Arminfo, Armenia
June 7 2018
Moscow wanted to see Karen Karapetyan in place of Serzh Sargsyan, but it had to put up with Nikol Pashinyan
Davit Stepanyan’s interview with Stepan Safaryan
[Armenian News note: the below is translated from the Russian edition of Arminfo]
In his interview to the ArmInfo [new agency], the director of the Armenian Institute for International and Security Affairs, Stepan Safaryan, is specifying interim results of the velvet revolution, discussing possible scenarios of resolving the domestic political crisis in Armenia, assessing the policy pursued by the new Armenian leadership regarding the settlement in Artsakh [Armenian name for Azerbaijan’s breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh], and sharing his views on the recent domestic political transformations in Artsakh.
RPA support new government to avert ‘final destruction’ of party
[Stepanyan] What interim results and future trends and aims of the velvet revolution can we specify right now?
[Safaryan] The date of 8 May, when Nikol Pashinyan was appointed prime minister, can be considered as a certain result of the velvet revolution, which resulted, with the consent of the parliamentary majority in the shape of the [former ruling] RPA [Republican Party of Armenia], in the formation of the government and approval of its programme. It is clear that Pashinyan’s main aim is to institutionalise the velvet revolution through an early parliamentary election, as it is clear that it is impossible to run the country from the street for a long time.
In this connection, there arises a question: Will we manage to overcome a second dividing line in the shape of parliament’s consent to an early election without a major upheaval? This is particularly [important] in conditions, when after 8 May, the RPA has gradually been recovering from the shock, voicing its position and even switching to the opposition mode. In this context, the Republicans’ attempts to play for time and wait for the exhaustion of the resource of public trust and a decrease in the level of public assistance to the government has become noticeable. It should also be noted that the Republicans are sure to try their best to preserve a majority in parliament and the parliament proper to win back power as easily as possible.
[Stepanyan] And apart from public trust, what is Pashinyan currently countering this with?
[Safaryan] Nikol Pashinyan’s choice of concrete targets in the process of establishing the rule of law, fighting corruption, and so forth is evident. The political effect of the struggle against these targets is also evident. They made it clear to the Republicans that an early election will be organised either without them or in coordination with them. After the attempts of the RPA’s oligarchic wing to sabotage the new government’s work via the “riot of supermarkets”, Pashinyan also made it clear that the RPA would either stop being parliamentary majority or it would agree to cooperate. The last statement by [Parliament] Speaker Eduard Sharmazanov shed light on yet another settlement of yet another situation. He said that the main composition of the Republican Party was going to vote against the government’s programme, whose highlight is holding an early election. However, he also announced that the Republicans were ready to try their best to get this programme approved. In other words, the RPA is trying to avert the danger of the dissolution of the parliament, being fully aware at the same time of Pashinyan’s ability to deprive them of their faction in the incumbent parliament. In the past, the RPA unfortunately brought into its ranks both criminals and oligarchs, whose criminal liability for specific acts can by no means be considered as political repression. No-one is going to reproach Pashinyan for eliminating crime or putting pressure on oligarchs, aiming to bring them back to the tax field. Correspondingly, refusing to give a formal consent to an early election within a year, the Republicans are informally ready to show support for the activities of Pashinyan’s government in exchange for his saying no to the final destruction of their party.
[Stepanyan] Is this going to satisfy Pashinyan?
[Safaryan] I do not think so. The thing is that refusing to show support for the programme of his government, the Republicans renounce an early election. On the other hand, from all appearances, this programme is sure to be eventually approved by parliament. By doing so, this programme will somehow become a legitimate document leading the country to an early election. And here, we see the emergence of an interesting and tricky situation, where the Republicans’ further activities are going to depend on further sentiments in our society.
[Stepanyan] The Republicans’ logic is clear. What is unclear in this case is Pashinyan’s logic. What hinders him from exerting a slightly stronger pressure to finally destroy the RPA and open a path to an early election by doing so?
[Safaryan] In my opinion, [these are] political agreements reached with the RPA. We should be able to realise that after 22 April, the developments flowed precisely into the streambed of political agreements and it is not particularly desirable to put an end to this. After all, on 8 May, an agreement was reached on the renunciation of violence on everyone’s part. Correspondingly, if Pashinyan breaks his own promises at a certain time, moves in the direction of the RPA’s destruction will imply the emergence of political uncertainty in the field, where he will have no guarantees of success.
Moscow wanted Karapetyan instead of Pashinyan – pundit
[Stepanyan] Can you see any external factors in this field of political uncertainty?
[Safaryan] What I can see so far is a total absence of those opposed to the change of power in Armenia. However, I can also see quite a conspicuous interest in influencing the final outcome of the developments in our country. And in this case, the Russian factor manifests itself most apparently. In Moscow, they do not seem to consider Nikol Pashinyan and his government as the main team so far. Indeed, this by no means implies that they will not regard them as the main team in the future. Everything will depend on the moves and steps Pashinyan proper will take. However, I get the impression that in Moscow, they nevertheless wanted to see a somewhat different scenario to unfold in Armenia after 23 April with the main role played by [former Prime Minister] Karen Karapetyan. In particular, I think that people in Moscow would very much like to see Karen Karapetyan in the post of Serzh Sargsyan, but they have also come to terms with Nikol Pashinyan. This scenario failed to unfold, as Russia’s moves against Nikol Pashinyan and those staging rallies in his support would automatically result in an increase of anti-Russian sentiments. Therefore, Moscow tried to stabilise the critical situation as far as possible to be able to understand and determine their further steps. If distrust towards Pashinyan persists and grows, people in Moscow might try to find and reinforce a more trusted player in Armenia.
[Stepanyan] [Do you imply] Karen Karapetyan?
[Safaryan] I do not rule this out. However, any member of the revolutionary team might become such [a player], say [businessman] Gagik Tsarukyan. However, if Russia fails to do so or they find playing out a scenario of the kind inappropriate, Moscow will try to smooth the things they dislike in Pashinyan’s policy. There is all the more reason for this against the background of all Armenian players’ dependence on the Russian factor, which is currently present to a varying degree. Anyway, I think that so far, no final blueprint of the Russian scenario regarding Armenia has been developed.
Karabakh to be represented at talks with Azerbaijan
[Stepanyan] Judging by Pashinyan’s statements on the Artsakh problem, the new Armenian prime minister is trying to pursue a new negotiating line in this direction. How realistic is this and is this not going to turn into yet another and the very corner, which Moscow is trying to cut?
[Safaryan] I consider this line as quite correct. I showed support for statements on the need of Artsakh’s participation in the negotiation process, even when they were made by Serzh Sargsyan. In terms of settling the problem, I consider precisely the given approach as correct. It is a different matter how successful Serzh Sargsyan was in this respect and how successful Nikol Pashinyan will be. However, a tripartite negotiating format is quite realistic, as it already existed in 1998, no matter whether Azerbaijan liked this or not. And up to 1998, the voice of [Nagorno-Karabakh capital] Stepanakert [Xankandi] was quite legitimate and weighty at all discussions and talks. This was documented in all fundamental documents of the OSCE MG [Minsk group]. In this light, I assess Nikol Pashinyan’s aim to return Artsakh to the negotiating table as quite realistic. And if Serzh Sargsyan lacked domestic legitimacy to achieve this goal, Nikol Pashinyan has this legitimacy. Correspondingly, the new Armenian prime minister is quite able to follow the path until the final victory. Indeed, in conditions of all players’ adaptation to the swamp, which has been characteristic of the process for years, and Baku’s whims, this path is not going to be easy. However, we should by no means renounce it. In this light, I consider it necessary that Armenia pursue a clear-cut line: Only the meetings held in a tripartite format can be considered as talks. All others [should be considered as] preparatory work for talks or just a conversation.
Developments in Naxcivan
[Stepanyan] Do the [military] advances of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces towards neutral territories in Naxcivan have a political implication? In other words, can this be considered as a demarche in response to the statements by the new Armenian leadership?
[Safaryan] In my opinion, this is part of Azerbaijan’s strategy. It was not for the fun of it that in 2016, Baku decided on precisely this version of the local war at the Artsakh-Azerbaijan level. They understood full well that in the case of large-scale war, Naxcivan would automatically and immediately become involved as soon as Armenia became involved. Naxcivan is Azerbaijan’s crack in armour both in military or political terms. Naxcivan creates preconditions for the participation or non-participation of other actors in the presumptive war. For example, Turkey’s participation in possible battles with the participation of its protectorate, Naxcivan, will immediately result in Russia’s interference. In a situation of the kind, Artsakh and its problem will take a back seat, giving way to yet another Russo-Turkish war. Therefore, in my opinion, what is meant here is reinforcement of defence positions of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, which are under a 100 per cent control of the Armenian Armed Forces even today. In other words, Baku is trying to tighten its possible control over the Armenian territory, trying to complete propaganda tasks at the same time.
‘Waves’ of Armenian revolution reaching Karabakh
[Stepanyan] Is the resignation of one part of the Artsakh leadership a continuation of the processes unfolding in Armenia or is the situation in Artsakh unfolding exceptionally within the framework of the domestic agenda?
[Safaryan] In Artsakh, there can be a number of quite specific factors, of course. However, I view the recent developments first and foremost as the waves of the revolution in Armenia. Despite the self-sufficiency of our political systems, the logic of their development is nevertheless strongly interrelated. Therefore, the desire of those living in Artsakh not to stay on the sidelines of their fellow-countrymen’s success in Armenia is quite understandable for me and raises no question. People in Artsakh also want to stop the worsening authoritarianism, lawlessness, and all those things that their fellow-countrymen managed to stop in Armenia. In other words, all these things are happening in Artsakh on the basis of objectively existing dissatisfaction with the authorities. Apart from this, I absolutely do not rule out the appearance of beneficiaries from outside to try to use the “Artsakh velvet” to secure concrete transformation of the 1994 status quo. It should not be ruled out that the developments in Artsakh are part of a bigger geopolitical plan. What is meant in both cases is one conflict of interests, contradistinction of renewed Madrid Principles and quite conventional and incomplete [Russian Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov’s plan, to say the least. In addition to this, there is a third scenario: Doing nothing, maintaining the existing status quo. And all the three scenarios have been clashing with each other over the past decades, continuing to clash even today.