THE CAUCASUS: FROZEN CONFLICTS AND CLOSED BORDERS
Washington
June 18, 2008
DC
As prepared for delivery
Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss the situation in the South
Caucasus region of Europe.
Let me begin with a characterization of the overall historical
context. In 1989, a wave of democracy began sweeping eastward from
its origins in Central Europe. Starting that year, the peoples of
Central and Eastern Europe threw off the failed systems of the past
and invested their hopes and energies in a future of democratic, free
market societies well-integrated with the transatlantic community. The
results were so astonishing and successful that it is hard today to
recall the divided Europe of less than a generation past. Europe in
its narrower definition, with the partial exception of the Balkans,
is now united and integrated through either membership or close
association with the European Union or NATO, or both.
The question remains, however, about the reach of this wave of freedom
and democracy. Will it, and can it, extend to the easternmost reaches
of Wider Europe?
The issue of whether the region between the Black Sea and the Caspian,
the south Caucasus, can in fact join Europe and its institutions is
being contested as we speak.
The policy of the United States in this region is unambiguous: we want
to help the nations of this region travel along the same path toward
freedom, democracy and market-based economies that so many of their
neighbors to the West have traveled. We believe that the ultimate
place of these nations – which are, after all, a part of Wider Europe
– ought to depend on their own choice and their own success, or lack
of success, in meeting the standards of democracy, the rule of law,
and responsible foreign and regional policies that the transatlantic
community has established. We do not believe that any outside power
– neither Russia nor any other – should have a sphere of influence
over these countries; no outside power should be able to threaten,
pressure, or block the sovereign choice of these nations to join with
the institutions of Europe and the transatlantic family if they so
choose and we so choose.
Georgia has made a choice to join NATO. The United States and the
nations of NATO welcome this choice, and Georgia’s neighbors should
respect it.
Azerbaijan has chosen to develop its relations with NATO at a slower
pace, and we respect its choice. Armenia’s situation is different,
due to its history and currently complicated relations with Azerbaijan
and Turkey, and we respect its choice as well.
To be sure, these nations and Russia need to have good neighborly
relations, based on a regard for one another’s interests and just basic
geographic proximity, but also based on respect for the sovereignty
of the nations of the South Caucasus, and, in particular, their right
to find their own way in the world. The United States does not see
itself in some 19th century contest with Russia for "influence,"
much less a sphere of influence in this region or any region. This
is not zero-sum. All countries – the countries of the South Caucasus,
Russia, and the transatlantic community – would benefit from a set of
benign relations among all the players, great and small, in the South
Caucasus. To be blunt: the United States does not seek to exclude
Russia from this region. That would be neither wise nor possible.
In looking at the region as a whole, our strategic interests are
focused on several issues: the advance of freedom and democracy;
security, including counterterrorism and peaceful resolution of
separatist conflicts; and energy. Our first strategic interest I
have already described–the spread of freedom and democracy beyond
the Black Sea and toward the Caspian. Each of the Caucasus countries
has made important strides in this area, but each has further to go
before we can say it has irrevocably chosen this path.
On the second interest, we are working with each of these governments
to find peaceful ways of dealing with the separatist conflicts
of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia that stem from
the breakup of the Soviet Union. We are also cooperating with each
government in the global fight against terrorism, and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and biological.
On the third issue, we believe it is in the interests of the
Euro-Atlantic community that Caspian gas and oil resources reach
European and global markets expeditiously, free from monopolistic
pressures and geographic chokepoints.
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are ancient nations, but they are
still new as nation states. They are navigating a double transition:
they must throw off the failed communist institutions of the past and
build new ones to replace them, including in many cases entirely new
systems – such as modern banking and financial systems to support
their newly free economies – where none existed before. The legacy
of Soviet communist institutions and poor governance is a burden; as
are the historical issues of ethnic strife that were exacerbated by
the Soviet experience. On top of this, these countries are building
new identities as modern, sovereign nation-states.
Despite sharing some common challenges, each of these three countries
has taken its own path in addressing these challenges, and the picture
on the ground in each country is mixed.
I would like to discuss these three states in turn, both the challenges
they face, and our efforts to support them.
AZERBAIJAN
We have welcomed our progress with Azerbaijan in recent years on
issues of security cooperation and diversification of energy supplies
and pipelines, and have good, productive relations with Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev.
We value Azerbaijan’s troop contributions – 150 soldiers in Iraq and
45 in Afghanistan; President Aliyev’s recent promise to double the
troop level in Afghanistan would put Azerbaijan’s troop strength up
around 90.
Azerbaijan also contributed to NATO’s peacekeeping force in Kosovo,
with a platoon embedded with a Turkish unit, up until Kosovo declared
its independence. We appreciate Azerbaijan’s steady offer of unlimited,
free overflight and landing rights for our supply network for Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This
cooperation has proceeded in parallel with advances in Azerbaijan’s
relations with NATO.
Azerbaijan has now adopted its second Individual Partnership Action
Plan, demonstrating to NATO and the United States its commitment to
reforming its armed services and cooperation with the transatlantic
alliance. Azerbaijan has also taken decisive steps to combat terrorism
by rounding up terrorist networks in Azerbaijan.
In the area of energy, Azerbaijan is emerging as one of Europe’s
critical, near-term alternative sources of natural gas. Azerbaijani
gas can open the way for a new network of pipelines that will help the
market, rather than a monopoly, determine the price and availability
of a critical commodity. As Azerbaijan has developed a strong role as
an energy source, it is also maintaining constructive relations with
Russia and its neighbors on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea,
and with Georgia.
Azerbaijan has had the world’s fastest growing economy for three
consecutive years. This growth is being driven by energy resources,
which present both a tremendous opportunity but also a challenge for
the government. The government deserves credit for stabilizing the
economy after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Its challenge now is
to manage the enormous influx of energy wealth without distorting or
corrupting the economy and political system.
The government has stated its intention to avoid what some call
"the energy trap" and its State Oil Fund has helped it tackle the
macroeconomic challenge of managing windfall energy revenues. The
Azerbaijani government has taken the first steps to improve
the business environment by implementing a "one-stop shop" for
registration of new businesses. But the business and investment climate
in Azerbaijan continues to be difficult, and much still remains to be
done to attract foreign investment outside of the energy sector. We
have urged the government to do more to limit and reverse widespread
corruption.
Progress in both economic and political reform will be necessary to
advance our shared objectives. Democracy has been part of Azerbaijan’s
tradition. In its brief period of independence after the Russian
Revolution, Azerbaijan established a democratic constitution, and
Azerbaijan has an opportunity to build on that proud tradition as
its next Presidential election approaches this October.
Yet the United States has been concerned for some time about a
relative lag in democratic reforms in Azerbaijan, including respect
for fundamental freedoms. We remain particularly concerned about
the state of media freedoms there. Although five journalists were
released by presidential pardon in December 2007, which we welcomed,
three still remain in prison. The jailed include editors of the leading
independent and opposition newspapers. In addition, the government has
failed to seriously investigate numerous cases of violence against
journalists. Perhaps as a result, much of the domestic electronic
media exercises self-censorship by failing, for example, to cover the
activities of opposition parties. We are working with Azerbaijan to
improve journalists’ professional and ethical standards. During my
last visit to Baku, I met with young journalism students studying in
an independent institution. I was impressed by their patriotism and
simultaneous commitment to democracy. The government should nurture
and support independent journalists and, as it does, it will have
our support.
We are also troubled by continuing restrictions on freedom of assembly.
Civil society and opposition groups are often relegated to
holding public rallies and demonstrations in remote locations
often inaccessible by public transport. We note that Parliament
recently passed a new law on public assembly with some welcome
features. Implementation of the law will be key.
We hope that Azerbaijan will use the presidential election in October
– not only election day and the vote count but also, importantly,
the conduct of the campaign – to demonstrate substantial democratic
progress. One important factor in measuring the conduct of ‘free
and transparent’ elections is domestic elections monitoring, and
unfortunately, Azerbaijani courts recently deregistered and annulled
Azerbaijan’s largest independent domestic election-monitoring NGO. The
United States would like to see this NGO’s registration restored. While
it is important that Azerbaijan permit a full and unfettered election
observation by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,
in fulfillment of its OSCE commitments, the determination by the
OSCE and other international observation missions on the conduct of
the elections could be hindered by the lack of a domestic election
monitoring effort.
One of Azerbaijan’s greatest challenges is to find a peaceful
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The United States,
in its role as co-Chair of the Minsk Group alongside our French
and Russian colleagues, continues to actively pursue a diplomatic
resolution of this problem. While we support Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity, Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status must be determined through
negotiations and a spirit of compromise that respects international
legal and political principles. An important step forward was taken
by President Aliyev and Armenian President Sargsian when they met for
the first time in St. Petersburg on June 6 to discuss the resolution of
the conflict, after which they met with the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. Both
sides reaffirmed their commitment to working within the Minsk process
and expressed their readiness to continue discussions on the "Basic
Principles," a document developed under the auspices of the Minsk Group
that lays out the basic framework for a lasting, peaceful settlement.
As Azerbaijan’s income from its rich oil and gas resources rises
dramatically, we continue to urge its leadership to use these revenues
wisely for both current and future generations. We hope that the
Azerbaijani government will avoid the temptation of thinking that
renewed fighting is a viable option. In our view, it is not. We
have noted our concern with persistent bellicose rhetoric by some
Azerbaijani officials. We have urged the government of Azerbaijan to
focus on the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and
its resultant benefits for regional integration, which will lead to
greater prosperity and stability for the entire Caucasus region.
In sum, Azerbaijan has the opportunity to accelerate its economic and
political development, to build on its successes in establishing good
relations in its region, and to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.
ARMENIA
Armenia can be a great success story, but its recent history has
been one of difficulties. The Armenian people have demonstrated
extraordinary resilience through their long history of hardship
and tragedy. Achieving independence from the Soviet Union in 1991,
the new republic was also rising from the ruins of a catastrophic
earthquake in 1988. That event mobilized aid from around the world,
including the first U.S. humanitarian mission in the Soviet Union,
and a wave of support from Armenian Diaspora groups.
This effort to rebuild was strained by the war in Nagorno-Karabakh,
which led to an energy embargo and closed borders with both Azerbaijan
and Turkey, exacerbating the post-independence political and economic
stresses.
Despite those hardships, however, the last decade has witnessed
an economic turnaround in Armenia, with double-digit GDP growth
year upon year coupled with, until recently, low inflation. The
Diaspora community around the world continues to extend its hand
to Armenia, in both humanitarian and philanthropic giving and direct
investment. Through their advocacy and indications of a will to reform,
Armenia in 2006 entered into a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact
worth $236 million. I also can’t let this opportunity pass without
thanking Armenia for a recent doubling of its troop level in Kosovo
to 70 and the continuation of the Armenian troop presence in Iraq,
which numbers 44.
Yet Armenia faces serious challenges today: geographic isolation,
widespread corruption, and recent setbacks to its democratic
development. Supporting Armenia’s regional integration is a particular
priority for the United States.
One major step toward regional integration would be a peaceful, just,
and lasting settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. During the
past two years, the parties have moved closer than ever to a framework
agreement based on a set of Basic Principles developed through
intensive negotiations under the auspices of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs.
Achieving normal relations between Armenia and Turkey is another
principle concern. As a key part of that effort, the United States
supports the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. The status quo is
not helpful to anyone. Fortunately, some progress has been achieved in
recent years: there are regular charter flights between Yerevan and
Istanbul and other flights to Antalya; bus connections via Georgia
are numerous; and trade with Turkey through Georgia is common. Both
countries would greatly benefit from increased, direct trade with
the other, connecting their electrical grids, and implementing
other measures natural to neighbors. The U.S. also supports more
cross-border dialogue and cooperation between the people of Armenia
and Turkey through research initiatives, conferences, and exchange
programs. An example of this cross-border exchange, supported by U.S.
assistance funds, was the performance of the Armenian Komitas Quartet
in Istanbul last week, and the scheduled performance of the Turkish
Bosphorus Quartet in Yerevan today.
Reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey, however, will require
dealing with sensitive, painful issues. Turkey needs to come to terms
with a dark chapter in its history: the mass killings and forced exile
of up to 1.5 million Armenians at the end of the Ottoman Empire. That
will not be easy, just as it has not been easy for the United States
to come to terms with dark periods of our own past. For its part,
Armenia must be ready to acknowledge the existing border and disavow
any claim on the territory of modern Turkey, and respond constructively
to any efforts Turkey may make.
In the short term, however, Armenia’s greatest challenge is to
strengthen its democratic institutions and processes, including respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and regain democratic
momentum lost after the significantly flawed presidential election
in February and its violent aftermath. There had been some positive
signs before the election, such as the invitation of a robust election
observation mission from OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR), and certain electoral reforms. But our
concerns grew during the lead-up to the vote, when international
observers noted a biased media environment, with the state media
vilifying former President Ter-Petrossian and other key opposition
candidates. Media outlets such as Radio Liberty that provided balanced
coverage to opposition candidates faced intimidation and harassment,
which continues to this day. The pro-opposition TV station, Gala TV,
continues to be investigated, ostensibly for tax reasons, in what
is widely seen as a government move to silence coverage viewed as
unfavorable to the ruling party.
The election itself was marred by credible claims of ballot stuffing,
vote buying, intimidation and even beatings of poll workers and
proxies, and other irregularities. Recounts were requested, but
ODIHR observers noted "shortcomings in the recount process, including
discrepancies and mistakes, some of which raise questions over the
impartiality of the [electoral commissions] concerned." OSCE observers
were also harassed in the period following the election.
When peaceful mass protests followed the disputed vote, the United
States and others pressed continuously for the government of Armenia
to refrain from responding with force. However, on March 1, within
hours of formal assurances by the Armenian government that they would
avoid a confrontation, police entered the square. Ensuing clashes
later in the day between demonstrators and security personnel led to
at least 10 deaths and hundreds of injuries. Mr. Ter-Petrossian was
taken to his residence by security forces, where he appeared to remain
under de facto house arrest for weeks. A State of Emergency (SOE) was
declared in Yerevan. Freedom of assembly and basic media freedoms were
revoked. Opposition newspapers were forced to stop publishing and news
websites were blocked, including Radio Liberty. The government then
filled the information void with articles and broadcasts disseminating
the government version of events and attacking the opposition.
While it was alleged that some protesters were armed before the March
1 crackdown, there have been no convictions to date on such charges.
Mass arrests of opposition activists, especially demonstration
organizers, soon followed. Since then, numerous activists have been
imprisoned on questionable charges. Some have fled the country while
others remain in hiding. Of the cases that have come to court,
several defendants have been given harsh sentences for seemingly
small offenses.
I contacted now-President Sargsian on March 1 and shortly afterwards
asked my colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza, to go
to Yerevan, where he met with all sides, including then-President
Kocharian, President-elect Sargsian and Mr. Ter-Petrossian. Since
then, we have sought to foster dialogue between the parties with the
aim of restoring full freedom of speech and assembly and securing the
opposition’s pledge that protests will be peaceful. We have criticized
the government’s crackdown and have called for the immediate release of
all those who have been detained for political reasons. The CEO of the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Ambassador Danilovich, sent
a public letter on March 11 to President Kocharian warning that the
election and post-election events threatened Armenia’s eligibility for
MCC funding absent a demonstrated commitment to democratic practices.
The Armenian government allowed the State of Emergency to expire
after 20 days, which allowed re-establishment of most print and
on-line media freedoms, though coverage of the political opposition
is still limited on television, where almost all stations are
loyal to the government. In addition, many of the SOE restrictions
were hastily written into law before the SOE expired, giving the
government vast latitude to prohibit and prevent demonstrations and
rallies. Furthermore, Armenia’s tax authorities have begun intimidating
investigations of four opposition newspapers. While the military
presence on the street has ended, the police presence remains palpable,
particularly in Freedom Square, where access is still being denied to
opposition activists who participated in post-election protests there.
Reports of intimidation and arrests of opposition activists continue.
The United States has called for an independent investigation into the
events of March 1 and 2, and prosecution of anyone who used violence
on either side. We seek full restoration of all basic freedoms in both
law and practice. We seek a national dialogue among the government,
opposition, and civil society leaders to chart new electoral reforms
and perhaps conclude a "contract for democracy" that will ensure
freedom of assembly in exchange for a pledge to protest lawfully and
peacefully. We want to see the release of all those who have been
arrested for political reasons. And we seek timely, substantive and
dramatic steps by the government of Armenia to restore the democratic
momentum.
Our efforts to assist Armenia during this crisis have been hampered by
the fact that we have not had an ambassador in Yerevan for nearly two
years. The position was due to be filled in 2006, but the nomination
got caught up in the controversy here at home over what words should
be used to describe the atrocities that the Ottoman Empire committed
against Armenians in the early years of the 20th century.
Whatever language we choose to describe this horrific period,
the United States can best help Armenia – and Armenian-American
relations – by having an experienced U.S. ambassador at the helm
in Yerevan. The setbacks in Armenia’s democratic development deeply
concern us as long-time friends and partners of the Armenian people,
and we need all of our resources to conduct a full dialogue with
Armenian officials at the highest levels of government. Armenia’s
leaders are at a crossroads in their path toward democracy and they
have much work to do. We are committed to working with Armenia as it
takes these steps, as we hope it will.
GEORGIA
Before the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia was often described as a
country near collapse – a "failed state." Since the Rose Revolution,
however, Georgia has enjoyed rapid growth and a marked decline in
corruption. The World Bank named Georgia "the world’s leading economic
reformer" in its 2007 "Doing Business" report, and Georgia is now
rated by the World Bank as the 18th easiest country in the world in
which to do business, placing it ahead of many EU member states.
The Georgian government has initiated judicial reform, established
fair standards of entrance into universities, and made exemplary
progress in combating trafficking in persons.
Georgia’s challenge at home is to build strong democratic institutions
and processes to match its commitment to economic and commercial
reform.
Notwithstanding progress on democratization since the Rose Revolution,
Georgia has work to do, and the events this past fall marked a
setback for democracy in Georgia. Large segments of the Georgian
public expressed serious dissatisfaction during protest rallies in
September, October, and November. This dissatisfaction stemmed from
a combination of continuing poverty and unemployment, a sense the
Georgian government had grown disconnected from certain segments of
society, and anger over a political system that seemed to be structured
to prevent the development of a vibrant opposition.
On November 7, Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs forcibly
dispersed protestors camped out in the vicinity of Parliament and
later that day the government imposed a State of Emergency. In several
confrontations that day police clashed with protestors elsewhere in
Tbilisi. The U.S. government condemned the imposition of a state of
emergency, the closure of the independent Imedi television station,
and what appeared to be the use of excessive force by the Georgian
government against protestors.
President Saakashvili addressed the crisis by taking an unusual step,
calling for a snap presidential election on January 5 that shortened
his term by a year. The conduct of the presidential election, in
which incumbent President Saakashvili narrowly won a first-round
victory, was regarded by OSCE and other observers as an improvement
over previous elections, but flawed, and thus did not fully restore
Georgia’s democratic reputation.
Georgian leaders and citizens will long argue over whether
irregularities skewed the outcome of the election. Our assessment,
after careful consideration by our Embassy, was that – absent evidence
to the contrary – Mikheil Saakashvili had been legitimately re-elected,
but that election irregularities had to be remedied prior to spring
parliamentary elections if Georgia were to restore the faith of its
voters and the international community in the country’s democratic
trajectory.
While we have not yet seen the OSCE’s final report on the May 21
parliamentary elections, our assessment at this point is that they
were a marked improvement over the January balloting. According to
the preliminary assessment of international observers, including the
OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
and the Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and NATO and the European
Parliament, the election in Georgia offered the people an opportunity
to choose their representatives from a wide array of choices. Georgian
officials made efforts to conduct elections according to OSCE and
Council of Europe commitments and standards for democratic elections.
Despite the improvements, international and domestic monitors
identified a number of problems during the campaign and balloting. For
example, before the elections there were allegations of voter
intimidation and a lack of balance in the media, and questions about
fair adjudication of complaints.
We have urged the Georgian authorities to investigate all allegations
of irregularities and to work with all sides to address the
challenges and shortcomings identified by international and domestic
observers. There are charges of violence against opposition members
which we have encouraged the government to investigate expeditiously
and to make the results of that investigation public.
The United Opposition has claimed that the elections were outright
stolen.
While we find this argument unconvincing, the Georgian body politic
remains deeply polarized. As a result, Georgian democracy continues
to lack a necessary element – a credible and viable opposition –
and the United National Movement and the United Opposition share
the blame for this shortcoming. Without a viable opposition, an
empowered, independent parliament and strong, credible judiciary,
and a reform process that respects dissenting voices, democracy will
not be consolidated.
To sum up: Georgia’s young democracy has made progress, but Georgia
needs to make more progress if it is to live up to the high standards
that it has set for itself. The United States will help as it can to
support democratic reform, urging the Georgian authorities to take
seriously their ambition to reach European standards of democracy.
While Georgia’s domestic political development has proceeded, Georgia’s
ability to find regional and international security is at risk. Georgia
has expressed its desire to join NATO, part of its overall effort
to join the European and transatlantic family. As it has done so,
Georgia has been subjected to unremitting and dangerous pressure
from Russia, including over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and,
to a lesser degree, South Ossetia. Georgian political mistakes in the
early 1990s led to conflicts in these regions, and the separatists,
with Russian military support, won. The Abkhaz, who comprised only
17 percent of that region’s inhabitants before the war, drove out
virtually all the ethnic Georgians, about 250,000 people, or nearly
half of the pre-war population. The legacy of these wars has been
a displaced persons problem that has placed heavy economic, social
and political burdens on Georgia, and the unresolved nature of these
conflicts is a major inhibitor of stability and security in Georgia.
Moscow has in recent years put economic and political pressure on
Georgia: closing their common border; suspending air and ground
transport links; and imposing embargoes against exports of Georgian
wine, mineral water, and agricultural goods. This year, despite
recently lifting some of the economic and transport embargoes, Moscow
has intensified political pressure by taking a number of concrete
steps toward a de facto official relationship with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, where Russian peacekeeping forces have been deployed since
the early 1990s – up to 3,000 in Abkhazia, and 500 Russians plus
500 North Ossetians in South Ossetia. In March, Russia announced its
unilateral withdrawal from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
sanctions on Abkhazia, which would allow Russia potentially to provide
direct military assistance (though the Russian government has offered
assurances that it will continue to adhere to military sanctions). On
April 16, then-President Putin issued instructions calling for closer
ties between Russian ministries and their Abkhaz and South Ossetian
counterparts. Russian investors are known to be buying property in
Abkhazia in disregard of Georgian law. Some of these properties may
have belonged to displaced persons, making their eventual return even
more difficult. Russian banks maintain correspondent relationships
with unlicensed and virtually unregulated Abkhaz banks, an open
invitation to money launderers.
Besides political pressure, Russia has also increased military
pressure.
Russian officials and military personnel have been seconded to
serve in the separatist governments and armed forces. Two Russian
officers were killed last September leading a unit of Abkhaz troops
in a firefight with a Georgian unit. Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia
are specifically mandated to facilitate the return of refugees, but
there has been no net return of Georgians to Abkhazia in over a decade.
On April 20, a Russian fighter shot down a Georgian unmanned aerial
vehicle over Georgian airspace in Abkhazia; a UN investigation
confirmed that a Russian fighter was responsible. Russia also has
increased its military posture in Abkhazia without consultation with
the Government of Georgia. In April, without consulting Georgia, Russia
sent highly-trained airborne combat troops with howitzers to Abkhazia
as part of its peacekeeping force, and in May Russia dispatched
construction troops to Abkhazia to repair a railroad link to Russia.
We are very concerned about these actions, which challenge Georgia’s
territorial integrity and have increased tensions in the separatist
regions.
They risk igniting a wider conflict and call into question Russia’s
role as a peacekeeper and facilitator of negotiations between Georgia
and Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively.
The United States has called on Moscow to reverse its unconstructive
actions and actively facilitate with us and others a diplomatic
process to resolve these conflicts. We could start from the peace plan
proposed by President Saakashvili and that Prime Minister Putin has
publicly supported. Georgia, for its part, must continue to resist
the temptation of a military reaction or unwise political demands,
even in the face of repeated provocations.
President Saakashvili has wisely offered to negotiate with the Abkhaz
leadership wide autonomy for Abkhazia, an offer that has support in
many European capitals and from the United States. Europe and the
United States are working together to support a peaceful approach to
the Abkhaz problem.
We continue to steadfastly support Georgia’s territorial integrity
within its internationally recognized borders. We want to work
with Russia in this effort, and Russia, if it chooses, could play
a constructive role in a settlement that took account of both the
parties’ interests.
The increase of Russian pressure against Georgia comes in the context
of Georgia’s transatlantic aspirations, particularly its attempt to
secure a Membership Action Plan (MAP) from NATO. The United States
and most NATO members strongly supported a MAP for both Georgia and
Ukraine at the April NATO Summit in Bucharest – and I wish to note
appreciation for bipartisan support for this effort from many Members
of Congress. Although there was no consensus at Bucharest for a MAP
invitation, NATO’s leaders stated flatly in the final communiqué from
the summit that Georgia and Ukraine will become members. NATO foreign
ministers will review Georgia’s and Ukraine’s MAP applications at
their December meeting, and they are empowered to take this decision
at that time.
Having accepted the principle of membership for Georgia and Ukraine,
the United States believes that NATO should proceed at its next
Ministerial meeting next December to offer them MAP. MAP is not
NATO membership. But it is a way to help aspiring countries meet
NATO’s requirements. Georgia has work to do before it is ready
for NATO membership. But Georgia has distinguished itself both by
the thoroughness of its military reforms and the deployability of
its troops as well as by the progress that I noted earlier. Today,
Georgia is the third-largest troop contributor in Iraq, with over
2,000 soldiers on the ground in Baghdad and Wasit Province. Georgia
has agreed to extend its deployment and will continue to stand with
Coalition Forces in Iraq. The Alliance should base its MAP decision
on these objective factors – holding Georgia to high standards,
and not allowing Russia to exercise a veto over an Alliance decision.
CONCLUSION
The countries that I have described are diverse both in their histories
and in the challenges that they face today. America’s policy toward
them has been steady, steadfast and supportive. The United States has
consistently sought to advance the frontiers of freedom in Europe. This
has been a bipartisan policy of the last three presidents. We will
continue this policy by working together with Russia and the nations of
Europe toward the goal of peaceful resolution of regional conflicts
and creating an environment that will allow the countries I have
described to join the Euro-Atlantic community if they wish to do so,
and if they meet NATO and European Union requirements.
We support an open world, without monopolies, spheres of influence,
or great power domination, in all aspects of development, from
the energy and economic sectors to political life. With a set of
consistent polices designed to support that end, we will pass on to
the next administration a solid platform on which to build in this
region in the future.
At the beginning, I described how a wave of freedom and democracy
swept eastward after the fall of the Berlin Wall. We believe that
wave is still on the move, and it will continue to advance as long
as we promote the cause of freedom, democracy, and prosperity.
Thank you. I look forward to responding to your questions.
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