In the ultimate irony, Russia’s obsession with Ukraine may have weakened its power over its other neighbors

CNBC
Oct 26 2023
PUBLISHED THU, OCT 26 20231:11 AM EDTUPDATED 5 HOURS AGO
Holly Ellyatt
KEY POINTS
  • With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine its most pressing geopolitical priority for at least the last 19 months, Moscow has not had much time or opportunity to hold as much power and influence over all its other neighbors.
  • Russia’s influence in parts of the South Caucasus region — which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia — and other former Soviet republics, differs from state to state.
  • Analysts say the war in Ukraine has created the irony that Russia has lost a degree of control, power and influence over its backyard.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine its most pressing geopolitical priority for at least the last 19 months, Moscow has not had much time or opportunity to hold as much power and influence over all its other neighbors — a position it has enjoyed since the breakup of the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago.

Russia’s influence in parts of the South Caucasus region — which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia — and other former Soviet republics such as Belarus and those further afield, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, differs from state to state. It’s also largely dependent on the degree of pro-Western or pro-Russian sentiment among the people and leadership, as well as the level of economic and geopolitical reliance on Moscow.

But analysts say one thing is for certain: The war in Ukraine has created the irony that a distracted Russia has lost a degree of power, control and leverage over its own wider backyard.

Azerbaijan’s seizing of breakaway region Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia in September highlighted Russia’s somewhat weakened or reshaped role in the region — given its perceived lack of anticipation of the offensive and lack of intervention in a long-running dispute in which it has traditionally been a mediator.

In a sign that Russia was caught off guard by the conflict in its own backyard, just one day before Azerbaijan launched its lightning offensive, Russia’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the humanitarian situation was improving in Nagorno-Karabakh and hoped that would aid the “normalising” of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.

The Kremlin rejects accusations that it no longer has the leadership status it once enjoyed, with President Vladimir Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov telling CNBC that “there is no such possibility” that Moscow’s influence has waned among its neighbors.

“Each area is equally important for Russia. Russia continues to play its role in the Caucasus,” Peskov said in emailed comments.

Geopolitical analysts are not so unequivocal, saying Russia’s failure to seize Ukraine in a matter of days — as Moscow expected — when its forces first invaded in February 2022, showed its military capabilities in a new light to its neighbors.

“The question arose about the real fighting capacity of the Russian army,” Vira Konstantinova, political scientist and international relations specialist, told CNBC.

Within the first month of fighting, and with Russian forces withdrawing from the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine’s armed forces had managed to debunk a “key myth of Russian propaganda,” she noted — that Russia’s army was powerful, well equipped and capable.

In fact, she said, Kyiv’s resistance highlighted to Russia’s neighbors and partners that “Russian power is a bubble with only a nuclear button in its center.”

Russian opposition politician Vladimir Milov, who once worked under Putin in the early days of his leadership, before becoming disillusioned with Russia’s geopolitical direction of travel, agreed that the war in Ukraine has, ironically, made Russia look weaker among its post-Soviet neighbors.

“If you take Ukraine out of the equation it’s really clear that Russia does not control the post-Soviet space, as Ukraine is bigger and more important than everything else. So it’s fair to say that if you do not control Ukraine, you do not control the post-Soviet space,” he told CNBC.

“When it was clear that Russia was failing to establish dominance over Ukraine, everybody else also saw that and started to behave more independently. People see that they [Russia] is not achieving this ultimate task and that means they are weak and have to turn elsewhere,” he noted.

Milov said there used to be two schools of thought in Russia two decades ago: one is that Moscow needed to reassert dominance over its post-Soviet neighbors and another — followed by Milov — believed Russia’s neighbors should be treated as equals and integrated, with Russia, into a broader Western space.

Milov said his school of thought had been erased over time — Putin, he said, “squeezed it out.”

Geopolitical analysts say Russia’s influence may have been shaken, but has certainly not disappeared — it remains a superpower among its neighbors and the possibility of further Russian intervention in Russian-backed breakaway regions such as Transnistria in Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia has not been discounted.

Igor Semivolos, executive director of the Center for Middle East Studies in Ukraine, noted that while it could be said that the “intensity” of Russia’s interactions in what it sees as its backyard has declined — particularly as it “concentrates the main effort on the Ukrainian question” — it’s not entirely correct to say that “Russia has lost its grip.”

“In general, so far, the weakening is observed only in the context of the reduction of Russia’s foreign policy initiatives in this region,” he told CNBC in emailed comments, adding that Russia still “maneuvers and tries to distribute the resources to keep the situation under control.”

But if Western nations wanted to take the opportunity to break Russia’s increasingly precarious hold over its neighbors, foreign policy initiatives and security guarantees are needed now, he said.

“It’s important that other powers start entering the region. The USA and Turkey [could] offer the countries their own security formulas [guarantees], and perhaps in the future, these security formulas will become more attractive than the Russian one,” he said.

Analysts say the West should certainly be reaching out to such Eurasian countries while the opportunity presents itself, and Russia is distracted with Ukraine. Azerbaijan’s decision to strike Armenia while Russia’s back was turned, metaphorically, showed that Moscow’s hands are largely tied, they note.

“Russia’s war on Ukraine has shaken stability in the South Caucasus, and Moscow may try to claw back influence in the region at the expense of regional peace and security,” Vasif Huseynov, head of the Western Studies department at the Center of Analysis of International Relations, a think tank based in Azerbaijan, noted in analysis.

But greater U.S. engagement with the likes of Azerbaijan could “reinforce a platform for peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia” and could help “counter threats to shared interests” from Moscow and Tehran, he noted.

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/26/russias-influence-over-its-backyard-declines-as-it-focuses-on-ukraine.html








Armenian Economy Minister, British counterparts discuss enhancing Armenia’s chamber of commerce system

 14:32,

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 28, ARMENPRESS. Armenian Minister of Economy Vahan Kerobyan had a meeting with the representatives of the British Chamber of Commerce in London.

"We have discussed further reforms aimed at making the chamber of commerce system in Armenia more efficient, which will enhance the effectiveness of their activities. In order to strengthen trade and business relations between Armenia and Great Britain, we have emphasized the need for more active participation of businessmen in the exchange of information and the organized sector exhibitions," Kerobyan said on his Facebook page.

The Armenian Minister of Economy also held a meeting with representatives of the largest banking and investment corporation, JP Morgan. During the meeting issues related to ensuring access to international markets for corporate businesses were discussed.

"At the meeting, the opportunities for attracting investments from international markets to support programs related to organizations in agriculture, industry, telecommunications and other sectors were touched upon,"  said Kerobyan.



Iran to host Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks ‘without Western countries’

EURACTIV
Oct 23 2023

Foreign ministers from Iran, Turkey and Russia will meet their counterparts from Azerbaijan and Armenia in Tehran on Monday (23 October) and discuss progress towards a peace agreement between the two South Caucasus neighbours, Iranian and Russian state media said.

The first meeting of foreign ministers of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan after the September lightning offensive by Azeri forces in Nagorno-Karabakh will also take place amid rising tensions in the Middle East.

IRNA news agency quoted the foreign ministry as saying the countries wanted to talk about regional issues “without the interference of non-regional and Western countries”.

That was an implicit reference to the United States and the European Union, whose involvement in the search for a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan has particularly annoyed Moscow.

Russia’s Interfax news agency said Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov would travel to Tehran for the meeting.

Since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow has sought to firm up military and diplomatic ties with countries outside the traditional West. Lavrov has met his Iranian counterpart several times since.

Russia regards itself as the security guarantor between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but the demands and distractions of its war in Ukraine have led to a weakening of its influence.

Azerbaijan last month staged a lightning offensive to regain control of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh where ethnic Armenians had enjoyed de facto independence since breaking away in the 1990s.

More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians were forced to flee and Armenia has accused Azerbaijan of carrying out ethnic cleansing – a claim Azerbaijan denies, saying people were free to stay and be integrated into Azerbaijan.

The two countries have fought two wars in the past three decades and have so far failed to reach a peace deal despite long-running efforts by the United States, EU and Russia.

The so-called 3+3 South Caucasus Platform, which first held talks in 2021, were to include also Georgia, but Georgia has stated previously it did not plan to participate in the initiative and said on Sunday it will not be coming to Teheran.

Moscow calls Armenia a “Ukraine 3” after Pashinyan’s speech at European Parliament

Oct 19 2023
By Ani Avetisyan October 19, 2023

The war of words between Armenia and Russia appears to be worsening  as Yerevan becomes more and more vocal about its disappointment with Russia and Moscow reacts fiercely. The latest incident took place after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s speech in the European Parliament, where he, once again, complained about Armenia’s “allies” that abandoned the country in its conflict with Azerbaijan. 

"When hundreds of thousands of Armenians were fleeing from Nagorno Karabakh to the Republic of Armenia, not only did our allies in the security sector refuse to help us, but they also made public calls for a change of power in Armenia to overthrow the democratic government", Pashinyan said, adding that the “conspiracy” against Armenia failed thanks to the unity in the country.

An anonymous high-ranking source told Russian state news agency TASS that  Pashinyan was following Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s footsteps by “quantum leaps”. 

"We consider Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's speech at the European Parliament on October 17 as absolutely irresponsible and provocative, especially as far as Russia and Russian-Armenian relations are concerned," the source told TASS, adding that “Armenia is trying to turn into Ukraine No. 3”, calling Moldova a “Ukraine No. 2”. 

Armenia has been voicing criticism about Russia and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty organisation (CSTO) since 2021, when Azerbaijan captured lands inside Armenia, but it became more vocal following the 2022 September attack when Azerbaijan captured a number of military positions inside Armenia, leaving hundreds dead. Armenia’s requests to Russia and CSTO for military assistance remained unanswered, making Armenia reconsider its strategic allies. 

In a September 24 speech, Pashinyan stated that the “security systems”  meaning CSTO and the alliance with Russia  of which Armenia was part were not effective and that Armenia was seeking to diversify its security architecture. 

Armenia has recently been more eager for Western-led initiatives and peace negotiations with Azerbaijan. Refusing a number of events with the CSTO and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Armenia hosted a short-term military training with US troops days before Azerbaijan’s September 19 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenia has been looking for new possible partners, among them, India and France. India and Armenia already have a number of contracts on arms supplies, while with France Armenia has just agreed to co-operate militarily, which includes delivery of weapons. Russia is still the main supplier of weapons, but with its war in Ukraine, the country struggled to send promised weapons to Armenia, nor has it returned the $400mn Armenia pre-paid for the weapons. 

Along with security issues, Yerevan faced a test of loyalty when initiating the ratification of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court. Armenia decided to join the court despite Russia’s warnings and threats that the ratification could affect the two country’s relations. 

The West has also become one of the leading facilitators of talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the talks are facing a standoff over the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders keep repeating that the peace agreement between the two countries is within reach. 

Pashinyan stated in Strasbourg that Armenia is ready to sign the peace treaty with Azerbaijan by the end of the year. 

https://www.intellinews.com/moscow-calls-armenia-a-ukraine-3-after-pashinyan-s-speech-at-european-parliament-297501/?source=armenia

Inter Milan plans to extend contract with Mkhitaryan

 12:47,

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 16, ARMENPRESS. Inter Milan plans to extend its contract with Henrikh Mkhitaryan, according to Italian media reports.

The current contract is signed until 2024, and the Italian club seeks another 1-year extension, according to the reports. The Armenian football star will earn a yearly salary of €3,8 million.

Long-Standing Ties Between Armenia and Russia Are Fraying Fast

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Oct 13 2023
Russia failed to stop Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh and the flight of Karabakh Armenians. Consequently, Armenia will be looking elsewhere for security guarantees.
Alexander Atasuntsev

The conflict in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh has not just ended in the worst possible way for Armenia, but for Russia, too. Despite Moscow’s bombastic rhetoric and its criticism of Armenia’s leaders, it’s clear that the failure of Russia’s peacekeeping efforts has jeopardized its long-term presence in the South Caucasus.

The 24 hours of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh in September that resulted in the capitulation of Karabakh Armenian defense forces to Baku revealed that Azerbaijan was more wary of Western sanctions than Russian military might. Despite being formally allied within the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Yerevan will no longer be seeking security guarantees from Moscow.

Armenia is the only post-Soviet country where Russia’s influence has grown steadily since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992, Russian border guards were stationed on Armenia’s borders with Iran and Turkey. In 1995, a large Russian military base was opened in Armenia’s second city of Gyumri. And in 2020, a Russian peacekeeping mission was deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh after the Second Karabakh War.

Russia’s peacekeeping mandate in Nagorno-Karabakh was unclear, however, with its viability resting only on Russia’s continuing political and military authority. In essence, it came down to both sides being unwilling to risk the death of a Russian soldier.

That all changed with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has devoured the Kremlin’s military capabilities and destroyed much of its authority. By the fall of 2022, when Azerbaijan attacked Armenian territory, it was clear Moscow was not willing to intervene. And during the one-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, Moscow showed again that it was not prepared to risk a conflict with Baku (even following the death of Russian soldiers).

Moscow’s attempts to justify its blunders haven’t been convincing. Of course, Russian officials are partially correct when they blame Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for renouncing Armenia’s territorial claims to Nagorno-Karabakh. But, at least formally, Armenia had never advanced such claims. More importantly, it’s unclear why such a statement by Pashinyan would annul Moscow’s guarantee to Karabakh Armenians. After all, Russia’s past recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of Georgia, and Transnistria as part of Moldova, did not prevent it from deploying peacekeepers to those regions.

The failure of Russia’s peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh—which now looks likely to be wrapped up—puts into question its entire military presence in Armenia. Since the 1990s, that presence has been based on an alignment of interests between Moscow and Yerevan. Now these interests are rapidly diverging.

Up until 2020, it was customary to assume that Moscow’s goal in the South Caucasus was to preserve the status quo. That was why Yerevan looked for Russian help—which never materialized—during the Second Karabakh War. It’s still an open question whether Moscow could have done more to stop that conflict before it ended in a catastrophic defeat for the Armenians. If it could indeed have done more and chose not to, that was a big mistake, paving the way for Turkey to take on a bigger role in the region and leaving Armenia vulnerable.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, all other regional issues—including those of the South Caucasus—have faded into the background for Moscow. Certainly, entering into a conflict with Azerbaijan and its main supporter, Turkey, would not bring Russia any closer to victory in Ukraine.

One option open to Russia could have been to increase arms exports to its ally Armenia, but Moscow needs all the weapons it can get for its war against Ukraine. Yerevan has even complained that Moscow is refusing to supply weapons for which it has already paid, forcing Armenia to turn to Indian suppliers instead. There have even been suggestions Armenia might buy Western arms.

Without security guarantees or arms supplies, there is little reason for Armenia to remain in the CSTO military alliance. Apart from joint military exercises, for many years the only reason for Yerevan to be a member of the CSTO was the option of buying Russian weapons at a discount.

It’s obvious that no country (not only Russia) can give Armenia a cast-iron security guarantee: any such guarantor would have to be ready to risk an armed conflict with Azerbaijan. But diplomatic tools can also serve as a restraining factor, and there are currently more of these available to the West than to Russia.

Unhappiness with Moscow has already pushed Yerevan to make several fateful decisions. In October, Armenia ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which means that if Russian President Vladimir Putin visits Armenia, he will be arrested.

The idea of joining the ICC first arose following the Azerbaijani attack on Armenia in September 2022, and videos showing Azerbaijani soldiers executing Armenian prisoners. Back then, Yerevan said that ICC membership would be another lever over Baku. But when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Putin in March, it must have been clear to Armenian officials how the Kremlin would react—and yet Armenia went ahead with the ratification.

Nor has Yerevan attempted to hide the real reasons for its decision, with Pashinyan stating: “We took the decision to ratify the Rome Statute when it became clear to us that the CSTO and the instruments of the Russian-Armenian strategic partnership were not enough to ensure Armenia’s external security.”

Moscow’s reaction was predictable, with Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov calling the ratification an “extremely hostile” step. In the following days, suppliers of Armenian brandy to Russia began to experience problems at customs.

In the past, Russia has blocked imports of goods to punish countries like Moldova and Georgia that it sees as pursuing a pro-Western course. But the tactic has never met with much success. If anything, it has had the opposite effect: Moldova received European Union candidate status in 2022, and Georgia could receive it later this year. It can’t be ruled out that Armenia will follow in their footsteps.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90768

By:
  • Alexander Atasuntsev

Netherlands expresses readiness to continuously support reforms in Armenia

 15:42,

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 13, ARMENPRESS. On October 13, Speaker of Parliament Alen Simonyan received the  chargé d'affaires of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Armenia Jaap Frederiks.

Simonyan said that Armenia is interested in further deepening and strengthening the Armenian-Dutch friendly relations, stressing the development of the parliamentary relations between the legislative bodies, the parliament’s press service said in a readout.

Touching upon the regional issues, he emphasized that Armenia does not stop making great efforts for establishing long-term peace in the region.

Alen Simonyan underscored that Armenia is ready for signing a treaty on peace and establishment of relations with Azerbaijan, remaining faithful to agreements reached in Brussels on 14 December 2021, in Prague 6 October 2022 and in May 2023.

Frederiks said that to establish peace in the region it is important that Azerbaijan also recognizes the territorial integrity of Armenia.

Reference was made to a number of issues regarding the further fate of the forcibly displaced Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh, prioritizing the unconditional exercise of security and rights. The opportunities of imposing international sanctions on Azerbaijan were discussed.

Jaap Frederiks commended the ratification of the Rome Statute by the Armenian parliament, describing it as highly important move. He also mentioned that his country is ready to continuously support the sectoral reforms being implemented in Armenia.

Rain doesn’t stop the R.I. community from marching for Artsakh

(Photo: GVK Images)

PROVIDENCE, R.I.—On Friday, September 29, 100 Armenians marched in the pouring cold rain to raise awareness of the ethnic cleansing happening in Artsakh. Beginning at the Armenian Historical Association of Rhode Island (AHARI), the group walked through the Brown University neighborhood and ended at the Avon Cinema, just in time for the viewing of the film Amerikatsi

Organized by the Providence “Kristapor” Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and sister organizations, the Homenetmen scouts led the way as honor guard. Local news coverage was provided by Kim Kalunian of WPRI channel 12.

“We are here today to let everyone know that 120,000 indigenous Armenians are being ethnically cleansed by Azerbaijan,” said chairman of the Providence ARF Hrag Arakelian.

While a sunny day would likely have attracted a larger crowd, those who attended were encouraged to see the community express support for Artsakh in spite of the cold rainy weather. Many parents brought their children, and some even brought their babies in strollers. Those who marched felt that getting wet in the rain was nothing compared to what the Armenians of Artsakh have endured, from a nearly 10-month blockade to being forced from their homes.

Now, there is a massive refugee crisis in Armenia where 100,000 Armenians of Artsakh have fled without a home or long-term plan. Armenia needs the diaspora to help in three ways:

  1. Advocate our elected officials to speak up about the atrocities, such as Senator Jack Reed did a few days ago in Washington.
  1. Donate to the Armenian Relief Society, a reputable organization that has been providing humanitarian assistance to the Armenian people for more than 100 years.
  1. Increase awareness by telling your friends, family members, and colleagues about what is happening to Armenians.

Azerbaijan issues warrant for former separatist leader as UN mission arrives in Nagorno-Karabakh

y! news
Oct 1 2023
















"Baku will try to preserve Armenians in NK as a museum piece". Opinion


Sept 29 2023


  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

Armenian political analyst on Baku’s intentions

“Baku will try to preserve Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh as a museum piece to show the world that Armenians live here and have no problems,” says Armenian political scientist Tigran Grigoryan.

He finds it difficult to guess how many Armenians will remain in Nagorno-Karabakh, but he believes that Azerbaijan will populate the region with its own people, and “in 10 years it will be meaningless to talk about the Armenian element”.

According to him, at meetings between Baku and Karabakh Armenians after the hostilities, the creation of a “transitional administration before full integration” is being discussed. Azerbaijan intends to complete this process by December next year, when elections are scheduled, the political analyst believes.

In an interview with an Armenian publication, Grigoryan commented on the military actions in NK, spoke about Armenia’s responsibility in the current situation, as well as the role of the U.S. and Russia.


  • Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians leave their homes, rush to move to Armenia
  • Explosion at fuel depot in NK. Armenian medics assist by helicopter
  • Urgently sever ties with Russia or calculate risks? Discussions in Yerevan

In the expert’s opinion, the situation in NK was prepared by the Armenian authorities with their small concessions to Azerbaijan. Their result was obvious when the Armenian Prime Minister stated that the international community expects Armenia to recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and “lower the bar on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh”. At the same time, international players started talking about “the rights and security of NK Armenians”.

Grigoryan says that the Armenian authorities have nullified all available opportunities with their inconsistent policy:

“It was clear that after the defeat in the second Karabakh war, the content of the negotiations could not but change, the new status quo had to be reflected at the negotiating table. But at least some principles and details had to be preserved.”

“This escalation was expected to take place in Karabakh earlier, at the time when the presidential elections were taking place. Before the elections, Azerbaijan made specific threats through closed channels,” the political analyst said.

Azerbaijan has been talking about conducting an “anti-terrorist operation” in various closed-door discussions since April 2023, and “internal political developments in Artsakh at least accelerated this process.”

“The events in Karabakh are Armenia’s new, westernized path and Russia’s expulsion from the Caucasus. Have the Abkhazians and Ossetians realized this?” – Georgian experts comment

According to the expert, the price of this is “the presence of Russian peacekeepers on the ground”. Grigoryan draws attention to the fact that if before the military actions in MK the Azerbaijani side emphasized that peacekeepers here are “deployed temporarily”, after the “anti-terrorist operation” the rhetoric changed dramatically.

“Hikmet Hajiyev [Azerbaijani presidential aide] talks about the presence of peacekeepers until 2025, and that the term of their deployment may even be extended.”

At the same time, Grigoryan notes that talks have intensified about the “Zangezur corridor”, i.e. an extraterritorial corridor through Armenia’s territory, which Azerbaijan demands. According to Grigoryan, if Moscow manages to get Russian presence on this section of the road and control of the railroad track, it will lose nothing even if the peacekeepers leave NK:

“If Russia controls this important transportation hub, by and large, it will be able to maintain control over both Azerbaijan and Armenia.”

According to Grigoryan, “shameful internal political processes” took place in Daghlig Garabagh – certain maximalist red lines were outlined, which were later very quickly violated. The analyst emphasizes that there is a tendency in Armenia to blame the NK authorities for all processes, but “the lion’s share of responsibility” in this case is on the Armenian authorities:

“The main problem is that at some stage Armenia simply stepped aside, distanced itself from this issue, tried to show that, say, we have nothing to do with this issue.”

The political scientist explains that on November 9, 2020, with the signing of the statement on cessation of hostilities, the Armenia-Azerbaijan-Russia triangle was formed. But Yerevan itself withdrew from the process, thus bringing it “into the field of Russian-Azerbaijani, we can say, Russian-Turkish agreements”.

Speech by Armenian Foreign Minister, assessments of UN Security Council members, European Union’s appeal to Azerbaijan, Armenian analyst’s commentary

Grigoryan says that Azerbaijan “carried out ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh, but there was zero reaction from the international community. At the same time, the analyst argues that world actors had the opportunity to prevent it, as Azerbaijan stated it openly, there were even “preparatory visits” before the start of the operation:

“For example, Elchin Amirbayov, one of the prominent figures in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, traveled to Europe. My colleagues, European experts told me that he came for this very purpose, warned and explained why it was necessary to carry out such an operation”.

As a result, Azerbaijan crossed the red line set by the U.S., escalated, and carried out ethnic cleansing. However, the threats of sanctions voiced during the closed meetings did not become a reality.

The analyst emphasizes that the United States constantly spoke about the “historical possibility” of signing an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, Washington took into account

  • Russia’s diminishing role in the region,
  • the policy of the Armenian government, which is ready to make unilateral concessions.

“For example, part of this process was that the U.S. even pressured other actors not to pass a resolution in the UN Security Council,” he said.

According to Grigoryan, the Americans were in a hurry to complete the process and fix a “political result” before the US presidential elections.

And now, as the expert says, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem has moved to the humanitarian dimension. And the U.S. is trying to show that it can help in humanitarian issues, but “on other issues – hardly”.

https://jam-news.net/armenian-political-analyst-on-bakus-intentions/