Author: Maghakian Mike

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 6, No. 14, 7 August 2006
A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Domestic Politics
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HEADLINES
* IDEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE PAVES KREMLIN’S COURSE
* KHODORKOVSKY’S WIFE: ‘THEY ARE TRYING TO BREAK HIM’
* RUSSIAN SUPREME COURT APPROVES LIST OF 17 ‘TERRORIST’ GROUPS
* A NEW RUSSIAN GAS STRATEGY EMERGES
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POLITICS
IDEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE PAVES KREMLIN’S COURSE. Two developments have
become obvious in the wake of the recent G8 Summit in St. Petersburg:
Russia’s rising political and economic clout, and growing concern
in the West that the Kremlin might abuse it. But talk of a reversal
in Russia’s intention of following its own democratic path may be
misguided.
PRAGUE, August 4, 2006 (RFE/RL) — Moscow’s new
diplomatic assertiveness was on display for the world to see during
last month’s G8 summit in St. Petersburg.
And one controversial topic that dominated the run-up to the
summit has remained in the spotlight — Russia’s repeatedly
stated intention of following its own democratic path, dubbed
“sovereign democracy.”
The concept was formulated by Vyacheslav Surkov, the deputy
chief and prime ideologue of President Vladimir Putin’s
administration. Surkov began floating the new ideology during
speeches to activists of the pro-presidential Unified Russia party in
February and May.
As outlined by Surkov on the website edinros.ru, sovereign
democracy centers on Moscow’s right to restrict the impact of
international law, global economic bodies, and world public opinion
on Russia’s domestic policies.
Surkov has said he borrowed the name for the concept from Che
Guevara, who in 1960 wrote that some states have all formal
attributes of democracy, but remain dependent on transnational
corporations and foreign political forces.
Surkov suggests that that Russia can materialize its
sovereign democracy in the economic sphere by putting under the
state’s control or dominance “such vital sectors of the national
economy as strategic communications, pipelines, the national
electricity grid, railroads and federal highways, the financial
system, and broadcast television.”
As for foreign policy, Surkov believes Russia must restore
its global influence, for geopolitical reasons and because of its
imperial tradition. In this context, Surkov notes that for 500 years
Russians have been a “state-forming nation” and that “Russians always
have matters beyond of their borders.”
Surkov has also suggested that sovereign democracy could form
the base of Unified Russia’s political platform. The role of the
president was not mentioned in Surkov’s outline of his ideology,
but, in fact, President Putin has already begun to implement it in
Russia’s assertive foreign-policy course.
Russia’s stated intention of following a course centered
on sovereign democracy was the source of harsh criticism in the
run-up to the July 15-17 G8 summit.
During a visit to Vilnius in May, U.S. Vice President Dick
Cheney accused Russia of backtracking from democracy. And as the
summit neared, criticism from the West increased as defensive
responses from Russia became sharper.
Just days before the event, Putin personally articulated the
basic provisions of the new doctrine. In an interview with major U.S.
and European television networks on 12 July, Putin countered that in
1990s, when Russia was economically and politically weak, the West
had many levers of influence on Russia’s domestic and foreign
policies.
Today, he argued, the situation has changed. The levers of
influence have disappeared, “but the [West’s] desire for
influence remains. We are categorically against using political tools
for intervention into our internal affairs,” Putin concluded.
Many Russian politicians also publicly touted the policy,
including Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, a
close confidant of Putin and a potential candidate to succeed him as
president.
Writing in “Izvestia” on 13 July, Ivanov said that
Russia’s current policies are based on three concepts:
Russia’s efforts to become an energy superpower, to develop a
strong army, and to follow sovereign democracy, a concept it would
defend by any means, including by force.
Such statements were not taken lightly by Russia’s fellow
G8 members assembling in St. Petersburg.
On the sidelines of the summit, U.S. President Bush expressed
disagreement with Russia’s claim to a special type of democracy.
According to Irina Yasina, a former leader of the
organization Open Russia who took part in a meeting between Bush and
several Russian human right activists 16 July, Bush told participants
that “there is no sovereign or a special [kind] of democracy,”
“Novoye Ruskoye slovo” reported on July 16. “There are fundamental
democratic values based on which democracy either does exist or not,”
she quoted the president as saying.
Unexpectedly, another hopeful to succeed Putin as president,
First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, in an interview with
“Ekspert,” No. 28, expressed his distaste for the term “sovereign
democracy,” describing it as “unsuccessful.”
Medvedev explained that “sovereignty” and “democracy” belong
to different philosophical categories and that they should not be
combined.
Some observers took Medvedev’s comments as an indication
of a split between Surkov and the Kremlin. But in his interview with
“Ekspert,” Medvedev said any difference with Surkov’s ideology
was more in style than in substance. This led others to suggest that
Medvedev was merely positioning himself as a “liberal” in Putin’s
camp to appease Western politicians and to counter domestic opponents
who had earlier rejected the concept of sovereign democracy.
Despite Medvedev’s comments, the evidence accumulated
both before and after the G8 summit indicates that sovereign
democracy is here to stay.
Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, one of the co-chairmen of Unified
Russia, lent his support to the doctrine when he suggested on July 13
that the West should look anew at Russia and change its attitude
toward its rising power.
Luzhkov’s comments were significant, considering that the
political heavyweight has already announced his intention to leave
his mayoral post in 2007. Some observers thus consider him to be
another prime candidate to succeed Putin, for the simple reason that
he does not have to prove to anyone abroad or at home that he is
capable of running the country.
Unified Russia General Council Secretary Vyacheslav Volodin
stated on July 25 that sovereign democracy is key aspect of his
party’s ideology, and that it would be a “basic element” of the
party’s program.
Medvedev’s and Unified Russia’s “strategic vision for
the country’s future coincides,” he added. The incorporation of
sovereign democracy into the party’s program is of key importance
because Surkov has suggested that after leaving office in 2008, Putin
might became the leader of Unified Russia, and thus remain in
politics as the head of the “ruling party.”
Oleg Morozov, the head of Unified Russia’s Ideological
Commission, on July 27 added a new twist to the party’s adoption
of sovereign democracy. He described the party as a “party of
historical revanche,” noting that “revanchism is a very good starting
point, a very powerful driving force.”
The concept of sovereign democracy has received considerable
support from another rising ideological force within Putin’s camp
— Archbishop Kirill. Speaking at the 10th World Congress of Russian
People in April, Kirill universality rejected Western democratic
values and defended Russia’s “specific” vision of democracy and
human rights.
Furthermore, in an article titled “It Is Time For The End Of
Dithering Diplomacy” published in July by kreml.org, the archbishop
bluntly criticized the democratic political system. “I place in
question that the division of power and a multiparty system relates
to common human values,” he said. “We should end dithering diplomacy,
which requires that we always have to justify ourselves. Our official
and public diplomacy always considers it a victory when we manage to
prove to the West that we are like them — but this is simply
disinformation and the wrong [thing to do].”
It is also noteworthy that the Kremlin and its political
allies adopted the doctrine of sovereign democracy at a time when a
new generation of Russians is emerging — one that is not familiar
with communism or a totalitarian regime influencing their social and
political lives.
The future of democracy in Russia may depend on whether the
Kremlin will truncate this new generation by succeeding in imposing
sovereign democracy upon it, or whether this new generation will
succeed in rejecting it. (Victor Yasmann)
KHODORKOVSKY’S WIFE: ‘THEY ARE TRYING TO BREAK HIM.’ Inna
Khodorkovskaya tells RFE/RL about the impact of prison on her
husband, the former tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and the pressures
she faces from the authorities.
PRAGUE, July 31, 2006 (RFE/RL) — Since Mikhail Khodorkovsky
was imprisoned three years ago, his wife and their three children
have lived in a house in the leafy Moscow suburb of Zhukovka.
The building and the land around it is — or rather was —
owned by an affiliate of Yukos, the oil company that once made
Khodorkovsky one of the richest and most influential men in Russia,
Khodorkovskaya explained in a July 25 interview with RFE/RL’s
Russian Service.
But on May 2 this year, Khodorkovskaya says, a Moscow court
impounded the family home, saying it was part of the ongoing
investigation into tax evasion at Yukos.
Khodorkovskaya suspects it will not be long before she and
the wives of other Yukos executives living in Zhukovka are forced
out.
It is part, she says, of the relentless pressure that the
authorities are piling on her husband and other Yukos officials.
Khodorkovsky is now incarcerated in a prison camp deep in
Siberia. Inna is permitted to visit once every three months. But
getting there is a major effort in itself: a nine-hour flight,
followed by a 15-hour train journey, followed by a 40-minute car
ride.
She is allowed to stay with her husband for three days in a
prison hostel that some Russian papers suggest borders on the
luxurious. In fact, she insists, they share a simple room furnished
with a bed, a chair and a cupboard.
Khodorkovskaya finds her husband much changed — a
consequence, she says, of the psychological, and sometimes physical
pressure he is subjected to.
“They’re trying to break him, nothing more, nothing
less,” she says of the prison authorities. “These are methods that
have probably long been worked on and refined. I would say that it
works on the principle of amplitude. They raise the pressure, then
they reduce it and then they raise it again. So there’s no
straight upward line, they’re just trying to drain him.”
His biggest difficulty, she says, is the isolation and the
mental vacuum caused by his inactivity. But he is finding other ways
to fill the gap.
“He reads a lot of religious literature. He’s not a
religious fanatic, he’s not completely mad about religion,” she
says. “His interest is analytical. He doesn’t push faith away,
but he has begun to experience it in a new way. If before he
approached the subject from a sort of historical point of view, now
he feels closer to it.”
Khodorkovskaya says she has no doubt that her husband is a
political prisoner, sentenced to satisfy the ambitions of the men who
now rule the Kremlin.
Khodorkovsky himself — and many independent critics —
describe his trial as a staged farce and a warning to Russia’s
immensely wealthy oligarchs to stay out of politics.
The Kremlin disagrees. Khodorkovsky, it says, is a criminal
who defrauded the state of a massive sum in taxes.
Inna Khodorkovskaya says she and her husband had feared the
state would come after him. Nonetheless, the couple had chosen to
stay in Russia.
“It was our joint decision. We talked about whether to stay
or go, but the decision was simple. What is there, out there? Of
course, no one suggested that things would get quite so bad, but
right to the end he intended to stay here. And I did too.”
In that respect, she says, nothing has changed. If the
authorities force her out of her home, she will stay in Russia. The
critical issue now is how to bring up her family in the absence of a
father.
But Khodorkovskaya betrays little bitterness.
Both she and her husband have been changed by the experience
of the last few years, she says. But they will emerge stronger, she
believes.
“There are moments when something serious happens in your
life and your values change. And, naturally, recent events… my
values have grown stronger, I would say. That’s to say, my values
have really crystallized,” she says. “I can’t say that they have
changed fundamentally. But his probably have because he used to be in
politics. Now he sees what’s happening there from a slightly
different perspective. Naturally, he has changed greatly.”
RUSSIAN SUPREME COURT APPROVES LIST OF 17 ‘TERRORIST’ GROUPS.
PRAGUE, July 28, 2006 (RFE/RL) — Russia today published a list of 17
organizations that it said had been identified as “terrorist” by the
national Supreme Court.
Yury Sapunov, the head of antiterrorism at the Federal
Security Service (FSB), said all 17 groups were seen as a threat to
the Russian state.
The publication today in the governmental “Rossiiskaya
gazeta” of what Sapunov calls the only official Russian list of
terrorist organizations contains few surprises.
But it will raise a few eyebrows — at least in the West —
for some names that are missing.
No mention here, for instance, of either Hamas or Hizballah,
both of which are at the center of world attention at the moment and
both of which rank high on most Western lists of terrorist
organizations.
Sapunov said Russia took into account the views of the
international community but said the 17 were primarily a national
list of organizations that the Supreme Court considered the greatest
threat to the security of the state.
Russia risked the ire of Washington by inviting Hamas leaders
to Moscow for talks after they won the Palestinian parliamentary
elections in January this year.
Sapunov said that neither Hamas nor Hizballah were
universally regarded as terrorist.
But the main reason they do not figure on the list, he said,
was because they were not trying to change Russia’s
constitutional order through violence and were not linked to illegal
armed groups and other extremist organizations operating in the North
Caucasus.
These, he said, were the main criteria used in deciding which
organizations to include.
Almost all the groups listed, he said, were linked in one way
or another to the Muslim Brotherhood, including Hizb ut-Tahrir, which
seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate stretching from Central Asia
to the Caucasus.
Rights campaigner Lev Ponomaryov says the inclusion of Hizb
ut-Tahrir is just an extension of the deep suspicion its members
arouse, despite the group’s official rejection of the use of
violence to achieve its ends.
Ponomaryov says he knows dozens of Hizb ut-Tahrir members who
have been jailed on what he says are trumped-up criminal charges.
“As a rule, drugs and gun cartridges and the like are planted
on them,” Ponomaryov said. “And now, in addition to all that,
they’re being accused of being members of a terrorist group. I
can assure you that there has not been a not a single accusation
directed at Islamic Liberation (Hizb ut-Tahrir) that they’ve
committed a terrorist act in Russia, or have even attempted to
organize one.”
Other organizations on the Russian list include the Congress
of Peoples of Ichkheria and Daghestan, the Supreme Military Majlis
Shura of the United Forces of the Mujahedin of the Caucasus, Jamiya
al-Islamiya, the Islamic Party of Turkestan, and the Pakistan-based
Lashkar-e-Toiba.
Sapunov said part of the problem with any list was that the
groups keep changing their names.
Not, he added, that that was fooling the security services.
Increased international cooperation, the support of President
Vladimir Putin and the government, and the creation of the National
Antiterrorist Center had made it possible at last to establish an
overall strategy for combating terrorism. (Robert Parsons)
(RFE/RL’s Tajik Service contributed to this report.)
A NEW RUSSIAN GAS STRATEGY EMERGES. PRAGUE, July 28, 2006 (RFE/RL) —
A Gazprom subsidiary recently issued a report recommending a dramatic
change of strategy for the Russian gas industry. It determined that
Russia should decrease exports of natural gas to European markets and
concentrate instead on developing new gas fields to keep up with
domestic demand.
The Research Institute for the Economics of the Gas Industry,
NIIGazekonomika, determined in its late 2005 report that domestic
consumption of natural gas is increasing at a faster pace than
projected in Russia’s two-year-old Energy Strategy.
The company, a fully owned subsidiary of Gazprom responsible
for researching economic and management issues, stated that Russia
should focus on developing new gas fields in the Yamal Peninsula and
other locations in order to meet future domestic demand.
Failure to do so could have a seriously detrimental impact on
Russia’s future economic growth, the report warns.
But ensuring domestic supplies would also require that Russia
decrease exports of natural gas to European markets, according to the
report, which notes the potential consequences for the CIS,
Asian-Pacific, and European gas markets.
It appears that Gazprom commissioned NIIGazekonomika to
conduct its study as part of the ongoing debate in the West and in
Russia about the real state of the Russian natural-gas industry.
Gazprom’s reported lack of investment into new gas fields
and pipeline construction have been widely seen as a potential danger
to European energy security. Such concerns have prompted Western
European governments to demand that Gazprom’s export pipelines be
opened to independent gas producers to prevent future shortfalls.
Russia, however, has rejected European pressure and the State
Duma recently passed legislation that further strengthens Gazprom’s
monopoly on gas exports.
Gazekonomika concluded that:
— Russian domestic gas consumption is rising faster than
projected in Russia’s Energy Strategy, which was announced in May
2003 and is the foundation of the country’s energy designs
through 2020. The new Gazekonomika study estimates that by 2030
domestic demand will be approximately 654 billion cubic meters (bcm)
per year, compared to the Energy Strategy’s estimate of 436 bcm.
— Gas-conservation technologies are not being implemented
and the Russian economy remains highly energy intensive
— A dangerously narrow gap exists between the cost of
production of gas and its domestic price.
The new study also states that the projections of the Energy
Strategy are based on data from the 1980s that, the study’s
authors claim, are not reliable.
Other projections of the Russian gas industry, such as one
conducted by Gazprom in 2004, also do not reach the consumption
levels estimated by NIIGazekonomika.
The 2004 Gazprom study projected that domestic consumption of
gas in Russia in 2020 will reach 525 bcm, while the new study places
this figure at 560 bcm.
Russia has already shown marked increases in domestic gas
consumption — rising by 17 bcm from January 2004 to the end of 2005.
“Taking into account the objective results, in the future one
cannot discount the growing internal demand for gas,” the
NIIGazekonomika study states. “The fulfillment of any of the
scenarios presented can potentially lead to an inability by Russian
Federation producers to meet demand for gas in both domestic and
foreign markets. This situation in turn can prevent double-digit
Russian GDP growth and can disrupt gas export obligations.”
Furthermore, the new study projects that by 2013 Russian gas
exports will begin to be pushed out of the European market by Central
Asian producers. The study projects that by 2013 the amount of
Russian gas replaced by Central Asian gas could total 10 bcm; in
2014, 24 bcm; in 2015, 30 bcm; and by 2030, 56 bcm.
If this were to take place, domestic demand would be met, but
the Russian budget could stand to lose tax revenues and hard-currency
reserves. The study forecasts cumulative losses of up to $110
billion.
This, however, is not seen as a tragedy. In fact, the
Gazekonomika report recommends that the Russia government intensify
development of its own gas resources by lowering exports to European
markets and “allowing” Central Asian gas producers to fill the gap.
The long-term benefits of developing new gas fields in the
Yamal Peninsula and the fields in Obskoy and Tazov are thus deemed by
the report to be Russia’s highest priority in the energy sector.
Such development would significantly decrease the need for huge
investments into the gas industry while allowing domestic production
to continue without major disruptions. Plans of how to proceed with
this strategy are presently being developed by Gazekonomika. (Roman
Kupchinsky)
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Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly” is prepared
on the basis of a variety of sources. It is distributed every
Wednesday.
Direct comments to [email protected].
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Armenian Consul General Condemned Act of Vandalism in Rostov
PanARMENIAN.Net
02.08.2006 15:07 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia and
journalists fathered August 1 evening in the Consulate General of the
Republic of Armenia in Rostov-on-Don to discuss the desecration and
the attempt to set fire to the Museum of Russian-Armenian Friendship
located in the Surb Khach Church.
As reported by Yerkramas, the newspaper of Armenians of Russia,
Ararat Gomtsyan, the RA Consul General to the South Federal Okrug,
condemned the act of vandalism and called on law enforcement to find
and punish those guilty. Chairman of the town community Artem Surmalyan
and professor Minas Bagdyrov also addressed the meeting participants.
To remind, on July 31 night malefactors damaged the Museum of
Russian-Armenian Friendship located in the Surb Khach Church. As
reported by the Yerkramas, the newspaper of Armenians of Russia,
when coming to work the museum employees saw outraging inscriptions
of the museum walls. The vandals could not enter the museum but broke
the windows. Experts suspect skinheads; law enforces have not issued
any versions so far.

277 FROM 1262 ENTRANTS RECEIVE UNSATISFACTORY MARKS FOR “PHYSICS” SUBJECT UP
TO NOW, AND 175 ONES RECEIVE 18-20 POINTS
YEREVAN, AUGUST 1, NOYAN TAPAN. From July 20-30, 1262 entrants from
1479 ones of the RA institutions of higher education took entrance
exam on the “Physics” subject by a centralized order. 277 of them
received “unsatisfactory” mark, and 175 received 18-20 points,
including 6 entrants with 20 points. As Roland Avagian, the Chairman
of the subject commission informed the Noyan Tapan correspondent,
125 from 150 entrants reported for the exam on August 1.
According to his estimation, the majority of entrants has enough
knowledge on this subject. As of the same day, 2087 entrants took
written exam on English.
According to data of the republican entrance commission, as of July
30, 1021 entrants received 18-20 points on that subject, among who
151 people got 20 points, 495 entrants got 19 points, 375 ones got
18 points. 114 entrants got less than 8 points. Nune Yernjakian, the
Chairwoman of the commission on written exam of English mentioned in
the interview to the Noyan Tapan correspondent that exams were going
on calmly up to then, no cases of breakings and making use of ciphers
were fixed. N.Yernjakian estimated satisfactory the level of entrants’
readiness as well.

Arka News Agency, Armenia
July 28, 2006
PRESENTATION OF VOLUNTARY WEB-SITE HELD IN YEREVAN
YEREVAN, July 27. /ARKA/. The presentation of a voluntary web-site
() has been held in Yerevan. During the presentation,
Chairwoman of the “Professionals for Civil Society” NGO Tsovinar
Sukiasyan stated that the goal of the web-site is facilitating the
formation and development of volunteers, informing the public of
voluntarism and creating favorable conditions for involving NGOs and
citizens in voluntary activities.
Sukiasyan pointed out that the web-site contains the information and
news about voluntary organizations, laws, legal acts and
international conventions on their activities. She said that the
web-site also has a forum for discussing topical issues, and all
those wishing can get registered. “In Armenia voluntary activities
evokes negative associations, and I hope that this project will help
peo9ple overcome this stereotype,” she said.
The web-site was designed by the “Professionals for Civil Society”
NGO with the assistance of the US Embassy in Armenia, under the
program of encouraging voluntarism and reforming legislation
regulating voluntary activities. P.T. -0–

David Simonyan: Surrender of territories to Azerbaijan: strategic
consequences for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
Regnum, Russia
July 27, 2006
REGNUM publishes the article of security expert David Simonyan
(Yerevan), which reflects his vision of the future of the Karabakh
conflict. The article is published in the author’s wording.
In the light of the continuing discourse on how to preserve the
“favorable window of opportunities” in the Karabakh peace process,
people in Armenia keep actively talking about the settlement
principles that have reportedly been presented to the Armenian
and Azeri presidents for discussion and possible signing. These
principles stipulate that Armenian troops be withdrawn from the
liberated territories and the territories, except for the Lachin
corridor, be given back to Azerbaijan.
The article is about the importance the liberated territory has for
ensuring the key element of Armenia’s national security – its military
component. When speaking about Armenia, you should keep in mind two
states, the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
(NKR), who are fully integrated in military and economic terms. As
you may know, military security is a condition of a state that allows
it to exclude any damage to its vital interests that can be caused
by threat or practical armed violence.
The given analysis is based on an axiom that is generally accepted
among experts: for ensuring national security one should be ready
for the worst scenario. And now, let’s more thoroughly consider the
significance the liberated territory has for ensuring the military
security of Armenia (RA and NKR).
The military conflict of 1991-1994 has improved the quality of the
following elements of the military-strategic position of the Armenian
states:
1. Frontline configuration
The present configuration of the frontline is optimal for the
Armenian side. The southern flank of the Artsakh front is shielded
by the Iranian border, the northern flank – by the hard-to-access
Mrav mountain range. In the east – from the mountains of Mrav to the
river Arax – the Armenian side has a well-fortified multi-echelon
defense line.
Should the Armenian side give back the territories of six districts
and keep only Lachin, the total frontline of the two Armenian states
with Azerbaijan, including Nakhichevan, will get 450 km longer to 1,100
km. The frontline between Artsakh and Azerbaijan will lengthen by 150
km to 360 km. For you to have the full picture of how long a border
Armenia will have with its conflicting neighbors, we should remind
you that Armenia also has a poorly protected 268 km border with Turkey.
In order to effectively fortify the extended frontline the Armenian
side will have to mobilize substantial human and financial resources.
First, the Armenian side will have to increase its army personnel (the
Armed Forces of Armenia and the Defense Army of Artsakh (Karabakh))
and, therefore, to prolong the compulsory service term for privates
and to enroll contract officers.
Second, after withdrawing troops, the Armenian side will have to
undertake big expenses to create new defense lines. To carry out the
above measures, the Armenian side will have to augment its military
budget, but to do this, it will have to further curtail its scarce
social financing and to face the ensuing negative consequences.
2. Depth of defense
The liberated territories have allowed the Armenian side to ensure
the minimum defense depth and to solve several important strategic
problems:
First, the present depth of defense has allowed the Armenian side to
form a multi-echelon defense line. Should the first line be broken, the
Armenian side will be able to resist on the following ones and to keep
the enemy outside Artsakh until additional troops come from Armenia.
Second, the central densely-populated areas of Artsakh, including
its capital, Stepanakert, as well as the settlements of the Goris,
Kapan and Meghri districts of Armenia have become inaccessible for
shelling by Azeri artillery and multiple rocket launching systems
(BM-21 “Grad”).
Third, by liberating the Zangelan, Jebrail and Fizuli districts
and moving the frontline over 100 km eastward, the Armenian side
has liquidated the threat to the vulnerable, just 40 km wide Meghri
district of the Republic of Armenia.
If the six districts are given back to the enemy and the frontline is
moved back to the former administrative border of Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Region, the Armenian side will lose the necessary depth
for effective defense and will face bigger difficulties in defending
Artsakh should a new war begin.
The new frontline will run just 5 km away from the district centers of
Mardakert, Askeran and Hadrut and 18 km away from Stepanakert. If the
Armenian side gives back the Karvachar (formerly Kelbajar) district
too, the Martakert district will get vulnerable to possible military
attacks from three sides.
Even fortified to the maximum, the new defense line will not be a
reliable guarantor of Artsakh’s military security. As we know from
military history, any well-fortified defense line (Mannerheim line,
Siegfried line, Bar-Lev line) can be broken by the attacker, and only
sufficient depth of defense can allow the defender to organize new
resistance lines and by wearing the enemy out to stop his attack. For
example, during the Yom Kippur War (1973), when the Egyptian troops
overran the 157.5 km long and 15 km deep Bar-Lev line in Sinai in just
six hours, it was exactly the depth of the line that allowed Israel
to stop the Egyptian troops, to prevent them from going deep into
its territory, to mobilize new forces and to turn around the situation.
Besides, if the border is moved, most of the settlements of Artsakh
and the Sunik region of Armenia, first of all, Stepanakert, Kapan and
Goris, will find themselves unprotected in the face of possible massive
shelling by the enemy. If a new war starts, a sudden massive bombing
of towns, district centers and villages by artillery and “Grads”
will cause big casualties among civilians and heavy in destruction
in Artsakh and Sunik. This may result in a mass exodus of people from
the area.
3. Military communications
Efficient military communications, well-trained and equipped mobile
troops, timely supply of arms, hardware, ammunition, fuel and other
stuff and quick evacuation are really crucial in modern war. For
the Armenian side, regular military communications would be really
indispensable, should the enemy get big superiority during the first
days of the war.
Let’s see in detail what military communications each side has:
Azerbaijan
The densely-populated areas of Azerbaijan are connected with the
Artsakh front by two railroads: Baku-Yevlakh and Baku-Horadiz station
and several motor roads: Baku-Shemakha-Yevlakh, Baku-Kurdamir-Yevlakh
and Baku-Birmai-Bailakan (Zhdanovsk) as well as belt road
Yevlakh-Barda-Agjabedy-Bailakan – quite a convenient road running
along the frontline. All running via steppe, these roads will allow
the enemy to quickly send mobilized troops to the Artsakh front and
to get multiple superiority in personnel and hardware before the
approach of the Armenian troops.
Artsakh
With the present frontline configuration, there are four motor roads
connecting Armenia with Artsakh and the frontline: Vardenis-Mardakert,
Goris-Stepanakert-Askeran-Agda m, Kapan-Zangelan-Jebrail and
Meghri-Mijavan-Horadiz. If the war resumes, these roads will allow
the Armenian sides to bring up quite big troops from Armenia to the
Artsakh front in just a few days.
So-called belt roads – communications running along the frontline
– are crucial for the frontline resistive capacity. They allow
to quickly redeploy troops to wherever there is a danger of
breach. At present the Artsakh Defense Army has two belt roads:
Mardakert-Agdam-Fizuli-Jebrail and the North-South highway project
to connect Mardakert-Stepanakert-Red Bazar-Hadrut.
If the six liberated districts are surrendered, the Armenian armed
forces will control only one belt road – Mardakert-Hadrut and
only one road connecting mainland Armenia with Sunik and Artsakh –
Yerevan-Goris-Stepanakert. This road runs through a highly mountainous
area with many passes.
If a new war starts, the Armenians will find it extremely difficult
to keep the narrow Lachin corridor from the enemy’s two-side strikes,
but even if they retain Lachin, the enemy will use its artillery and
aviation to make it as hard as possible for Armenia to quickly transfer
big military forces and material and medical assistance to Artsakh.
Meanwhile, the fate of Artsakh will depend exactly on how quickly
Armenia will supply it with troops as the Defense Army of Artsakh
may prove not strong enough to resist the onslaught of the greatly
prevalent enemy.
Thus, you clearly see that the liberated territory is extremely
important for keeping the military balance between the conflicting
sides, while its surrender by the Armenian side will break
it to Azerbaijan’s advantage and will strongly aggravate the
military-strategic situation of the Armenian states – something
neither peace agreements nor international peacekeepers will compensate
for. This is especially dangerous as Azerbaijan is heavily swelling its
military potential, particularly, by redoubling its military budget
in 2006 – from $300 mln to $600 mln – while Armenia will hardly be
able to keep pace in the coming years for the following reasons:
1. The state budget of Armenia is 3.5 times smaller than the
state budget of Azerbaijan ($1 bln against $3.5bln) and this gap
will continue to grow as Azerbaijan will increase its oil exports.
Meanwhile, Armenia’s economic potential will not allow this country
to allot as much money to the military as to keep the military parity
with Azerbaijan.
2. Armenia can no longer hope for the big free military hardware
supplies that it got from Russia in the mid 1990s and that helped it
to keep military balance with Azerbaijan for the last decade. The key
military partner of Armenia, Russia has begun to show more pragmatic
policy in the last years, with no political or economic preferences.
Hence, only by retaining the liberated territory, carrying out military
reforms and improving the state administration system as a whole will
the Armenian side be able to offset the growing military potential
of the enemy and, thereby, to keep the Azeri side from temptation to
resume military actions.
Given the continuing variance of the sides concerning the status of
Artsakh, any change in the present configuration of the contact line
will not stop the conflict but will simply create another, much more
conflict-prone situation in the sphere of security.
Should Azerbaijan, whose leadership keeps saying that it will never
put up with the loss of Karabakh, agree to sign peace agreements, but
will later prove not content with the return of just six districts
and will make up its mind to get back the whole Artsakh by war,
Armenia will get in a serious danger.
Turning to advantage the change in the military balance and the
consequent vulnerability of Artsakh’s whole defense system, Azerbaijan
may use some convenient political moment to launch a blitzkrieg attack
and to occupy Artsakh. In order to break the frontline, the Azeris
will quickly concentrate strongly prevalent forces for one main
blow – not a hard thing to do for them given the big quantitative
and technical prevalence of the Azeri Army over the Defense Army
of Artsakh and the facts that 70% of Azeri troops are deployed near
the frontline and that Azerbaijan has better capacities for quickly
deploying mobilized troops to the Artsakh front. The outcome of the
war will greatly depend on its very first days, particularly, on the
ability of the Defense Army of Artsakh to keep the frontline intact,
which may prove quite a hard job.
Armenia will have very limited capacities to help Artsakh: it will
not be able to use the vulnerable Lachin corridor for transferring
big military contingents. If the frontline is broken and the Armenian
troops fail to stop the enemy at Stepanakert, the Armenian side may
lose not only Artsakh but also Sunik. If Azerbaijan occupies Artsakh,
Turkey will certainly encourage it to try to make true the Pan-Turkic
dream: to seize the Meghri district, thereby, linking Azerbaijan with
Turkey and cutting Armenia from Iran. To this end, the enemy may strike
from two sides – from Zangelan and Nakhichevan. After losing Artsakh,
it will be extremely hard for the Armenian side to keep Meghri:
the district is very narrow and lacks the necessary defense depth,
while the motor roads connecting it with the rest of Armenia are
quite vulnerable.
The liquidation of Serbian Krajina in Croatia in 1995 is one example
of how real this scenario can be: Croatia broke earlier cease-fire
agreements, mobilized its armed forces and suddenly attacked
Serbian Krajina. In some few days they broke the frontline and
occupied the region. As a result, Serbian Krajina stopped to exist
and half million of Serbs were forced to leave their homeland and
become refugees. This tragedy happened in the center of Europe in
the presence of thousands-strong UN peacekeeping contingent and led
to no sanctions against the aggressor side.
Conclusions:
1. One of the key factors keeping the military balance between Armenia
and Artsakh, from the one side, and Azerbaijan, from the other, and
compensating for Azerbaijan’s personnel and hardware superiority and
capacity to increase its military potential is the present optimal
configuration of the Artsakh frontline.
2. The existing military balance rather than the cease-fire agreement
of 1994 is keeping Azerbaijan back from resuming large-scale military
actions.
3. By giving back any part of the liberated territory, the Armenian
side will give Azerbaijan a military advantage and will reduce its
own military security. This may inspire the enemy – should there be
convenient moment – to solve the Karabakh problem by war. That’s why
it is absolutely inadmissible to surrender the liberated territory
to the enemy.
4. Given the aggressive and genocide-prone Azeri-Turkish alliance,
with its overwhelming military prevalence and open desire to destroy
the Armenian statehood, the key security guarantee for Armenia and
Artsakh must be the Armenian Army and the present territory of the
Armenian states (42,000 sq. km.)

Pilot Error Blamed In Armavia A320 Accident
Aero-News Network, FL
July 27, 2006
Russian investigators say it was pilot error that caused the crash
of an Armavia Airlines Airbus A320 back in May… killing all 113
people on board the plane.
As Aero-News reported, the accident happened during foul weather as
the Armenian aircraft was on approach to the airport in Sochi… a
Russian seaside resort.
A spokeswoman for the civil aviation authority that links Russia with
eleven of its former republics says a terrain avoidance alarm sounded
in the cockpit shortly before the crash… but the crew was unable
to add power and pull up in time to avoid crashing into the Black Sea.
Of the 113 people on board that flight… 26 were Russian citizens.
Their families will receive about $3,800 from the state… on top of
the $8,900 already paid out by the airline.

The International Herald Tribune: “Dutch Disease” Threatens Azerbaijan
PanARMENIAN.Net
26.07.2006 16:34 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ For Azerbaijan, the biggest question at present
is what to do with the so-called “wall of money” that will start
to accrue once the oil begins to flow. Some observers are already
predicting a bad case of pending “Dutch disease”- by which an increase
in oil revenues renders a country’s manufacturing less competitive
by raising the exchange rate – unless Baku manages to divert both
state and private investment into the non-oil sector and addresses
the subject of income disparity between the new rich and the growing
number of disgruntled or desperately poor,” Thomas Goltz wrote for
The International Herald Tribune.
“For now, the question of the political ramifications of future
oil-related wealth is on hold as investors, citizens and former
pipe-dreamers celebrate the realization of what is now a “pipeline
to somewhere.” I hope my zany motorcycle circus of six years ago
played some little part in this process. I also hope that the current
leadership of Azerbaijan will use the occasion of its new-found wealth
to win more than just fair-weather friends and address some of the
urgent social issues at play here on the shore of the Caspian,”
the observer wrote.

Ruling party booklet on EU prefaces premier, lists Turkey’s “red lines”
Anatolia news agency
26 Jul 06
Ankara, 26 July: [Ruling] Justice and Development Party (AKP) Foreign
Relations Department prepared a booklet – “EU in 100 questions” –
aiming to introduce Turkey’s European Union (EU) adhesion process to
the society.
One hundred questions have been asked in the booklet as well as
the answers regarding the foundation of the EU, its history, motto,
decisions, consultative and jurisdictional bodies, enlargement process
and screening process as far as Turkey is concerned.
“Turkey’s unifying identity appears to be an important asset at a
time when efforts are underway to polarize the world in the axis of
civilizations and at a time when terrorism gradually became more
destructive and merciless,” Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan wrote in the preface of the booklet.
Erdogan also reaffirmed that Turkey’s EU perspective was always
“full membership”.
In the booklet, Turkey’s red lines are listed such as:
-“Turkey cannot recognize Cyprus Greek Cypriot administration under
the name of Cyprus Republic. A political recognition is only possible
after a comprehensive and durable settlement.
-“Acknowledging ‘so-called Armenian genocide’ can never be a
pre-condition in the negotiation stage. No concessions will be made
from the Lausanne Treaty and (Turkey’s) territorial integrity.
-“It is out of question for Turkey to accept ‘Privileged Partnership
Status’ (offered by some European politicians). Screening process is
expected to be concluded at the end of this year.
“Agriculture and environment will be the two topics that will strain
most Turkey at the negotiation process,” it was also underscored at
the booklet.

Karabakh Conflict Sides Fail to Fulfill Obligations on Settling Military Incidents
PanARMENIAN.Net
24.07.2006 13:41 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The sides in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict have
undertaken to quickly settle all the incidents at the contact line,
however they fail to fulfill this obligation, OSCE Minsk Group former
Russian Co-chair Vladimir Kazimirov told PanARMENIAN.Net.
“Let’s suppose that the implementation of the agreement has uncovered
its shortcomings, but there should be political will and protection
of lives of the civilians living near the contact line. However the
matter was reduced to holding of selective monitorings which cannot
secure either direct contacts between the sides or supervision of the
contact line. Meanwhile the incidents still claim lives and aggravate
tension and distrust between the sides,” Kazimirov underscored.
The Russian diplomat remarked that Armenian Defense Minister
Serge Sargsyan has publicly announced the readiness to fulfill the
obligations undertaken if the Azeri side acts the same way. Karabakh
joined the position and reiterated it in May 2006, however Baku keeps
silent for years already. “Baku’s negative approach was conditioned
by the unwillingness to maintain immediate contact with the military
of the opposite side, moreover with Nagorno Karabakh a party to the
agreement,” he said.
To note, the proposals on strengthening the ceasefire were sent by
Vladimir Kazimirov to the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents on
February 3, 1995. The consent of the parties was received February 4,
1995 from the Defense Ministers of all the conflicting sides.

Cyprus and the 300 Soldiers of Leonidas
Cyprus Mail, Cyprus
July 23 2006
By Nicos Rolandis
A WAVE of merciless carnage, destruction and despair has again
reached our shores. It has inundated the Middle East and the Eastern
Mediterranean. July 1982 comes back to my mind, when Beirut was in
flames and I convened here in Cyprus a conference of the Non-Aligned
Movement to express solidarity to the Palestinians. The international
community was as frigid and nonchalant as it is today.
Solidarity is always welcome in circumstances such as the above.
Practical results however are almost non-existent. The flames which
burn the flesh and the soul cannot be put out by words and wishes. As
Pope Benedict said when he visited Auschwitz “In a place like this,
words fail. In the end there can only be a dreaded silence – a silence
which is itself a heartfelt cry to God: Why, Lord, did you remain
silent? How could you tolerate all this?”
The Middle East and Cyprus have followed parallel paths in the past.
We both have unresolved national problems, military confrontations,
occupied territories, human losses, refugees, missing persons. We also
have a number of other common traits: extreme nationalism, lack of
moderation, stubborn pursuit of the absolute and a tendency to overlook
the political balances in our area, in which might creates right.
If both in our case and in the case of the Middle East, the love for
our country was not going only through our hearts but through our
minds as well, we would have all ended up in a much better position.
The recent meeting of President Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader
Talat was a step in the right direction. It took place, however,
after a long and unwarranted delay. I hope it is not too late. For
the past three years the trains leading to a possible solution were
loaded only with dreams and hopes – nothing else. They left Cyprus
behind, in a misty atmosphere, with new settlers coming in, replete
with pain for properties lost in the occupied north. We now need
positive developments. If nothing happens, I fear that we shall move
into a new adventure with unpredictable consequences.
Former President of Greece Costis Stephanopoulos, a mature politician,
has warned about a possible armed conflict with Turkey if the
national issues remain unresolved. The appraisal of former Prime
Minister of Greece Costas Simitis is similar to the above. The two
distinguished Greek politicians know very well how inflammable our
area may become. They both lived through the incidents with the Imia
islands and the S300 missiles, which almost led to war. I was in
Geneva when the decision was taken not to import the missiles into
Cyprus. I had meetings with Greek Minister and Simitis “confident”
Alecos Papadopoulos at the residence of Archbishop Damaskinos of
Switzerland. I know that we got very close to war.
As I have written in the past, Cypriots never assessed correctly the
danger of military conflict. After the coup in 1974, many people
here excluded the possibility of invasion. They considered that
Turkey would not dare to move against Cyprus, because the latter
was a member of the United Nations, of the Council of Europe, of the
non-Aligned Movement, of the Commonwealth and furthermore Cyprus had
signed an Association Agreement with the European Communities. They
also relied on the Guarantees of Greece and the United Kingdom. Our
political demeanour however in the 1960s, the various warlords and
their followers and the coup d’etat which ensued, constituted an
explosive brinkmanship. We avoided the invasion in 1964 and in 1967;
we did not avoid it in 1974. In addition Makarios himself believed
that there wouldn’t be a coup against him; but the coup took place.
We are now of the impression that, irrespective of our political
behavior, Europe will always avert threats against us. If this
was the case Greece would not face any danger in 1996 with the Imia
islands and in 1998 with the S300 missiles. The warnings of President
Stephanopoulos would not be valid either.
Greek politicians were much more prudent than their Cypriot peers in
this regard. They had made it clear since the 1960s that Greece could
not be drawn into armed conflict, whenever Cyprus decided unilaterally
to follow her own course. Georghios Papandreou, Constatinos Karamanlis,
Andreas Papandreou, George Rallis, Constantinos Mitsotakis and Costas
Simitis gave discreetly the above message to us. Andreas Papandreou
was particularly cautious. In April 1983, when we were in Athens on a
state visit, there were rumours about a probable military operation
by the Turks, as a result of the activities of Armenian fighters in
Cyprus. The Prime Minister considered the situation as very grave,
so he convened an urgent meeting. I set out here below the exact
contents of a note prepared by the then Director of my office (and
recently Minister) Alecos Shambos.
“On the 12/4/83, before lunch, a meeting was held at the residence
of Ambassador Mr Hadjimiltis; Messrs Papandreou, Kyprianou,
Haralambopoulos, Skoularikis, Drosoyiannis, Rolandis, Veniamin, D.
Michaelides and service personnel participated. The subject examined
was the security of Cyprus, especially in the light of Turkish threats
related to the Armenians. It was clear that the Prime Minister
wanted to ascertain to what extent Greece would be implicated in case
Cyprus was struck by a limited Turkish military operation (bombing
or occupation of the Melkonian School etc).
At no stage of the meeting Greece undertook a commitment to support
Cyprus militarily in case of military operation of any nature. It
became clear though, that there was an intention of military support
of a certain nature by Greece, without a clear definition of such a
support. It was decided that in case of a limited Turkish operation
our own reaction should also be limited and not extend beyond the
space which Turkey would strike. In this regard Papandreou mentioned
that Greece might send approximately 300 men for the support of Cyprus.
When we finished, the atmosphere was frigid. One of the Cypriot
participants whispered in my ear: “Nicos, does he mean he will send
to us the 300 fighters of Leonidas?” (Leonidas was a legendary king
of ancient Greece who fought the Persians with 300 men).
So, President Papadopoulos, watch your step. I do not think that you
have convinced either the government and certainly not the opposition
in Greece about your line of thought. Moreover you have not convinced
the Europeans and the Americans. So do not set the measure higher
than you can jump. If we have a serious military problem, Europe is not
going to attempt to save us, unless we convince her that we work in a
correct way to save ourselves. Thus far we have not convinced her. ??
NICOS A. ROLANDIS POLITICAL BUREAU