Author: Lilit Nahapetian

Begin-Sadat Center
for Strategic Studies
BESA
by Emil Avdaliani
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,723, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Recent fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan
exposed Israel as a significant player in the region. Though far apart
geographically, Baku and Jerusalem pursue strategic relations. The
dilemma is how this should be done in a region where Russian, Iranian,
and Turkish interests predominate, as none of those countries desires
another competitor.
Fighting in July between Armenia and Azerbaijan caused many casualties
along the border, and the governments of the region fear an escalation
to the scale of the four-day war between the two states in 2016. I
will not delve into the details of the recent flare-up as that has
been done elsewhere (and much remains in dispute in any case), but
will focus instead on one interesting aspect of the tension in the
South Caucasus: the role of Israel.
Jerusalem is confronted with a dilemma in the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (which is officially within
Azerbaijan’s borders). Israel is not a direct participant, but it
enjoys close relations with both combatants (for instance, Armenia
recently sent its first ambassador to Israel). Jerusalem has stayed
completely out of the evolving conflict so far, which is the logical
approach. One of the latest statements from Israel’s foreign ministry
about the recent violence is an anodyne expression of concern and a
hope for a swift ceasefire.
Though small and far from the conflict area, Israel nevertheless has
vital strategic interests in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan stands
out, as its relations with Israel dwarf the latter’s relations with
Armenia.
Israel and Azerbaijan established diplomatic relations in April 1992,
and in 1993, Israel opened an embassy in Baku. Ever since then,
relations have broadened and deepened. The relationship is predicated
on a number of geo-strategic factors. The first is Azerbaijan’s loss
of political control over Nagorno-Karabakh and growing need to correct
that situation via an expansive military program, which has caused it
to become a major importer of Israeli defense technologies. Israeli
defense companies have trained Azerbaijani special forces and
bodyguards, built security systems for the Baku airport, and upgraded
Soviet-era military equipment (tanks).
The scale of the transactions between the two is immense. In 2012,
reports emerged about a $1.6 billion purchase by Azerbaijan of weapons
manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries. In 2016, Israeli PM
Benjamin Netanyahu said Azerbaijan had bought $5 billion worth of
weapons from Israel (unmanned aerial vehicles and satellite systems).
In 2017, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported
that Baku had purchased $127 million worth of military technology from
Jerusalem.
This does not mean that all has gone smoothly so far. Halts in
cooperation between the two have occurred. In 2017, claims emerged
that an Israeli drone manufacturer had attempted to bomb the Armenian
military on the Azeris’ behalf during a demonstration of one of its
“suicide” unmanned aerial vehicles. In a rare move, the Israeli
Defense Ministry suspended the export license.
Thus it comes as no surprise that on July 21, after the recent border
flare-up with Azerbaijan, Armenia showcased alleged Israeli-made
drones that it presumably shot down during the fighting. No specifics
were given, but the Israeli firm Aeronautics Defense Systems does
indeed manufacture several types of Orbiter UAVs, including
lightweight systems for reconnaissance and others for aerial attack.
Overall, however, the bilateral military cooperation has been
burgeoning ever since Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991. Israel has
been willing to provide Baku with high tech at a level that Yerevan
and even Moscow do not possess.
But business alone is insufficient grounds for a long-term
geopolitical relationship. Azerbaijan and Israel share other
fundamental interests, of which the Iran issue is arguably the most
crucial.
Iran, located to Azerbaijan’s south, is Israel’s arch nemesis, while
Baku and Tehran have mixed relations. Diplomatic relations exist and
bilateral economic contacts are extensive (primarily via the newly
introduced North-South economic corridor through Azerbaijan, though
much more can yet be achieved there). Baku is nevertheless
apprehensive about Iranian moves that could complicate its position in
the South Caucasus and Caspian Sea.
All of this is heightened by Tehran’s concerns about the allegedly
political aspirations of the Azeris in Iran. Tehran thinks that at an
opportune moment, secession talks could occur, at which a “Greater
Azerbaijan” idea might emerge. This is all hypothetical, but there is
a high level of distrust between the two states. Consider, for
example, Azerbaijan’s recent claim that Iran was sending trucks to
Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku summoned Iranian diplomats and accused Tehran
of stoking the conflict over the land.
This state of affairs naturally makes Israel a comfortable partner for
Azerbaijan. Moreover, from Jerusalem’s perspective, Azerbaijan’s
geographic position on Iran’s border makes it an ideal site for the
gathering of strategic intelligence. Media sources claim that Israel
helped Baku build electronic intelligence-gathering stations along the
Azerbaijani border with Iran in the 1990s.
Claims are occasionally made that the two countries are engaged in
tactical cooperation against Iran. For instance, in 2012, Foreign
Policy reported that Israel had an arrangement with Azerbaijan
allowing it to potentially fly sorties out of the country. Cooperation
regarding the war on terror also exists.
The close relations between Israel and Azerbaijan also fit into the
larger perspective the US has for the region. In the early 1990s,
Washington encouraged a triangular relationship between Turkey,
Azerbaijan, and Israel. Georgia was added later, though the Russian
invasion of Georgia in 2008 shattered Tbilisi’s prospects as did the
crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations.
Despite that setback, the geopolitical model has worked. Azerbaijan
and Israel continue to regard their geopolitical interests as vital
for regional security, and Georgia plays a transit role. Baku supplies
up to 40% of Israel’s oil needs, which is imported through the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.
There are also weaknesses to their bilateral relations. Azerbaijan
experiences geopolitical pressure from Russia and Iran, and the
cold-to-hot war with Armenia is a persistent problem. In these
difficult geopolitical circumstances, Baku has to balance its
relations with Israel carefully to avoid drawing heavy pressure from
Tehran, Moscow, and even Ankara.
Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi
State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various
international consulting companies and currently publishes articles on
military and political developments across the former Soviet space.