US STILL PERCEIVES AZERBAIJAN AS A FRIENDLY STATE – FINNISH RESEARCHER
news.az, Azerbaijan
March 25 2010
Mikko Palonkorpi News.Az interviews Mikko Palonkorpi, Researcher,
Finnish Graduate School for Russian and East European Studies
Unoversity of Helsenki.
How can you comment on the current situation in the South Caucasus?
What can you say about Russia’s position on Azerbaijan on the one hand,
and US position on Azerbaijan on the other hand?
I think the current situation in the South Caucasus is still shaped
by the "new" regional realities introduced by the aftermath of the
Russo-Georgian war on the one hand and Turkish-Armenian rapprochement
on the other. Former includes Georgia’s recovery from the war, Russia’s
recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
impact of the conflict for the future energy transit projects
in the region and Russia’s renewed military presence in Georgia
(in the breakaway republics). Latter has potential to bring both
new dynamics and tensions to the region, whether in form of fresh
foreign policy options for Armenia or impact on Nagorno Karabakh
conflict resolution. Despite sometimes bellicose rhetoric, I don’t
see imminent threat of war in any of the region’s protracted conflicts.
I tend to agree with those who see at least slight signs of cooling
bilateral relation between the US and Azerbaijan, mainly due to
US involvement in Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process. However,
I don’t think that US position on Azerbaijan has changed dramatically.
The US still perceives Azerbaijan as a friendly state – if not an
ally or strategic partner – and would like to see continuation of
Azeri oil and gas transit to the West via non-Russian (or non-Iranian)
pipeline networks. The US appreciates Azerbaijan’s strategic location,
not only as a gateway to the Caspian, but also as a neighbor of Iran.
On a one hand Russia perceives Azerbaijan as a competing producer
of oil and gas. South Stream and other Russian pipeline initiatives
are in direct competition with the Nabucco or SCP phase II. But on
the other hand Russia has repeatedly made offers to purchase all
natural gas produced in Azerbaijan and therefore recent gas deals
between the two were warmly welcomed by Moscow. Russia appreciates
Azerbaijani foreign policy, which has skillfully balanced the
Western and Russian interests. However, Russia doesn’t possess
effective leverage instruments towards Azerbaijan, since it’s not
(energy)dependent like Armenia, nor is there Russian military bases
in its territory, like in Georgia.
What can you say about the negotiations around the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict? Is Armenia or Azerbaijan in the most favorable conditions
today?
Unfortunately I haven’t been able to follow the recent negotiations
(Munich & Sochi) in detail, but I think that continuation of talks
between the presidents are important itself, even if there is (only)
slow progress is in key issues.
Windfall that Azerbaijan receives from the oil and gas exports
definitely benefits Azerbaijani side and it has enabled it to
challenge Armenia into a costly arms race. On the contrary, if
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement continues towards concrete steps
(opening of the Armenia-Turkey border) without requiring progress
in the Karabakh negotiations, that would obviously work in Armenia’s
advantage. It is difficult to say how these factors balance each other
out and whether Armenia or Azerbaijan is in more favorable position
in the negotiations. I think more pressing question is whether both
sides are ready to make significant compromises needed to break the
deadlock and whether domestic political audiences, especially in NKR,
are ready to accept any possible compromise reached by the presidents.
What interests do the United States, Russia and EU pursue in resolution
of the Karabakh conflict? Why do they demonstrate a different
approach to the Karabakh conflict as compared to the South Ossetian
and Abkhazian conflict? Why do the United States and the West support
the territorial integrity of Georgia while in case with Azerbaijan they
mention the principle of the rights of people for self-determination?
The US, Russia and influential EU-country France are the three
co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group facilitating the NK conflict
resolution efforts, which in itself is a strong indication of their
commitment to the conflict resolution process on that level.
For the United States the Karabakh conflict was high on its agenda
in 2001, when US tried to mediate a resolution to the conflict in the
Key West summit. More recently the Obama administration has endorsed
the Armenia-Turkey reconciliation and normalization process, leaving
the Karabakh question more or less to the background. I think US
interests towards Karabakh are linked to its broader regional interests
including further development of the South Caucasus energy corridor;
geopolitical interests of South Caucasus as a gateway to Caspian and
Central Asia & three strategic partners located in the region (Turkey,
Georgia, Azerbaijan); alternative supply routes to Afghanistan via
Georgia and Azerbaijan and finally countering Iranian influence in
the South Caucasus.
After the August war Russia stepped up its efforts find settlement
to the Karabakh crisis by hosting Presidential level talks in
Moscow (Nov. 08) and recently in Sochi. There are multiple reasons
for Russia’s renewed and intensified efforts. By facilitating NK
negotiations Russia has tried to present itself as a regional peace
broker and thereby burnishing her damaged international image and
reputation after the August war. Maybe there were some concerns
in Moscow that Turkey could seize the initiative with its fresh
SC security and stability platform. On the other hand Russia has a
along the way made clear its commitment to the peaceful and negotiated
settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Last but not least, while
endorsing strategic alliance with Armenia, stability of Azerbaijan
is also in Russia’s interests, because any instability in Azerbaijan
could spread easily into already fragile Dagestan in the Russian North
Caucasus, multiplying serious security problems there. In the end
Russia faces dilemma: How to seek resolution to the conflict, which
at same time does not alter the existing status quo too much to its
own disadvantage. These objectives are likely to be mutually exclusive.
For the EU there are many good reasons to support Nagorno Karabakh
conflict resolution efforts. The recent rounds of the EU’s Eastern
enlargement have brought the South Caucasus and by definition also
its conflicts closer to the EU. There is an understanding within
the Union that the security, stability and prosperity of the South
Caucasus have an impact on the EU’s own security (hard and soft) and
desire to prevent re-emergence of another war in Europe. I think that
the August war in Georgia only strengthened this view and brought the
point home, especially when the French EU representatives played key
role in cease fire process and the European Union Monitoring Mission
(EUMM) is now observing compliance of the cease fire.
Conflict resolution in South Caucasus has played growing importance
on the EU agenda even before August ’08, especially after the EU
Special Representatives for the Southern Caucasus Heikki Talvitie
(first) and Peter Semneby (current) were nominated. The EU Special
Representatives are expected to support the conflict-prevention and
peace-settlement mechanisms and in the NK case to cooperate closely
with the OSCE Minsk Group. In addition, the EU programs such as the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP)
include components that are aimed at increasing the stability in the
South Caucasus region.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are included in these EU frameworks as
target countries.
Certainly there are other issues as well, like Turkey’s EU-membership
bid (not to mention Georgia’s EU aspirations). If Turkey would ever
be accepted as a full-fledged EU member, even in the distant future,
among other things the EU would become a regional actor in the South
Caucasus almost overnight. In short, the EU doesn’t have the luxury of
remaining indifferent or ignoring the South Caucasus and its conflicts
(including Nagorno Karabakh) anymore.
There is also an indirect energy security dimension or supply
diversification aspect that motivates the EU. Caspian basin is the one
of the most promising non-Russian alternatives for the EU to diversify
its oil and gas imports. Stability and security of the region is a
precondition for the Nabucco, SCP II, Trans-Caspian pipeline or any
other future energy transit project. From this perspective it is in
EU’s self-interest to support the NK conflict resolution, which in
turn contributes to the stability of the region.
I disagree with the second and third part of the question that it
has been the predominant policy of "the West" to support territorial
integrity of Georgia, while supporting self-determination in Karabakh.
I don’t see such policy adopted by the West.
I think it is more of a wider problem related to lack of consistency
and coherency in international relations. The United States and
most of the Western European countries demonstrated very different
approaches towards the recognition of the independence of Kosovo than
they did towards similar calls to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
argument being, that since each (frozen) conflict is unique by its
history, dynamics etc. they should not be compared or removed from
their territorial and historical context. On the other hand Vladimir
Putin and other Russian leaders argued that recognition of Kosovo’s
independence sets a dangerous precedent for the all frozen conflicts
in the territory of the FSU. However, after Russia recognized the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia its leadership was quick
to reassure Azerbaijan that Russia still respects the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan.