Author: Manouk Vasilian

Verelq: Gas, electricity and price increases. How vulnerable is Armenia to Iran?

Manouk Vasilian
Photo: sputnik

The military-political crisis created around Iran, the disruption of the normal course of cargo transportation and the growth of uncertainty in foreign markets create serious challenges for the economy of Armenia. What to expect in terms of commodity prices and general inflation, how threatened is the balance of the Armenian energy system, and what alternative ways does Armenia have to mitigate possible economic shocks? Around these key issues, emerging risks and likely scenarios VERELQtalked to an economist Suren Parsyan with.



 


Suren Parsyan is in the photo, the source is 168.am


VERELQ: Mr. Parsya, as we know, the military operations against Iran with the participation of the USA and Israel have been going on for about the fourth-fifth week. Considering that Iran is one of the two open land borders of Armenia (the other is Georgia), is it possible to present certain numbers or estimates as to what kind of impact this war has had on Armenia’s economy?


Suren Parsyan. It is too early to make a complete economic assessment at this time, because in the case of individual products, we had certain reserves and are currently using them. The situation will be clearer if these hostilities continue for another two or three months and our local supplies are exhausted. In that case, we will have to find new alternatives to imports from other countries and spend additional financial resources. At this moment, we can already record that there are problems with cargo transportation, food, vegetables and certain types of fruit. for example, some fruits have already increased in price. In the domestic market, it concerns, for example, pomelo and, in general, fruits and products of non-Armenian origin.


VERELQ: Are we talking about the goods that we imported directly from Iran or brought in transit through the territory of Iran, which is one of the main logistics routes for us to the Middle East and Asia?


Suren Parsyan. Yes, for goods brought directly from Iran or through its territory. Either they have increased in price or they are not on the market at all. As an example, let me also mention the Hungarian so-called “big peppers”. They are certainly not vital in our daily diet, but they provide a necessary variety in our general commodity market. The situation may worsen if we cannot import dairy products from Iran. For now, there are certain stocks. we are talking about milk cream, milk powder and butter, of which we used to import in large quantities, about 5-6 million dollars a year.


VERELQ: If we divide those 6 million dollars over 12 months, it turns out that we imported approximately half a million dollars worth of dairy products from Iran per month.


Suren Parsyan. It is true. At the moment, it has not yet had a significant impact, as local milk production has started to become active, but in the long term, it may have a negative impact on the dairy market. I should also mention that cargo transportation has also become somewhat more expensive. In particular, the companies complaining about the increase in tariffs regarding cargo transportation through Georgian ports. Seeing that Armenia has no alternative due to the problems of the southern (Iranian) direction, the operators of Poti port in Georgia are making some revisions in their price policy.


VERELQ: It is known that about 25% of our foreign trade was carried out through the territory of Iran. Now, have these flows largely moved to Georgia, to the ports of the Black Sea?


Suren Parsyan. Yes, they have partially moved there, and the Georgian side is already making appropriate price revisions. This is an additional problem for us. although it is not clear to what extent and how this will happen, it is obvious that we will have a certain increase in transportation costs. This increase will have a direct impact on the prices of goods imported to Armenia, which may generally lead to inflation. At the same time, the RA Central Bank conducts its policy in this direction and, in fact, does not even try to prevent or limit inflation, leaving the refinancing rate unchanged. At the same time, the government is implementing a very active fiscal policy, which is a vivid example of the significant increase in pensions and additional government spending planned from April 1.


VERELQ: In other words, is the Government pursuing a more expansionary policy, stimulating spending?


Suren Parsyan. Yes, expansive. The following image is obtained. on the one hand, we have an increase in the prices of imported goods due to logistical problems, on the other hand, an increase in pensions and the activity of state programs. Both of these factors will certainly contribute to inflation.


VERELQ: It turns out that in the background of the shortage of goods caused by the disruption of external supplies, we also have inflation fueled by the increase in domestic demand.


Suren Parsyan. Yes, yes. Frankly, I can’t imagine how the government will be able to control this inflation, because our local agriculture volume is not enough to cover the domestic demand. We have a vivid example of this today in the beef market. The price of beef has increased sharply because the volume of local production has decreased in recent years. And it is impossible to restore local beef production in just two or three months. it is not such a fast-reacting field, so now we are facing the fact. I think we can have a similar situation in other product markets, especially dairy products. Under these conditions, it is clear that we will have a significant increase in prices in this market as well.


VERELQ: And in the background of all this, how realistic is the prediction of the RA Central Bank that we can have only 1.5% inflation, or is it just a very conservative approach?


Suren Parsyan. In fact, the Central Bank makes a very optimistic forecast, because if we take into account all the above factors, then, in my opinion, we will have a much higher inflation. I would like to mention only that, according to official statistics, inflation was already 4.2% in January-March of this year. In other words, there is already quite high inflation, and to that are added these new inflationary factors entering the market, which will accelerate the pace even more.


VERELQ: It is clear.


Suren Parsyan. It is not clear how they imagine to stop it now. By the way, inflation is currently somewhat restrained by the continued appreciation of the national currency, the AMD. If the foreign currency money flows (transfers) coming to Armenia decrease, it will lead to dram devaluation, which in turn will cause new inflation. For example, we had large cash flows from the United Arab Emirates and Russia, which had a positive effect on our exchange rate market, strengthening the dram. However, these flows have either stopped or decreased significantly. Therefore, we have emerging risks in this regard as well, which may deepen even more.


VERELQ: Do you mean that the foreign currency may become more valuable in Armenia, that is, the dram may depreciate?


Suren Parsyan. Yes, the dram may depreciate, as a direct result of which imported goods will become more expensive for us. And if we look at the issue from the point of view of exports, the real sector of the economy, then we should study the structure of our exports. According to last year’s data, we had about 3 billion dollars of exports to Russia and about 2 billion dollars of exports to the UAE. During the last month, the export direction to the Emirates has stopped, and the Russian direction may also be limited due to the purely political situation.


VERELQ: Yes, which was discussed recently, especially considering that Armenia sells the main part of its agricultural products and alcoholic beverages on the Russian market (within EAEU).


Suren Parsyan. Turning to Europe is problematic at the moment, because we do not export a significant volume of products to the European market. From the point of view of the loss of Russia, reorientation towards Europe is a complex process. Our other important export market is China. we export 52% of our mineral production, or 70% of copper alone, to China itself. This export is carried out through the Georgian port of Poti. Now, fortunately, the prices of copper in the world market are quite high, reaching up to 12,000 dollars (for one ton). For comparison, I should note that last year they ranged from 6,000 to 7,000 dollars. This sharp rise in prices is helping to make our mining industry quite profitable this year. This sector can partially compensate for other losses, ensuring the inflow of dollars into the economy of Armenia. We can predict that this year only individual large mining enterprises will have a turnover of more than 1 billion dollars.


VERELQ: Especially considering that this year the Amulsar gold mine, which was closed for many years due to environmental problems, was also restarted. Will this also increase dollar flows?


Suren Parsyan. Yes, yes, without a doubt. Despite the problems, this year we have activation of several sectors providing foreign exchange.


VERELQ: However, if the Iranian market is closed or there are serious problems in the logistics direction, does it not lead to an increase in our dependence on other markets, for example, Russia?


Suren Parsyan. Of course, and now we are in that situation. We used to import liquefied gas and diesel fuel from Iran, but now we can’t, or if we do, it’s in very small quantities and with great difficulty. Problems arise everywhere: bank transfers, technical, organizational issues, even the physical movement of trucks. That’s why right now we have to import energy carriers from Russia.


VERELQ: And against this background, when there are certain political disagreements and tensions between Armenia and Russia, which are already being raised at the highest level, how do they affect our work in the same Russian market, and especially the import of energy carriers?


Suren Parsyan. I must state that it definitely has a negative effect. It has already been officially announced that Russia limits the export of gasoline and fuel.


VERELQ: Is it probably done to satisfy their internal demand?


Suren Parsyan. Yes, and it is also due to the fact that the Ukrainian side regularly attacks Russian oil refineries. In other words, there are also objective reasons. This is a serious risk for us, and how the Armenian side should manage or reduce these risks is not yet known. We have to turn to other countries and other suppliers, be it Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan or another state that will be able to provide these volumes. Azerbaijan, of course, cannot supply us with gasoline for political reasons, besides, it itself imports gasoline from Russia and the UAE. Regarding diesel, there may be alternatives, but in the matter of liquid gas, due to the Iranian crisis, we are completely dependent on Russia.


Moreover, if the war continues and the American side also attacks Iran’s energy infrastructure, we may have serious problems with the “Gas for Electricity” barter program. This transaction constitutes a significant part of the trade turnover between us and Iran. Armenian-Iranian trade amounts to approximately 700 million dollars, of which half or a little less than half falls on this energy exchange.


VERELQ: Do you mean the “Gas for Electricity” interstate program, through which Armenia receives electricity from Iranian gas, thereby meeting a part of the domestic demand, and returning the rest to Iran as electricity?


Suren Parsyan. That’s right. If Iran’s power system is attacked, we will lose the ability to supply Iran with electricity and get gas instead. This will be a direct blow to our internal energy balance. The point is that the Yerevan Thermal Power Station produces electricity with that gas. From 1 cubic meter of gas, it produces about 4.6 kWh of electricity, of which 3 kWh is exported to Iran, and 1.6 kWh remains in Armenia. This has an extremely important balancing role in our energy system, both in terms of pricing and sustainable supply. In addition, our power transmission line connecting with Iran is also of balancing importance. when we have a surplus of electricity, we send it to Iran, and when we have a shortage (for example, during accidents), we take electricity from there. In other words, Iran is not only an export market for us, but also an important hub that ensures the security and balance of our entire energy system.

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168: Either there will be no Iran, OR… AMN’s Open Plan. CP’s Only Offer: Pateraz

Manouk Vasilian

March: 29, 2026

Satik Seyranyan in the “Classes” program the guest Vahe Davtyan is a doctor of political sciences, professor, energy security specialist։

Yesterday, US President Donald Trump, who at least several times a week personally, through US officials or representatives of other countries, announces the start or continuation of “successful” negotiations with Iran, made another eccentric statement, saying: “They should open the Trump Strait, that is, the Strait of Hormuz… the fake news will say that I said this by accident… Accidental things do not happen to me in this war situation,” he announced. he

The main theses of the interview are below.

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  • “Trump Road”, “Trump Strait”, “Trump Lake” in Kosovo… this methodology is the same, and we see how transport links are used by the US as a tool of expansion. So, all the principles that are included in the document of the new national security strategy of the United States in, they are absolutely naked. This indicates that the geo-economic component will be the basis of the newly formed world order: either there will be no Iran, or there will be an Iran that will not act as a key player in the Middle East, which will ratify the 2018. signed Caspian Convention or 1982 maritime convention. We are dealing with attempts to implement basic geo-economic policies through the use of archaic force. This shows that the Deep State continues to operate in the United States.
  • The US no longer hides the fact that its aggression against Iran pursues one goal: the possession of Iran’s oil and gas resources. In fact, Washington has always been very sensitive to Iranian oil and resources. In the 1950s, as the British position in Iran weakened, the US carried out the first Color Revolution in Iran, which led to the arrest of Iran’s nationalist prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, and the distribution of all of Iran’s oil and gas resources among several Western actors. This configuration lasted until 1979, when the Islamic Revolution took place and American capital was driven out of the Iranian economy.:
  • The Achilles heel of the US Middle East strategy of projecting on Iran is that in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, and other places, after the neutralization of the leader, the state and the political system collapse, in the case of Iran, this is not the case, and the neutralization of the leader has no effect on the stability of the political system. And this is what allowed Iran to become an important player in the Middle East. Today we see that Iran is not only more than an armed state, but also an institutional state that is quite difficult to undermine. If the national authorities in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Somalia at some point they tried to go out on the US to start a negotiation process, Iran refuses to do so, seeing this conflict as an opportunity. Iran sees itself a priori as the number one superpower in the Middle East. In this mega-region, as regional superpowers, Iran and Saudi Arabia collide, and that is why the US is trying to create problems between these two states. Saudi Arabia has already announced its intention to become a nuclear power, and this is being done to counterbalance Iran.:

  • The US has recently been trying to engage in dialogue with China. We are talking about possible institutional cooperation between Washington and Beijing. There is potential to establish that cooperation, and we are talking about economic interaction. China is an important economic and trade player, but it is still not seen in the framework of the new world order as a threat generation zone in the Middle East.
  • Iran’s ambassador to Armenia has already directly stated that Iran is alone in this war. 

To remind: In a conversation with Vahe Davtyan Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Iran Khalil Shirgholami a few days ago had said.

“Iran acts almost alone. You know that we are virtually alone in the war against the enemy, and during this national defense, no country participates and supports us by our side and on our behalf. Meanwhile, the United States possesses the most powerful military force in human history, and the Israeli regime is a completely militarized system, equipped largely with state-of-the-art weaponry provided by the Americans or from its own arsenal. Therefore, if we take these conditions and the situation into account, it will become clear that even under these conditions, Iran, as a lone warring country, which fights solely based on its own capabilities, can already be considered a winner. The enemy has not achieved his goals, and the costs for our opponents are increasing day by day and will continue to increase. We are absolutely determined that Iran will not come out of this war as the defeated side.”

  • We see that Russia is showing caution in the processes taking place around Iran, and this is due to some steps of the USA, in particular, the easing of sanctions, which enables Russia to direct new resources to the Ukrainian front. As for Russia providing intelligence to Iran, Iran has good intelligence and knows very well the location of all military bases, economic and oil and gas facilities in the Middle East.
  • The Strait of Hormuz is closed and there is a shortage of oil and gas in Europe. Turkey is more than skillfully trying to adapt to this situation, which is trying to diversify the export of natural gas to Europe through “Turkish Stream” and “Blue Stream”. Russia will try to make up that shortfall in the form of indirect supplies, but that doesn’t mean there aren’t bypass routes, and one of those routes is Turkey, and that’s why Turkey is showing a rather passive attitude now.

  • The fact that Turkey has taken an anti-Israel stance in this conflict fits into its geo-economic policy. Russia will continue to exercise caution. To say that Russia has an unequivocal and unequivocal pro-Iranian position in this conflict, I at least doubt it.
  • The volume of Iran’s exports has decreased for obvious reasons, including to China, and Russia can take advantage of this to try to fill the missing volumes.
  • The post-World War II security architecture is crumbling today. A new system of international relations will be formed, the basis of which will be the right-wing ideology based on national, conservative ideas.:
  • The proliferation of nuclear weapons must be controlled, and in this regard, the IAEA must be given real tools to influence the internal decisions of states, otherwise nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of, for example, various terrorist organizations at any moment. 
  • We must closely monitor Turkey’s development of nuclear weapons. This is also brought to the Azerbaijani agenda. Aliyev has already announced the development of a peaceful atom several times, but taking into account the relations between Azerbaijan-Turkey, Azerbaijan-Pakistan, which is a nuclear power, of course, at some point, Azerbaijan will transform the peaceful atom into a military atom. In this regard, even more so, we should not allow our Metsamor nuclear power plant to be closed:
  • About the authorities of Armenia and the existing challenges. We must understand that we are not dealing with a statesman. Nikol Pashinyan is busy with political careerism, and his horizon is limited only to election cycles. What do you want from a political force that has no proposition for the public and the only thing it does now is terrorize its own people into saying if you don’t elect me there will be war? To me, a citizen, KP does not have any economic, social, or infrastructural proposals. In other words, it is clear that in the case of this political vacuum, they must implement the “happy bus” operation in order to stay on the informational surface. But unfortunately, we are we do not have such a political system that this inability is the basis for political change:

  • For the security of the state, especially in such a difficult situation, it is very dangerous for the number of politically neutral citizens to increase, who say: I do not believe in anyone, I will not go to the elections… This creates fertile ground for the reproduction of power. When a country is in crisis, it is very dangerous when an apathetic electorate carries a lot of weight.
  • If you want to clarify and preserve your identity, it is necessary to preserve the principle of “us-them” and “me-she”, otherwise it is difficult to preserve the national identity. Now they are trying to erase those lines and convince us that we do not have any contradictions with Azerbaijanis who implement anti-Armenian rhetoric and anti-Armenian programs.:
  • Armenian hatred in Azerbaijan is at the institutional level. An example: Armenia imports gasoline from the SOCAR company. At the same time, SOCAR’s subsidiary in Switzerland is funding anti-Artsakh, anti-Armenian lobby groups. The National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan is still funding quite large research groups, whose main goal is to show that Armenia is an artificial state, and Armenians do not have a national identity… We see that from 2020, after the 44-day war, Azerbaijanis are establishing themselves as a political nation. And the government of Armenia contributes to this՝ turning us into an object that serves Azerbaijan’s political interests:
  • TRIPP is the same “Zangezur Corridor” which, solving the issues of Nakhijevan, will lead to the internal colonization of Azerbaijan through Armenia, which Azerbaijan failed to do for decades, because Nakhijevan had an internal clan, protected by the Constitution. This is a project that makes Armenia a tool for the establishment of Azerbaijan’s statehood and long-term development.
  • By managing Nakhichevan and Artsakh, Azerbaijan gets the opportunity to become a key player in the region.
  • Neoliberal ideas and approaches are considered by the Armenian government as a key foreign political toolkit, and this is when the era of leftist ideologies, leftist populism, and neoliberalism is coming to an end in the same Europe. Anti-liberal forces are gaining new positions in Europe, appearing in Parliaments. Putting the citizen above the state fits perfectly into neoliberal politics. I hope that after the June 7 elections, we will have a new reality that will review our relations with Europe and various geopolitical centers.

  • The term “hybrid warfare” is used in a highly manipulative way. It is the application of several tools, including military, information, psychological, and other tools. Yes, the tools of hybrid war are used against Armenia, but not by Russia.
  • From the point of view of financial security, we are in a very dangerous situation. And I am not saying this, the principles established by the RA Central Bank testify to this. 
  • It is a very important indicator when the state implements infrastructure projects. This is not done in Armenia, it is very important. Through infrastructural projects, you also appropriate that territory, you strengthen your sovereignty in your territory. How many major infrastructure projects has CP implemented in the last 8 years: 0? If the state does not ensure industrialization, it is useless to talk about economic capacity, good living:
  • Turkey is regaining its own position in pan-Eurasian logistics links, showing that Turkey is the key logistics hub that is most important in connecting Europe to Central Asia. Turkey is proving to be a very important player in the Middle Corridor. And TRIPP is what he needs for that.
  • If there was talk of a complete transport blockade of Armenia, TRIPP would not be so dangerous. Otherwise, talking only about the unblocking of 40-42 km means talking about the enclavization of Armenia. It will lead to a blockade of Armenia. By paralyzing the North-South international corridor, which is of vital interest to Armenia, we are significantly reducing the level of our transportation security.: There are unverified reports that a 500 meter wide area is being provided for TRIPP, which if confirmed raises serious questions. What is that huge area for, what are they going to put there? 
  • And parallel to this, we see talks about changing the Armenian railway model developing at the official level. Pashinyan is talking about handing over the concession of “South Caucasus Railway” to the Kazakh side. If the Kazakh capital is brought to our railway network, it means the actualization of the Middle Corridor, the Turan Corridor, in the territory of Armenia. The withdrawal of Russian capital from our railway system is in the interests of Turkey and the United States.

To remind: A few days ago, when Nikol Pashinyan was asked in a briefing whether during his telephone conversation with Putin, the question of urgently transferring the concession of “South Caucasian Railway” to a third party was raised, because there are discussions about transferring it to a Kazakh company, Pashinyan expressed hope that a partnership solution would be given to this issue.

“We will not mind if it turns out that there is a mutual understanding between us and Russia, that the Kazakh company is acceptable to both of us…

It’s not like we sit down and discuss with the Russian partners… because the Russian partners have not yet said: OK, we agree, let’s do it that way. I mean, the discussion is in a different mode, but there are such ideas floating around,” he said. 

Back in mid-February, Pashinyan announced that his idea about the railway is that any country friendly with Armenia and Russia buys the right to manage it from Russia. 

“There are forces within the framework of TRIPP who say that let’s make it so that after Meghri, when it enters Nakhijevan, it does not enter Nakhijevan and bypasses Armenia. Naturally, our international partners say: “How can I bypass Armenia? Armenia is our partner.” There, those who want to bypass Armenia say that the railways of Armenia are under the control of Russia. We are doing everything to convince that, yes, it is under the management of Russia, but it is the property of Armenia, and Russia does not want to and will not create any obstacles regarding regional projects in any way,” he said. 

It was talked about for a long time, he also mentioned that the concession could be transferred to Qatar, Bahrain or even the United Arab Emirates. We should also remind that Kazakhstan is a member of the Organization of Turkic States. Therefore, as a result of the deal, Turkey and Azerbaijan will have greater leverage to influence the railway.

  • If the methodology applied to the northeastern borders of Armenia is used in the demarcation and demarcation process, Armenia may end up in enclave conditions if Azerbaijan continues its aggressive, militaristic policy. If the change of the route of the gas pipeline is not technical, but related to demarcation and delimitation processes, it is very dangerous.:

To remind, the other day information was spread that a part of the gas pipeline from Georgia to Armenia will be moved at the request of Armenia. It is reported that the change of the location of the pipeline is related to the request of the Armenian side, because the Armenian part of the gas pipeline is located in the Georgian-Armenian-Azerbaijani trilateral border zone and was mined in the 90s.

“Based on the fact that it is not possible to maintain the minimum safety standards and carry out repair work in the given section, on the basis of the tripartite interstate agreement, it was decided to remove the said problematic section of the gas pipeline from the mined zone and build a new gas pipeline at a safe distance,” the justification for the relocation stated.  

  • Presenting the relocation of the 5.5-kilometer section of the Georgia-Armenia gas pipeline as a “technical issue” means consciously reducing the real depth of the problem. In fact, this is a manifestation of risks accumulated for many years, but not resolved at the systemic level.

The roots of the problem come from the 1990s, when this complex border junction between Armenia-Georgia-Azerbaijan turned into a minefield. Since then, a section of the pipeline has been virtually out of full operation․ not only its stable technical maintenance, but also its constant control is impossible.

Now it is proposed to build a new section with a length of about 5548 meters to bypass the danger zone. Georgia is building its part, Armenia is building its own.

We are talking about the backbone of our energy system. Armenia receives about 2.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually through the territory of Georgia via the “North Caucasus-Transcaucasia” route, which connects to the “Red Bridge-Sevkar-Berd” gas pipeline. And it is at this juncture that the vulnerability that forces logistics to be restructured today is formed.

The demarcation process did not simplify this picture, but aggravated it. Some sections of the gas pipeline have appeared in risk zones, and some sections have actually passed into the range of the enemy’s direct access.

It is also noteworthy that the initiative comes from Yerevan.

  • There is talk of extending the life of the Metsamor nuclear power plant for another 10 years, until 2046. Rosatom claims that this is possible, which will greatly strengthen our energy security. At the same time, the famous 123 agreement lifted the ban on the export of nuclear technology from the USA to Armenia, and the proposed modular reactor construction technologies have not yet been properly tested.
  • In the collective West, there is a perception of risk and a pragmatic calculation. In order to ensure economic and political stability within the same European Union, it is necessary to keep Turkey, Azerbaijan, and other states of the Turkish world in the zone of predictability. For example, Hungary, Slovakia conduct this policy. But Europe’s political elites also consider the Turkish direction as a means of ensuring their economic stability, which is directly proportional to their political reproduction.

Details in the video.




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Papikyan holds talks with Safran defence executive in Paris, signs agreement

Manouk Vasilian
Military18:02, 27 March 2026
Read the article in: العربيةFrançaisHayerenРусский中文

On March 27 in Paris, Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan met with Alexandre Ziegler, Executive Vice President and Defense Director at Safran Electronics & Defense.

Papikyan shared a video from the meeting on his Facebook page, noting that an agreement was signed at the end of the talks.

Earlier, it was reported that the Armenian Defense Minister, who is on an official visit to France, also held meetings with the French President’s military advisor, as well as with representatives of French defense companies.

Read the article in: العربيةFrançaisHayerenРусский中文

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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Mafia crackdown: Armenian police launch raids on suspected mobsters in Yerevan

Manouk Vasilian
Law11:12, 26 March 2026
Read the article in: Armenian:

Police and Investigative Committee officers have launched a joint raid at about 20 locations across Yerevan as part of a mafia crackdown.

Kima Avdalyan, spokesperson for the Investigative Committee, told Armenpress that the actions are part of ongoing criminal investigations and include all necessary procedural measures.

A law enforcement official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Armenpress that the raids are targeting suspected mobsters, or, as they described them, “individuals of the criminal subculture.”

Read the article in: Armenian:

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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Garegin B intends to visit Georgia and participate in the funeral of Ilya II

Manouk Vasilian

The Catholicos of All Armenians received an official notification from the Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church regarding the funeral of the blessed Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II and related events. This was reported by the information system of the Mother See.


“His Holiness intends to visit Georgia, attend the funeral ceremony, pay his respects to the late blessed Patriarch and convey his grief to the Georgian Orthodox Church and the friendly Georgian people.


As for the exit ban, the attorneys of the Mother See are taking steps in that direction,” the Mother See explained.

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Minimal Iran fallout expected for Armenia if conflict resolves soon, economy m

Manouk Vasilian

Economy13:52, 18 March 2026
Read the article in: Armenian, Georgian, Русский, Türkçe中文:

The Armenian economy is currently incurring losses due to the war in Iran, but if the conflict ends soon, the losses are expected to be minimal, Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan said.

He made the comments during a parliamentary committee hearing when asked about the potential fallout of the war in Iran.

“Currently, we are assessing these risks. We hope the conflict will be short-term. We also hope that our strategic partners and friendly countries involved in the conflict will resolve it. In that case, in our view, the losses will be minimal. There are already some losses, particularly reflected in the rising prices of certain goods. First, we see some inflationary risks. Second, for the organization of certain production processes, Armenia also imports raw materials, and in that case, we may again face similar inflationary risks,” Papoyan said.

Armenia has a fairly large trade turnover with Iran, including both imports and exports. According to the minister, the current situation will not have a positive impact on the Armenian economy in the long term.

“However, if we follow the statements of political leaders at a high level, there seems to be hope that the conflict will end in the near future. We believe that, in that case, there should not be very significant negative outcomes,” he added.

Papoyan’s comments came after Central Bank Governor Martin Galstyan warned on Tuesday that Armenia’s economy cannot remain unaffected by the ongoing military operations in the region, and that the escalation of the situation could lead to an inflation rate of 1.2–1.7% in Armenia.

The U.S. and Israel launched what they described as a pre-emptive strike against Iran on February 28, claiming that Tehran was developing a nuclear weapon and posed a threat—an allegation Iran has denied. In response, Iran launched counterattacks, firing missiles and drones at Israel, as well as at U.S. assets and other targets across the Middle East.

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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RFE/RL – Questions Raised Over Criminal Record Certificate In Case Involving R

Manouk Vasilian
  • Mkrtich Karapetian
March 18, 2026
Avet Konjorian, a member of the ruling Civil Contract party and brother of Hayk Konjorian, head of the party’s parliamentary faction.

A criminal case involving the brother of a senior ruling party figure in Armenia has raised questions about the integrity of official records and lenient sentencing procedures amid concerns about potential influence peddling.

Avet Konjorian, 44, the elder brother of Hayk Konjorian, head of the parliamentary faction of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s ruling Civil Contract party, was fined in early 2026 after being prosecuted for driving while deprived of his license. However, the circumstances under which he received a relatively mild punishment have drawn scrutiny – particularly due to the appearance of a certificate stating he had no prior convictions despite a documented criminal record.

Repeat Offense, Lenient Punishment

According to official court data available on Datalex, the Armenian judiciary’s electronic database, Avet Konjorian was stripped of his driving license for one year in July 2025. Just three months later, patrol officers found him driving a Mercedes, prompting the initiation of criminal proceedings by the Investigation Department of Armenia’s Kotayk province.

Avet Konjorian

Besides a substantial fine, driving while deprived of the right to operate a vehicle carries a range of penalties, including imprisonment of up to one month or community service of up to 150 hours.

However, within weeks, the case was sent to court and resolved through a “fine by agreement,” a procedure permitted under Armenia’s Code of Criminal Procedure for minor, first-time offenses committed by individuals without prior convictions. Avet Konjorian agreed to the arrangement and was fined 375,000 drams (about $1,000), with the court deferring payment after he claimed inability to pay the sum in full. The ruling entered into force on January 29.

“Clean Record” Certificate

Central to the court’s decision was a Form 8 certificate issued by the Police Information Center, stating that Avet Konjorian had no previous convictions. This document allowed the case to qualify for resolution through a fine by agreement, which requires that the accused have no prior criminal record.

However, Avet Konjorian had previously been convicted in 2010 of large-scale fraud. According to that case, he and an associate deceived a resident of the town of Abovian into paying approximately $15,000 under the pretense of purchasing an apartment, then embezzled the funds.

A court found Avet Konjorian guilty and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment, suspended with a three-year probationary period. The verdict was upheld after prosecutors unsuccessfully sought a harsher sentence. Mitigating factors cited at the time for Avet Konjorian’s suspended sentence included full restitution of the $15,000, the presence of two young children, and character references from neighbors describing him as “a devoted son of the homeland.”

Contradictory Explanations

The presence of a certificate indicating no prior convictions has prompted conflicting explanations from Armenian authorities.

In response to inquiries from RFE/RL’s Armenian Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that its records do not show any Form 8 certificate indicating the absence of a criminal record that was issued for Avet Konjorian in 2025. The ministry added that it has requested a copy of the certificate from the court for further examination.

A screenshot of the reply of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to RFE/RL’s Armenian Service.

The Investigative Committee, which handled the case, has offered a different account, maintaining that the certificate was indeed obtained from the Crime Statistics and Research Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and included in the case file.

The discrepancy leaves unresolved how the document entered the proceedings.

Expungement Argument

Avet Konjorian’s lawyer, Melanya Sargsian, argued that the issue hinges on the legal concept of expungement. She said that for minor or medium-gravity crimes, a conviction is considered expunged after a certain period, after which a person is treated as having no prior convictions.

“It does not matter whether it is Avet Konjorian or anyone else, if the conviction has been expunged, then the person is considered not to have a prior conviction,” she said.

However, the Ministry of Internal Affairs offered a different interpretation. In its response, it stated that Form 8 certificates should include all relevant data about individuals, including their past convictions and expungement status. The ministry emphasized that such records are retained in the operational database regardless of expungement, as stipulated by government Resolution 933-N.

Unanswered Questions

In one of his speeches in parliament in 2021, Hayk Konjorian stressed that “personal relationships and aspects of private life can become the subject of political debate when they in some way affect the public good.”

Hayk Konjorian, head of the parliamentary faction of the ruling Civil Contract party (file photo)

“We have seen such examples when sons-in-law, godparents, in-laws’ drivers and mistresses have used their positions to harm the public interest,” he said, referring to Armenia’s previous administrations.

RFE/RL’s Armenian Service asked Avet Konjorian’s lawyer whether external influence could have played a role in the appearance of the “clean” certificate, given her client’s family connections. Sargsian dismissed the suggestion.

“No, no, no… don’t look for any interference here. If a person has an expunged conviction, he is considered to have no conviction,” she said.

Avet Konjorian declined to comment on his prior conviction when contacted by RFE/RL’s Armenian Service, ending the phone call.

Beyond the criminal record issue, discrepancies also appear in Avet Konjorian’s employment records. While court documents describe him as unemployed and unable to pay the fine immediately, official records indicate that he continued to serve as director of a real estate company for most of the duration of the court proceedings, leaving the position only several weeks before the ruling entered into force. Presenting Avet Konjorian as unemployed may therefore have led the court to apply a more lenient standard in determining the final fine.


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Yerevan to upgrade urban sanitation system

Manouk Vasilian

Yerevan10:23, 16 March 2026
Read the article in: ArabicSpanish

Mayor of Yerevan, Tigran Avinyan, announced on Monday that City Hall plans to buy new waste disposal equipment to improve urban sanitation services.

“Dear residents of Yerevan, the Yerevan City Hall plans to purchase 69 units of equipment in 2026 to improve street cleaning and waste disposal services,” Mayor Avinyan said during the City Hall executive meeting.

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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Armenia’s Military Procurement from India and Article 36 of the Additional Pr

Manouk Vasilian
Lieber Institute, West Point
Mar 16 2026

by Davit Khachatryan | Mar 16, 2026

Armenia is rearming. Following the catastrophic losses of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the complete collapse of Russian reliability as a security guarantor, Yerevan has undertaken one of the most consequential military modernization programs in its post-independence history. The centerpiece of that effort is a procurement relationship with India, covering Pinaka 214mm multiple-launch rocket systems, Akash-1S surface-to-air missiles (with the next-generation Akash-NG on order), ATAGS 155mm towed howitzers, ZADS counter-drone systems, Swathi counter-battery radars, and Konkurs anti-tank missiles. By 2022-2024, India had become the source of 43 percent of Armenia’s total weapons imports. Armenia is now India’s largest single arms export customer by value.

Has Armenia complied with its obligation, under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I (AP I), to review these weapons before acquiring them? That question exposes an underappreciated doctrinal problem about who bears the Article 36 obligation when weapons cross borders: the manufacturer, the buyer, or both, and under what conditions. It also requires examining whether the weapons Armenia has acquired are “new” within the meaning of the provision, a question with a less obvious answer than it might seem. And most structurally, Armenia’s situation is paradigmatic of a large class of AP I States Parties for whom Article 36 exists in theory but has never been operationalized in practice.

The Obligation

Article 36 of AP I, to which Armenia has been a party since 2007, provides:

In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.

The text is notably broad. It does not confine the obligation to weapons developed by the State Party itself. It reaches any “acquisition,” the operative term for Armenia’s situation as a buyer rather than a developer. An International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary confirms that “acquisition” was deliberately included to capture exactly this scenario: a State that procures from abroad must conduct its own legal review before or upon incorporation of the weapon into its arsenal (para. 1469). The obligation is independent, non-transferable, and does not evaporate because another State may have conducted its own legal assessment before export approval.

Article 36 addresses only High Contracting Parties and their own weapons decisions. This creates a threshold question: does India bear an Article 36 obligation in respect of its exports to Armenia, does Armenia bear it in respect of its acquisitions, or do both? Both bear independent obligations, but with different content, and the distinction matters.

The legal question Article 36 poses is always relational: not whether this weapon is lawful in the abstract, but whether this State’s employment of it would be. The drafting history of Article 36 indicates that it was crafted with arms-producing States in mind. In that context, review integrates naturally into the procurement cycle: legal assessment accompanies development, and the same entity that makes the weapon decides whether it is lawful. The contemporary arms trade is dominated by a division between States that develop and sell on the one hand, and States that buy and use, on the other. For purchasing States, which constitute the large majority of AP I’s 174 States Parties, Article 36 asks for something their procurement architecture was never designed to provide.

The applicable rules bind Armenia, including its treaty commitments, its customary obligations, its rules of engagement, and the factual circumstances of its likely use. An Indian review, conducted against Indian doctrine, Indian treaty exposure, and Indian operational parameters, addresses none of this. The two obligations share a common framework, the substantive rules of international humanitarian law (IHL), but their content diverges at the point that matters most.

There is a further dimension. India is not a party to AP I. Its obligations arise, if at all, from customary international law, and the customary status of Article 36 remains contested (skeptical: here, p. 94; here, p. 285; contrary view, p. 342-43). Armenia, by contrast, is unambiguously bound by AP I as a treaty party. Armenia’s obligation is therefore more secure legally than India’s, not less.

While no formal Article 36 review mechanism has ever been publicly documented in Armenia, this is not unusual. ICRC guidance on Article 36 implementation identified fewer than twenty States worldwide that had established formal review procedures; they were predominantly NATO members and a handful of other active arms-producing nations.

This structural gap does not dissolve the obligation. But it does explain why the obligation goes systematically unmet. The ICRC has long recognized this and offered technical assistance to States seeking to develop Article 36 review procedures. A 2006 ICRC Guide, updated in 2016, provides a workable template that is not contingent on having a domestic arms industry: an interagency body drawing on the Ministry of Defense legal directorate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and external expert input. Several small States with no arms production have adopted variants of this model. Armenia has not.

There is also a role for supplier States, though it does not substitute for the buyer’s independent obligation. India could, as a matter of export policy, require recipient States to document Article 36 compliance as a condition of sale, or provide its own review documentation to facilitate the buyer’s assessment. Whether India does so is not publicly known. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database records the flow of weapons but not the legal reviews, or their absence, that accompany them. The international community tracks what weapons go where with considerable precision, while remaining entirely blind to whether the legal obligations governing those weapons’ acquisition are being met.

Are These “New” Weapons?

Article 36 does not define “new weapon.” If read relationally, the term encompasses any weapon newly entering a State’s arsenal, regardless of how long other States have fielded it. In that sense, Armenia’s acquisition of the Pinaka system is an acquisition of a new weapon, regardless of India’s decades of operational experience with it. This interpretation aligns naturally with the text, “acquisition” is used without qualification, and with the purpose of Article 36, which is to ensure that every State Party takes responsibility for the weapons it employs, not merely those it invents.

If read as requiring novelty, as State practice has tended to suggest by concentrating review resources on technologically novel systems, the obligation is triggered only where genuinely novel legal questions arise that existing IHL does not clearly resolve. On this reading, a 155mm howitzer acquired today does not trigger Article 36 because artillery has been governed by settled IHL principles and rules for over a century. Yet this approach creates a serious accountability gap: “conventional” weapon types can raise entirely unconventional legal questions when combined with new delivery platforms, new targeting technologies, or new operational doctrines specific to the acquiring State’s context. The Article 36 review is precisely the mechanism for catching those combinations.

For instance, Akash-NG is India’s next-generation surface-to-air missile system, currently in development. Armenia is among the first prospective foreign operators of a platform whose full capabilities and effects have not yet been publicly established.

What a Sufficient Review Would Require

Article 36 does not prescribe a procedural template, but the substantive questions a legally adequate review must address are not difficult to identify. Article 36 requires, at a minimum, a genuine legal assessment, conducted in good faith by a competent authority, examining the weapon against the applicable rules of IHL and any other relevant rules of international law in the context of the acquiring State’s anticipated employment. This is a due diligence standard. The State must turn its mind to the question, bring appropriate legal expertise to bear, and reach a reasoned determination. Acquiring weapons without legal assessment, or treating the question as answered by default, falls short regardless of whether the weapons turn out to be lawful.

Applied to Armenia, the answers are less comfortable. The most straightforward questions concern superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering under Article 35(2). None of the systems Armenia has acquired appears designed to cause effects exceeding military necessity, but that conclusion must be reached through documented legal assessment, not merely assumed. Harder questions arise under the principles of distinction and the prohibition on indiscriminate weapons. The Pinaka raises a related but distinct set of questions. Area-effect weapons are not inherently unlawful, but their use in circumstances where distinction cannot be exercised is prohibited, and review should establish what operational constraints that entails for Armenia’s specific geographic and tactical context, a question that becomes more acute the closer one looks at Armenia’s border terrain.

Treaty exposure shapes the legal framework within which these questions are answered. Armenia is neither a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, nor to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. India is likewise outside both instruments. That non-party status means Armenia is not prohibited from acquiring systems that incorporate submunition technology. But it does not mean those systems escape legal scrutiny; it means the scrutiny runs through AP I. Whatever munitions Armenia acquires and however it employs them, the obligations of distinction (arts. 48, 51(4)(b)), proportionality (art. 51(5)(b)), precautions in attack (art. 57), and the prohibition on indiscriminate weapons (art. 51(4)) apply in full. Article 36 is precisely the mechanism that links this procedural obligation to that substantive one: the review must determine whether the weapon, as Armenia intends to use it, would comply with those rules. The absence of a treaty prohibition on acquisition makes the Article 36 review more important, not less.

All of this analysis, however, must ultimately be conducted not in the abstract but against the specific circumstances of Armenia’s anticipated employment, including the theaters of likely conflict, adversary countermeasures, terrain, and applicable rules of engagement. This is the deepest reason why a review by the purchasing State cannot be outsourced to the seller. India’s review, if any, was conducted against different strategic and operational parameters. Armenia’s review must answer Armenia’s question. No one else can.

Concluding Thoughts

Armenia’s obligations under Article 36 were triggered when it entered into its first Indian defense contract. The absence of any publicly documented review process is not a minor procedural deficiency. It is a gap in the State’s compliance with a treaty obligation that goes to the heart of how wars are fought and, in Armenia’s case, may soon need to be fought again.

The buyer-State problem is a systemic feature of the Article 36 regime, and Armenia is a notable instance. But that systemic framing should not obscure the individual legal responsibility at stake. Article 36 does not ask whether a State has the institutional infrastructure to conduct a review. It asks whether the State has determined that its weapons are lawful. The obligation existed before the infrastructure did, and it continues in its absence.

A State that has recently experienced the consequences of operating under-equipped and under-prepared, legally as much as militarily, has particular reason to take seriously an obligation designed to ensure that its new weapons are not only effective, but lawful. The capacity to do so exists. The legal expertise is present. What is missing is the institutional decision to treat Article 36 not as an abstract treaty commitment, but as a practical requirement of responsible rearmament.

***

Davit Khachatryan is an international law expert and researcher with a focus on operational law, international criminal law, alternative dispute resolution, and the intersection of various legal disciplines.

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Articles of War is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Articles of War does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Authorship does not indicate affiliation with Articles of War, the Lieber Institute, or the United States Military Academy West Point.

 https://lieber.westpoint.edu/armenias-military-procurement-india-article-36-additional-protocol-i/




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Explainer | How Pashinyan is working to topple Catholicos Karekin II

Manouk Vasilian
OC Media
March 12 2026

As parliamentary elections grow nearer, tensions between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Armenian Apostolic Church continue to build.

by Arshaluys Barseghyan

Although Armenia is constitutionally secular, Christianity forms a core part of the national identity, with Armenians taking pride in being widely regarded as the first country to adopt Christianity as a state religion in 301. The current head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholicos Karekin II, maintained close ties with Armenia’s previous leaders, creating favourable conditions for cooperation. Under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, however, relations have shifted, with developments surrounding Church-state relations coming to dominate public and political discourse.

The topic again rose to prominence in May 2025, when a new round of tension between the Church and state escalated after Pashinyan criticised Church leadership for failing to properly maintain churches across the country, comparing them to ‘storage rooms’ filled with construction materials and other non-religious items

As accusations against the Church, and specifically against Karekin II, continued to grow, Pashinyan gradually made clear that he was seeking to oust the Catholicos.

In January, this goal was formally articulated in a Church reform agenda signed by Pashinyan and 10 senior clergy members at Pashinyan’s official residence. The statement announced the creation of a Coordinating Council to be composed of the signatories and tasked with overseeing the organisational aspects of the reform process. Notably, Pashinyan signed the document in his capacity as Armenia’s prime minister — rather than as a follower of the Armenian Apostolic Church, as he had previously framed his involvement in Church issues — raising widespread concern that the move may have violated the constitution.

As Armenia heads toward its 2026 parliamentary elections, Pashinyan’s government has intensified its criticism of the Church, including warning of ‘hybrid threats’ facing the country, widely interpreted as referring to Russia, and hinting at Karekin II’s alleged foreign ties. It remains to be seen if Pashinyan will succeed in ousting Karekin II, however.

Why does Pashinyan want Karekin II out?

Pashinyan has put forward several justifications for seeking to replace Karekin II as Catholicos of the Armenian Apostolic Church, but two stand out.

First, he claims Karekin II violated his vow of celibacy and fathered a daughter, which would make him ineligible for the post.

Second — and more seriously — Pashinyan alleges that Karekin II has ties to ‘foreign intelligence services’, apparently Russian, which pose a threat to Armenia’s security. The accusations have raised questions about why no action was taken earlier, if Pashinyan’s government was aware of the information after coming to power in 2018.

Rejecting claims that he is seeking a more loyal Church leader, Pashinyan has claimed that he wants one free of foreign ties.

Still, as the standoff deepens, increasingly serious accusations against Karekin II and other senior clergy are always on offer — including allegations of paedophilia, employing ‘sectarian logic’, preaching ‘radical texts’, and ensuring ‘shadow money’ enters Armenia ‘to be used for political purposes’ — alongside the continued arrests of clergy on criminal grounds.

In February, Pashinyan offered further insights into his confrontation in an interview with Public TV, accusing the Church of acting as ‘a foreign state within the state’ and insisting that ‘the church should not engage in politics’.

Citing prior calls by Karekin II for Pashinyan’s resignation, as well as Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan’s 2024 anti-government protests, Pashinyan claimed such actions could not ‘remain without consequences, because we are talking about the sovereignty and security of our state’.

What pressure is Pashinyan employing against the Church?

Since the renewed confrontation, the government has taken a series of steps critics describe as repressive, targeting both the Church and Karekin II, interfering in the Church’s internal affairs, and using law enforcement as instruments of political pressure.

To start, four high-ranking priests have been placed in pre-trial detention on various charges, with two later remanded to house arrest and one under administrative supervision. The cases have sparked concern, particularly as some charges relate to incidents or statements from years ago, which authorities had previously declined to open investigations into, citing a lack of grounds.

Beyond the four detained clergy — including Karekin II’s nephew, Bishop Mkrtich Proshyan — other clerics, including Karekin II himself, have faced charges, with measures ranging from pre-trial detention to travel bans. Earlier in February, such restrictions prevented Karekin II from attending a bishops’ synod in Austria, in line with Pashinyan’s statement.

Karekin II’s brother says no judge would sentence catholicos, threatens excommunication

The cases have also affected other members of Karekin II’s family. His brother Gevorg Nersisyan and Nersisyan’s son Hambardzum were arrested during a local election campaign in Vagharshapat in November 2025. Following Pashinyan’s allegations, the Armenian Security Service (NSS) declassified documents claiming another brother, Archbishop Yezras, head of the Diocese of New Nakhchivan and Russia, had been recruited by the Soviet-era KGB.

Attempts to publicly discredit senior clergy have also intensified. Intimate footage allegedly depicting Archbishop Arshak Khachatryan was leaked, and the Pashinyan-affiliated website Civic.am has published a photo of Bishop Kirakos Davtyan in an alleged intoxicated, partially undressed state, suggesting he was an alcoholic.

Separately, authorities dissolved the Spiritual-Cultural Public TV company, which broadcasts the Church-founded Shoghakat TV. Reports also indicate that military commanders have pressured army chaplains to back Pashinyan’s reform agenda, while defrocked clergy were allowed to conduct liturgies under police supervision, with Pashinyan and officials in attendance. NSS officials were involved in omitting Karekin II’s name from services, a move that disrupted the established order of the religious ceremony and was a sign of protest against the Catholicos by his subordinates.

How is Karekin II fighting back?

Since tensions with the authorities increased in May 2025, Karekin II has defrocked or removed several opponents within the Church as a main tactic to fight back.

Among the first to be defrocked, in October 2025, was priest Aram Asatryan, an early vocal supporter of Pashinyan within the clergy. Neither Asatryan nor Pashinyan accepted Karekin II’s decision to strip him of his status; Pashinyan even attended a liturgy led by Asatryan following the decision. The Mother See called this liturgy ‘a soul-destroying initiative’ and accused Pashinyan of attempting to ‘split the Church’.

Asatryan remained at his assigned church, often seen under police protection. In January, the Church filed two lawsuits demanding the return of the church keys and a Yerevan apartment allocated to Asatryan by the Mother See.

The highest-ranking clergyman affected was Bishop Gevorg Saroyan, who was defrocked in January after suing to challenge his dismissal as Primate of the Masyatsotn Diocese.

Responding to criticism over the defrocking practices, the Mother See reported that during Karekin II’s 26-year tenure, 101 clergymen had been dismissed, including 21 directly by the Catholicos himself. At the same time, 491 clergymen were ordained.

Neither Armenian authorities, nor the defrocked clergy members have accepted Karekin II’s decisions, pointing towards his alleged illegitimacy as head of the Church.

Separately, Karekin II and the official Mother See have so far responded modestly to the accusations, avoiding offensive language, unlike their opponents, who have publicly used priests’ civilian names as well as obscene speech. That being said, some clergy have offered insults, calling Pashinyan ‘the chief madman of the country’ or ‘Judas’.

In official statements, Karekin II and the Mother See have described the authorities’ actions as ‘oppression’, ‘interference in internal affairs’, and an ‘anti-Church campaign’ that ‘poses a grave threat to our national unity, undermines [Armenia]’s internal stability, and strikes directly at Armenian statehood’.

The Church has also said Pashinyan’s initiative ‘directly violates’ the Armenian constitution and infringes on the rights of the Church, guaranteed both internationally and under Armenian law, and described the prosecutions of clergy as unjust.

Who’s winning the clergy’s loyalty?

Despite some clergy siding with Pashinyan, the majority have remained loyal to Karekin II or stayed silent.

Following the publication of the Church reform statement, the ruling Civil Contract party reported that another 20 or so clergy members had joined the initiative.

However, some of the 10 senior clergy members who signed the statement have been linked to past corruption cases and charges under Pashinyan’s government. In addition, one of them, Archbishop Hovnan Derderian, has since appeared to turn on Pashinyan by signing a statement urging Armenian authorities to ‘stop the persecution of the Church’. In February, he and 24 other high-ranking priests ‘reaffirm[ed] his loyalty to the Mother See and the Catholicos’.

At the same time, the latest survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI) found that the Church was the second institution Armenians were most satisfied with after the Armed Forces, with 39% very satisfied with both. However, satisfaction with the Church leadership was lower, with only 23% saying they were very satisfied.

Armenians 23% less concerned about national security compared to 2025, survey finds

Can Pashinyan succeed?

Despite the release of a reform agenda with an explicit goal of ousting Karekin II, the roadmap offers no clear explanation of how such a goal could be achieved. The Armenian Apostolic Church does not grant external actors any role in the election or removal of the Catholicos, leaving significant legal and procedural gaps in the proposal.

The Catholicos, as the Church clarifies, ‘is elected for life in the National-Church Assembly, ordained and consecrated by 12 bishops in the Mother See Cathedral’.

Additionally, Armenia is a secular state, and its constitution draws clear boundaries between the state and religious institutions. In particular, Article 17 states that ‘the freedom of activities of religious organisations shall be guaranteed’ in the country.

The constitution further limits the actions of state officials, stating that they ‘shall be entitled to perform only such actions for which they are authorised under the constitution or laws’.

Citing these articles, Pashinyan’s critics argue that these provisions prohibit direct government intervention in Church affairs, and that any such attempt by the executive to influence the removal of the Catholicos would exceed constitutional authority and violate the constitution.

Even so, Pashinyan vowed in January that he intended to make Karekin II reconsider and resign.

‘[Former Prime Minister] Serzh Sargsyan also had no intention of leaving, but he was forced to leave; the same will happen to Ktrich Nersisyan [Karekin II] — he will be forced to leave as well’.

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