hand, the U.S. allows the Turks to do their
will, that would destroy the American-Kurdish alliance and cause the
U.S. to look feeble in the eyes of all peoples in the region.

The Kurds’ biggest achievement has been ensuring relative security
and stability in their region while the rest of Iraq burns. However,
this stability has caused the Kurdish leaderships to behave as if
they already have an independent state. Indeed, they have been
building airports, flying their own flag, refusing to teach Arabic in
their schools, and signing oil deals with international companies
without even consulting with the central government in Baghdad. A
Turkish invasion would end all that. There would be no more Kurdish
‘sovereignty.’

The Turkish government has managed this crisis very wisely by making
sure that any military involvement would be carried out legally and
constitutionally. It also ensured that its two important neighbors,
Syria and Iran, were on board. In fact, it was only yesterday that
Syria’s Bashar al-Assad – on a visit to Ankara – expressed his
country’s support for Turkey’s right to invade Northern Iraq. Assad’s
words implied a new strategic partnership in the making, which could
conceivably expand to include Iran as well. Two ‘evil’ states and a
regional superpower under one roof!

It is the West’s fault that Turkey is turning Eastwards and taking
refuge in its Islamic imperial past. By slamming the door of EU
membership in Ankara’s face for purely racist and religious reasons,
and by insulting its patriotic feelings by raising the Armenian
‘genocide’ issue, the West has deliberately provoked the Turks.

Ironically, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, which now finds itself in a
precarious situation, has failed to find a single Arab or Moslem
ally. This reflects remarkable foolishness and shortsightedness on
the part of the Kurdish leadership.

In fact, the only regional leader who has come to the rescue of the
Kurds was Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who two weeks ago
promised Erdogan that he would eradicate all PKK bases in Northern
Iraq. But no one believes that the Turkish PM will take Maliki’s
promise seriously, since he knows that the Iraqi leader has no army
to speak of, cannot speak for the Kurds, and cannot even protect
himself.

Turkey has been rapidly regaining its role as a regional Islamic
superpower. It has been turning its back to the West (particularly
the U.S.) in a measured and considered manner. In fact, Turkey, with
its wisdom, independence, sovereignty, economic progress, and
military prowess, has been giving other Moslem peoples lessons in
democracy. Turkey has become a rare example of an Islamic democracy
in the midst of petty dictatorships and failed American wars.

Not too long ago, Turkey threatened Syria with military action if
Damascus did not curb the PKK, which had its bases in Syria at the
time. The late [Syrian president] Hafez al-Assad understood the
message immediately and sent PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan packing to
Nairobi, whence he was picked up by Turkish intelligence and flown
back to Ankara.

"Now Turkey is threatening Jalal Talabani and Mas’ud Barzani with the
same fate. But are these two Kurdish leaders as wise as Hafez
al-Assad was? Would they raise the white flag and turn against their
own Kurdish brethren? I do not believe they have much of a choice,"
concludes ‘Atwan.