Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, April 4, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 65
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Timetable set for Russian troops to leave Georgia
*Washington rewards Yerevan’s interest in NATO
*Dushanbe considers military help from China, Pakistan
AGREEMENTS SIGNED ON RUSSIAN MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM GEORGIA
On Friday, March 31, Georgia’s First Deputy Defense Minister, Mamuka
Kudava, and Russia’s Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-General
Alexei Maslov, signed a set of agreements on the withdrawal of Russian
forces from the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases and other Russian
military installations in Georgia.
The agreements concern the implementation of the May 30, 2005, Joint
Statement, signed by Georgia’s then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome
Zourabichvili with her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on the
cessation of functioning of those bases and installations and
withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia by 2008. The Russian side
carried out an initial stage of the withdrawal last August (see EDM,
June 3, August 1, 16, 2005).
The documents just signed in Sochi include an agreement on the
timeframe and modalities of functioning and withdrawal of Russian
forces from Georgia and an agreement on the transit of Russian
military cargoes and personnel through Georgia’s territory.
The Akhalkalaki base is to be emptied of most of its heavy equipment
during 2006 and to be completely closed by October 1, 2007, with a
possible extension until December 31, 2007, subject to weather
conditions. The Batumi base is to ship out most of its heavy equipment
during 2007 and to be completely closed before the end of 2008. The
two garrisons total approximately 3,000 Russian military personnel at
present. The Batumi base will be the last to close because it serves
as an evacuation point for heavy equipment by sea to Russia from
various points in Georgia.
During the withdrawal process, the Russian side shall retain:
a) the Gonio exercise range on the Black Sea shore outside Batumi, to
be used for logistical operations related to the evacuation, not for
exercises;
b) the Russian officers’ hostel in Mtskheta outside Tbilisi, a
way-station on the Russian forces’ evacuation route to North Ossetia;
c) the Soviet-era Kojori communications station also outside Tbilisi,
to be used jointly by Russia and Georgia under Georgian jurisdiction;
and
d) the Tbilisi building of the Headquarters of the Russian Group of
Forces in the Transcaucasus, in order for those headquarters to manage
the withdrawal process.
All of these installations are also to be handed over to Georgia in
2008. The bases shall function during this period “in a withdrawal
mode,” i.e., without conducting firing practice or other combat
exercises, essentially packing up. Russia shall allocate 2.166 billion
rubles from its state budget in 2006 through 2008 to finance the
withdrawal of its forces from Georgia. For its part, Georgia
authorizes the use of its air space, highways, railroads, and ports
for the transport of Russian military equipment and personnel out of
Georgia.
It is informally understood that most of the Russian personnel and
some two-thirds of the hardware shall relocate to Russia’s North
Caucasus Military District, while one-third of the hardware is to be
transferred to Russia’s base at Gyumri in Armenia. The Russian side
undertakes not to transfer that equipment to another party, meaning
Armenian forces.
Russia retains limited, strictly regulated transit rights to supply
its forces in Armenia through Georgian territory in the future. Any
Russian military equipment transported via Georgia to Armenia is not
to be handed over to other forces (i.e., Armenian) and not to be
deployed in any conflict zone (i.e., Karabakh and Armenian-occupied
territories inside Azerbaijan). The content of Russian military
transit cargoes shall be agreed by Russia and Georgia one year in
advance. Cargoes must not include mass-destruction weapons, their
components, or any dual-use nuclear, chemical, or biological
substances. Georgia has the right to refuse the transit of any Russian
cargo that poses a threat to national security or violates any of
those conditions.
The March 31 agreement (like the May 30, 2005, Joint Statement) does
not cover Russia’s Gudauta base, which is located in Abkhaz-controlled
territory. Moscow has claimed since 2003 that it “closed” the base,
but has not allowed international verification at the site. In fact, a
Russian garrison has continued to be stationed at the base all along,
with weapons stockpiles and helicopters. Moscow seeks OSCE approval
for the base to be assigned to Russia’s “peacekeeping” troops in
Abkhazia. Georgia’s Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili noted,
“They’ve been lying for years, telling us that the base was closed
… We will not allow them to kick sand in our face” (Imedi TV,
Rustavi-2 TV, March 31).
On March 28, unidentified Abkhaz gunmen stole arms from the Gudauta
base and some of them were wounded in an exchange of fire with the
Russian garrison during the getaway. The March 31 agreement does not
pertain to Russia’s “peacekeeping” contingents in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. The Georgian parliament seeks a formula for replacing those
contingents with a genuine, international peacekeeping operation.
(Interfax, Prime-News, March 31)
–Vladimir Socor
U.S. ANNOUNCES MAJOR NEW AID PACKAGE FOR ARMENIA
The United States has officially committed itself to providing 5.65
million in additional economic assistance to Armenia, in a further
indication of its deepening ties with the South Caucasus country. The
sum, substantial by Armenian standards, is to be provided over the
next five years under the Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge
Account (MCA) program aimed at promoting good governance and economic
reforms around the world.
The administration included Armenia on the list of 16 developing
countries eligible for MCA funding when it unveiled the program two
years ago. The cash-strapped government in Yerevan jumped at the
opportunity to meet some of its pressing socio-economic needs. The MCA
compact that was signed by senior U.S. and Armenian officials in
Washington on March 27 is the product of Yerevan’s lengthy
negotiations with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a
U.S. government agency handling the scheme.
Speaking at the signing ceremony, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice described the agreement as a “testament to the hard work and
dedication of the Armenian people and their elected government.” Rice
stressed that provision of the aid is conditional on the proper
conduct by the Armenian authorities of parliamentary and presidential
elections due in 2007 and 2008 respectively. “These are important
commitments and the United States stands ready to help Armenia to
ensure that its upcoming elections are free and fair,” she said.
Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian assured her that his
government would do its best to honor those commitments. “Our task
until then is to partner with the United States and European
governments to implement the necessary corrective steps to improve the
conditions necessary for an honest and fair expression of people’s
voices,” he said.
The large-scale aid will be channeled into rural regions of Armenia
that have seen little development despite a decade of nationwide
economic growth. The main segment, worth 6 million, will be spent on
upgrading the country’s malfunctioning irrigation networks, which date
to Soviet times. Another million will be used for capital repairs of
about 1,000 kilometers of battered rural roads. U.S. and Armenian
officials say these two infrastructure projects will directly benefit
75% of the approximately one million Armenians dependent on
farming. The first major installment of the aid is expected to be
disbursed early next year.
Interestingly, Armenia has already been one of the world’s leading
per-capita recipients of U.S. economic assistance, which is approved
by Congress and has totaled .6 billion since 1992. The size of
this “regular” aid is commonly attributed to the strength of the
Armenian-American lobby on Capitol Hill. But finding an explanation
for Armenia’s inclusion in MCA, which is single-handedly decided by
the Bush administration, is a more difficult task. Unlike neighboring
Georgia (the only other former Soviet state covered by MCA), Armenia
has no ambition to join NATO and maintains close military and
political ties with Russia.
Many Armenian observers regard the promised MCA funds as a further
incentive for President Robert Kocharian and his most likely
successor, Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian, to accept a compromise
solution to the Karabakh conflict. U.S. officials say a framework
peace deal may still be achieved this year despite the collapse of a
crucial Armenian-Azerbaijani summit in France last February. In this
regard, local observers consider very significant Rice’s remark that
Armenians have an “elected government.” (The State Department strongly
criticized the 2003 Armenian presidential and parliamentary
elections.) Haykakan Zhamanak, a pro-Western Yerevan daily critical of
the ruling regime, editorialized on April 1 that Washington is thereby
“removing all questions about Robert Kocharian’s legitimacy.” A
commentator for another paper, 168 Zham, went further, speculating
that the Americans are disinterested in Armenia’s democratization
because “our society is overwhelmingly pro-Russian.”
The United States was quite cautious in criticizing reports of serious
fraud during last November’s constitutional referendum in Armenia (and
parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan) — a far cry from its tough
reaction to the disputed presidential ballot in Belarus on March
19. MCC chief executive John Danilovich expressed concern at the
Armenian authorities’ handling of the referendum but promptly lauded
their “commitment to sustaining the democratic reforms” after
receiving relevant assurances from Kocharian last January. In a March
27 speech at a conference organized by the Armenian Assembly of
America, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried said
Washington is “taking at face value assurances from the Armenian
government” that the 2007 and 2008 elections will be democratic. Many
Armenians are far more skeptical on this score.
By providing extra aid to Armenia Washington may also be rewarding the
government’s ongoing efforts to forge closer security links with NATO
and America in particular. “We do support Armenia’s efforts to
strengthen its relations with the Euro-Atlantic community,” Fried
said, commending the Kocharian administration for seeking greater
“balance in its relations with the West and the Russians.” Fried’s
deputy Matthew Bryza welcomed “considerable progress made in this
regard over the past year” after holding talks with Armenian leaders
in Yerevan on March 7. “I don’t think that the government of Armenia
can move at a pace that for us is too quick,” Bryza told a news
conference. “But we are very happy with the level of cooperation. This
has been a significant year for U.S.-Armenian security cooperation.”
(Haykakan Zhamanak, April 1; 168 Zham, March 30-31; RFE/RL Armenia
Report, March 7, 28; Text of Daniel Fried’s address to the Armenian
Assembly of America, )
–Em il Danielyan
TAJIK MILITARY WEARY OF NATO
Tajikistan’s military leadership has expressed public concern over the
country’s recent trend toward closer involvement with the NATO
Alliance as a mechanism through which Dushanbe will gain enhanced
military and security capabilities. The apparent turn in the direction
of Tajikistan’s stated aims in this sphere sends a worrying signal
throughout the region at a difficult time for the evolving and dynamic
relationship formed between the Alliance and the Central Asian
militaries. However, the weak Tajik armed forces are desperately in
need of multiple sources of foreign assistance and thus seek to
diversify these sources beyond traditional security partners to
include Pakistan.
Colonel-General Sherali Khayrulloyev, Tajikistan’s defense minister,
explained in Dushanbe on March 29 that he still considers Russia to be
Tajikistan’s most reliable military and security partner. “The Tajik
armed forces have been set up thanks to Russia’s assistance and
contribution. Military-technical cooperation between our countries is
at a very high level today.” Khayrulloyev pointed to Tajikistan
sending 300 to 400 servicemen annually to Russian military academies
since 1994. These courses of study use a full training curriculum
lasting three to five years. In contrast, programs sending servicemen
to other countries, such as China, India, and the United States,
provide only short-term courses lasting from one to six months, mainly
because of the necessity to teach the servicemen a foreign
language. Most surprisingly, Khayrulloyev weighed the opportunity of
forming closer links with NATO against more typical arrangements with
Moscow, concluding, “Soviet standards are no worse.” Such attitudes
are unsurprising in many ways, given the continued residue of
Soviet-trained servicemen within these structures; as such thinking is
endemic within the Ministry of Defense itself. Indeed, Tajikistan was
slow to join the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which it
finally did in 2000, and a combination of factors has made difficult
its relationship within the PfP process. (Interfax, Moscow, March 29).
Of course, Russian and Tajik servicemen are regularly engaged in joint
combat training. A joint exercise of the 92nd Motorized Rifle
Regiment, part of the 201st Russian Motorized Rifle Division based in
Dushanbe, and cadets from the Tajik Ministry of Defense military
institute will commence exercises at the Lohur training ground on
April 4. The focus will be battalion-level defensive actions, and will
be Russian led, funded, and instill Russian military-thinking
practices on Tajik counterparts. Tajik brigades and Russian motorized
rifle regiments have just concluded a joint exercise at the Mumirak
and Sumbula training grounds in late March.
Joint training is cost effective and the preferred option for the weak
Tajik military, especially when its high-profile exercises with Russia
can project a positive image for its beleaguered armed
forces. Nonetheless, Dushanbe does want to conduct its own training,
though often to advertise its need for additional foreign
assistance. A recent one-day drill was conducted at the Sumbula
military range (Khuroson District of the southern Khatlon Region),
codenamed Masnad-2006 (Position-2006). It involved divisions from the
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Emergency Situations, State Border
Protection Committee, and the Interior Ministry’s Directorate for the
Khatlon Region. Carried out in three stages with more than 3,000
servicemen and officers from the relevant agencies participating, the
exercise was intended to display competence in the face of a
theoretical terrorist threat. The scenario rehearsed a response to an
international terrorist group attacking two detachments’ border troops
and taking hostages. The Tajik Ministry of Defense said it expected to
hold similar drills with the involvement of the Chinese armed forces
in Mountainous Badakhshon Autonomous Region in the summer (Asia-Plus
News, March 28).
In addition to looking toward China for extra help with its armed
forces, Dushanbe also envisages closer links with Pakistan. A
Pakistani military delegation led by General Shahid Tirmizey, a
committee chair from the Pakistani Armed Forces General Staff, made a
two-day fact-finding visit to Tajikistan on March 28-29. The
delegation saw the Fakhrobod firing range, where a demonstration
exercise was held. The delegation also held meetings with Salohiddin
Nasriddinov, deputy Tajik minister of foreign affairs, as well as the
leadership of the State Border Protection Committee and the Ministry
of Defense (Avesta, March 28; Itar-Tass, March 29).
Khayrulloyev’s overtly pro-Russian remarks must be seen in context. On
March 28 President Emomali Rahmonov endorsed a single blueprint for
combating terrorism and extremism, aimed at raising the effectiveness
of the fight against modern threats in accordance with Tajikistan’s
international commitments. The blueprint itself therefore aims to
ensure the closest possible collaboration among the power-wielding and
law-enforcement agencies and Tajik state structures responsible for
financial control with their counterparts from regional countries and
other international anti-terrorist organizations in the fight against
terrorism.
If this venture is to avoid being purely another paper effort to prove
that the authorities are attempting to do something about the possible
terrorist threat to the country, then Dushanbe will need help from a
variety of sources. Khayrulloyev, in his efforts to deliver success in
this area, fully understands the risks involved in closer integration
with NATO and the upheaval to the weak Tajik armed forces that could
ensue. He may, in this context alone, want to signal greater readiness
to rely on Russian help, while looking to China and Pakistan for
support that will not prove over-burdening, which some in the Tajik
Ministry of Defense believe NATO’s help would prove in the long term.
–Roger N. McDermott
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation,
is edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those
of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the
content of EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in
error, please respond to [email protected].
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.
The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)
Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.