VUQAR SEIDOV: "UNTIL THE LIMITS OF PLEBISCITE ARE DEFINED, WE SHOULD NOT AGREE ON REPLACEMENT OF ARMENIAN OCCUPATIONAL FORCES WITH INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPERS"
Today.Az
ews/politics/45528.html
June 9 2008
Azerbaijan
Today.Az has already reported with reference to Regnum agency that
on Friday, deputy assistant US Secretary of State Matthew Bryza made
a declaration regarding ways of Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement.
In particular, the US co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group said that
"as soon as the occupied lands return to Azerbaijan, they will be
demilitarized, international peacekeeping forces will be deployed
there, Armenian armed troops will be withdrawn and they will not
be as strained as now, when Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces
are separated from each others by mine fields and in some cases by
100 meters". The US diplomat assured that "Armenians would be in a
greater safety if territories return back to Azerbaijan".
At the same time, Matthew Bryza noted that agreement would not be
achieved if it is unacceptable for Armenia. "I agree that it would
be risky for the Armenian President if he agrees to return the lands
to Azerbaijan, the same as there is a political risk for Azerbaijan,
if it gives to Armenia what it wants in exchange to the lands", said
Matthew Bryza, drawing attention of the Armenian side to a number of
attractive moments, such as creation of a corridor between Nagorno
Karabakh and Armenia and procedure of definition of the status of
Nagorno Karabakh.
For comments on the said announcement Day.Az appealed to political
reviewer Vuqar Seidov, who said the following:
Official Baku should be cautious about Matthew Bryza’s announcement. It
contains an element, which may play a role of a trap for Azerbaijan
in the future. We will speak of it later.
First of all, it is necessary to note that speaking of the return
of territories, Bryza does not specify, what he means under it. He
might have meant only 7 regions around Nagorno Karabakh or all lands
of Azerbaijan, occupied by Armenia, including the seven regions and
Nagorno Karabakh and three small exclaves (Kerki, Yukhari Askipara
and Barkhudarli), uncontrolled by Baku. In the first case, the talk
should not be continued: which deployment of peacekeeping forces is
spoken of if only a part of lands is liberated? And where will they
be deployed? In Aghdam or in Fizuli?
Certainly, common sense implies the second case and the returned
territories should mean also Nagorno Karabakh. In other words, it is
implied that the borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan are restored
de-facto in the form they had in the Soviet times de jure, including
all exclaves and enclaves (as far as I know, the two countries have
not concluded any agreement regarding exchange of exclaves and,
consequently, the issue of mutual liberation of occupied exclaves
should not be removed from the agenda).
Second, speaking on the creation of a corridor between Nagorno Karabakh
and Armenia, Matthew Bryza does not say anything about a creation of
a similar corridor in Megri. I do not know if this issue is raised
during private talks, but I would like to note that the creation
of a corridor in one place and unwillingness to create a similar
corridor in another place, not differing much from Lachin, creates a
disbalance in the positions of the two sides. If restoration of trust
in the region is spoken of, how can one create privileges for itself
and reject providing a privilege for the opposite side? If there is
a de-facto land communication between Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia,
which is illegal, by the way, there is no land communication, either
de-facto or de-jure, between Nakhchivan and the rest of Azerbaijan. And
if in case of Nagorno Karabakh the question is a communication between
one state (Armenia) and a part of another state (part of Azerbaijan),
in case of Nakhchivan we have two parts of one and the same state,
separated from each other by a country, which is in turn striving
for creation of a corridor in another part of the region. Therefore,
Baku has a right to raise this issue and equalize the status of Lachin
corridor to Megri.
If the argument of the Armenian side is that "we have a right to
claim for the corridor, as we shed our blood in Lachin and you did not
shed your blood in Megri", these a priori provokes Baku for similar
measures on the other part of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border,
which is extremely undesirable and inexpedient for both parties,
not speaking of the illegality of such steps per se. Therefore, it
would be fair for the issue of corridors to be settled on the basis
of balance and mutuality, while Matthew Bruza’s statements almost
never contain this issue.
And the third and the most important one. Let’s recall how western
states were separating Kosovo from Serbia, unnoticed for Serbia. They
did it by phases but purposely. In the very beginning Belgrade had
their word that in all variants of the conflict resolution, Serbia’s
territorial integrity will not be violated and peacekeepers are
only needed to maintain order in the region and restore the damaged
infrastructure and public regulation mechanisms. But as soon as KFOR
forces were deployed in the region, NATO seemed to forget about its
promises. Even despite obvious progress in the democratization of the
Serbian community, it became difficult for Belgrade to get repeated
confirmations of its formal sovereignty over Kosovo -the peaceekepers
settled in the region profoundly and Serbians became aware that they
had once been entrapped. It was almost impossible to restore the
sovereignty by way of war in conditions of NATO forces deployment
in Kosovo. And it was then a time for introduction of a new player-
Marti Akhtisaari. His role in the rest of the match and the final
score is well known to everyone. Serbia, assured of its territorial
integrity, lost this game.
In conditions of growing military might of Azerbaijan, it is
most important for Armenia to rule out possibility of renewal of
hostilities. Today’s front line is the maximum, which Armenians
managed to attain in conditions of internal war in Azerbaijan in the
early 1990s. The frontline will, undoubtedly, change if hostilities
are renewed and not in favor of Armenian side (though Bako Saakyan
regularly speak about transfer of military actions into the center
of Azerbaijan and Armenian Defense Minister threatens with occupation
of additional 20% of Azerbaijani lands). No matter how the new front
line seems and what the cost of these changes is, Armenians would
hardly manage to expand the control area. They will only lose their
positions. Therefore, for Yerevan it is important to prevent resumption
of hostilities and at the same time preserve Nagorno Karabakh during
the negotiations.
It can undoubtedly be attained by either tactics of exhausting
the opposite side by decades of obstinacy and lack of compromise
(which failed as Azerbaijan has rather grown its might and confirmed
readiness to war) or by external help, which peakeeperers are
attributed to. Backed by the peacekeepers, one may hold a profitable
referendum and be sure on non-resumption of hostilities.
Azerbaijan’s legal right to restore sovereignty over the occupied
lands by way of war is a trump card, which the co-chairs of the
OSCE Minsk group and Armenia try to deprive Azerbaijan of. It can
be neutralized only by a similar trump card of the opposite side,
which implies deployment of peacekeeping forces in the region,
against which Azerbaijani armed forces would hardly be used.
Matthew Bryza’s recent statement create a unique situation, when it is
more reasonable for Azerbaijanis, insisting on the phased resolution of
the conflict for all these years, to start to ponder over the details
of the last stage (definition of the final status of the region),
before agreeing to initiation of the first phase. Until limits of
future plebiscite on Nagorno Karabakh status, ruling out separation of
the region from Azerbaijan, are defined and coordinated, the agreement
on replacement of Armenian occupational forces with international
peacekeepers will threaten with Kosovo trap for Azerbaijan. If the
format and limits of the referendum are coordinated not before the
deployment of peacekeepers in the region but after it, the Armenian
side will have a chance to insist on such a referendum, which does
not rule out the independence of Nagorno Karabakh. It would be
as difficult for Azerbaijan to argue on the format of referendum
following deployment of peacekeepers as it was for Belgrade.
Distrust is what prevents Armenia and Azerbaijan from attaining an
agreement. Armenians are concerned with the security of the Armenian
population of Nagorno Karabakh and suspect that Azerbaijan will
drive Armenians away from Nagorno karabakh as soon as it gets its
seven regions back, while Azerbaijan is concerned with formalization
of the loss of Nagorno Karabakh and narrowing of its territory and
accuses Armenia of occupying territories beyond Nagorno Karabakh and
driving Azerbaijanis away of those lands to use refugees and occupied
territories as objects of speculations and hostages until Baku
"liberates" Nagorno Karabakh.
Baku has rejected maximalism and made a serious compromise, by
agreeing to provide wide autonomy to the region. Now it is time for
Armenia to reject maximalism and stop striving for formalization of
the separation of Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan. The trust can
be restored if both parties have international guarantees of what
concerns them – Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh should not
be deported or subjected to any discrimination, and the region should
never be separated from Azerbaijan.
If these two postulates are accepted as a starting point by the
parties and the co-chairing countries take a role of guarantors of
non-violation of these basic principles, the trust between the parties
will increase accelerating the conflict resolution.
The internal self-determination of the demilitarized Nagorno Karabakh,
consisting of two communities, is a format, which is acceptable for
everyone. This is the pipe of peace which Baku and Yerevan can smoke
to ensure peaceful co-existence in the region. This formula rules
out maximalism of the sides and offers mutual compromise and ensures
inviolability of the principles, concerning each party. Yerevan should
reject separation of Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan by the Kosovo
model and Baku in turn should reject forced resolution of the conflict
and forced repatriation of Armenian population to Armenia by the model
of Serbian Kraina. The model of a two-community Serbian-Hungarian
Vojvodina with deployment of international peacekeeping forces can
be probed in Nagorno Karabakh provided that it remains a part of
Azerbaijan. Being members of the EU, recently joining Shengen and
in the future the area of single European currently circulation,
the issue of belonging of the southern areas of Slovakia, fully
inhabited by ethnic Hungarians is not so urgent as it had been before
joining the European Union. Few recall it in these two countries. With
Romania’s joining Shengen and the zone of European currency, issue
of Hungarian speaking Transilvania will also lose its importance. The
issue of Italian South Tirol, inhabited by ethnic Austrians, is also
irrelevant today as integration made these issues unimportant.
The longer Armenia fails to trust the formula of internal
self-determination of demilitarized Nagorno Karabakh, comprising two
communities, the longer will the Nagorno Karabakh conflict remain
unsettled and the more will our two countries be distanced from
European integration, which would finally smooth this conflict.