THE BIG MISTAKE OF THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
Persian Journal
Iranian.ws
/publish/article_23880.shtml
Jan 10 2008
Iran
Bahman Aghai Diba, PhD International Law of the Sea – Persian Journal
Foreign Minister of Iran, Mauchehr Mottaki, may pay a high price for
his big mistake. Speaking about the share of Iran in the Caspian Sea,
he has said that Iran had never more than 11.3% of the Caspian Sea.
Immediately after this, the Spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign
Ministry has declared: Iran was not accepting less than a fair share
of the Caspian Sea which was 20% of it.(1)
Ahmad Zaidabadi, an expert of Iranian issues, writing for the
Persian Service of the BBC, has mentioned: "…the direct remarks
of Mr. Mottaki and saying that the USSR did not let Iran to cross
the connecting line between Astra-Khan and Hussiengholi [two sides
of the Iranian land border in the Caspian Sea] weakens the formal
position of Iran regarding the Caspian Sea’s legal regime [refer to
the previous report of the OSW on the Summit of the Caspian States
in Tehran] and in addition to that, this is a clear political gaffe
and Mr. Mottaki might not remain immune from its implications." (2)
Also, Shahabnews, a new news agency in Iran, has reported: "Confusion
and conflicting remarks of the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s officials
about the legal regime of the Caspian Sea, has endangered the share
of Iran in the Caspian Sea…" (3) Perhaps, more interesting and
more clear than all of the previous cases, the former Deputy Foreign
Minister of Iran (and brother of the former foreign minister of
Iran), Sayyed Mohammad Sadegh Kharrazi, has posted an article in
a website close to the Iranian diplomatic circles and he has said:
"the documents of the Summit of the Caspian States in Tehran contained
some points against the legal and political positions of Iran…the
Iranian Foreign Minister is well aware that his positions will affect
the future claims in the Caspian sea. At the same time, it is not the
administration, but the Majles that can decide on the issues related
to the territorial integrity of the state… his remarks are in clear
contrast to the principles set force by the wise Supreme leader on
[preservation of the state dignity, and expediency." (4)
Backgrounds The Summit of the Caspian States was convened In Tehran on
16th of October and it ended its work by issuing a decoration on behalf
of the participants. The 25 point declaration of the Tehran summit
contained almost no important commitment directly related to the legal
regime of the Caspian Sea. As far as the question of the "legal regime
of the Caspian Sea" per se was concerned, Iran lost a point by keeping
silence about its usual practice of declaring the agreements among
the other littoral states as null and void. Iranian regime refrained
from using this important event for emphasizing its opposition to the
existing agreements. This may have legal consequences for Iran if the
case is finally refereed to the international adjudication (like going
to the ICJ) or a special arbitration tribunal. For the same reason,
some observers have considered Azerbaijan as the winner of the Summit
in Tehran as far as the legal regime of the Caspian is in view. The
regime of Iran, in contrast to the wishes of the Iranian people (who
had made it clear before the summit that they would not accept any
violation of what they considered as the legitimate rights of Iran
in the Caspian Sea even for the sake of the Russian support from the
regime) seemed to have made a concession to the other littoral states
about the legal regime of the Caspian Sea.
After warnings by several experts on the Caspian Sea affairs about
the consequences of the Iranian silence in the Tehran Summit about
its positions regarding the agreements of the other littoral states
(including the direct protest of the writer in the Radio Farda Farsi
program on the same day), the Special Representative of Iran in
Caspian affairs tried to create a better understanding of the Iranian
positions. Mehdi Safari, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran said that
Iran would not sign any document that ignored the legitimate rights
of Iran and he rejected the bilateral and trilateral agreements for
the division of the Caspian Sea.
What are the positions?
Although the USSR is dead and the Russian Federation is not a super
power as it was once, the Russian leaders are always dreaming of
restoring the Russian hegemony in the area that once used to be the
Russian domain. As far as the Caspian Sea is concerned, they want to
use the whole Caspian Sea for their military and civilian fleet. They
are following these policies:
1. Division of the Caspian Sea bed (only) on the basis of a modified
median line (MML). It means the more coastal area you have, the
more area of the Caspian Sea you get. According to the MML, Russia,
and Azerbaijan get almost twenty percent (each of them), Kazakhstan
gets 30 percent, Turkmenistan gets almost 17 percent and Iran gets
almost 13 percent of the Caspian Sea-bed. The MML formula leaves the
wasters of the Caspian Sea for common use of the littoral states.
2. Putting pressure on all Caspian states, especially Iran, to accept
the MML for division of the Caspian Seabed. The Russians have succeeded
to convince Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in this field. Iran, along with
the on and off support of Turkmenistan, has not agreed with it.
3. Excluding all non-littoral states from having military or civilian
presence in the Caspian Sea. The Russians have stationed one of their
most important naval concentrations in the Caspian Sea. The civilian
fleet of the Russians in the Caspian Sea handles ninety percent of
the maritime transportations in the Caspian Sea. The Fishing fleet
of the Russians has no rival in the region. They want to exclude the
non-littoral states to have no rival. The other littoral states have
nothing considerable in the Caspian Sea, except than some old dated
boats and the fishermen who work in the way the ancient tribes.
4. Creating difficulties for the usage of Volga-Don and Volga-Baltic
channel for the other littoral and non-littoral states, for keeping the
advantages of the Russian fleet, ports and facilities. The Russians
have been insisting that the Volga channel is completely an internal
waterway. (While the new conditions of the Caspian Sea requires some
kind of reconsideration in this regard and make it an international
waterway or a waterway under a special regime, such as the Bosporus
and Dardanelle.)
5. Refraining from providing the other littoral states with larger
ships for expansion their military or civilian fleet. For example
by refraining from selling ships, or helping them to build naval
facilities. The littoral states of the Caspian Sea, except than
the Russian Federation, do not have any military of civilian fleet
(Iran�s share from the shipping in the Caspian Sea is less
than 4 percent.) and the Russians want to keep them that way.
6. Forcing the littoral states to use Russian outlets for the export
of their oil and gas. The landlocked states of the Caspian Sea need
proper outlets for their exports and the Russians try to make them use
the Russians facilities. One of the ways to do so is the rejection of
building under water pipelines in the Caspian Sea under the pretext
that it damages the environment. It is noteworthy that the Russians
are responsible for ninety percent of the pollution in the Caspian Sea
through thousands of the Russian factories that pour their industrial
wastes in the Volga River and eventually the Caspian Sea.
7. Formation of a kind of common military force for the Caspian Sea.
This force will be almost completely a Russian instrument for
patrolling all the Caspian Sea. Other littoral states have hardly
enough boats to do low-level police activity in their shorelines.
8. Using the opportunity gained by Iran’s isolation to force Iran
to accept the MML. Iran is under pressure and the Iranian regime is
desperate for its survival. The Russians are well aware that they
cannot treat a thoroughly nationalist government in Iran, as they
treat the Islamic regime of Iran.
The Republic of Azerbaijan is happy to get twenty percent of the
Caspian Sea by the MML. However their policies are:
1. Attracting the Western countries, especially the USA into the
Caspian Sea. The inclination of Azerbaijan to the Western states,
especially the USA, is not originating from an inherent love. This
policy is based on the fact that the Azerbaijan Republic, as the second
Shiite country in the world (after Iran), is feeling worried about
the ideological provocations orchestrated by the Islamic Republic and
other Islamic extremist elements. Also, the Azeris need to neutralize
the Russian presence, as a force supporting Armenia (which has close
relations with Iran and Russian Federation).
2. Good relations with Israel as an indication of the inclination
to the Western countries. The Azerbaijan Republic is aware that its
relations with Israel can play an important role in convincing the
West about its intentions.
3. Presenting the Baku-Jeyhan pipeline as the best way for oil exports
of the Caspian land-locked countries. The Baku-Jeyhan pipeline is
now operational and despite the fact that it was not an economical
project, the Western support has succeeded to create this pipeline. The
Baku-Jeyhan pipeline is the clear sign of the failure of Iran and
Russia in the regional pipeline diplomacy. However, the Azeri oil is
not enough for using the full capacity of the Baku-Jeyhan pipeline,
and Azerbaijan needs to attract the cooperation of the regional
countries, especially Kazakhstan to give this pipeline.
4. Getting into NATO and leaving the hand of NATO free in the Caspian
Sea. Azerbaijan has already suggested the Americans and the NATO to
use the Abshoran peninsula as their military bases. There are some
news about establishment of the radar posts by the NATO in Azerbaijan
and possible use of the Azeri territory for an attack against the
Islamic regime of Iran.
5. Getting the international support in the case of Nagorno Gharabagh
with Armenia. This is the most important issue in the political agenda
of the Azeri governments. Azerbaijan is ready to give concessions in
the Caspian Sea to the forces that help it in the case of Nagorno
Karabagh. The Republic of Azerbaijan has rejected the suggestions
of Iran for meddling in this issue because they do not believe in
impartiality of Tehran.
6. Exploration and exploitation of the resource in the Caspian Sea
with the capital and expertise of the Western countries. Azerbaijan
has been exploring the oil resources of the Caspian Sea for the last
two hundred years (more seriously in the last fifty years). They need
new technology and investment in the oil and gas resources.
7. The Azerbaijan Republic has already joined with the Russians in
using the MML as the formula for division of the maritime borders
with the Russian Federation, as far as the Caspian Seabed is
concerned. However, they are interested to make this division wider
and to include the waters too.
Kazakhstan is trying to make use of the opportunity created by the
access of the country to most of the Caspian Sea. The MML leaves this
country with 30% of the Caspian Sea-bed. The Kazakhstan’s fields are
actively developed by the Western companies, especially the Americans,
interested in non-OPEC, non-Arab, Non-Iranian oil.
Kazakhstan has already concluded treaties with the Russians and the
Azerbaijan Republic for using the MML as the division criteria of the
Caspian Seabed. Iran has proclaimed such treaties as null and void
because the littoral states have originally agreed to make decision
on the legal regime of the Caspian Sea unanimously.
The government of Turkmenistan is not satisfied with the MML, not
because its share according to the MML formula is 17 percent, but due
to the fact that the important oil fields claimed by Turkmenistan
are given to Azerbaijan by the MML. Turkmenistan once went to the
brink of war with Azerbaijan over these oil fields (Kapaz or Sardar
oil fields). It was interested to be in the side of Iran against the
MML, but it was not ready to tie its destiny to the Islamic regime
of Iran. Turkmenistan has already showed that it agrees with the MML
and there are only some problems (such as the Kapaz oil fields) that
should be hammered out. Also Turkmenistan is waiting for the destiny
of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline.
What is the position of Iran?
The position of Iran is to divide the Caspian Sea according to equity
(20% for each). The Russian Federation is imposing its formula
of MML for the division of the Caspian Sea-bed and leaving the
superjacent waters for the common use. Iranian position about the
possible division of the Caspian Sea is not limited to the "seabed"
(unlike MML). Iran is asking for a complete division of the whole
sea. This kind of division will lead to:
1. Restriction of the Russian forces from traveling freely all over
the Caspian Sea.
2. Stopping the industrialized fishing fleet of the Russians from
using the national sections of the other countries 3. Disconnection
the direct link of the Russians with Iran. The Russian Federation
has no land border with Iran at the moment.
Following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the land border of Iran and
the Russians was removed. Division of the Caspian Sea into national
sectors, as Iran is calling for, will result into removing the water
borders with the Russians too.
However, at the moment nobody is taking the positions of Iran in
the Caspian Sea serious. Due to the troublesome nature of the Iran’s
Islamic regime, all countries in the region are pausing to see what
is going to happen to the regime of Iran. After all, what is the use
of entering into agreement with an unstable regime? The successors
of this regime may decide to punish or take revenge from those who
support it now. Iranian people think that the failure of the Islamic
regime of Iran for protecting the Iranian rights in the Caspian sea
(as an ancient country which has been living in the southern shores
of the Caspian Sea and as a state that has shared this body of water
with the Russians for a long time) is the result of the mismanagement
of the international relations and the wrong decisions of the Islamic
regime in the field of the foreign policy.
The best policy for the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a regime that
has not succeeded to safeguard the national interests of Iran in the
Caspian Sea, is refraining from entering into any kind of contractual
arrangements or agreements that might jeopardize the national interests
of Iran in the Caspian Sea in an irreversible way.
These are the reasons for the preferred inaction policy:
1. Iran does not need its oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea
immediately. There are many places (including the Persian Gulf)
that Iran possesses large amounts of oil and gas reserves. These
can be exploited much easier as compared to the Iranian side of
the Caspian Sea. In fact, the Iranian side of the Caspian Sea is
deep (the deepest point is almost a thousand meters deep) and it
is difficult to explore and exploit oil and gas reserves here. Any
economical activity in this section requires high technology and more
investment. It must be noted that although the Caspian Sea is a lake,
it has the features of the open sea in many regards like water currents
and weather conditions. You to add to this picture the difficulties
of getting the facilities to the required points in the face of the
non-cooperation of the littoral states and isolation of Iran.
2. The nuclear issue of Iran, along with other policies of Iran, has
left Iran in a weak situation in front of the Russians. Iran needs
the Russians for stopping the adoption and implementation of the UN
sanctions. This makes the maneuverability of the already weak policy
of Iran more limited.
3. It is not a good idea to take the case of the Iranian interests
in the Caspian Sea to the international tribunals (such as the UNSC,
International Court of Justice, and international arbitrations). Iran
has not the international prestige, the support of any country in
the world and the case of the Caspian Sea the Russians are on the
other side too. Referring the case of the Iranian rights to the
international forums will not be a solution for Iran at the present
conditions. In fact, Iran must try to avoid the efforts of the others
to take the case to such forums. With all littoral states, Russia,
the US and the EU on the other side, who is going to vote for the
Iranian rights in the Caspian Sea?
4. The establishment of the new legal regime will ease the way for
the others to do what they want and Iran will be left back due to
the lack of expertise and financial resources. The picture is bleaker
for Iran if we consider that some of the most important oil and gas
fields in the Caspian Sea are common among the littoral states in
any kind of division.
5. Iran has failed in the pipeline diplomacy so far. The important
pipelines are already avoiding Iran. The new legal regime will not
change the situation of Iran in the pipeline diplomacy of the region.
It seems that under the present conditions, the best policy for the
Islamic Republic of Iran is refraining from entering into any kind of
treaty for the legal regime of the Caspian Sea, because the conditions
are set to impose the worst situation upon Iran. Iran has no reason
to hurry about the legal regime of the Caspian Sea.
The recent remarks of the Iranian Foreign Minister is clearly a mistake
and against the national interests of Iran and even contrary to the
policies of the present regime.
(1) 4.html dated 12/31/2007
(2) ory/2008/01/printable/080101_la_az_caspian.shtml,
dated Jan. o1/2008.
(3) (4)
;pa ge=26&DWritingId=65 dated
Jan. 3, 2008.
Bahman Aghai Diba is a Senior Consultant to the World Resources
Company in the Washington DC Area
http://www.iranian.ws/iran_news
http://www.payvand.com/news/07/dec/129
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/st
http://www.shahabnews.com/prtd25of6ytox.a2y.html
http://irdiplomacy.ir/index.php?Lang=fa&