Diena newspaper website, Latvia
Sept 1 2008
European Union’s 9/11: Is Latvia Overcoming Short-Sightedness of
‘Trojan Horse’?
Commentary by Andris Spruds
The 21st century really began on 11 September 2001, when the
self-satisfaction and sense of inviolability of the United States –
victor of the Cold War – came to an end. Russia experienced its 9/11
late in 2004. The Ukrainian Orange Revolution drew a sufficient thick
and humiliating line across Russia’s ambitions of power and
restoration of empire. The United States reacted by intervening in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia responded to its humiliation, which
largely began with the Rose Revolution in Georgia, with an excessive,
not to say senseless demonstration of military force before the eyes
of the entire international community, and with a recognition of the
"independence" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And that is exactly what
makes it clear that the European Union has now experienced its own
9/11. The identity of the EU has largely been based on getting rid of
the uncompromising specter of nationalism which existed between the
two world Wars, and one can partly agree with the Russian political
technologist Gleb Pavlovskiy, who has written that the EU project is
an institute of anesthesia. But only partly, because Europe very well
remembers Chamberlain’s return from Munich with the belief that he had
achieved peace for future generations. When [French President Nicolas]
Sarkozy, representing Europe, returned from Moscow with a peace plan,
the leaders of Russia obviously had nothing but contempt for the
agreement which they themselves had signed. This recalled Lenin’s
words – that agreements exist so that they can be violated. Far more
importantly, it recalls the fact that the policies which the West
practiced between the two world wars – trying to make peace with
aggressors – led, in the end, to the exact catastrophe which the
policy had been designed to prevent. Russia has brought back to life
the specter of Chamberlain’s umbrella, which is so deep and traumatic
in European consciousness.
European Response
The last time that European leaders held an emergency summit was after
the events of 11 September 2001. There is no question that over the
next hours and days, the European Union will continue to express
support for Georgia’s territorial integrity. It will continue to
denounce harshly Russia’s "disproportionate" demonstration of force,
and it will freeze negotiations on the EU-Russian partnership. If
those negotiations were suspended when Russia placed an embargo on
Polish meat, after all, Russia’s behaviour in Georgia has clearly
earned any humbler reaction. True, there may be no actual sanctions. I
have been critical about the European Union’s foreign policy positions
and their effectiveness, but I have to say that the aforementioned
reaction would be quite sufficient at this time. First of all that is
because Russia, as a weak country, is seeking any evidence in support
of its desire to present itself as a superpower. It would also give
additional legitimacy to the fragile system of Putin and Medvedev in
which each person in the "collective Medvedev" tries to be as great a
defender of the national interest as possible.
Preferred European Actions
Secondly, and more importantly, the fact is that the European Union’s
effective response to its own 9/11 will be a matter not for the next
few days, but rather for upcoming months and even years. First of all
this should be manifested through effective energy policies,
transforming post-Soviet countries into the EU’s own "near abroad" in
real terms. Quietly and peacefully, the European Union must introduce
the so-called "Gazprom clause," thus bringing to an end the systematic
attempt by Gazprom to take over Europe. Individual EU countries can
politely announce that for ecological reasons, they will not be able
to agree to the Nord Stream or the South Stream pipeline. Europe may
potentially establish the office of a special representative on
external energy policy, and that person, and especially the financial
resources associated with same, are eagerly being awaited in countries
such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, to say nothing of Georgia,
Azerbaijan and Ukraine. The EU’s new Eastern Partnership policy must
make it clear that Ukraine and Moldova can join the EU. After Georgia
and Ukraine, NATO must offer a membership action plan to Azerbaijan,
too. That will make it possible next to turn to Armenia and Belarus,
which have accepted their status as Russia’s "inner courtyard" just
because they lack any alternative. Russia’s behaviour has become a
matter which will determine whether the European Union will maintain
its self-respect. Paradoxically enough, Russia’s actions have in fact
provided an impulse and an opportunity for the European Union to show
that its slow and thorough approach may be the most adequate response
to 9/11.
Latvia’s Situation
A few words about Latvia. Unnoticed, but in my view very important
were statements made by Prime Minister [Ivars] Godmanis last week –
that the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline and its branches
will be possible only if all EU member states support the idea and the
project is given priority status in the EU. That was a response to the
supposed proposal that Latvia develop underground gas storage
facilities. The fact is that Latvia is once again starting to think
about an energy strategy which first of all takes into account the
state’s long term interests, not those of certain project organizers
and their related political circles. Deep respect for Godmanis if his
statement ends up being full of long term content and implementation.
It would mean that Latvia would overcome the potential Russian "Trojan
horse" in the Baltic region and instead of short-sightedness, would
help to pursue the common EU policy positions which are in our own
interest.