But as the dust settles, the attack’s ripple effects are reverberating far beyond Nagorno-Karabakh itself. Russia’s decision to stand aside and allow Azerbaijan to conduct its final invasion, despite its peacekeeping role as part of the cease-fire deal that ended the fighting in 2020, has sparked a profound sense of betrayal in Yerevan. That in turn has created an opportunity for the European Union to forge stronger ties with Armenia and reshape the geopolitical orientation of the South Caucasus.
Armenia has diverged from many other post-Soviet countries—such as the Baltic states, Ukraine and Georgia—by maintaining deep ties with Russia rather than seeking to integrate with the EU. As a formal Russian ally under the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO, Yerevan has long counted on Moscow to guarantee its security. Their robust defense ties include discounted purchases of Russian arms as well as a Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city.
Yerevan has since attempted to reorient itself away from Russia. In a symbolic blow, the Armenian Parliament voted in October to join the International Criminal Court, despite the arrest warrant the court issued against Russian President Vladimir Putin for war crimes in Ukraine. As a result, Putin is now at risk of arrest if he sets foot on Armenian soil. Armenia subsequently declined to take part in CSTO exercises and summits, and Pashinyan has cast doubt on the future of Russian military bases in Armenia.
The Armenian government has simultaneously pursued stronger ties with the EU. Its recent acquisition of French weaponry—contrasting with Moscow’s failure to deliver prepaid arms shipments—indicates its ambitions to find alternative security partners to Russia. Yerevan has also sought aid from the European Peace Facility, which reimburses EU member states for their arms donations to partner countries. This coincides with Pashinyan’s statement that “Armenia is ready to be closer to the European Union, as much as the European Union considers it possible.”
Armenian citizens also find it increasingly difficult to see a future with Russia. A January-March 2023 survey by the International Republican Institute found that only 50 percent of Armenians believed the country’s relationship with Russia to be “very good” or “somewhat good,” down from 93 percent in the autumn of 2019. By contrast, 86 percent of respondents to the 2023 survey had a positive view of relations with the EU—and this gap has almost certainly widened since September’s events.
Yet various factors could restrict Armenia’s ability to pivot. Besides Azerbaijan, its neighbors include a hostile Turkey and a bitterly anti-Western Iran. Attempting to break from Russia and align with the EU could make Armenia more vulnerable, unless it receives security guarantees, which the EU’s current inadequacy as a security provider makes unlikely for the foreseeable future.
This explains Yerevan’s insistence on remaining within the CSTO, despite calls from opposition groups to withdraw. Armenia likewise seems set to remain within the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union, or EEU, given its high economic dependence on Russia. The Kremlin is well-aware of these obstacles, as demonstrated by Putin’s recent statement that it would not be in Armenia’s interests to leave Russian-led organizations such as the CSTO, EEU and Commonwealth of Independent States.
While these constraints are considerable, the degree to which they limit Armenia’s room for maneuver depends on the EU. And while the bloc has undoubtedly stepped up its support for Armenia in recent months, it could do substantially more. Although it may be unable to offer formal security guarantees to Yerevan, the EU should do everything possible to prevent further aggression by Azerbaijan, including a potential attempt by Baku to seize Armenian land to establish a corridor to its Nakhichevan enclave.
To do so, Brussels should build on its previous mediation efforts between Yerevan and Baku, as well as the current positive momentum in the Armenia-Azerbaijan relationship, to drive negotiations toward a conclusive peace settlement. Strengthening Yerevan’s negotiating hand could incentivize Baku to make peace. The EU should therefore follow through with equipping the Armenian military through the European Peace Facility and offering training to Armenian forces, and it should consider upgrading the EU Mission in Armenia by arming its border monitors stationed there.
Moreover, the EU could help Armenia wean itself off of economic dependence on Russia by instituting a regular macro-financial assistance program, similar to those currently in place for Ukraine and Moldova. It could also work toward a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, or DCFTA, as part of a potential broader Association Agreement with Yerevan, an idea now gaining traction in Brussels. This would simultaneously function as a major political signal of long-term commitment to close relations with Armenia. As the trajectories of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia demonstrate, DCFTAs can even be precursors to EU candidate status. And while that does not currently appear on the horizon for Armenia, the same was true for all three of these other post-Soviet republics only a decade ago. More immediately, the EU should proceed with visa liberalization for Armenians to foster closer societal links.
Taking these actions could allow the EU to make good on its promise to work toward “the strengthening of EU-Armenia relations, in all its dimensions, based on the needs of the Republic of Armenia.” While following through on certain measures could trigger backlash from Azerbaijan, which the EU has been careful not to antagonize due to its status as a major energy partner, Brussels is due for a reassessment of its relationship with Baku, as called for in an October 2023 European Parliament resolution. It could use that reassessment process to incentivize Azerbaijan to accept closer EU ties with Armenia.
Engaging Armenia as a close partner in the South Caucasus would export stability to the region and represent a strategic victory vis-à-vis Russia, undermining Moscow’s broader goal of asserting an exclusive sphere of influence within which core EU values such as democracy, freedom and human rights hold no sway. Seizing the chance for such a broad strategic victory should outweigh the temptation to tiptoe around Baku in order to advance narrow economic interests.
Ten years after Armenia backed down from signing a DCFTA with the EU due to Russian pressure, the country is once again turning its focus to the West. Meanwhile, the EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Georgia has given Brussels a greater stake in the future of the South Caucasus. Having reached this inflection point, the EU has an immense opportunity to help Armenia set a resolutely pro-Western trajectory that results in a permanent shift in the geopolitical orientation of the region.
Yet capitalizing on it will require the bloc to commit fully to Yerevan by offering credible alternatives to Russian partnership. Making half-hearted or empty promises, on the other hand, could leave Armenia dangerously exposed and force it unwillingly back into Moscow’s embrace. Bold action is thus imperative—and time is of the essence.
Nicholas Lokker is a research associate for the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. His work explores the development of the political and security order in Europe, focusing in particular on the integration and enlargement of the European Union as well as the evolving roles of Russia and the United States in the region.
Anna Avanesyan is a researcher for the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.