Author: Liana Toganian

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one's belief or religion
The right to join together and express one's belief
=================================================
8 July 2021
AZERBAIJAN: "They hold services and pray there, but without a congregation"
Azerbaijani military forces have blocked Armenian Church pilgrims' access
to Sunday worship at Dadivank Monastery since 2 May, citing first
coronavirus, then a blocked road because of a landslip. "They do not want
Dadivank to function as a Christian monastery, but they can't say directly
that they don't want this," says Nagorno-Karabakh's Bishop, Vrtanes
Abrahamian. "So they use technical issues." The Monastery, in Azerbaijani
territory close to the ethnic Armenian-controlled unrecognised entity of
Nagorno-Karabakh, is home to six monks and is protected by Russian
peacekeepers.
5 July 2021
UZBEKISTAN: President to sign restrictive new Religion Law?
Uzbekistan's new Religion Law [signed by the President 5 July, came into
force 6 July] maintains almost all the restrictions on freedom of religion
and belief in the current Religion Law. It continues to ban: all exercise
of freedom of religion and belief without state permission; teaching about
religion without state permission; sharing beliefs; and publishing,
distributing or importing printed and electronic religious materials which
have not undergone compulsory prior state censorship. The continuing
restrictions are in defiance of Uzbekistan's legally binding international
human rights obligations.
* See full article below. *
5 July 2021
UZBEKISTAN: President to sign restrictive new Religion Law?
By Felix Corley, Forum 18, and Mushfig Bayram, Forum 18
Uzbekistan's new Religion Law maintains almost all the restrictions on
freedom of religion and belief in the current Religion Law, Forum 18 notes.
The new Law – which officials have been working on since at least 2015 -
completed passage in Parliament on 26 June and is now awaiting presidential
signature into law.
[UPDATE 6 July 2021: On 5 July, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed the
Religion Law. His signature was announced on 6 July, when the text of the
new Law was finally made public and it came into force. The signed Law
included only minor changes compared to the 4 May 2021 version.]
The restrictions are maintained in defiance of Uzbekistan's legally binding
international human rights obligations, as noted in recommendations to the
country from the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion or Belief, the UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR), and the UN
Human Rights Committee. The most recent recommendations on the draft
Religion Law, requested by Uzbekistan, are by the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe Venice
Commission.
The recommendations identify numerous continuing restrictions including:
- a ban on all exercise of freedom of religion and belief without state
permission;
- a ban on teaching about religion without state permission;
- a ban on sharing beliefs;
- and compulsory prior state censorship of all printed and electronic
religious materials (see below).
Although the Religion Law reduces the number of adult citizens required to
apply for a community to be allowed by the regime to exist from the current
100 founders to 50, it adds an extra restriction requiring all founders to
live in one city or district (see below).
Among other restrictions, the new Religion Law retains the burdensome state
registration process as well as the web of other state restrictions on
exercising freedom of religion and belief and related human rights. For
example, state registered religious organisations must still inform the
regime of any events they plan to hold outside their state registered
premises (see below).
Abduvohid Yakubov, a human rights defender from Tashkent, identifies
several "critical problematic issues" in the new Law. These include
restrictions on religious education, registration of religious
organisations and religious educational institutions, and the powers given
to the state Religious Affairs Committee, "which are against the principle
of the separation of the State and religion".
Forum 18 has studied a copy of the text in the version approved by the
lower chamber of Parliament on 4 May 2021. It appears that the Senate did
not make any changes to the lower chamber's text.
The drafting and adoption of the new Religion Law took place almost
entirely in secret. Once the draft Law entered parliament, the public was
given no access to any texts after the publication of a draft text in
August 2020. Even after the Law had completed passage in the Senate on 26
June 2021 and was then sent for presidential signature, no text of the
newly-adopted Law was made public (see below).
The President usually signs laws between several days or weeks after the
Senate has approved them. The new Law is due to come into force when it is
officially published. "The state wants total control and even discussion of
the Religion Law is in secret," one human rights defender commented. "This
breeds extremism" (see below).
The regime has not announced changes to the Criminal and Administrative
Code punishments for exercising freedom of religion or belief which
correspond to the new Religion Law. However, the General Prosecutor's
Office has separately prepared a draft new Criminal Code set to come into
force from 1 January 2022 (see below).
Although Uzbekistan has been from 13 October 2020 a member of the United
Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, the regime has repeatedly failed to
implement recommendations on its binding international human rights
obligations. As well as the October 2020 Joint Opinion from the Venice
Commission and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) on the draft Religion Law, other ignored recommendations include:
September 2017 recommendations from the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion or Belief; recommendations the regime claimed in 2018 to accept
from its UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR); and May 2020 Concluding
Observations of the UN Human Rights Committee (see below).
People in Uzbekistan have repeatedly outlined the changes they would like
to see in a new Religion Law and the regime's actions
(
 ). However, as with the
recommendations of international experts - the regime has also ignored
these criticisms made by the people it rules.
New Criminal Code drafted
The regime has not announced changes to the Criminal and Administrative
Code punishments for exercising freedom of religion or belief which
correspond to the new Religion Law.
However, the General Prosecutor's Office has separately prepared a draft
new Criminal Code set to come into force from 1 January 2022. A
"consultation" – begun on 22 February 2021 – received 102 comments
before it ended on 9 March 2021. The new Code has not yet been presented to
parliament.
The new Code would continue to punish those who exercise freedom of
religion or belief without state permission.
Members of religious communities and human rights defenders have also
criticised the draft new Criminal Code. A "disguised old Criminal Code with
no real changes", Protestants complain
(
 ). Muslims describe it
as "our government's old tricks". Solmaz Akhmedova of the Human Rights
Alliance noted that "they just made some decorative changes".
State control over exercise of freedom of religion or belief to continue
Despite provisions in Article 7 of the new Religion Law that religion is
separate from the state, human rights defenders and religious communities
have repeatedly complained about the continued role for the state to
restrict and interfere in the exercise of freedom of religion or belief
(
 ).
Commenting on the August 2020 draft text, the Venice Commission and OSCE
ODIHR Joint Opinion 
(
 )
states that the draft "does not provide for strong guarantees of the
autonomy for religious organizations and continues to subject fundamental
elements of the freedom to manifest religion or belief to some forms or
state control or state authorization".
The continuation of tight state controls in the new Religion Law – many
of which are vaguely worded and open to arbitrary implementation - is in
defiance of the October 2020 Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion
on the draft Law. This had included among its recommendations: "to remove
vague and overbroad wording, which give too wide discretion to those public
authorities tasked with implementation, thus potentially leading to
arbitrary application/interpretation and undue restriction to the right of
freedom of religion or belief".
Religion Law part of web of state controls
While the Religion Law is the main legal text setting out the state's
control over the exercise of freedom of religion or belief, it is by no
means the only one.
The Criminal and Administrative Codes include numerous provisions punishing
the exercise of freedom of religion or belief
(
 ).
Other laws which remain in force also include restrictions. The 2014 Law on
Prevention of Violations of the Law gives wide-ranging powers to state
bodes, including committees which run mahallas [local districts], as well
as non-state and non-commercial public organisations and ordinary citizens
(
 ). The Law requires
individuals punished for exercising freedom of religion or belief to be
placed on the Preventive Register and be subjected to close control.
The Prevention Law also gives mahalla committees wide powers in
co-operation with the police. These include the requirement to "take
measures to prevent the activity of unregistered religious organisations,
ensure observance of rights of citizens to religious freedoms, not allow
forced propagation of religious views, consider other questions related to
observance of the Religion Law".
While the new Religion Law makes no specific mention of any role for
mahalla committees in restricting freedom of religion or belief in their
local districts (unlike in the current Law), the Prevention Law still
requires mahalla committees them to restrict freedom of religion and
belief.
In addition to the registration obstacles in the Prevention Law and the new
Religion Law if signed into law, detailed regulations on how registration
applications can be made, and matters such as the censorship procedures for
all religious materials
(
 ), provide more
barriers to exercising freedom of religion and belief.
Hostility to exercise of freedom of religion or belief remains
Alongside published legal texts, official attitudes also play an important
role in restricting the exercise of freedom of religion or belief.
Throughout the Soviet period and in the years since then, police and secret
police officers, prosecutors, courts and other officials and state bodies
have routinely denied individuals' and communities' human rights, including
the freedom of religion or belief
(
 ).
The new Religion Law – like the current 1998 Law – rests on the
regime's underlying deep hostility to the exercise of freedom of religion
or belief and other human rights, along with the assumption that the
exercise of human rights must only be exercised with state permission.
The hostility to human rights is revealed in what the Venice Commission and
OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion
(
 ) describes as: "vague
and overbroad wording, which give too wide discretion to those public
authorities tasked with implementation, thus potentially leading to
arbitrary application/interpretation and undue restriction to the right of
freedom of religion or belief"
Such an approach is evident in the definitions in Article 3 of "missionary
activity", "proselytism" and "illegal religious activity" (see below).
Article 5 describes one of the state's aims in enacting policy on freedom
of religion and belief: "to counter the implanting and spread of various
religious ideas and views threatening public order, health, morals and
rights of individuals".
Article 4 also bans, among other things, "the use of religion with the aim
of violent change to the constitutional order, violation of territorial
integrity, Uzbekistan's sovereignty, the denigration of the Constitutional
rights and freedoms of citizens, propaganda of war and national, racial,
ethnic or religious hatred, causing harm to the health and morals of
citizens, violation of civil accord, the spread of slanderous fabrications
destabilising the situation, the creation of panic among the population and
the carrying out of other actions directed at the person, society and the
state".
Article 9 bans registered religious organisations from "carrying out
forcible financial collections and levies on believers, as well as
conducting other measures harming the honour and worth of the individual".
It remains unclear why these explicit bans are included in the new Religion
Law when these bans are already included in laws of general applicability
which cover such actions by anyone.
Exercise of freedom of religion and belief without state permission still
to be banned
Article 3 of the new Religion Law, which defines concepts in the proposed
Law, identifies "illegal religious activity" as "activities without
registration as a religious organisation, the implementation by a religious
organisation of activities outside its [legally allowed] location,
including religious and prayer buildings and territories belonging to a
religious organisation, as well as engaging in religious educational
activities privately outside religious educational institutions".
The continuation of the ban on exercising freedom of religion or belief
without state permission is in defiance of the recommendations of the
October 2020 Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion
(
 ) on the draft Law.
This had included among its recommendations: "remove the definition of
"illegal religious activity" and expressly state that religious or belief
groups may exist and carry out their activities without registration".
Council of Churches Baptists – who refuse on principle to seek state
permission to exercise freedom of religion or belief and have been
frequently raided and punished for meeting for worship
(
 ) – told Forum 18 in
August 2020 that the proposed new Law fails to respect their
internationally-recognised right to exercise freedom of religion or belief
without state permission.
Exercise of freedom of religion or belief at home and elsewhere still to be
limited
Article 9 of the new Religion Law specifies where registered religious
communities are allowed to conduct "religious rites and ceremonies". These
include in registered places of worship, places of pilgrimage, cemeteries
and "in cases of ritual necessity" in homes at individuals' request.
This provision – which repeats the wording of the current Religion Law -
appears to ban individuals from organising meetings for worship or other
religious activity in their own homes.
Notification of off-site religious events still needed
Article 12 of the new Religion Law, which sets out obligations of
registered religious organisations, requires them "to notify the Justice
bodies on the conducting of events (conferences, seminars and others, with
the exception of religious rituals and ceremonies) for provision of support
for their free conduct".
The continuation of the prior, compulsory notification of off-site
religious events is in defiance of the recommendations of the October 2020
Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion
(
 ) on the draft Law.
This had included among its recommendations: "to remove the obligation to
notify the Committee of Religious Affairs about events".
The Joint Opinion noted that: "Freedom of religion or belief includes the
right of a religious or belief community or organization and its members to
perform religious/belief activities without giving notice of them to State
authorities, unless the nature of these activities require the co-operation
of State bodies."
The Opinion also notes: "The list of the activities to be notified includes
events (meetings, round tables, seminars, etc.) that may not necessarily
require such co-operation. Moreover, the scope of this requirement is
unclear (..) it "violates the principle of autonomy and non-interference in
the activities of religious or belief communities and organizations and the
right to privacy of members of religious or belief organizations under
Article 17 of the ICCPR [International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights]."
While the August 2020 draft Law had specified the Religious Affairs
Committee rather than the Justice Ministry and its departments as the
organisation religious communities had to inform of such events, the new
Law as adopted by Parliament returns to requiring that the Justice Ministry
must be informed of events in advance.
The Law as adopted by Parliament continues the requirement set out in a 1
June 2018 Justice Ministry Decree. Under this Decree, non-commercial
organisations (including religious organisations) must inform the Ministry
or the local Justice Department of plans to hold events such as seminars or
conferences away from their registered premises
(
 ). They must give 10
days' notice or – if any foreign citizens are involved – 20 days'
notice.
A religious community the state allows to exist must give the reasons for
any event, the address, date and time, how many people are due to attend,
what type of people they are (students, women, children), sources of
finance, and provide copies of any literature or audio-visual material that
will be used at the event. Any foreign citizens attending have to be named,
with information on their citizenship and date of birth.
The Decree says religious communities do not have to give such notice for
"religious rituals", but they do if the events are of any other nature.
Justice Ministry officials can ban such events if religious communities
fail to submit full information or if the proposed event is not in line
with the law. If religious events go ahead without notifying the Justice
Ministry or in defiance of a Justice Ministry ban, the organisers can face
punishment.
"We hope that according to the new Law we will not be required to give
advance notice of our meetings and spiritual exercises of our believers,
including information about the participants and topics discussed," Bishop
Jerzy Maculewicz, head of the Catholic Church in Uzbekistan, told Forum 18
in June 2020 
(
 ).
Religious teaching without state permission still to be banned
Article 3 of the new Religion Law, which defines concepts in the proposed
Law, identifies "illegal religious activity" as including "engaging in
religious educational activities privately outside religious educational
institutions".
The continuation of the ban on religious teaching without state permission
is in defiance of the recommendations of the October 2020 Venice Commission
and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion
(
 ) on the draft Law.
This had included among its recommendations: "remove the prohibition of
"engaging in religious educational activities in private".
Article 3 of the new Law defines a "religious educational establishment" as
"an institution associated with a specific confession created by a central
organ of administration of [registered] centralised religious organisations
of Uzbekistan to prepare professional officials of religious organisation
and necessary religious personnel for them".
Article 17 states that only centralised religious organisations registered
by the Justice Ministry can establish religious educational establishments.
Before applying to register such institutions, a centralised religious
organisation needs an "assessment" from the Religious Affairs Committee.
This appears to be a requirement for the Committee to have given its
approval.
Article 11 allows religious educational establishments to function only
after the Justice Ministry has registered them and the Religious Affairs
Committee has given them a state licence. Only adults would be allowed to
study in such institutions, under Article 8. Everyone teaching a religious
subject in such institutions "must have professional religious education".
This means that religious communities which have been unable to register
centralised religious organisations, or do not have communities in at least
8 of the country's 14 regions making them ineligible to apply, cannot try
to register a religious educational establishment. Nor could several
communities of different religious communities set up a joint religious
educational establishment.
The October 2020 Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion
(
 ) on the draft Law said
the restriction on which organisations could have religious educational
establishment "may discriminate against smaller religious or belief
communities and organizations" and said the restriction "should be
removed".
Nor, it seems, could a religious educational establishment offer education
to individuals who want to learn more about their own or other faiths
without this leading to a specific role in that registered religious
community.
"These religious schools can prepare only religious ministers or workers,"
human rights defender Yakubov told Forum 18. "It does not allow a wider
public to receive religious education without becoming religious ministers.
Moreover, school children are banned from religious education altogether."
Yakubov calls for all religious organisations to be allowed to offer
religious education, not only those which have been able to gain state
recognition as "centralised religious organisations". He also calls for the
role of the Religious Affairs Committee to be abolished.
Sharing beliefs with others still banned
Article 3 of the new Religion Law, which defines concepts in the proposed
Law, identifies "missionary activity" as "activities for the compulsory
imposition of religious views and the dissemination of religious teachings
by purposefully exerting ideological influence on a person (or group of
persons) with the aim of converting him (them) to one's religion ".
Article 3 then defines "proselytism" as "a form of missionary activity,
expressed in the conversion of believers from one denomination to another".
Drawing on these definitions, Article 7 declares: "Carrying out missionary
activity and proselytism are not allowed."
The continuation of the ban on sharing beliefs with others is in defiance
of the recommendations of the October 2020 Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR
Joint Opinion 
(
 ) on the
draft Law. This criticised the August 2020 draft Law as it "still prohibits
[..] missionary activities".
Religious censorship to continue
The new Religion Law continues the prior, compulsory state censorship
(
 ) of all "materials of
religious content". Article 10 defines these as all printed and electronic
materials, including on the internet, as well as signs and symbols,
"expressing the dogmatic bases, history and ideology of the teaching and
commentary on it, the practice of rituals of different religious faiths, as
well as an evaluation from a religious position of individual
personalities, historical facts and events".
The continuation of the prior, compulsory state censorship of all
"materials of religious content" is in defiance of the recommendations of
the October 2020 Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion
(
 ) on the draft Law.
This had included among its recommendations: "remove the state censorship
requirement "prior to producing, importing and distributing religious or
belief materials".
Article 10 of the new Law declares that the Cabinet of Ministers sets out
the procedure for individuals and legal entities to be allowed to produce,
import or distribute materials about religion.
"Production, import or distribution of materials of religious content on
the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan is carried out after receiving
a positive conclusion of a religious studies expert analysis with the aim
of preventing the spread in society of ideas and views capable of
destroying inter-religious accord and religious tolerance and calling for
violence and outrages on a religious basis."
"No one can express their religious views publicly without the permission
of the state," human rights defender Yakubov complained to Forum 18. "This
is gross violation of human rights."
Burdensome registration approval to continue
Article 16 specifies that the Justice Ministry registers centralised
religious organisations and religious educational establishments. Local
Justice Departments in the 14 regions register local religious
organisations.
However, under Article 17, applications for registration of any level of
religious organisation require an "assessment" from the Religious Affairs
Committee. This appears to give the Committee a power of veto. It remains
unclear how the Committee decides whether to approve an application or not,
nor what a community can do if the Committee refuses to give its approval.
In addition, local religious communities need an "assessment" from the
regional administration where they are located "with the attachment of a
conclusion on the appropriateness of the immovable property of a local
religious organisation which it proposes to use as its postal address, with
the demands of town-planning norms".
The continuation of "stringent and burdensome registration requirements" is
in defiance of the recommendations of the October 2020 Venice Commission
and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion
(
 ) on the draft Law.
This had included among its recommendations: "to review the registration
requirements and documents required and simplify them to ensure that they
are not burdensome, especially remove the requirement to obtain the letter
of consent from the Committee on Religious Affairs and the letter of
guarantee from the local state authorities".
Another OSCE ODIHR/Venice Commission recommendation had been: "to more
strictly circumscribe and specify the grounds for refusal to register a
religious or belief organization in compliance with the limitation grounds
permissible under Article 18 of the ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights]".
Compulsory approval from the Religious Affairs Committee "must be removed",
says human rights defender Yakubov. "The Committee has always abused its
powers against religious communities and particularly mosques since 1998.
It always created numerous obstacles in order not to register local
mosques."
Applications also need to include information about the organisation's
founders, and the founding meeting, and – for centralised and local
organisations – a document confirming that the leader has appropriate
religious education, unless the community does not routinely give religious
leaders education (see below).
Under Article 24, the Justice Ministry will include details of registered
religious communities in a publicly-accessible electronic register. The
register will include "information on the initiators (founders),
participants (surnames, first names and patronymics), and contact details".
Many individuals have in the past been unwilling to be identified as a
founder and therefore to provide their personal details to the authorities
for fear of state reprisals.
Enforced liquidation still to be possible
Officials will under Article 25 of the new Law still be able to seek the
liquidation of registered religious organisations, though now this must be
done through the courts, not by the Justice Ministry or Justice Department
as under the current Law.
Reasons for liquidating a registered religious organisation include
"violating legislation by the religious organisation". A court can, at the
request of the Prosecutor's Office or Justice Ministry or Justice
Department, suspend a registered religious organisation for six month for
"activities contradicting the aims in its statute" or failing to correct
"violations" pointed out by these bodies.
Suspension or liquidation of a registered religious organisation means that
any activity by members of such communities becomes illegal and punishable
under the Criminal or Administrative Codes.
Independent mosques banned or not?
The new Religion Law – like the current Law – contains no provisions
that specifically ban Muslim communities outside the framework of the
state-controlled Muslim Board (Muftiate) from seeking state registration.
However, officials have always refused to register such communities without
giving any valid reason why independent mosques or mosques of non-Muslim
Board affiliation cannot exist
(
 ).
The last provision of Article 14 – which specifies which documents must
accompany registration applications - declares: "Statutes of religious
organisations which have centralised organs of administration must be
agreed by these organs."
Officials might interpret this provision in a way that prevents any mosque
without the approval of the Muslim Board (or Orthodox church without the
approval of the Russian Orthodox Church's Tashkent diocese) from seeking
state registration.
Restrictions on religious leaders to continue
Article 11 of the new Religion Law declares: "The leader of a religious
organisation can be an individual having appropriate religious education,
with the exception of confessions whose doctrines do not envisage a system
of professional religious education." However, having religious education
appears to be a requirement for the leader of most registered religious
organisations, not a choice.
Article 17 requires applications to register a centralised religious
organisation or a local religious organisation "with the exception of
confessions whose doctrines do not envisage a system of professional
religious education" to include "a document on the presence of religious
education" of the leader.
The Law does not explain why religious leaders need state approval for
their religious qualifications, nor define what level of religious
education is sufficient to satisfy officials, nor whether it matters where
this religious education was obtained.
Article 16 requires leaders or employees of a registered religious
organisation who are foreign citizens to be accredited by the Justice
Ministry. The current Law requires leadership candidates who are foreign
citizens to be approved by the Religious Affairs Committee.
Under a May 2018 Decree, religious communities seeking registration must
provide 
(
 ): a notarised
copy of Uzbekistan's official recognition of any official foreign or Uzbek
religious education that the head of a religious community has completed;
and a notarised copy of Uzbekistan's official recognition of any official
foreign or Uzbek religious education that the head of a religious
educational institution run by the community has completed. There is no
indication of what type of religious education, whether formal or informal,
is covered by this second new registration requirement, and as there is no
formal official centre to recognise foreign religious education fulfilling
this new restriction is at present impossible.
Religious Affairs Committee's vague role
Article 15 of the August 2020 draft Law had set out the role of the
Religious Affairs Committee. Among tasks assigned to it were: licensing and
overseeing religious educational establishments; approving the granting of
land for building to any registered religious organisation; overseeing
foreign travel for religious purposes, including the haj and umra
pilgrimages to Mecca and religious study abroad; and censoring religious
literature and other materials.
Article 16 and Article 17 of the August 2020 draft Law set out the roles of
the Justice Ministry and its departments, and of local administrations.
However, all these provisions had been deleted by the time Parliament
adopted the new Religion Law.
While the rest of the new Religion Law mentions tasks handed to these
bodies, some roles are no longer specified. However, the new Law does not
annul numerous decrees which, for example, assign responsibility for
controlling foreign travel for religious purposes (including the haj
pilgrimage) to the Religious Affairs Committee.
Restrictions changed, not abolished
The new Religion Law eases some of the restrictions in the current Law but
adds alternative restrictions. Most notable is the reduction of the number
of adult citizens needed to apply to register a local religious community
from 100 to 50. However, a new requirement is added that these founders now
must live in one town or district.
Even with a lower number of necessary founders, officials have many
possibilities to find reasons to reject applications from communities they
do not like, as frequently happens
(
 ) at present.
This also means that no community with fewer than 50 adult citizen members
would be able to exercise freedom of religion or belief collectively.
The October 2020 Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion
(
 ) on the draft Law
questions why religious communities require a higher threshold for
registration than public associations, which in Uzbekistan require ten
adult citizens. The Joint Opinion suggests that two people should be
enough. The recommendations also declare: "It is recommended to remove the
requirement of citizenship and simply require permanent residence in
Uzbekistan, and not in a specific district/city."
The OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Guidelines on the Legal
Personality of Religious or Belief Communities
(
 ) warn against "burdensome requirements
that are not justified under international law" (paragraph 25) such as
among other things "an excessive minimum number of members" (paragraph 27).
Having no minimum membership, or only requiring two to five members, are
offered as examples of good practice within the OSCE, of which Uzbekistan
is a participating State.
Article 21 of the new Religion Law reduces the maximum time the Justice
Ministry or regional Justice Departments are allowed to consider
registration applications from three months in the current Law to one
month.
Under Article 19, registered religious organisations must notify any
changes to their postal address, bank details or ruling body to the Justice
Ministry or regional Justice Departments electronically within one month.
Under the current Law, such changes require the full re-registration of the
organisation, with all the burdensome requirements this entails.
The new Law does not continue the bizarre provision in Article 14 of the
current Religion Law which bans people who are not registered clergy from
appearing in public wearing religious clothes.
Electronic documentation
Article 15 of the new Religion Law notes that the registration process
(which it describes as a "state service") is to be done online.
Applications for registration are to be submitted electronically and
registration certificates are held online in a registered religious
community's online account.
However, although religious organisations seeking registration will have to
submit documentation electronically, such documents will still be
considered by officials. Whether they continue to use arbitrary criteria
for rejecting applications from communities they do not like remains
unclear.
The new Law does not say if registered religious communities' compulsory
annual reports on their activity to the Justice Ministry or regional
Justice Departments are to be submitted electronically.
No mention of compulsory re-registration
The new Religion Law makes no mention of whether or not religious
communities that have state registration now will be required to
re-register under the terms of the new Law. All registered religious
communities were required to re-register the last time Uzbekistan adopted a
new Religion Law in 1998
(
 ).
The Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion
(
 ) cited autumn 2020
videoconferences with Uzbek state officials, who "confirmed that existing
registered religious organizations will not be required to re-register,
though some stakeholders emphasize that the adoption of the Draft Law will
require substantial changes to be made to their charters, and therefore
that it be re-registered with the payment of the relevant fee."
Member of UN Human Rights Council, yet ignores human rights obligations
Uzbekistan was on 13 October 2020 elected to the United Nations Human
Rights Council
(
 ).
The Council oversees the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of member states'
implementation of their legally-binding human rights obligations.
In 2018 Uzbekistan claimed to accept UPR recommendations on freedom of
religion and belief and other human rights
(
 )
at the end of the review of its human rights record.
Among the UPR recommendations relating to freedom of religion and belief
which Uzbekistan claimed to accept but has not implemented were three from
Ghana:
Cease all restrictions on the right to freedom of opinion and expression
(
 ), and ensure that the
right to manifest one's religion in private or in public
(
 ) is fully protected
and realized";
"Consider removing burdensome and oppressive registration requirements
(
 ), and rescind
intrusive government practices, including monitoring and raiding, which
infringe on the right to freedom of religion or belief"
(
 );
and "Release all prisoners of conscience incarcerated or arbitrarily
detained on account of their faith
(
 )."
Uzbekistan also claimed to accept but has not implemented two
recommendations from Canada:
"Revise practices in detention facilities to eliminate the use of torture
or other cruel treatment or punishment
(
 ), employ independent
monitoring, and thoroughly investigate and prosecute allegations of such
practices";
and "Revise provisions in the country's criminal and administrative codes
relating to freedom of religion or belief
(
 ), so as to conform
with article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(
 )".
The October 2020 OSCE ODIHR/Venice Commission Joint Opinion is the latest
opinion to identify successive failures on the part of the regime to
implement its binding international human rights obligations
(
 ), or act on
recommendations to do this. In September 2017, UN Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Religion or Belief Ahmed Shaheed (A/HRC/37/49/Add.2
(
 )) recommended: "A new law on
freedom of religion or belief should be fully compatible with article 18
(
 ) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The new draft law should be open to
consultations and comments by the public
(
 ), especially civil
society, religious and belief communities and international partners,
including the United Nations system".
Similarly, among the May 2020 Concluding Observations of the UN Human
Rights Committee (CCPR/C/UZB/CO/5 
(
 )),
the Committee stated that Uzbekistan should: "Guarantee the freedom of
religion and belief and refrain from any action that may restrict such
freedoms beyond the narrow restrictions permitted in article 18 of the
Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights]", and should "Expedite the
adoption of the new draft Act on Freedom of Conscience and Religion,
ensuring its conformity with article 18 of the Covenant, including through
the decriminalization of proselytism and other missionary activities, as
well as of any religious activity by unregistered religious organizations".
New Religion Law adopted in secrecy
The amended Religion Law was approved in the lower chamber of parliament in
the first reading on 15 September 2020
(
 ). The Legislative
Chamber of parliament, the Oliy Majlis, approved the new Religion Law in
its second reading on 4 May
(
 ) and then sent it on
to the upper chamber, the Senate. It approved the new Religion Law on 26
June 
(
 ), the Senate
website announced the same day.
The new Law was then sent to President Shavkat Mirziyoyev for signature,
Senator Batyr Matmuratov told Forum 18 from Tashkent on 28 June. The
President usually signs laws between several days or weeks after the Senate
has approved them.
The drafting and adoption of the new Religion Law took place almost
entirely in secret, with only infrequent public announcements of progress.
The draft text of the new Religion Law was made public on the parliamentary
website in Uzbek and Russian on 19 August 2020 "for public discussion". The
website gave a parliamentary email address for those wishing to submit
comments. However, it gave no deadline for when comments needed to be
submitted by. Parliament gave no indication subsequently whether it had
taken account of the submitted comments.
Among the recommendations UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or
Belief made following his October 2017 visit to Uzbekistan, he recommended
(A/HRC/37/49/Add.2 
(
 )) that: "A new
law on freedom of religion or belief should be fully compatible with
article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", as
well as that "The new draft law should be open to consultations and
comments by the public, especially civil society, religious and belief
communities and international partners, including the United Nations
system".
Members of religious communities and human rights defenders have repeatedly
expressed their frustration to Forum 18 about the secrecy of the new
Religion Law's drafting process, and the regime's apparent lack of
willingness to end restrictions violating human rights obligations.
(
 ) 
Once the draft Law entered parliament, the public was given no access to
any texts after August 2020. Even after the Religion Law Law had completed
passage in the Senate on 26 June 2021, no text of the newly-adopted Law was
made public, even though it is now awaiting presidential signature. After
the Religion Law was sent for presidential signature, a human rights
defender commented that: "The state wants total control
(
 ) and even discussion
of the Religion Law is in secret." They added that: "This breeds
extremism." 
Despite numerous calls between 28 June and 5 July, no official of the
Senate, the Presidential Administration, the Justice Ministry or the state
Religious Affairs Committee would discuss with Forum 18 why the new
Religion Law violates Uzbekistan's international human rights commitments
and why the Law was adopted in near-secrecy.
Akmal Saidov, the first deputy chair of the Legislative Chamber, the lower
chamber of Parliament requested a Joint Opinion from the Venice Commission
and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on
the draft Religion Law
(
 ), which was published
on 12 October 2020.
The secrecy and lack of consultation with the population who will be
governed by the Religion Law is in defiance of the Joint Opinion's
recommendation that: "the public authorities are encouraged to ensure that
the Draft Law is subjected to inclusive, extensive and effective
consultations, including with civil society and representatives of various
religious or belief communities, including minority religious or belief
communities, offering equal opportunities for women and men to
participate." (END)
Full reports on freedom of thought, conscience and belief in Uzbekistan
(
 )
For more background, see Forum 18's Uzbekistan religious freedom survey
(
 )
Forum 18's compilation of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) freedom of religion or belief commitments
(
 )
Follow us on Twitter @Forum_18 
(
 )
Follow us on Facebook @Forum18NewsService
(
 )
All Forum 18 text may be referred to, quoted from, or republished in full,
if Forum 18 is credited as the source.
All photographs that are not Forum 18's copyright are attributed to the
copyright owner. If you reuse any photographs from Forum 18's website, you
must seek permission for any reuse from the copyright owner or abide by the
copyright terms the copyright owner has chosen.
© Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved. ISSN 1504-2855.
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                                        Thursday, July 1, 2021
Prosecutors Seek First Asset Seizures
        • Naira Bulghadarian
Armenia - A mansion in Yerevan believed to belong to the family of Vladimir 
Gasparian, a former chief of the Armenian police.
Armenian prosecutors are poised to ask courts to allow the confiscation of 
expensive properties and other assets of three former officials suspected of 
illegal enrichment.
A controversial law enacted by the Armenian government last year allows 
prosecutors to seek asset forfeiture in case of having “sufficient grounds to 
suspect” that the market value of an individual’s properties exceeds their 
“legal income” by at least 50 million drams ($100,000).
Courts can allow the confiscation of such assets even if their owners are not 
found guilty of corruption or other criminal offenses. The latter will have to 
prove the legality of their holdings.
The politically sensitive process is handled by a special division formed within 
Armenia’s Office of the Prosecutor-General last September.
A spokesman for the law-enforcement agency, Gor Abrahamian, told RFE/RL’s 
Armenian Service on Thursday that the division has investigated more than 200 
individuals and believes that at least four of them had illegally enriched 
themselves and their families.
Abrahamian said the prosecutors have secured court decisions to freeze their 
assets worth a combined 6 billion drams ($12 million). Those include 20 
properties and cash, he said.
The suspects are Vladimir Gasparian, a former chief of the Armenian police, 
fugitive former Environment Minister Aram Harutiunian as well as a retired 
National Security Service officer and his son.
Abrahamian said Gasparian has already visited the prosecutors’ headquarters in 
Yerevan to familiarize himself with details of investigators’ claims about the 
legality of properties owned by him, his wife, two children and mother-in-law.
A lawyer for Gasparian declined to say whether the once influential police 
general will plead guilty to the corruption accusations.
The law in question allows an out-of-court settlement of such cases which would 
require suspects to hand over 25 percent of their assets to the state.
In Abrahamian’s words, the prosecutors’ will take court action if the suspects 
refuse such a settlement in the coming weeks.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian has repeatedly portrayed the law on asset 
forfeiture as a major anti-corruption measure that will help his administration 
recover “wealth stolen from the people.” Pashinian has indicated his intention 
to use it against Armenia’s former leaders and their cronies.
Opposition groups and figures, among them supporters of former President Serzh 
Sarkisian, have condemned the law as unconstitutional and accused Pashinian of 
planning a far-reaching “redistribution of assets” to cement his hold on power.
One former official, who used to run the Armenian customs service, decided to 
“donate” a luxury hotel belonging to his family to the government in late 2018 
to avoid prosecution on charges of illegal entrepreneurship and money 
laundering. The government has repeatedly failed to auction off the property 
which was valued at $15.8 million before the coronavirus pandemic.
Armenian Officials Lacking Faith In Pashinian Told To Resign
Armenia - Government and law-enforcement officials attend a cabinet meeting in 
Yerevan, June 24, 2021.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian said on Thursday that Armenian civil servants and 
other state officials lacking faith in his administration must resign in view of 
his party’s victory in the June 20 general elections.
Meeting with members of his staff, Pashinian argued that the Civil Contract 
party won a popular mandate to implement its election platform.
“I want to say that the entire government system’s task is very clear: to 
implement over the next five years what is written in the Civil Contract party’s 
pre-election program and was approved by Armenian citizens’ votes,” he said. 
“Therefore, it is people who believe in that program and regard it as their 
operational guideline who must work in the state governance system. This is an 
important precondition.”
“Those who do not believe, do not accept or have reservations [about the 
program] … we find that normal. Therefore, we must wish those who have a problem 
with that success in their further activities,” he said.
Pashinian did not specify any mechanisms for getting rid of government or 
law-enforcement officials not trusting him. He said only that his government is 
planning “major reforms of the civil service system.”
Armenian law bans politically motivated dismissals of civil servants.
During the recent election campaign Pashinian pledged to “purge” the state 
bureaucracy and wage “political vendettas” against local government officials 
supporting the opposition. He repeatedly brandished a hammer meant to symbolize 
a popular “steel mandate” which he said he needs in order to continue ruling 
Armenia with a more firm hand.
The state human rights ombudsman, Arman Tatoyan, denounced that campaign 
rhetoric. He said that staff purges inevitably involve mass violations of 
workers’ rights.
The secretary of Armenia’s Security Council, Armen Grigorian, stated earlier 
this week that Pashinian’s party received a popular mandate to carry out such 
purges. “The state apparatus … must unequivocally serve the victorious 
[political] force,” he told Armenian Public Television.
According to Armenian press reports, several provincial governors appointed by 
Pashinian are now pressuring elected heads of local communities, who supported 
opposition forces during the elections, to resign. One of those governors has 
publicly demanded their resignation.
The Union of Communities of Armenia, which represents the country’s elected 
local administrations, on Wednesday condemned the government pressure as illegal 
and undemocratic.
Pashinian already pledged to purge the government, judiciary and security 
apparatus of “remnants” of the country’s former leadership in April 2020. He 
accused them of trying to discredit him and scuttle his initiatives.
Pashinian Again Replaces Chief Of Staff
        • Gayane Saribekian
Armenia -- Health Minister Arsen Torosian speaks at a cabinet meeting in 
Yerevan, June 11, 2020.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian replaced his chief of staff on Thursday for the 
second time in six months.
Arsen Torosian was named to manage the prime minister’s staff on January 18. He 
previously served as Armenia’s health minister.
Torosian was replaced by Arayik Harutiunian, a senior adviser to Pashinian and a 
former education minister. Both men are leading members of Civil Contract.
Pashinian introduced Harutiunian to his staff later in the day. Commenting on 
what was the first major personnel change made by him since his Civil Contract 
party’s victory in the June 20 parliamentary elections, he said Torosian asked 
to be allowed to take up one of the ruling party’s 71 seats in Armenia’s new 
107-member parliament.
Pashinian also cited the need to increase the “efficiency of governance” in the 
country. “The quality of governance starts from the prime minister’s staff,” he 
said.
Pashinian should technically form a new cabinet and receive a vote of confidence 
from the National Assembly later this summer. Neither he nor his political 
allies have indicated so far whether he will replace many of his current 
ministers.
Pashinian sacked seven ministers in a cabinet reshuffle announced by him in the 
aftermath of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh stopped by a Russian-brokered ceasefire 
in November.
Armen Khachatrian, a pro-government member of Armenia’s outgoing parliament, 
said on Thursday that he does not know whether the new cabinet will be 
significantly different from the current one. He said he hopes that Pashinian 
will pick more technocrats.
“I think that professionals must be chosen … for a number of spheres,” 
Khachatrian told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service. “As regards the question of who they 
have supported and what they have done, it must not matter at all.”
Khachatrian asserted at the same time that Pashinian’s staffing policy has been 
too “tolerant” until now.
Sofia Hovsepian, one of several lawmakers who defected from Pashinian’s team 
late last year, was skeptical about the composition of the new cabinet and its 
competence. “They don’t get rid of failed officials,” she told reporters.
Hovsepian said that instead of appointing “capable individuals” to senior 
positions Pashinian is planning a purge of civil servants and other state 
officials who have not pledged allegiance to him. She said Torosian’s 
replacement by another Pashinian ally suggests that the prime minister has not 
learned any lessons from his mistakes.
The secretary of Armenia’s Security Council, Armen Grigorian, claimed earlier 
this week that Pashinian’s party received a popular mandate to carry out such a 
purge. “The state apparatus … must unequivocally serve the victorious 
[political] force,” he told Armenian Public Television.
Armenian Government Expects Faster Growth In 2021
        • Sargis Harutyunyan
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian (file photo)
The Armenian government has revised upwards its economic growth forecast for 
2021, expecting a faster growth after last year’s decline.
At a cabinet session on Thursday acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian said that 
the economy is now projected to grow by 6 percent this year.
Earlier, the forecast was that the Armenian economy would grow by 3.2 percent 
after shrinking by 7.6 percent in 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic and the 
war in Nagorno-Karabakh.
“I am glad to say that while economic growth forecasts are being revised upward, 
our economic growth forecast for 2021 now is 6 percent,” Pashinian said.
“It is important that in parallel with these indicators, we are quite 
successfully fulfilling the revenue part of the state budget, and in this 
regard, we have even over-fulfilled it during the first half of the year,” the 
acting premier added.
The kind of revision comes less than two weeks after Pashinian and his political 
party, Civil Contract, scored a landslide victory in snap parliamentary 
elections, gaining the right to form the next Armenian government 
single-handedly.
Ensuring a more dynamic growth of the economy was one of Civil Contract’s 
pledges during the election campaign.
Speaking at today’s cabinet session head of the State Revenue Committee Eduard 
Hovannisian presented some details of the tax collection during the first six 
months of 2021.
He said that tax revenues in the period in question amounted to more than 750 
billion drams ($870 million), whereas they had originally been planned at a 
level of 683 billion drams.
Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2021 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
 

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one's belief or religion
The right to join together and express one's belief
=================================================
Wednesday 16 June 2021
AZERBAIJAN: 8 new Strasbourg judgments, 9 judgments awaited - list
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg issued judgments
in May and June in eight freedom of religion or belief cases, finding that
Azerbaijan had violated human rights and ordering compensation. One of the
lawyers in seven of the cases, Asabali Mustafayev, said that all involved
were "a little dissatisfied" with the ECtHR judgments, as the Court had not
looked at all aspects of the violations included in the cases. Nine other
freedom of religion and belief cases from Azerbaijan are awaiting
judgments.
AZERBAIJAN: 8 new Strasbourg judgments, 9 judgments awaited - list
By Felix Corley, Forum 18
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg issued judgments
in May and June finding that Azerbaijan had violated human rights in a
further eight freedom of religion or belief cases and ordering that the
victims be paid compensation and costs. The regime contested all the cases.
Seven of the cases resulted from a police raid on a meeting for worship of
Muslims reading the works of the late theologian Said Nursi and subsequent
fines in June 2015. In the eighth case, the ECtHR found that Azerbaijan
violated the rights of two women from the southern town of Masalli who had
established the NGO Religion and Women's Rights in 2011, but which was
denied registration (and thus the legal right to exist) by the Justice
Ministry (see full list below).
The total amount Azerbaijan is to pay the victims in the eight cases is
25,500 Euros (52,500 Azerbaijani Manats, 257,000 Norwegian Kroner or 31,000
US Dollars), plus legal costs.
In line with Azerbaijan's legally-binding international human rights
obligations, the decisions of both the United Nations (UN) Human Rights
Committee and the ECtHR require the regime to change its laws and practices
so that freedom of religion and belief violations cannot recur
(
 ). Forum 18 is not
aware of any proposed government legal or other changes to meet this
obligation. Instead, Religion Law amendments which the President signed
into law today (16 June) increase state restrictions on the exercise of
freedom of religion or belief
(
 ).
One lawyer argues that more must be done to achieve the fulfilment of ECtHR
judgments. "At present, the government offers only compensation for the
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights," the lawyer – who asked
not to be identified for fear of state reprisals – told Forum 18 on 15
June 
(
 ). "The Council of
Europe must launch enforcement mechanisms, as the judgment of the Court
alone is not enough for justice. Only the Court judgment together with an
enforcement mechanism can be fair."
"It is easier a couple of times a year to buy off those few complainants
who manage to get to the European Court than to change the well-established
system that suits the authorities," Eldar Zeynalov of the Human Rights
Centre of Azerbaijan told Forum 18 from Baku in March. "And if it is
possible to do this without bringing the essence of the problem to public
consideration at all, this is ideal for the government. And this is exactly
what happens when concluding friendly settlements or when the ECtHR accepts
a unilateral declaration from the government."
(
 )
Baku lawyer Asabali Mustafayev, who worked on the seven men's cases,
commented: "Demands on the government from outside are too weak," he told
Forum 18 on 15 June 
(
 ).
"The Council of Europe and other international organisations are not
insistent enough, so the government gets away with flouting [its
obligations]".
Mustafayev also said that all involved were "a little dissatisfied" with
the ECtHR judgments, as the Court had not looked at all aspects of the
violations included in the cases. He described the 3,000 Euros awarded to
each victim as "a highly miserly sum", especially as it includes recompense
for the fines that each had paid (see below).
Forum 18 was unable to reach Chingiz Asgarov, the government's
representative to the ECtHR. His phone went unanswered each time it called.
The latest judgments bring to 58 the number of known cases related to
violations of freedom of religion or belief that have concluded at the
ECtHR (see below).
The latest case lodged with the ECtHR, in April 2021, is that of Protestant
Christian Rahim Akhundov who was dismissed from his job as a parliamentary
staffer in Baku in December 2018. He said he was dismissed from his job at
the Milli Majlis on the orders of the State Security Service (SSS) secret
police for hosting meetings for worship at his home (see below).
Including Akhundov's case, nine cases from Azerbaijan related to the
regime's violations of freedom of religion or belief are known to remain at
the Strasbourg court (see below).
UN Human Rights Committee decision: Police raid on meeting for worship
In addition to the ECtHR cases, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights
Committee has also found that Azerbaijan has violated human rights in
freedom of religion or belief cases. Most recently, it found - in a
decision issued on 26 April
(
 ) – that the regime
had violated the rights of six Jehovah's Witnesses in Aliabad in the
northern Zakatala District in September 2013. The six were among victims of
a police raid, who were forcibly taken to the police station, had religious
literature seized and were then fined (or in one case given an official
warning).
Jehovah's Witnesses from Azerbaijan have six other freedom of religion or
belief cases pending with the UN Human Rights Committee. Four relate to
police raids on meetings for worship and two to speaking to others about
their beliefs.
ECtHR judgment: Police raid on meeting for worship
Seven cases considered together
(
 ): Alakbarov v. Azerbaijan
(Application No. 55503/15); Ismayilov v. Azerbaijan (Application No.
55507/15); Jabrayilov v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 55510/15); Sabuhi
Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 55512/15); Huseynov v. Azerbaijan
(Application No. 55520/15); Gasimov v. Azerbaijan (Application No.
55524/15); and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 55531/15).
In June 2015, police and officials raided Sabuhi Mammadov's home in Gadabay
in western Azerbaijan where Muslims who study Said Nursi's works were
meeting 
(
 ). A court
fined Mammadov for organising an "illegal" religious meeting, while Emin
Alakbarov, Javanshir Ismayilov, Elmir Jabrayilov, Samir Huseynov, Rovshan
Gasimov and Parvin Yunusov were among 13 others fined for "hooliganism"
(
 ).
The ECtHR asked the regime questions
(
 ) about the seven cases on 11
July 2017.
The ECtHR considered the seven cases together. In a judgment issued on 6
June 2021 
(
 ), the Court found
that Azerbaijan had violated the rights of all seven. The ECtHR awarded
compensation of 3,000 Euros to each of the seven, plus costs of 1,000 Euros
for all the cases jointly, to be paid to their main lawyer, Rustam
Mustafazade.
Asabali Mustafayev, a Baku lawyer who also worked on the seven men's cases,
said all involved were "a little dissatisfied" with the ECtHR judgments, as
the Court had not looked at all aspects of the violations included in the
cases. He described the 3,000 Euros awarded to each victim as "a highly
miserly sum", especially as it includes recompense for the fines that each
had paid. He also described the sum awarded for legal costs as "very
little, given that it covered legal costs for seven cases, entailing a lot
of translation and postage of documents".
ECtHR judgment: NGO registration denial
Maharramova and Huseynova v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 31592/14
(
 )).
The group Religion and Women's Rights, founded by two women in the southern
town of Masalli in 2011, applied to the Justice Ministry for registration
as a non-governmental organisation (NGO). The Ministry twice in 2011 and
twice in 2012 sent the application back, citing alleged irregularities in
the documentation. The NGO challenged the denial through the courts,
finally losing in the Supreme Court on 6 November 2013. Afruza Maharramova
and Sadaya Huseynova lodged a case to the ECtHR on behalf of the NGO in
April 2014.
The ECtHR asked the regime questions
(
 ) about the case on 11 October
2016.
The ECtHR considered the case together with 11 other cases where Azerbaijan
had arbitrarily denied legal status to NGOs. In a judgment issued on 20 May
2021 
(
 ), the Court found that
Azerbaijan had violated the rights of all 12 applicants. In the case of
Religion and Women's Rights, it awarded compensation of 4,500 Euros jointly
to Maharramova and Huseynova, plus costs of 6,000 Euros for all the cases
together, to be paid to their lawyer, Intigam Aliyev.
Nine known cases awaiting ECtHR judgments
The ECtHR in Strasbourg has already completed 58 cases from Azerbaijan
submitted since 2004 related to violations of freedom of religion or belief
and inter-related rights.
Of these 58 completed cases:
- 19 ended in findings of violations and awards of compensation;
- 17 were closed after Azerbaijan admitted violations and offered
compensation in a "unilateral declaration";
- 12 were friendly settlements, where the regime agreed to pay compensation
(in 1 case it also admitted violations);
- 10 were dismissed or withdrawn (one following the death of the
applicant).
Including a new case lodged in April 2021 for being fired from work for
exercising freedom of religion and belief, 9 ECtHR cases related to the
regime's violations of freedom of religion or belief are known to remain.
The cases – submitted between 2012 and 2021 - cover a wide range of
violations. Of these, 4 were lodged by Muslims, 4 by Jehovah's Witnesses
and 1 by a Protestant Christian. Some cases cover more than one violation,
such as police seizing religious literature during a raid on a meeting for
worship.
In approximate reverse chronological order of violation they are:
- Fired from work for exercise of freedom of religion or belief (1 case
involving 1 individual applicant)
- State censorship of religious literature (1 case involving 1 individual
applicant)
- Punished for conscientious objection to compulsory military service (2
cases involving 2 individual applicants)
- Raids on meetings for worship (2 cases involving 5 individual applicants
and 1 community)
- Jailed for leading prayers (1 case involving 1 individual applicant)
- Unlawful house search (1 case involving 1 individual applicant)
- Registration denial (1 case involving 2 individual applicants and 1
community)
Details of all nine cases are given below.
New ECtHR case: Fired from work for exercise of freedom of religion or
belief
Akhundov v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 20687/21).
In late April 2021, Protestant Christian Rahim Akhundov lodged a case to
the European Court of Human Rights about his dismissal from his job as a
parliamentary staffer in Baku in December 2018. He says that after he met
friends and relatives at his Baku home for Christian worship, study, and
discussion, he was dismissed from his job at the Milli Majlis on the orders
of the State Security Service (SSS) secret police
(
 ). Akhundov lost his
final appeal at the Supreme Court in Baku on 23 September 2020.
The ECtHR has not yet asked the regime questions about the case.
ECtHR: State censorship of religious literature
Miriyev v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 1717/20).
In February 2018, the State Committee for Work with Religious Organisations
on theological grounds banned the publication and distribution of the book
(
 ) "Things Not Existing
in Islam" by Muslim theologian Elshad Miri (also known as Miriyev).
Repeated 
  appeals
against the ban failed. After failing on 20 December 2019 in the Supreme
Court to overturn the ban, Miri lodged a case in the ECtHR
(
 ).
The ECtHR has not yet asked the regime questions about the case.
ECtHR: Punished for conscientious objection to compulsory military service
1) Mehdiyev v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 52773/19
(
 )).
Emil Mehdiyev refused to perform military service on grounds of conscience
and offered to do an alternative civilian service (which does not exist in
Azerbaijan). In July 2018, Barda District Court convicted him and handed
down a one-year suspended prison term, and required that he live under
probation for one year
(
 ). Ganca Appeal Court
rejected his appeal in October 2018
(
 ). The Supreme Court
rejected his final appeal in April 2019
(
 ). He filed his appeal
to the ECtHR on 7 October 2019.
The ECtHR asked the regime questions
(
 ) about the case on 1 March
2021.
2) Abilov v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 54768/19
(
 )).
Vahid Abilov refused to perform military service on grounds of conscience
and offered to do an alternative civilian service (which does not exist in
Azerbaijan). In September 2018, Agdam District Court found him guilty and
sentenced him to a one-year suspended prison term
(
 ). Ganca Appeal Court
rejected his appeal in October 2018
(
 ). The Supreme Court
rejected his final appeal in April 2019
(
 ). He filed his appeal
to the ECtHR on 17 October 2019.
The ECtHR asked the regime questions
(
 ) about the case on 1 March
2021.
ECtHR: Raids on meetings for worship
1) Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 81028/17
(
 )).
In March 2017, police raided a home in Quba where Muslims who study Said
Nursi's works were meeting and seized religious literature. Almost all of
those present were fined in March 2017, including Vuqar Rafiyev
(
 ).
The ECtHR asked the regime questions
(
 ) about the case on 6 September
2018.
2) Niftaliyev and Others v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 561/12
(
 )).
In June 2011, police raided a Jehovah's Witness meeting for worship in
Yegana Gahramanova's home in Ganca. A court fined Gahramanova, as well as
Rashad Niftaliyev, Rana Sadigova and Teymur Valiyev (though his fine was
reduced to a warning because of his disability)
(
 ) for an "illegal"
religious meeting. The Baku Jehovah's Witness community joined the
application to the ECtHR.
The ECtHR asked the regime questions
(
 ) about the case on 6 July
2017.
The ECtHR received all submissions from both parties by 7 February 2018,
and the case is awaiting an ECtHR judgment.
ECtHR: Jailed for leading prayers
Babayev v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 34015/17
(
 )).
Police arrested Shia Muslim Imam Sardar Babayev in February 2017 and a
court jailed him in July 2017 for three years for leading prayers in a
mosque having gained his religious education outside Azerbaijan
(
 ). He initially brought
the case to challenge his pre-trial detention, but his lawyer updated the
case after his jail sentence was finally upheld on 13 February 2018
(
 ).
The ECtHR asked the regime questions
(
 ) about the case on 4 September
2018.
"The government gave its comments, they were sent to us and we in turn gave
our comments," his lawyer Javad Javadov told Forum 18 in March 2020
(
 ). He said they are now
waiting for the ECtHR to give its judgment.
ECtHR: Unlawful house search
Miragayev v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 29550/14
(
 )).
In May 2012 police and the then-National Security Ministry (NSM) secret
police raided Zeka Miragayev's Baku home
(
 ). Police confiscated
30 copies of the Koran, 24 other books (including some by Said Nursi), a
computer, and a small sum of money. After repeated failures of legal
challenges to the raid and confiscations
(
 ), the ECtHR
application concerns the unlawful search of the applicant's flat. Miragayev
also notes that he was not duly notified of a hearing before the Supreme
Court.
The ECtHR asked the regime questions
(
 ) about the case on 24 October
2018.
ECtHR: Registration denial
Moroz and Others v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 49264/12).
Baku's Jehovah's Witness community was first registered in December 1999
and gained the compulsory re-registration in February 2002. It applied for
another compulsory re-registration in November 2009
(
 ), but the State
Committee rejected the re-registration application in February 2010
(
 ), after which the
community went to court. After nearly two years from 2010 of unsucessful
legal challenges to the State Committee
(
 ), in February 2012
Jehovah's Witnesses finally lost their case in the Supreme Court
(
 ).
Leonid Moroz, another community member, and the Baku community itself then
lodged their ECtHR application on 1 October 2012.
As of 15 June 2021, the ECtHR has not yet asked the regime questions about
the case. (END)
Full reports on freedom of thought, conscience and belief in Azerbaijan
(
 )
For more background, see Forum 18's Azerbaijan religious freedom survey
(
 )
Forum 18's compilation of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) freedom of religion or belief commitments
(
 )
Follow us on Twitter @Forum_18 
(
 )
Follow us on Facebook @Forum18NewsService
(
 )
All Forum 18 text may be referred to, quoted from, or republished in full,
if Forum 18 is credited as the source.
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copyright owner. If you reuse any photographs from Forum 18's website, you
must seek permission for any reuse from the copyright owner or abide by the
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© Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved. ISSN 1504-2855.
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