ndex/cc_articles/goble/goble_2008/aug_2008/goble_0 01_assumption.html
Ten Shattered Assumptions of Azerbaijan Foreign Policy
by Paul Goble
On-going series: Crisis in the Caucasus – 2008
The Georgian / Russian Conflict and Its Impact on Azerbaijan
August 17, 2008
No country, with the possible exception of the two immediate antagonists –
the United States and Russia – has seen its foreign policy environment
transformed by the recent war in Georgia, more than Azerbaijan.
That conflict and the way in which both these individual countries and the
international community have reacted have cast doubt on almost all the
assumptions on which Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has been based over the
last decade. And, consequently, both the government of Azerbaijan and the
Azerbaijani people are confronted with the difficult and traumatic task of
redefining not only the mental maps that they have of the world around them
but also of redefining their foreign policy agendas.
Because these changes have come so quickly, because they are interrelated,
and because there is no obvious or – at least easily agreed upon – response
to any or all of these assumptions, it is far too early to say just what
Baku will now do or even where both its immediate environment and the
broader international community will land in a new angle of repose. But it
may be useful to specify 10 assumptions on which Azerbaijan’s foreign policy
have rested and then look at the ways in which the events in Georgia have
shattered them, in order to be in a position to consider the challenges and
choices the new environment poses to Azerbaijan.
Shattered Assumption 1
Georgia is sufficiently stable to allow it to be the primary path for the
export of Azerbaijani and Caspian Basin oil and gas bypassing Russia.
The most obvious consequence of Russia’s intervention in Georgia for
Azerbaijan is its demonstration that Georgia is not a reliable pathway west
for Azerbaijani and Caspian hydrocarbons. Russia both through the actions of
its own forces and its allies have blown up portions of the pipeline,
destroyed a key railway bridge, and wreaked havoc in Georgian ports. Oil
flows have been disrupted, and Azerbaijan has already had to ask Moscow for
greater access to pipelines flowing through the Russian Federation to
Novorossiisk. The assumption in Baku that Georgia was a reliable path that
Azerbaijan could use to bypass Russia has been shattered, fracturing in turn
Azerbaijan’s assumptions about itself and the world.
Shattered Assumption 2
Russia has accepted the 1991 settlement and will not use military force
against its neighbors.
Western powers led by the United States have said for the past 15 years that
Russia has accepted the 1991 settlement and will never use force to
challenge it. If Russia was a status quo power in the past, it is not now;
and Moscow has exploited the misperceptions in the West to act against its
neighbors, first by subversion and then as in Georgia by naked military
power.
Under Vladimir Putin, it has become a revisionist power, one whose leaders
believe that they can and should use force to promote their goals and
especially to punish their enemies. Thus the assumption that Russia has
entered the international community as a member which accepts the rules of
the game-an assumption that many in Baku have operated on in many cases
because they were encouraged to do so by Western governments-also lies
shattered in the dustbin of history.
Shattered Assumption 3
The United States is sufficiently powerful to be a reliable and credible
deterrent to any Russian misbehavior in the former Soviet space.
There is no question that the United States is the last remaining
super-power, but for three reasons, as the Georgian events demonstrate, the
US is not in a position to bring its power to bear in the post-Soviet space
in ways that would block Russian action.
First, and most disturbingly, the United States has spent most of the last
decade talking about its strategic partnership with Russia-a self-delusion
that has nonetheless created a class of people in Washington’s foreign
policy establishment who will find a way to justify not challenging Russia
on anything.
Second, the United States has acted in ways in the Balkans and in Iraq and
Afghanistan that make it more difficult for Washington to credibly oppose
the use of power by another state, if it has nuclear weapons, to advance its
own interests.
And third, the current administration since September 11th (2001) has not
only focused almost exclusively on combating terrorism in the Middle East
but has neglected its allies in Europe and elsewhere and, thus, is not in a
good position to mobilize a coalition against Russia. For those reasons and
for others having to do with European dependence on Russian oil and gas, yet
another assumption of Baku’s foreign policy-up to now-lies discredited.
Shattered Assumption 4
The United States and the international community are so committed to the
inviolability of borders that they will not permit any revision of them,
especially by violence.
The United States and the international community are opposed to border
changes in principle, but not necessarily in practice. Not only did the US
and its allies ultimately welcome the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, but most recently they have supported the independence of
Kosovo. As a Wilsonian, the author believes that supporting the right of
nations to self-determination is correct, but he also is convinced that
support for that principle means that one must be consistent. If one isn’t,
others will exploit that. And what the Russians have done in Georgia-or at
least why Putin and company assumed they could get away with it-is the
product of recent history in the Balkans more than anything else. Western,
and especially American failure, to understand the implications of what was
done there and to take action in the former Soviet space has thus shattered
yet another Azerbaijani assumption.
Shattered Assumption 5
Turkey can be counted on to back Azerbaijan against Russia.
One of the bedrock assumptions of Azerbaijani thinking is that Turkey will
always be in Azerbaijan’s corner in the event of a clash. The events in
Georgia prove that is not so. Ankara’s decision not to allow two American
hospital ships to pass through the Straits in order to provide assistance to
Georgia shows that Turkey today is far more influenced by Russia than many
in Baku had thought, and its suggestion that Russia and Turkey should become
joint guarantors of stability in the Caucasus may have its roots in
Ataturk’s policies, which, after all, were pro-Soviet early on, but such a
condominium would not mean that Turkey would protect Azerbaijan, but rather
that it would cover Russian pressure on Baku.
Shattered Assumption 6
Iran, thanks to American-led efforts to isolate it and its own domestic
problems, does not pose any fundamental threat to Azerbaijan.
Not only has Iran lined up behind Moscow’s actions in Georgia, but it has
expanded its level of cooperation with Armenia in the intelligence and
security areas, and it has adopted a much harder line against its own ethnic
Azerbaijanis in the North. Iran may be in a box in some respects as
Washington clearly wants, but in its immediate neighborhood-and Azerbaijan
is part of that-Tehran possesses the resources, the motive, and now the
opportunity, to cause trouble for Baku.
It is almost certain that Iran will seek to spark new challenges by the
Lezgins and, working with Armenia, other minorities inside Azerbaijan, as
well as seek to use the large number of Iranians living in Azerbaijan to put
pressure on Baku. Azerbaijan’s assumption to the contrary, one again
encouraged by the United States, is likely shattered beyond repair as the
Georgian events play out.
Shattered Assumption 7
Azerbaijan’s growing economy might well allow it to counter any challenge
posed by Armenia over Karabakh.
Azerbaijani officials from President Ilham Aliyev on down regularly insist
that their country’s growing economic might well allow them to build up
their political and military power to the point that Baku will be in a
position to rebuff any challenge by Armenia in the future. There are three
reasons why that assumption is now shattered.
First, economic power does not translate directly into military power. One
can purchase more weapons but that does not in itself mean that one has more
power.
Second, Armenia now, more than ever, can count on Russian help. Relative to
Armenia, Azerbaijan looks very strong; relative to Armenia and Russia, it
looks rather different.
And third, and again as the events in Georgia show, a modern military can be
overwhelmed by numbers and by a power willing to sacrifice in order to
achieve its military and political ends. "Economism" was a mistake a century
ago; it is still a mistake in strategic thinking.
Shattered Assumption 8
Azerbaijan as a source of oil for an energy-thirsty Europe guarantees that
it can count on outside support against any challenge.
Azerbaijani oil is Baku’s chief calling card to the world, but Azerbaijan is
not the only source of oil and the Georgian events make its oil less
attractive than it was before. After all, if Azerbaijan has something the
world wants but can’t deliver it reliably-and Moscow has demonstrated that
it won’t be able to unless they make concessions to Russian demands-then
Azerbaijan oil, however much other countries might like to have it, is
devalued.
Shattered Assumption 9
Azerbaijan’s so-called "balanced foreign policy" is sufficient to give
Azerbaijan the security and freedom of action its leaders want.
Many specialists on international affairs have been impressed by
Azerbaijan’s "balanced foreign policy," its efforts to maintain ties with
all sides rather than line up only with one. Some would argue that the
Georgian events show the virtue of that approach rather than undermine it,
but that would be true only if one thing were true which clearly it is not.
A balanced approach presupposes that the two sides are roughly equal in
power, but Russian actions in Georgia show that for the immediate future,
that clearly is not true-
Shattered Assumption 10
Azerbaijan’s international environment is sufficiently benign that it now
can, and should, focus exclusively on its domestic problems.
If there has been one refrain in the comments of Western officials visiting
Azerbaijan, it is this: Azerbaijan should not worry so much about ensuring
the continued viability of the state; it should focus on reforming that
state, improving the quality of democracy there. That Azerbaijan should
focus on improving its domestic arrangements is beyond question, but it is
for exactly the opposite reason that Western officials give. Azerbaijan
lives in a bad and increasingly dangerous neighborhood, and it must act in
ways that will ensure that the country can survive as a more or less
independent actor with a chance for long-term survival. The notion that
Azerbaijan can count on a benign environment has never been completely true;
it now lies shattered with all of the others listed above.
Many will see this list as overly bleak, but in the wake of Russia’s
violation of the rules, of the West’s failure to find a way to force Moscow
to back down, and of the rising tide of calls for "looking beyond" what
Russia has done in order to avoid "a new cold war" and to obtain all the
"benefits" of East-West cooperation, Azerbaijan, its leaders and its people,
will not be doing themselves any favors by acting as if they do not have to
redefine their approach because the environment in which they must operate
is a very different one than that which they have been assuming they could
rely.
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