Author: Karagyozian Lena

Associated Press Worldstream
January 11, 2005 Tuesday 12:24 PM Eastern Time
Armenia announces aid to tsunami-hit region
YEREVAN, Armenia
The government of Armenia plans to send about 25 million drams
(US$50,000, [euro]38,000) in aid supplies to tsunami-hit Sri Lanka,
officials said Tuesday.
About two-thirds of the amount would be in tents and other goods, and
the remainder is medicine including antibiotics, Deputy Foreign
Minister Armen Baiburtian said.

Armenian MP says Council of Europe report on Karabakh unbalanced
Hayots Ashkarh, Yerevan
11 Jan 05

Excerpt from Vaan Vardanyan’s report by Armenian newspaper Hayots
Ashkarh on 11 January headlined “It will be difficult in Strasbourg”
The Armenian parliamentary delegation will soon leave for Strasbourg
to take part in a PACE [Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe] session. We have interviewed the chairman of the Foreign
Relations Commission of the National Assembly, Armen Rustamyan, in
this connection.
[Hayots Ashkarh correspondent] Mr Rustamyan, [PACE rapporteur] David
Atkinson’s report on the Karabakh issue will be discussed at a PACE
plenary session. When will our delegation leave for Strasbourg? What
are your expectations from the discussion of this issue? [Passage
omitted]
[Armen Rustamyan] We should explain to the PACE delegates that it is
unacceptable to adopt a resolution when the representation balance
between the conflicting parties has been disturbed.
[Correspondent] Do you mean that NKR [Nagornyy Karabakh Republic]
representatives have not been invited to the Council of Europe to take
part in the discussions?
[Rustamyan] Yes, I do. Balance has really been disturbed in this
sense. It is not clear how the conflict can be discussed when one of
the directly involved parties does not take part in this discussion?
For this reason we have to put forward Karabakh’s positions as well,
noting that they are not Armenia’s but of a party to the conflict that
is being ignored.
When Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the Council of Europe and assumed
obligations, the Council of Europe was given the following task to
settle relations between the parties: to promote a peaceful
settlement, relieve tension and create conditions for
rapprochement. But if the provisions of the document that will be
adopted in PACE are not balanced, it may have an adverse effect that
will aggravate the situation.
[Correspondent] Do you think the Azerbaijani delegation is pleased
with Atkinson’s report and the [expected] resolution?
[Rustamyan] In some sense it is very advantageous to Azerbaijan
because it contains a number of points and unclear wording which can
be used in the future for propaganda ends. The major pitfall is that
according to the general logic of the document, the conflict has not
three but two parties – Armenia and Azerbaijan – but this does not
correspond to reality. At the same time, they hint using the vague
wording that one of the parties has occupied the territories of the
other.
In fact, the Azerbaijani delegation does not fight against this
document in any way. However, I am sure that by strengthening their
positions even more they will submit a package of changes so that in
the future they can use it to tamper with the essence of the
conflict. [Passage omitted]

JCPA.org,(Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs)
Jan 5 2005
WHAT IF BUSH INVITED SHARON AND ABU MAZEN TO CAMP DAVID?
THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE POST-ARAFAT ERA
Dore Gold and David Keyes
At President Clinton’s failed Camp David peace summit in mid-2000,
Barak offered more than any Israeli prime minister in history. Yet
the talks exposed vast remaining disparities between Israel and many
of today’s post-Arafat Palestinian leaders on key issues that must be
considered before the Bush administration dispatches a “presidential
envoy” or risks convening yet another peace summit in the period
ahead:
Refugees: Several months after Camp David, Abu Mazen wrote: “The
right of return means a return to Israel, not to the Palestinian
state.” As recently as January 1, 2005, Abu Mazen reiterated: “We
won’t forget the right of return of refugees who have been exiled
from their land for more than half a century.” Palestinian officials
were, in fact, dismayed by President George W. Bush’s statements
about preserving Israel as a Jewish state, since they hoped that by
flooding Israel with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians they would
be able to demographically overwhelm its Jewish majority.
Borders: The Palestinians insisted that the June 1967 line be the
recognized international boundary and even demanded the Latrun
salient, which includes a section of the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem
highway. Additionally, the Palestinians rejected any Israeli
sovereignty over national consensus suburban areas just beyond the
municipal borders of Jerusalem, such as Maale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev.
According to the notes of EU Special Representative to the Peace
Process Miguel Moratinos from the Taba talks, the Palestinians “did
not accept proposals to annex (settlement) blocs” to Israel.
Jerusalem: Former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami noted that Abu
Mazen, who had a reputation for moderation, suddenly became energized
at Camp David and rejected U.S. proposals for compromise on
Jerusalem. At the end of the Taba talks, even the status of the
Western Wall remained contested. According to Moratinos, the
Palestinians acknowledged Israel’s request for an “affiliation” with
the Western Wall, but did not explicitly accept Israeli sovereignty
over it.
Security Arrangements: Israel requested early warning stations in the
West Bank for security purposes and the right to deploy forces in the
event of an Arab coalition attack from the east. The Palestinians
insisted that no Israeli soldier be on any of their territory and
also rejected Israeli control of air space. Muhammad Dahlan explained
in Taba that the Arab world would not accept Israeli force
deployments inside a Palestinian state that were aimed at other Arab
states. Furthermore, the Palestinians made clear at Taba that they
would not accept a demilitarized Palestinian state, either.
In 2001, Abu Mazen admitted, “Had the Camp David summit been convened
again, we would have taken the same position” on the permanent status
issues. Abu Ala, too, expressed no regret at any missed opportunity,
asserting that he would not agree to what was offered at Camp David
“even if it were to be proposed in another 100 years from today.”
During the Oslo years, the explicit declarations of Palestinian
leaders were often ignored and treated as statements for internal
consumption alone. Wishful thinking was frequently substituted for
hard analysis. This does not mean that in 2005 no “window of
opportunity” exists; rather, its actual size must be accurately
measured. Indeed, in the present context, a partial cease-fire is
more realistic than significant progress on any of the substantive
issues raised at Camp David in 2000. What emerges from the following
analysis is that a full-blown, final status peace accord between
Israel and the Palestinians is probably more remote today than five
years ago.
————————————————————————
Revisiting Past Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations
Arafat’s death has been heralded as marking the dawn of a new age and
a golden opportunity to revive negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians. Since Arafat was the main obstacle to peace, the
thinking goes, the Arab-Israeli peace process can finally be put
“back on track.” Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote
in the New York Times on December 30, 2004: “Arafat’s death makes a
comprehensive settlement feasible once again.”1 Thus, a renewed call
for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians has been placed
at the forefront of today’s political debate.
But is this assessment really correct? It assumes that Arafat stifled
his more moderate advisors, who are now rising to positions of
authority from which they will shake off his hard-line legacy. It is
certainly true that Arafat’s departure from the political scene was
fortuitous, yet the likelihood of productive negotiations today
remains in serious question. Many analyses of past
Israeli-Palestinian negotiating failures have focused on Arafat’s
negative role. It may therefore be instructive to revisit the past
negotiating history and examine the positions of other key
Palestinian players who are now likely to play a leading political
role in determining future Palestinian policies on peace.
Prior to the outbreak of the Palestinian violence in 2000, there were
several sets of negotiations that are worthy of review, including
pre-negotiations in Stockholm and the 2000 Camp David summit. Even
after the violence began there were the Taba talks in 2001. Some
revisionist historians have placed the blame for the failure of each
of these talks on tactical mistakes made by the parties involved: if
only the Palestinians were given more time to prepare for Camp David;
if only Barak had treated Arafat with more respect; if only the
negotiators had convened twenty-two times in Stockholm instead of
twenty. In fact, at that time, the gaps between the two parties on
nearly every major issue, from borders to Jerusalem to refugees to
security, were simply too wide to bridge.
Since the Camp David talks, the political landscape has changed
dramatically. Bush, Sharon, and Abu Mazen have replaced Clinton,
Barak, and Arafat. The Palestinian violence has resulted in the
deaths of thousands. The 9/11 attacks have occurred, and the Taliban
and Saddam Hussein regimes have been destroyed.
Negotiations are often risky ventures. Positions need to be soberly
assessed, the timing must be right, and all the parties must be
primed to reach a peaceful endgame. So what would happen if Bush
invited Sharon and Abu Mazen to Camp David today? Are the gaps still
unbridgeable?
Clinton’s Camp David Peace Summit
At President Clinton’s failed Camp David peace summit in mid-2000,
Barak offered more than any Israeli prime minister in history. Yet
the talks exposed vast remaining disparities between Israel and many
of today’s post-Arafat Palestinian leaders on key issues that must be
considered before the Bush administration dispatches a “presidential
envoy” or risks convening yet another peace summit in the period
ahead:
Refugees:
Israel agreed to the complete resettlement of Palestinian refugees in
a Palestinian state but not in Israel itself. Proposals for accepting
a minimal number of dispossessed Palestinians into Israel on
“humanitarian grounds” over a period of years were also discussed.
The Palestinians rejected this and demanded the unlimited return of
all refugees into Israel. Nabil Shaath told Clinton at Camp David
that the Palestinians anticipated that 400,000-800,000 Palestinian
refugees would be expected to go to Israel.2
In an article in the London Arabic daily al-Hayat, written several
months after Camp David, Abu Mazen clarified: “The right of return
means a return to Israel, not to the Palestinian state.”3 As recently
as January 1, 2005, Abu Mazen reiterated in Rafiah: “We won’t forget
the right of return of refugees who have been exiled from their land
for more than half a century.”4 Two days later, he repeated this
point, adding, “the day will come when the refugees return home.”5
Both Abu Mazen and Abu Ala explicitly reiterated their commitment to
the “right of return” when they presented their respective
governments to the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2003.6
Borders:
Israel offered to withdraw from over 94 percent of the West Bank and
all of Gaza, conceding the long-standing principle of “defensible
borders” and instead accepting international forces in the Jordan
Valley. The Palestinians insisted that the June 1967 line be the
recognized international boundary and even demanded the Latrun
salient, which includes a section of the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem
highway. Additionally, the Palestinians rejected any Israeli
sovereignty over national consensus suburban areas just beyond the
municipal borders of Jerusalem, such as Maale Adumim and Givat
Ze’ev.7 According to the notes of EU Special Representative to the
Peace Process Miguel Moratinos from the Taba talks, the Palestinians
“did not accept proposals to annex (settlement) blocs” to Israel.8
Jerusalem:
Israel proposed making eastern Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian
state. Yet the Palestinians rejected any territorial compromise over
the city; Palestinian spokesmen, such as Abu Ala, even laid claim to
the western half of Jerusalem as well. Former Foreign Minister Shlomo
Ben Ami noted that Abu Mazen, who had a reputation for moderation,
suddenly became energized at Camp David and rejected U.S. proposals
for compromise on Jerusalem.9 At the end of the Taba talks, even the
status of the Western Wall remained contested.10 According to
Moratinos, the Palestinians acknowledged Israel’s request for an
“affiliation” with the Western Wall, but did not explicitly accept
Israeli sovereignty over it.
Security Arrangements:
Israel requested early warning stations in the West Bank for security
purposes and the right to deploy forces in the event of an Arab
coalition attack from the east. The Palestinians insisted that no
Israeli soldier be on any of their territory and also rejected
Israeli control of air space. As will be clarified later, Muhammad
Dahlan explained in Taba that the Arab world would not accept Israeli
force deployments inside a Palestinian state that were aimed at other
Arab states. Furthermore, the Palestinians made clear at Taba that
they would not accept a demilitarized Palestinian state, either.
While Barak came to Camp David to negotiate, Arafat failed to present
a single idea or serious comment.11 No amount of skillful diplomacy
could have brought the parties together at that time; despite a
historic opportunity and heavy U.S. pressure, the Palestinians could
not be compelled to moderate their demands. Shlomo Ben Ami commented
that no rational Israeli leader could have concluded a deal at Camp
David.12 From the outset, the Palestinians knew that they would not
budge regarding key issues. Feisal Husseini, who held the PA’s
Jerusalem portfolio, and Assad Rahman, who held the refugee portfolio
on the PLO Executive Committee, did not even attend Camp David.13
President Clinton wrote that he believed Abu Mazen and Abu Ala would
have accepted his ideas for peace but didn’t want to be at odds with
Arafat.14 Unfortunately, Arafat’s successors have pledged to maintain
his main ideological goals. Muhammad Dahlan has warned, “I would
caution against the illusion that when there is a sharp transition
from Arafat to post-Arafat, the (Palestinian) mythological rules will
be broken. For there to be legitimacy, there needs to be continuity.
Those who come after Arafat will want to build their positions on the
basis of their being his successors.”15
A Moderate Abu Mazen?
Abu Mazen succeeded Arafat as chairman of the Palestine Liberation
Organization and is the Fatah faction’s candidate to become the next
Palestinian Authority chairman. Abu Mazen has become known for his
conclusion that the Palestinian reliance on violence as a political
tool was a tactical mistake. However, on issues of policy he is
extremely close to Arafat. He categorically demands the full right of
return for all Palestinian refugees, despite the clear danger this
would pose to the future of the Jewish state. He has rejected any
limitation on the number of refugees allowed to return to Israel,
“even if they [the Israelis] offered us the return of three million
refugees.”16
As recently as November 2004, Abu Mazen said, “We promise you
[Arafat] that our heart will not rest until we achieve the right of
return for our people and end the tragic refugee issue.”17 He also
rejected proposals to moderate Palestinian goals in exchange for
formal recognition of their state by the U.S. and a financial support
package of billions of dollars, saying, “we rejected these [offers]
and said that our rights are not for sale.”18
Regarding borders, Abu Mazen has said, “I will cut off my hand if it
signs an agreement in which even one centimeter of Palestinian
territory conquered in 1967 is missing.”19 This language contradicts
the very deliberate wording of UN Resolution 242, which calls for
negotiations to determine future borders, and ignores Israel’s right
to “defensible borders.” He even said in September 2000 that Israel
should not have sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter in the Old City
of Jerusalem or over the Western Wall.20
On the pre-Camp David preparations, Abu Mazen stated, “We made clear
to the American and Israeli sides several times that the Palestinian
side is unable to make concessions on anything” (authors’
emphasis).21 Thus, it should have come as no surprise when, after the
most generous offer in Israeli history, Abu Mazen claimed that Camp
David was “a trap, from beginning to end….We did not miss an
opportunity at all, but rather survived a trap that was set for
us.”22 Abu Mazen’s explanation for turning down the Israeli offer was
that it “never reached the level of our aspirations.”23 Furthermore,
he concluded, “I don’t feel any sense of regret. What we did was the
right thing to do.”24
Where, then, did Abu Mazen’s reputation for political moderation come
from? Part of this emanated from the mythology of the Oslo peace
process, with the famous Beilin-Abu Mazen document of October 31,
1995, which many observers felt proved that Israeli-Palestinian
differences were indeed bridgeable. Yet Abu Mazen personally told one
of the authors of this Jerusalem Viewpoints back in 1996 that there
never was a Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement, for Abu Mazen never signed
the document. Arafat called the document “a basis for further
negotiations,” which only meant that he hoped to lock in the Israeli
concessions that were made and continue the discussions to achieve
further concessions. The myth that Yossi Beilin and Abu Mazen struck
a detailed understanding, nevertheless, served as critical background
for the efforts of Israeli and U.S. negotiators to keep working at
the failed Camp David summit.
Arafat’s Sordid Legacy and the Question of Jerusalem
Arafat’s political legacy endures. Arafat had told an amazed Clinton
at Camp David that the ancient Jewish Temple never stood in Jerusalem
but rather in Nablus. Clinton understood, as Dennis Ross has noted,
that a formula for peace that denies the very foundation of the
Jewish religion is no solution at all, and only sows the seeds of
further hated and conflict.
Yet this isn’t just Arafat’s contention. PA Minister for
International Planning and Cooperation Nabil Sha’ath has said,
“Israel demands control of the Temple Mount based on its claim that
its fictitious temple stood there.”25 PA negotiator Saeb Erekat also
claimed there is no proof that the Jewish Temple is at the site of
the Temple Mount.26 PA Prime Minister Abu Ala noted, “The Israelis
claimed that under the Mosques there is something that belongs to
them.”27 Even so-called moderate Abu Mazen stated that the Jews
“claim that 2000 years ago they had a temple. I challenge the claim
that this is so.”28
This denial of the core of Jewish history reflects a potent
xenophobia that permeates throughout Palestinian society. For
example, the PA minister for culture and information was infuriated
at the idea of allowing Jews to even pray on the Temple Mount,
arguing that the reaction from the Arab and Muslim world would be “a
thousand times worse” than the 1996 riots.29 Can one imagine a
similar proposal that denied Christians the right to pray at the
Vatican, or Muslims the right to pray at the Kaaba in Mecca?
Palestinian negotiator Hasan Asfour, who was a part of the Oslo
process since its inception, viewed allowing Jews to pray at the
Western Wall as “a Palestinian concession. They [Jews] should not
view this as a right.”30 Abu Ala dismissed any discussion of Israeli
rights to the Western Wall. “It is pointless to discuss [these]
details before Israel recognizes Palestinian sovereignty in
Jerusalem.”31 And he did not say “east Jerusalem.” This is classic
Arafat. In Ramallah in 2000, Arafat said that the demand for
sovereignty in Jerusalem “does not only refer to the Church of the
Holy Sepulchre and the Temple Mount Mosques, and the Armenian
quarter, but it is Jerusalem in its entirety, entirety, entirety”
(authors’ emphasis).32
Abu Ala’s position on Jerusalem is clear: “We want complete
Palestinian sovereignty on the Mount of Olives, on the tombs of the
prophets and on all that you call ‘The Holy Basin.”33 Similarly, Abu
Mazen stated that “Jerusalem must return to our sovereignty, and we
will establish our capital in it.”34
These statements are fueled and inspired by Palestinian religious
leaders with positions of great influence. For example, the mufti of
Jerusalem asserted that “no stone of the Al-Buraq [Western] Wall has
any relation to Judaism. The Jews began praying at this wall only in
the nineteenth century.”35
Former Arafat advisor Akram Haniya, who also participated in the Camp
David summit, warned that “[the Americans] are making a grave mistake
[if they] believe that Arafat can sign an agreement that does not
answer to their minimum national rights” (authors’ emphasis).36 The
demand for total sovereignty over Jerusalem is a maximalist position
disguised as a minimalist one that completely disregards the
centrality of Jerusalem to the Jewish people. Only by shedding this
facade of minimalism – a myth that was powerfully exposed at Camp
David – can negotiations progress.
The European Union as well bears a measure of responsibility for
fueling Palestinian irredentism. On March 1, 1999, the German
ambassador to Israel, whose country was serving as the rotating
president of the European Union, sent a Note Verbale to the Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs reviving the UN General Assembly’s
outdated proposal for internationalizing Jerusalem. After seven Arab
armies invaded the nascent State of Israel and the UN did nothing to
protect Jerusalem, Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion,
declared the old UN proposal “null and void.” Still, the Germans were
prepared to state in 1999: “The European Union reaffirms its known
position concerning the specific status of Jerusalem as a corpus
separatum. Abu Ala seized this opportunity to challenge Israeli
sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem, stating, “The [EU’s] letter
asserts that Jerusalem in both its parts – the western and the
eastern – is a land under occupation.37
In 2002, the head of Israeli military intelligence, Major General
Aharon Ze’evi (Farkash), noted: “According to the assessment of the
Intelligence Branch, it is impossible to reach an agreement with
Arafat on the ‘end of conflict,’ even if Israel would agree to the
implementation of the right of return, withdrawal to the ’67 borders,
division of Jerusalem, and handing over the Holy Places to
Palestinian rule.”38 Former Prime Minister Barak said IDF
intelligence gave the Camp David talks a less than 50 percent chance
of succeeding.39
After Camp David, Abu Ala stated that “in order for an additional
summit to be convened, the Israeli position must come closer to the
Palestinian position, rather than the other way around.”40 Abu Ala’s
position regarding borders is that the Palestinian “state has
internationally recognized borders, which are the borders set in the
[1947] partition resolution.”41 Ironically, it was the Palestinians
who rejected the 1947 UN partition plan.
Some in the Arab world understood the enormity of Barak’s offer at
Camp David and the lengths to which Israel was willing to go for
peace. Prince Bandar, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington, placed
the blame squarely on Arafat, saying, “Clinton…really tried his
best…and Barak’s position was so avant-garde that it was equal to
Prime Minister Rabin…it broke my heart that Arafat did not take
that offer.”42 The long-serving Saudi ambassador believed Barak’s
offer indeed met the Palestinians’ “minimum national rights.”
The Questions of Security and Land
The need for an Israeli security presence in the West Bank,
especially the right to deploy in an emergency, is a security
imperative founded on the historical reality of repeated attacks by
surrounding countries and cross-border incursions. Nevertheless,
Palestinian security chief Mohammed Dahlan categorically rejected any
such arrangement. Dennis Ross writes, “Mohamed Dahlan was dead set
against any Israeli or foreign presence in the border crossing and
rejected the idea that the Israelis should have guaranteed access
routes into the West Bank.”43 Ross seems genuinely surprised that
Dahlan was most resistant on security – the issue on which he
expected the least difficulty in reaching a compromise.44
Dahlan’s hard line on security was additionally surprising because he
came from the younger generation of Palestinian leaders who were
expected to be more pragmatic than the old PLO ideologues. But that
clearly was not the case. In fact, the main security issues were not
resolved at Camp David, including early warning stations, control of
air space, demilitarization, Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley,
and management of border crossings. Even on the issue of Israeli
emergency access to the West Bank, Ross writes that the parties faced
“basic disagreements.”45
During the Taba talks, Gilead Sher noted that on security issues,
“the main disputes remained.”46 Similarly, Shlomo Ben Ami wrote,
“Regarding security the Palestinians opposed the fundamental
assumptions of the [Clinton] outline, and practically are retreating
from what was conceded at Camp David….’You have no need,’ [Dahlan]
says, ‘for emergency deployment areas; the Arabs world will not
accept this kind of deployment in the territory of the Palestinian
state against another Arab state.'”47
Regarding Israel’s territorial offers as well, the gaps were
unbridgeable. In discussing the Israeli offer of 3 percent of Israeli
territory in exchange for annexing 6 percent of the West Bank, Ben
Ami concluded: “we reached the end of our ability to show further
flexibility.”48 Yet Abu Ala viewed this formula as unacceptable.49 At
Taba, Abu Ala expressed dismay at an Israeli map that showed the
annexation of the Latrun salient. He continued, “we have a problem
with Gush Etzion and there is no chance that we can accept the
annexation of [Jerusalem suburbs] Maale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, and Har
Homa [within municipal Jerusalem] to Israel.”50
“Only Arafat”
Chief U.S. negotiator Dennis Ross, in his 840-page account of Camp
David and the peace process, The Missing Peace, wrote: “Whenever my
exasperation with Arafat was reaching its limits, Abu Mazen, Abu Ala,
or Mohammed Dahlan (or Yossi Ginossar) would remind me that only
Arafat had the moral authority among Palestinians to compromise on
Jerusalem, refugees, and borders….Often Abu Mazen or Abu Ala or
other Palestinian negotiators would tell me ‘You prefer dealing with
us because you see us as more moderate, but we cannot deliver, only
he can.'”51 Thus, even if Abu Mazen or Abu Ala were moderate and
willing to compromise on primary issues, by their own account, they
would not be able to carry out such agreements. It is vital to
recognize the inherent limitations of the PA.
Furthermore, it remains an open question whether Abu Mazen will act
to disarm the radical groups. On January 1, 2005, he told a campaign
rally in Rafiah in Gaza that the Palestinian leadership had a duty to
protect militants wanted by Israel and indicated that he did not
intend to crack down on them.52 This view is shared by Abu Mujahed,
one of the local commanders of the Aksa Martyrs Brigades in Balata
near Nablus, who said, “We don’t believe that Abu Mazen will allow
anyone to confiscate our weapons.”53
This would be in line with Abu Mazen’s previous record when he was PA
prime minister during the short-lived hudna (temporary cease-fire) in
the summer of 2003, when he stated, “Cracking down on Hamas, Jihad,
and the Palestinian organizations is not an option at all.”54
Israel’s Post-Arafat Position
For more than four years, Israel has been subject to a relentless
barrage of suicide bombings, sniping attacks, and Kassam rockets.
Over 1,000 Israelis have been killed and thousands more have been
injured. Throughout this period the Palestinian Authority either
explicitly aided terrorism or did nothing to curb it. Israel cannot
disregard the record of the past four years and cede its very real
security needs for defensible borders, early warning stations,
intelligence-gathering capabilities, and freedom of movement.
Were Israel to withdraw from the Jordan Valley, for example, then
many of the armaments today being used by insurgents in Western Iraq
and Saudi Arabia could be diverted to the hills of the West Bank.
During the Oslo years, Israel was prepared to take risks based on the
hope that Palestinian intentions had changed. This time Israel will
not take the same risks, but will instead preserve its defensive
capabilities, particularly those pertaining to territory.
Israel’s claim has been bolstered by President Bush’s April 14, 2004,
letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon recognizing Israel’s right to
“defensible borders” that would enhance Israel’s own self-defense
capabilities instead of using the kinds of international forces
envisioned in President Clinton’s post-Camp David proposals. In
short, today, after four years of bloodshed and painful losses,
Israel has more robust requirements for its defense compared to what
was being considered in 2000.
Camp David III: Slim Chance for Success
In 2001, Abu Mazen admitted, “Had the Camp David summit been convened
again, we would have taken the same position” on the permanent status
issues.55 Abu Ala, too, expressed no regret at any missed
opportunity, asserting that he would not agree to what was offered at
Camp David “even if it were to be proposed in another 100 years from
today.”56 He also insists that all Palestinian refugees should return
to their homes in Israel, saying, “the principle of the right of
return is sacred.”57
True, Abu Mazen does not wear Arafat’s military uniform; he has
openly stated that violence does not serve the Palestinian interest;
whether he will crack down on armed groups still remains extremely
doubtful. Nevertheless, even his most forthcoming statements do not
indicate that Abu Mazen has rejected Arafat’s political legacy in any
way, and that he is more prepared to show flexibility on key issues
that separate Israel from the Palestinians.
Moreover, Palestinian leaders such as Abu Ala have yet to overcome
their fundamental rejection of Israel’s right to maintain its Jewish
character. After President Bush referred to Israel as a Jewish state
at the 2003 Aqaba summit, Abu Ala said Bush’s words “aroused great
concern among us. These words should not have been said….These are
definitions that will bring the region into turmoil.”58 Abu Ala has
even voiced interest in “starting new negotiations on Haifa, Jaffa,
and Safed.”59
Diplomatic initiatives must be preceded by a very careful assessment
of the real positions of the parties in order to first ascertain
whether bridgeable differences actually exist. Unfortunately, during
the Oslo years, the explicit declarations of Palestinian leaders were
often ignored and treated as statements for internal consumption
alone. Wishful thinking was frequently substituted for hard analysis.
This does not mean that in 2005 no “window of opportunity” exists;
rather, its actual size must be accurately measured. Indeed, in the
present context, a partial cease-fire is more realistic than
significant progress on any of the substantive issues raised at Camp
David in 2000. What emerges from the foregoing analysis is that a
full-blown, final status peace accord between Israel and the
Palestinians is probably more remote today than five years ago.
* * *
Notes
1. Warren Christopher, “Diplomacy That Can’t Be Delegated,” New York
Times, December 30, 2004.
2. Shlomo Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard: A Voyage to the
Boundaries of the Peace Process (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot Books,
2004) (Hebrew), p. 215.
3. Al-Hayat (London), November 23, 2003, cited by Yael Yehoshua, “Abu
Mazen: A Political Profile,” MEMRI Special Report No. 15, April 29,
2003.
4. Arnon Regular, “‘We Won’t Forget the Right of Return,’ Abu Mazen
Says and Earned Praise in Rafiah,” Ha’aretz, January 2, 2005.
5. Ibrahim Barzak, “Abbas Pledges Palestinian Refugees Will Return to
Homes in Israel, Endorsing Stand That Has Torpedoed Peace Efforts,
AP/San Diego Union Tribune, January 3, 2005;
6. ; and “Yasser
Arafat and Ahmad Qurei (Abu ‘Alaa) Speeches to PA Legislative Council
Prior to Vote on New Government,” MEMRI, January 15, 2004.
7. Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace
Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002 (New York: Other Press 2002),
p. 353.
8. Ha’aretz, February 17, 2002.
9. Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard, p. 190.
10. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 354.
11. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2004), p. 705.
12. Itamar Rabinovich, Waging Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2004), p. 163.
13. Uri Horowitz, “Camp David 2 and President Clinton’s Bridging
Proposals – The Palestinian View,” Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies, January 2001;
14. Bill Clinton, My Life (London: Hutchison, 2004), p. 944.
15. Maariv, April 6, 2001; Dore Gold, “Jerusalem in International
Diplomacy,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, May 2001, p. 53.
16. Yigal Carmon and Aluma Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for
a Final Settlement,” MEMRI, August 4, 2000, quoting Al-Ayyam, July
30, 2000; ;ID=IA3500
17. Ewen MacAskill, “Blair May Visit Israel to Revive Peace Process,”
Guardian, November 24, 2004;
,2763,1358070,00.html
18. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final
Settlement,” quoting Al-Ayyam, July 30, 2000.
19. Yotam Feldner, “The (Revised) Palestinian Account of Camp David,
Part II: Jerusalem and Territorial Withdrawal,” MEMRI, September 7,
2001, quoting Al-Quds, November 11, 1998;
;Area=conflict&ID=IA6901
20. Abu Mazen’s speech at the meeting of the PLO’s Palestinian
Central Council, September 9, 2000;
21. “Abu Mazen: Had Camp David Convened Again, We Would Take the Same
Positions, Part I,” MEMRI, August 1, 2001, quoting Al-Ayyam, July 28,
2001;
;ID=SP24901
22. Saul Singer, “Who’s Fault Was the Failure of Camp David,”
Jerusalem Viewpoints no. 474, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
March 15, 2002;
23. “Abu Mazen: Had Camp David Convened Again, We Would Take the Same
Positions, Part I.”
24. Palestinian National Authority, August 2, 2001, quoting Al-Ayyam,
July 28, 2001;
25. Ricki Hollander, “CNN.com Mangles Facts in Jerusalem Feature,”
September 1, 2003, quoting Al-Ayyam, July 27, 2000;
;x_context=3
26. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final
Settlement,” quoting Ha’aretz, July 27, 2000.
27. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final
Settlement,” quoting Al-Ayyam, July 30, 2000.
28. Yael Yehoshua, “Abu Mazen: A Political Profile,” MEMRI, April 29,
2003, quoting Kul Al-Arab, August 25, 2000;
;ID=SR01503
29. Amnon Kapeliouk, “Camp David Dialogues,” Le Monde Diplomatique,
September 2000;
30. Gold, Jerusalem in International Diplomacy, p. 52, quoting Voice
of Palestine, September 17, 2000.
31. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final
Settlement,” quoting Al-Quds, July 25, 2000.
32. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final
Settlement,” quoting Al-Hayat Al-Jadida.
33. Gilead Sher, Just Beyond Reach: The Israeli Palestinian
Negotiations 1999-2001 (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2001) (Hebrew), p.
410.
34. Yehoshua, “Abu Mazen: A Political Profile.”
35. “East Jerusalem and the Holy Places at the Camp David Summit,”
MEMRI, August 28, 2000, quoting Kul Al-Arab, August 18, 2000;
;Area=conflict&ID=SP12100
36. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final
Settlement,” quoting Al-Ayyam, July 29, 2000.
37. Gold, Jerusalem in International Diplomacy, p. 33.
38. Singer, “Who’s Fault Was the Failure of Camp David,” quoting
Maariv, January 23, 2002.
39. Benny Morris, “Camp David and After: An Exchange – 1. An
Interview with Ehud Barak,” New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002;
40. Yigal Carmon and Aluma Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for
a Final Settlement, Part II: Reactions and Implications,” MEMRI,
August 7, 2000, quoting Al-Ayyam, July 30, 2000;
;ID=IA3600
41. “Abu Ala: ‘The Borders of the Palestinian State Are Those Set By
the 1947 UN Partition Plan,'” MEMRI, December 21, 1998, quoting
Al-Hayyat Al-Jadida, December 21, 1998;
;Area=conflict&ID=SP1898
42. Rabinovich, Waging Peace, p. 166.
43. Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 703.
44. Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 725.
45. Ross, The Missing Peace, pp. 702-703.
46. Sher, Just Beyond Reach, p. 406.
47. Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard, p. 432.
48. Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard, p. 435.
49. Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard, p. 432.
50. Sher, Just Beyond Reach, pp. 404-405.
51. Ross, The Missing Peace.
52. Greg Myre, “Abbas Sees Duty to Shield the Militants,” New York
Times, January 2, 2005;
53. Khaled Abu Toameh, “Interview with a Gunman,” Jerusalem Post,
January 3, 2005;
ull&cid=1104643912526
54. Nadia Abou El-Magd, “Defiant Abbas Rules Out Crackdown on
Militants,” Associated Press, July 24, 2003;
55. Yehoshua, “Abu Mazen: A Political Profile,” quoting Al-Ayyam,
July 28, 2001.
56. Y. Yehoshua and B. Chernitsky, “Ahmad Qurei’- Abu ‘Alaa: A Brief
Political Profile of the Nominated Palestinian Prime Minister,”
MEMRI, September 18, 2003, quoting Al-Watan, July 25, 2001;
;Area=conflict&ID=IA14703
57. Yehoshua and Chernitsky, “Ahmad Qurei’- Abu ‘Alaa,” quoting
Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, December 20, 2000.
58. “Interview with PLC Head Ahmad Qurei (Abu Alaa),” MEMRI, July 3,
2003, quoting Al-Nahar, June 12, 2003;
;ID=SP53403#_edn1
59. Yehoshua and Chernitsky, “Ahmad Qurei’- Abu ‘Alaa,” quoting
Al-Nahar (Jerusalem), June 28, 1996.
* * *
Dore Gold is President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
Previously, he served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations
(1997-1999), Foreign Policy Advisor to former Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, and advisor to Prime Minster Ariel Sharon. He was involved
in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations between 1996 and 1998 in both the
Hebron Protocol and the Wye Plantation Conference. He is the author
of Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global
Terrorism (Regnery, 2003), and Tower of Babble: How the United
Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos (Crown Forum 2004).
David Keyes is specializing on terrorism at the Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs and is assisting Dr. Dore Gold. His most recent
Jerusalem Viewpoints, “Will a Gaza ‘Hamas-stan’ Become a Future
al-Qaeda Sanctuary?” (November 2004), was co-authored with Maj.-Gen.
(res.) Yaakov Amidror.

Azerbaijan Cites ‘Positive’ Talks On Disputed Region
RFE/RL Armenia Report
Tuesday, 04 January 2005
Baku, 4 January 2005 (RFE/RL) — Azeri President Ilham Aliyev has said
efforts to resolve the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over the disputed
Nagorno-Karabakh region are entering a new, positive, phase.
Aliyev made his remarks yesterday at a meeting of Azerbaijan’s Security
Council. He said Azerbaijani officials are using all means to ensure
negotiations with Armenia develop “positively.”
Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic Armenian exclave in Azerbaijan, has been de
facto independent since Armenian-backed forces won control over the
territory in 1994 following a six-year war.
Despite a cease-fire, Armenian-backed forces and Azerbaijani troops
continue to face off across a demilitarized zone, and shooting
occasionally erupts.
The two countries are involved in an international effort to reach a
peaceful settlement, sponsored by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
(with additional AP reporting)

RA MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO ORGANIZE 5 BUS ROUTES FOR VISITING “YERABLUR”
PANTHEON ON DECEMBER 31
YEREVAN, December 30 (Noyan Tapan). The RA Ministry of Defense will
organize the visit of the “Yerablur” pantheon for the relatives of
perished freedom fighters at the New Year’s night. According to press
service of the RA Ministry of Defense, buses given for this purpose
will go on the following routes. Route N1 – the Lamp Plant –
“Barekamutiun” station – the Sport-Concert Complex – “Yerablur”. Route
N2 – Nork Massiv (“Radiotechnique” shop) – the Avan-Arinj highway –
the “Airarat” movie house – the Railway station – the “Airenik” movie
house – “Yerablur”. Route N3 – 6th Nork Massiv – Erebuni – Nzhde
square – “Yerablur” Route N4 – Nork Massiv (market) – Victory Park –
Opera – Mashtots Avenue – “Yerablur”. Route N5 – Davidashen market –
the Republican hospital – Malatia – “Yerablur”.

Stratfor.com
Armenia: The Crush of Global Pressures
December 28, 2004 1815 GMT
Summary
The former Soviet republic of Armenia, located at the crushing center
of a series of geopolitical tectonic plates, is on the cusp of a
massive change. But unlike many of the other former Soviet republics
that are choosing between Russia and the West, Armenia’s choice is not
nearly as clear-cut — and its future will be free of the decisive
paths that may be available to other states.
Analysis
Armenia is a former Soviet republic in trouble. Its economy holds
little prospect, its people are leaving in droves and its geopolitical
space is under siege. The one factor that has helped it keep its head
above water to date is Russian sponsorship. But, as Russia racks up
geopolitical defeats, that too could soon give way.
The South Caucasus that Armenians call home is where the Russian,
Turkish and Iranian geopolitical plates converge, putting the small
states there under enormous — and continuous — pressure. Georgia and
Azerbaijan have opted to look not just to Turkey next door, but also
to Europe and the United States. Such connections make Iran —
clerical regime or not — hostile to both states, a factor that is
only enflamed when one considers that nearly a quarter of Iran’s
population is actually of Azerbaijani ethnicity.
Armenia, for reasons of war, history, and the 1915 Armenian Genocide
by the Turks, naturally looks to Iran, and especially similarly
Orthodox Christian Russia to counterbalance itself against its hostile
eastern and western neighbors.
Under the Soviet system, Armenia received its oil from Azerbaijan and
traded (as part of the Soviet Union) with Turkey. As the Soviet era
ended, however, Armenia became embroiled in a war with Azerbaijan over
the fate of Nogorno-Karabakh, a majority Armenian enclave within
Azerbaijani territory. Armenia — or if you believe Yerevan’s public
relations, Armenian volunteers supporting the Karabakh Armenians —
won the war and continues to control a large western slice of
Azerbaijani territory contingent to it. But Turks, who consider
Azerbaijanis their ethnic kin based on historical, ethnic and
linguistic grounds, slapped on a near-total embargo, limiting
Armenia’s trade options to only Georgia to the north and Iran to the
south.
Armenia has refused to negotiate down from this untenable geopolitical
position. After winning the Nogorno-Karabakh war, Armenian leaders —
backed by a fiery nationalism that is quite popular among Armenians
within both the country and the diaspora — have refused to seriously
negotiate a peace agreement with Azerbaijan that might end the
military standoff.
To be fair, the Azerbaijanis have not exactly been extending olive
branches either, but Baku believes that ultimately its oil and natural
gas revenues will allow it to build up a military force capable of
recapturing its lost territory. It likely is correct. Armenia, on the
other hand, is an economic basket case dependent upon diaspora support
for one-fifth of its gross domestic product. Nearly one-third of
Armenians have emigrated abroad to look for better opportunities since
independence in 1991, the sharpest population decline anywhere in the
world. Only three million remain. There are eight million Azerbaijanis
and 69 million Turks.
To sustain its political and military positions, Armenia largely is
dependent upon Russia, as the source of nearly all of its energy and
its de facto security guarantor. Russia’s commitment to the Armenian
relationship will soon begin to falter, and with it, quite possibly
Armenia’s chances for survival.
The dawning problem is one that Armenian President Robert Kocharian
has foreseen. In October 1999 there was a paramilitary attack against
the Armenian Parliament that resulted in the deaths of several members
of the country’s mostly pro-Russian political faction; Russia took
advantage of the situation to send special forces troops in and cement
its political influence in the small country. The attack and Moscow’s
reaction to it shook Kocharian’s view of the Russians as a dependable
ally. After all, if the Russians could not prevent its most ardent
supporters from harm, and would take advantage of Armenian instability
to strengthen its grip, was Russian protection really worth it?
Kocharian, always a moderate on the issue of Russia, began quietly
reaching out to other potential power centers in an attempt to balance
foreign interests in Yerevan.
But the coming crisis has little to do with Armenian desires of
balance, and everything to do with a new world being forced upon the
small country. In 2005 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline will
activate, and within two years its sister project, the Shah Deniz
natural gas pipeline, will most likely also enter operation. The two
parallel lines will transport Azerbaijani energy west through Georgia
and Turkey and then on to global markets. Azerbaijan and Georgia will
then be getting all of their energy needs from the two projects and
will no longer need to import any energy from Russia’s Caucasian
network.
Once that happens, Armenia will no longer be able to depend upon
Russian deliveries. On one hand, the economics of maintaining the
network of supplying Armenia — which does not even border Russia —
are questionable unless Russia can also ship petroleum to Azerbaijan
and Georgia. Economies of scale and all that.
More importantly, the Georgians are not particularly fond of Russians.
Once they have a reliable alternative to the purchase of Russian
natural gas, they are very likely — just as the Moldovans,
Ukrainians, Belarusians and Transdnesiterians have done before them —
to siphon supplies bound for elsewhere (i.e. Armenia) from the Russian
supply line that crosses their territory. That will put Russia in the
awkward position of either subsidizing a geopolitical foe, or cutting
off supplies to Armenia to spite Georgia.
Even worse than the energy issue, Georgia may soon be causing problems
for Russia’s military deployment in Armenia. Already Georgian
authorities — with full Western support — are blocking Russia from
resupplying and rotating new troops into its Georgian military base in
Akhalkalaki near the Armenian border. Once the Russians are forced out
of Akhalkalaki, as seems likely, it will become an open question
whether Tbilisi will impinge upon Russia’s ability to keep its
Armenian forces supplied.
Either way Russia’s most significant contributions to Armenian
security are about to fall into jeopardy, and, fate in the Caucasus
being a fickle thing, the Armenians must plan accordingly.
Armenia is preparing for a possible future without Russian sponsorship
in two ways. First, it is looking to its other traditional backer,
Iran, to fill the gap. The Armenians and the Iranians already are
putting together an alternative natural gas supply line to keep the
lights on in Yerevan. Unlike Russia, Iran actually borders Armenia, so
maintaining a new network is not an overburdening expense. Unlike the
massive trans-Caucasus network that connects Armenia to Russia, the
Iranian-Armenian project only requires a mere $30 million, 26-mile
pipe linking the countries’ networks together.
But Iran can never be Russia: their cultures are too dissimilar and,
unlike Russia, Iran lacks the ability to project power in a way that
might dissuade Azerbaijan or Turkey from working against Armenia. Iran
favors Armenia over its Shiite compatriots in Azerbaijan because it is
concerned about maintaining supremacy over the Turkic minority within
its own country and as a lever to keep Azerbaijan and Turkey
physically separated. It is a relationship based upon mutual interest,
but unlike Azerbaijan and its Turkish sponsor, the two are not willing
to sacrifice anything — certainly not blood — for each other. Even
if they wanted to, their military projection capabilities are
questionable to say the least.
Military intimidation in the Caspian is something that has already
backfired horrendously on the Iranians. In 2001, Iran fired warning
shots at Baku-based ships prospecting near the Iranian-Azerbaijani sea
border. Turkey responded by helping Azerbaijan host military
exercises. When it was over, several advanced fighter jets, complete
with Turkish pilots, remained behind.
Undercutting the commitment of the gas line, Iran is even working to
pipe some Turkmen gas to the Armenian market so that should Armenia
default on its energy debts — as it has in the past — Iran will be
left holding the transit fees, but Turkmenistan the energy bill.
Second, Armenia is extending Washington a tentative hand, and what
better way to do it than to support the current administration’s
primary international project? On Dec. 4, the Armenian Parliament
voted to empower Kocharian to send a small team — 46 support
personnel — to participate in the Iraqi occupation coalition. The
contingent will not be seeing any combat, and the entire affair has
been carefully orchestrated (with the United States paying for the
whole thing).
This puts Armenia on the long list of former Soviet republics and
clients which have sought to trade the Kremlin for the West: Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia,
Serbia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and most recently — and loudly —
Ukraine.
Unlike all of these states, however, Armenia cannot fully choose the
Western path.
Armenia, unlike the states aforementioned states, is not
geographically proximate to the Western states. And unlike Azerbaijan
and Georgia (who share this characteristic), Armenia has no oil
(unlike Azerbaijan) and has missed out on its chance to be a transit
route that could ship petroleum westward (unlike Georgia).
Moreover, for Armenia to truly make a go at Westernizing, it would
have to bury the hatchet with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which would mean,
at a minimum, withdrawing the bulk of its forces — volunteers — from
internationally-recognized Azerbaijani territory. In addition to that
being a non-starter at home, it would enrage the Armenian diaspora,
endangering the one international advantage that Armenia enjoys; the
diaspora’s economic support is the only thing that keeps the Armenian
economy in its pseudo-functional shape.
This commits Armenia to strategic ambiguity out of circumstance rather
than design. Russia is being cut off, the West is for all practical
purposes out of reach, and Iran is so fundamentally different that
though Armenia can be a good neighbor it could never really be a
client. Winds of change are blowing in Armenia. Russia is more
strategically distant than ever, and the West’s strategy of triggering
soft revolutions a la Georgia and Ukraine has proven reliable.
Armenia’s next presidential elections are in 2006.
Winds of change are blowing in Armenia; it is not clear whether
Armenia will survive them.

Glendale News Press
LATimes.com
Dec 29 2004
Interest low for board seats
Candidates include Armond Agakhani, Hoover alum Larry Miller and
parent Naira Khachatrian.
By Darleene Barrientos, News-Press and Leader
GLENDALE – The public school board race is not generating nearly the
same type of interest as the City Council and city clerk elections.
As of Tuesday, only incumbents Greg Krikorian and Chuck Sambar have
announced their intention to run for the three open seats on the
Glendale Unified School District board. That’s in contrast to the
crowded city races, where 10 are in line for the four open City
Council seats and six want to be city clerk.
“It is curious. It’s very curious,” said Patty Scripter, president of
the Parent Teacher Assn. of Glendale. “I’m hoping somebody will step
up, but it’s a big commitment, and there are a lot of issues facing
the school board that will make it a challenge.”
There are a few potential candidates, but they won’t confirm whether
they will run.
One of those possible candidates is Armond Agakhani, former field
representative for Assemblyman Dario Frommer and chairman of the
city’s parks, recreation and community services commission.
“I’m giving it serious consideration,” Agakhani said. “You will hear
something by the beginning of January.”
Another potential candidate was Naira Khachatrian, president of the
Armenian Parents Committee and frequent critic of the district’s
English Language Development program and Medi-Cal billing practices.
“I can’t answer that right now,” Khachatrian said. “We will wait to
see what’s going on.”
Sambar said he has been talking to people, encouraging them to run
for the spot board clerk Lina Harper will leave vacant when she steps
down in April. Hoover alumnus Larry Miller is also considering a run,
Sambar said. Efforts to reach Miller for comment were unsuccessful.
Scripter said she hopes a candidate with a similar background to
Harper’s will come forward.
“We’re hoping for someone with Lina Harper’s expertise,” she said.

Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Dec 27 2004
Armenia Sends Special Military Team to Iraq
JTW (27 December 2004)
Armenian Defense Minister Serge Sarkisyan said that Armenia would
send 46 military experts to Iraq to operate as part of the Polish
contingent. The minister said that the U.S. command and the Polish
division would arrange logistics support, medical services, housing
and utilities for the Armenian experts. The Armenian Defense Ministry
received approval from parliament to
send the experts to Iraq for a year.
There is an Armenian minority group in Iraq, and according to the
Iraq experts, Armenians in Iraq will be under threat after the
decision. The Iraqi resistance groups see the states that send
soldiers to Iraq `hostile’ and make attacks against these countries
as seen in the Madrid Case.
Armenia is a relatively poor and the country has been suffering from
economic catastrophes. Analyzers say the decision was taken in order
to attract the American support for Armenia in the Caucasus:
`Armenia takes a high risk by sending military peoples to Iraq. Iraqi
militants may attack Armenian targets in Armenia and around the
world. Apart from this kind of attacks, Yerevan must consider the
safety of the Armenian minority in Iraq. The arrival of Armenian
military people to Iraq will put the Armenians in Iraq at risk’ said
Dr. James Trivar, international politics expert. According to Trivar,
the Armenian military team could be perceived as a contribution to
occupation of Iraq by US led countries.

Tehran wants to develop military cooperation with Azerbaijan
AFX Asia (Focus)
Dec 23, 2004
BAKU (AFX) – Iran wants to develop military cooperation with
neighbouring Azerbaijan, Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani said
after meeting his Azeri counterpart Safar Abbiyev.
The Azeri minister was invited to visit Tehran. The defence ministry
said consultations on military cooperation between the two countries’
would continue.

Armenian paper accuses Azeri leader of provocative comments on ties with Russia
Ayots Ashkhar, Yerevan
22 Dec 04
Text of unattributed report by Armenian newspaper Ayots Ashkhar on
22 December headlined “Aliyev’s provocation”
We would not have paid attention to the statement made by the chairman
of the Russian State Duma, Boris Gryzlov, in Yerevan that Armenia is
Russia’s outpost in the South Caucasus, if it were not for [Azerbaijani
President] Ilham Aliyev’s comments.
Aliyev’s attempt to describe Boris Gryzlov’s idea as something that
allegedly casts a doubt on Armenia’s independence was a well-thought
out and careful provocation addressed to the world community, as well
as to relevant “listeners” of the “Armenian audience”.
Addressing the world community, Ilham Aliyev first aimed to attract
Western countries’ attention to the word “outpost”. As is known, in
the recent period, the main trend in processes in CIS countries has
been a certain limitation of Russia’s influence on the post-Soviet
area. So within the framework of this process of forming a negative
attitude towards Armenia, it was advantageous to Aliyev to change
intentionally the meaning of the word “outpost” used by Gryzlov,
describing it as something that questions Armenia’s independence.
But the point is that the word “outpost” means that a certain state
in any specific region is a reliable point of support for this or
that superpower. For instance, for tens of years Israel has been
considered to be the USA’s outpost in the Middle East, but this does
not at all mean that Arab countries are dealing with a state that
has lost its independence.
Incidentally, the West did not bother to reply to Aliyev’s
comments, while some forces in Armenia are speculating on them with
pleasure. They even tried to assess this fact as a slap in the face
of independent Armenia from the Azerbaijani president and as an
obvious disgrace.
Incidentally, how will they respond if these forces and functionaries,
which have obvious pro-Western orientation, come to power tomorrow and
if any American official says for instance that “Armenia is the USA’s
outpost in the South Caucasus” or “Armenia is an outpost of the West”.
Certainly, it was absolutely expectable that a member of the Armenian
Pan-National Movement, David Shakhnazaryan, commented on this, saying
that not Armenia, but its current authorities are Russia’s outpost
in the South Caucasus. But how should we understand the statements
of some top officials that “the Republic of Armenia is a sovereign
state and cannot be an outpost of any country”? And they make such
statements at the moment when, for instance, the leadership of Georgia
is trying to prove by all means that Georgia is an outpost of the
West in the South Caucasus. Can we conclude that Georgia is trying
to give up its sovereignty? Or is it really advantageous to Georgia
to have such status?
Incidentally, for many years Armenia has been an outpost of the West in
the whole of Asia. Maybe time has come for us to think that remaining
Russia’s outpost in parallel with the improvement of Russia-West
relations, we shall be able to restore our traditional status of the
West’s outpost as well and strengthen our own positions.
These responses to Ilham Aliyev’s simple provocation testify that due
to our politicians’ different orientation they do not understand or
do not want to accept the simple fact that in the modern world, being
an outpost of any superpower that has strong nuclear potential is not
only a serious security guarantee, but also an obvious advantage in
comparison with neighbours.