Armenia – a landlocked Caucasus nation that effectively lost the war against its archenemy Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 – is struggling to preserve remnants of its sovereignty. Faced with strong pressures from Baku to launch the construction of a controversial Nakhchivan corridor, as well as with a lack of support from its nominal ally Russia, Yerevan is trying to buy time ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 20.
Nikol Pashinyan, the country’s acting Prime Minister, is seen by many Armenians as a traitor, since he did not manage to prevent Azerbaijan from capturing Nagorno-Karabakh – a region in Azerbaijan that was under the Armenian control for 26 years. During the 44-day war that erupted in September 2020, the Azeri forces seized the largest portion of the mountainous territory. The only part of Nagorno-Karabakh that is still not under Baku’s jurisdiction is Stepanakert, the region’s largest city, and its surrounding area. That territory is now under Russian control, given that the Moscow-sponsored peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2020 resulted in the deployment of almost 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, Yerevan increased its dependence on the Kremlin, and Russia is now acting as an arbiter in the border dispute between the two countries.
Moscow recently offered to help demarcate Armenia-Azerbaijan border, after the Armenian authorities accused Azerbaijan of capturing six Armenian troops. Yerevan insisted that its soldiers were captured on Armenia’s side of the border while conducting engineering works, while Azerbaijan’s officials claimed that the troops attempted to cross the border and place mines on supply routes leading to the Azerbaijani positions. Two weeks before the incident, Pashinyan accused Azerbaijan’s army of advancing more than three kilometres (two miles) into southern Armenia, where the Azeri troops reportedly took control of the areas around the Black Lake. Although the embattled Armenian Acting Prime Minister officially asked the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to intervene, the Russia-dominated bloc never protected Armenia – a CSTO member-state.
Armenia has to make painful concessions to Baku – the clear winner of the 44-day war
Some Russian analysts believe that Yerevan is trying to drag Russia into a confrontation with Azerbaijan, with whom Moscow has lucrative energy deals. That is one of the reasons why the Kremlin is reluctant to provide support to its nominal ally. Moscow aims to preserve good relations with Baku and is aware that Yerevan’s space for political maneuver is rather limited, which means that Armenia, regardless of the outcome of the parliamentary elections, will most likely remain in the Russian geopolitical orbit. At the same time, the Kremlin is trying to increase its business cooperation with Azerbaijan. According to The Trade Representative Office of Russia in Azerbaijan, Russian-made products worth almost $450 million were exported to Azerbaijan in the first three months of 2021, and the Russian Federation held a leading position among the countries exporting goods to the energy-rich Caspian country. Armenia, on the other hand, has to make painful concessions to Baku – the clear winner of the 44-day war.
According to the Moscow-brokered peace deal, Yerevan will have to ensure a stable rail connection between Azerbaijan mainland and its exclave of Nakhchivan – sandwiched between Armenia and Turkey – through the territory of southern Armenian close to the border with Iran. Naturally, the Armenian leadership is trying to find a way to avoid implementing this part of the agreement. The Azeri border incursions, as well as capturing of the Armenian troops, could be interpreted as Baku’s pressure on Yerevan to start construction of the railway.
“This issue is being discussed within the framework of a working group at the level of deputy prime ministers of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia, and there are good results”, said Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, pointing out that Baku has already launched the construction of a railway from the southern town of Horadiz to the border with Armenia.
“Most of Nakhchivan corridor is already operational, and it will be fully built in the next two to two and a half years”, Aliyev emphasized.
Although Armenia is attempting to postpone the construction of Nakhchivan corridor, also known as Zangezur corridor, its government reportedly decided to provide land plots in Kafan, Meghri and Tekhe for free use to the Border Department of the Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). It is worth noting that a railway and a road are expected to pass through the southern town of Meghri to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. FSB’s role, according to the peace deal, is to guarantee the free transit through the Armenian territory, which means that Yerevan will de facto lose its sovereignty in this part of the former Soviet republic. Armenian media reports suggest that FSB’s border guards will also be deployed to Kafan and Tekhe, which would purportedly help in strengthening the country’s border with Azerbaijan – a nation that will clearly benefit from Nakhchivan corridor.
As the American five-star general and Field Marshal Douglas MacArthur once said, “In war there is no substitute for victory”. Armenia, as a defeated country, is expected to keep facing humiliations from Azerbaijan. Snap elections will unlikely pull the country out of its political crisis, nor will it improve Yerevan’s geopolitical position.