National Review
August 14, 2008 Thursday
Talk Is Cheap
by Kara S. Flook
Despite the optimism of Nicolas Sarkozy’s peace plan, the conflict in
Georgia seems to be far from over. Not only do many details of the
plan still lack agreement (the plan is based largely on Russian
demands), but Russian troops are moving farther into Georgia, breaking
their agreement to return to their August 6 positions. As the
situation worsens, it is important to understand how and why it came
about, and to consider the long-term implications for both the region
and U.S. involvement.
On August 8, after a week of fighting between Georgian troops and
South Ossetian separatists, Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili,
responded by launching a full-scale offensive on the South Ossetian
capital, Tskhinvali, in order to restore constitutional order in the
region. Russia, which had begun amassing troops on its border with
South Ossetia four days earlier, quickly sent in troops, claiming the
need to reinforce Russian peacekeeping troops (who had failed to stop
South Ossetian fire over the past week) and protect "Russian
citizens."
South Ossetia, like Abkhazia, is a separatist region which, despite
its claims to independence, is internationally recognized as part of
Georgia. Russia supports both South Ossetian and Abkhazian claims
(though it does not recognize either as independent) and has
maintained a peacekeeping presence in Tskhinvali since 1992 and
Abkhazia since 1994. Despite it’s supposedly neutral role, Russia
supported South Ossetia’s demands for significant concessions from
Georgia before coming to the negotiating table, and severely hampered
its objectivity by granting Russian passports (and, in effect, Russian
citizenship) to the majority of South Ossetians.
Russia claimed that its peacekeeping role in South Ossetia gave it the
right to send in troops in response to Georgia’s offensive against
Tskhinvali, and quickly overstepped those bounds, conducting air raids
on military bases, roads, the oil port of Poti, and other strategic
targets all around Georgia, and sending a flotilla from the Black Sea
Fleet to the Georgian coast to fire on Georgian targets. Russian
troops advanced from South Ossetia into Georgia to take up a position
near Gori (some reports indicate that they temporarily occupied the
town), while other troops poured into Abkhazia, supporting Abkhaz
separatists in an attack on Georgian troops in the Kodori Gorge before
advancing into Georgia, first to Zugdidi and then to Senaki.
On the morning of August 12, just before Nicholas Sarkozy’s arrival in
his capacity as president of the European Council, Russian president
Medvedev declared an end to military operations in Georgia, declaring
"The aggressor has been punished," but he left a loophole, instructing
the military to take care of pockets of resistance. As already
mentioned, Sarkozy offered a peace plan biased toward the Russians;
Medvedev agreed to return troops to their August 6 positions, but this
has not happened.
Furthermore, some of Russia’s earlier actions indicate that they
expect the conflict to be of long duration: Among the troops sent to
the area were the GRU Spetsnaz (Military Intelligence Directorate
Special Forces) Battalions "Vostok" (East) and "Zapad" (West), both
stationed in Chechnya and known for both their effectiveness and their
brutality. It is unlikely they would have been removed from Chechnya,
where their presence has been important to ensuring the Kremlin’s
control over the region, for any minor operation.
Medvedev has also ordered investigations into allegations of genocide
against Saakashvili and the Georgian government in South
Ossetia. Allowing his 150 forensic experts to carry out their
investigation to his satisfaction will certainly require not only
maintaining Russian control on the ground, but ensuring that the area
is off-limits to all others.
Though Georgia chose to launch its offensive on August 8, it is clear
that Russia provoked the conflict and chose its basic timing and
location. Not only did Russia begin amassing troops on their border
with South Ossetia on August 4, but Russia has also been inciting
South Ossetian actions for some time.
It is highly suspicious that just as the situation in Abkhazia began
to cool down and international pressure on Russia and Abkhazia to
negotiate increased, South Ossetia heated up. What is behind Russia’s
actions? NATO expansion and the upcoming 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi
are both strong motivating factors. Shortly after NATO announced that
Georgia would soon become a member in April 2008, Russia expanded its
relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
This had the dual benefit of further complicating Georgia’s attempts
to resolve its "frozen" conflicts (which had been mentioned in
refusing Georgia a Membership Action Plan at the same NATO meeting)
and opening up trade routes with Abkhazia, on which Russia is heavily
dependent for the raw materials (lumber, sand, gravel, and cement) and
labor needed to prepare Sochi for the Olympics. Russia has a strong
need to maintain the stability of this supply chain within its
control.
This second factor is one of the reasons Russia chose South Ossetia
for the location of the conflict. Not only was a conflict in South
Ossetia unexpected (Abkhazia has been much more volatile), allowing
the Russians to better paint a picture of an aggressive Georgia
attacking innocent civilians, but any major conflict in Abkhazia would
disrupt the supply chain for the Sochi Olympics. Tskhinvali has been
destroyed in the conflict; Russia could not risk that with Sukhumi
(the capital of Abkhazia).
Russia’s aggression is very dangerous for the stability of the
region. Neighboring countries were quick to take sides, with
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states quickly declaring
their support for Georgia and condemning Russia’s acts, while most of
Central Asia supported Russia. Though Armenia, Iran and Turkey all
have declared neutrality, Armenia and Iran both lean heavily toward
Russia, while Turkey leans toward Georgia.
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This split of the region mirrors the general split of influence — a
split Russia would like to do away with. The states supporting Georgia
are all westward-leaning and pro-U.S., while those supporting Russia
are strongly tied to it. Russia deeply resents U.S. involvement in
what it perceives as its sphere of influence — the Caucasus and the
greater region of the former Soviet states — and has gambled on this
act decreasing that influence. A weak U.S. reaction, such as we have
seen thus far, greatly diminishes U.S. standing in the region and,
arguably, as a world power. Georgia, a friend and ally, has been left
to the mercies of Russia, and partners and potential partners such as
Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are all taking note.
Ukraine must be particularly nervous, as they are likely next in the
line of fire. Recent Russian rhetoric has been very aggressive in
threatening Ukraine about NATO membership and asserting territorial
claims to the Crimea. The presidents of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Poland issued a Joint Declaration shortly after Russia’s invasion,
stating their concern: "Following the unilateral military actions of
the Russian military forces, we will use all means available to us as
Presidents to ensure that aggression against a small country in Europe
will not be passed over in silence or with meaningless statements
equating the victims with the victimizers." Poland’s cooperation with
the U.S. over the proposed missile shield has earned it direct threats
from Russia, while the Baltic States have been the victims of
oil-based punishment when their policies incurred Russia’s
displeasure.
The current response to the situation in Georgia does not bode well
for U.S. influence in the region. The U.S. has failed to protect its
friend and ally, an ally that had the third-largest troop presence in
Iraq, after the U.S. and Britain, and is sending the message that our
assurances and promises are meaningless. Russia is trying to show the
world that it is the only meaningful power in the region, and the
U.S. has done nothing to disprove that.
In order to regain its lost ground, the U.S. needs to offer more than
words. The U.S. should firmly tell Russia that unless its troops pull
back to their August 6 positions, the U.S. will provide military aid
to Georgia, demand and help author a more neutral peace plan, require
all future peacekeeping forces in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia be
truly international, and move quickly to reassure other U.S. allies by
convincing NATO to extend Article 5 protection to Ukraine. It may not
be easy, and it may take a lot of political capital, especially to
spur NATO to action, but if strong steps are not taken, the political
capital and trust that the U.S. will lose will be much greater.
— Kara S. Flook is a research assistant in Foreign and Defense Policy
Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.