Left Hook
June 25 2005
Turkey: In the Light of the Final EU Decision
H. Yener Ekrose
On 6th of October 2004 the EU Commission has finally announced ‘the
good news’ and turned the green light on, suggesting within its
report the commencement of membership talks with Turkey. 1 Long
before that, the Turkish media had already been carrying out
discussions on the European Union, even more intensively since Turkey
signed the Customs Union Agreement in 1996. What awaits the Turkish
society, the peculiar conditions for Turkey’s accession, and the
requirements that Turkey should further fulfill, figured prominently
in media coverage after October. The Turkish media has not been alone
in presenting such discussions, however. The same is true for the
European media and also for some Arabic-language newspapers.
Debates in the European media focus mainly on whether it is a ‘sane’
decision to expand the EU to the Euphrates and Tigris, and thus
become neighbors with countries like Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
Problematic for the EU is how to cope with a ‘Muslim’ country in a
culturally ‘Judeo-Christian’ setting, though Turkey is a long time
loyal Western ally, not only in NATO, and though there are millions
of Muslims living in every European country and taking part in the
post-Cold war socialization processes. Moreover, reports of human
rights violations from Turkey along with the lingering limitations to
freedom of thought are mind-boggling for the European public and
contribute to the European hesitations in letting Turkey in. No less
unbelievable is the striking difference, both culturally and
economically, in Turkey between the western and the eastern regions,
and between the city and the countryside.
For Turkey, the choice of becoming an EU member stands as a political
and cultural preference, albeit at times with staggering doubts. This
preference comes as a part of the Europeanization process started
during the Ottoman Empire and later defined by Atatürk as an ultimate
aim. Turkey has become increasingly decisive about its orientation
toward the Europe over the years. This is especially explicit under
the new ‘liberal Islamist’ AKP (Justice and Development Party)
government, which won the majority of seats in the Parliament as a
result of the elections in November 2002. 2
For the EU, the possibility of letting Turkey in creates a pendulum
that swings between two ‘extreme’ feelings: almost an ‘ontological
fear’ from accepting an American ‘Trojan horse’ that would be
detrimental for the political unification of the EU and thus
hindering its emergence as a global actor that could eventually
prefer to play a balancing role against the US; and a joy of
realizing the European power as Turkey is a militarily powerful
‘democratic Muslim’ country close to strategic regions and resources,
which would give Europe an extra friendly outlook as to its relations
with the Islamic world.
Security, Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, free trade and investment in and
through Turkey, and military-defense industry projects are some
dimensions of this joy. Yet, to be realistic, Turkey, as a
social-cultural bridge to the Muslim Middle East, has for the time
being little to offer. Despite its Sunni Muslim majority, Turkey’s
secular state and elite control the ‘church’ in various ways and do
not accept the role of being a ‘model Muslim-democratic country’ for
other Muslim societies.3
Nevertheless, Islam draws a special attention as part of the European
fears and concerns. Many analysts point to the uneasy relationship
between “Western values” and Islam, and the rift that Turkey’s Muslim
majority would add to this once Turkey becomes a member. Arguably,
the fear of an ‘Islamic Europe’ in the near future underlies these
evaluations and Turkey appears as a double-edged sword in this
regard. Moreover, many young people in Turkey might prefer to live in
Western Europe once the boundaries are opened, increasing the
cultural and economic stress in the EU.
>From the Middle Eastern perspective, although democracy and reform
are welcome in principle for decades, Western/European cultural and
political domination is frowned upon. Particularly, secular
orientation of Europe, and also of Turkey, stands for some popular
Islamist circles in the region as a mental abyss between the
cultures. This perspective views Turkey as a ‘Trojan horse,’ though
not from the US into the EU, but from the West (through Turkey) into
the Middle East.
Nonetheless, Turkey under a ‘liberal Islamist’ government achieving
reforms, preparing itself for the EU, and standing for ‘justice’ has
received praise from the Middle Eastern people. Turkish Parliament’s
rejection of the bill in March 2003 to allow the U.S. troops to open
a northern front at the beginning of the Iraq War has earned the
sympathy and respect of the people in the region. Moreover, the AKP
and the Parliament managed to resist the U.S. demands of fetching
Turkish troops to Iraq, and thereby also curbing the political
presence of the Turkish military in the domestic politics.
The socio-politically ubiquitous military has been compelled to
“abdicate its regency over the state” 4 as a part of the political
reform, required accession into the EU. Indeed, this is one of the
toughest challenges that Turkey and its ‘liberal Islamist’ government
face, bringing the military under total civilian control. As the last
couple of weeks made explicit, the military will resist a full and
long-term withdrawal of its control on the political and social
spheres. The military justifies this with its being the guardian of
the republican values and democracy in Turkey, which it perceives to
be under continuing threat.
Despite the debates on Turkey’s EU prospects in the media, it is
clear that within the ‘new’ international context and ‘strategic
thinking,’ which appears as a function of re-dividing the world
regions and consolidating control over the most precious resources in
the post-cold war power game, Turkey is assigned to play the game in
a position that is either very close to or as a part of the Western
world. One should take into account the fact that the Turkish
military has a defining role in this game. Thus the country is
‘gently’ pushed towards the EU with a combination of carrots and
sticks. The EU was ‘advised’ to pull Turkey toward the union in spite
of strong the arguments in contrary. On 8th October columnist and
media analyst Haluk Sahin writing in the Turkish daily Radikal has
quoted a successful Turkish-German businessman Vural Öger, who is
also a member of the European Parliament from the SPD party in the
ruling Red-Green coalition, saying: “There are many obstacles. There
emerge new obstacles and difficulties. Yet, it is as if a hidden
power is pushing Turkey and the EU towards each other.” 5
The decision of the EU on 17th of December, 2004, has demonstrated
that the advice has been well taken and ‘the hidden power’ made the
first step. It was reported that the EU will start talks with Turkey
in October 2005, tough the initial warning to Turkey lingered. The
talks will start, but they will be open-ended, meaning that they
could be suspended grave failures or reneging on part of Turkey to
carry out further reforms as to human rights, freedom of thought,
education, economical restructuring, and, the last but not the least,
minority-rights guarantees especially related to the long neglected
Kurdish culture and language. As amelioration on this latter track,
the former Kurdish deputies were released in June 2004 and a Kurdish
language program ‘Our Cultural Riches,’ though not satisfying the
demand for the Kurdish language thoroughly, on the state-run TRT
began broadcasting. 6
Although the membership talks and the eventual membership have not
been conditioned upon Turkey’s ‘contribution’ toward solution of the
Cyprus problem and the public discussion of ‘the Armenian question’
toward a solution, it would be strongly expected from the European
side that these tracks are not ignored from a democratic future
European member. Probably due to pressure for further solutions these
two questions will be presented behind the curtains. The Armenian
question should be further consulted, but the difference from the
past is that the people in Turkey are willing to discuss it, and in
the press more views are expressed challenging the official stance.7
The Cyprus problem needs a whole-hearted engagement from all sides
for a solution, especially with the humanitarian focus of bringing
the communities culturally-politically together and ameliorating the
poor situation of the Northern Cypriots.
Turkey has a long course of 40 years in its rearview mirror since the
country’s application for the EU membership. Yet, there is still a
qualitatively and quantitatively long way to proceed, which is
fraught with ups and downs, low and high points, mutual understanding
and mutual anger, dangers of losing the path and full-hearted
grasping of the European project. What is hoped anyway is that the
desired membership will be reached at the end.
Accordingly, what has been observed until now was the ever increasing
optimism and embracing of the EU ideals, especially after the AKP
took office and continued the reform program, which was launched
under the former Bulent Ecevit government, at a faster pace on the
European path. This has helped widen the political space and helped
enable a diversification of voices in the public sphere, until the EU
decision on the 17th December. What followed after December 2004 was
a contrast picture to the preceding two years. Turkey has suddenly
lost faith in the EU and ultra-national hysteria has risen.
Ultra-nationalists were mobilized against ‘normalization’ in the
country, especially on the Kurdish question. Moreover, political
relations with the U.S. have soured. Opinions pointing to the
possibility of a coup from the military have taken public attention
and created fear among the public.
Turkey is a ‘mosaic’ of contradictions, where intentions, laws and
applications of those laws appear often not to match. On the one hand
there is a relative opening on various themes, as suggested above,
that have long been taboos and ‘red-lines’ for Turkey. On the other
hand, an ‘unripe’ discussion culture, which is vulnerable to
manipulation from the ‘inner state,’ paralyzes the political public
space opened after so many long struggles and pains. These
contradictions can be choking at times. Having abolished the infamous
State Security Courts (DGM), a great step forward, the new penal code
comes as a big blow to efforts for further freedom. The journalists,
intellectuals and the other civil society organs complain rightly
that despite having a government dedicated to freedom and despite the
reform process at hand with popular support, the parliament has voted
in favor of the new penal code, which includes laws that limit
freedom of thought, freedom of press, limit rights to organization. 8
Similarly, the praise the new civic code has received has been washed
away by the heavy-handed reaction of the police forces against female
demonstrators in Istanbul on Women’s Day this year.
If a better education project is one side of the coin in making out
of Turkey a democracy, which demands more financial and intellectual
resources than what has been procured until now, the other side is
the solidarity between the leaders, the people and public bodies.
This can heal the wounds through the provision of calm and rational
discussions, while keeping the interaction with the outside world
live.
What all these contradiction show is that it would be destructive for
Turkey to tie the entire democratization process and the process of
grasping of the value of human life and freedom of thought to the
‘European dream’ alone. The understanding of those values cannot be
imposed from outside, but should grow from inside, naturally through
the interaction with the outside. The ‘European dream’ has given a
substantial initial kick that no one should neither ignore nor
devalue, but that dream remains short of providing all the answers
that the socio-political reality awaits in Turkey. The dream could
turn out to be first a sluggish waiting, and later becoming an
intellectual and organizational indolence, leading altogether to the
destructive social apathy and political quiescence.
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H. Yener Ekrose, 28, is a Ph.D student of Political
Science/International Relations in Germany.
Notes:
1. For various aspects of the Turkey-EU relation see Mehmet Ugur
(ed.), Turkey and European Integration, London: Routledge, 2004.
2.On AKP and Political Islam in Turkey see R. Quinn Mecham, “From the
Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: the Transformation of Political
Islam in Turkey,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, (2004).
3. For an argument in contrary see Graham Fuller, “Turkey’s Strategic
Model: Myths and Realities,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3
(Summer 2004).
4. Caglar Keyder, “The Turkish Bell Jar,” New Left Review, vol. 28
(July-August 2004), p. 80.
5. Haluk Sahin, Raporun Ardindaki Gizli Gücler (The Secret Powers
Behind the Report), Radikal Gazetesi, 8 October 2004., Turkish.
6. Keyder, op.cit., p. 81. 7. Among others see Ayhan Aktar, Artik
Seçim Yapma Vakti (The Time to Decide), Radikal Gazetesi, 4 May 2005,
Turkish at
haber.php?haberno=151602&tarih=04/05/2005. 8. Among others see Fehmi
Koru, Mrifet Soruda Degil-Cevapta (Hidden in the Answer), Yeni
Safak, 10 May 2005, Turkish.
http://www.radikal.com.tr/
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