Eurasia Daily Monitor
June 15, 2009-Volume 6, Issue 114
BELARUS BOYCOTTS MOSCOW’S CSTO SUMMIT
by Vladimir Socor
Belarus refused to attend the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) summit in Moscow on June 14. The summit made
decisions to enlarge the size of collective rapid deployment forces, the
scope of their missions, and the legal basis of their operations.
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka cancelled the participation
of Belarus at the last moment before the summit; and his government is
now contesting the validity of the summit’s decisions made in the
absence of Belarus. The Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, signed the
summit’s documents with reservations attached, limiting Uzbekistan’s
participation in future CSTO activities. Armenia’s position was not
immediately clear (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, RIA Novosti, June 14).
At the concluding press conference, Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev asked "the states" that have not signed the summit documents to
reconsider and sign them later. Belarus was scheduled to take over the
chairmanship of CSTO’s Council of Heads of State from Armenia at this
summit, in accordance with the annual rotation in Russian alphabetical
order. With Belarus boycotting the summit, however, Russia has taken
over the CSTO’s chairmanship "for the period of Belarus’ absence."
Adding insult to injury, Lukashenka did not personally
notify the Kremlin about his refusal to attend. Lukashenka’s office
informed Medvedev’s office and the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs informed the CSTO Secretariat on the shortest possible notice.
Moscow takes the position that Belarus’ non-participation in
the summit does not invalidate the summit’s decisions. Under the CSTO’s
rules of procedure, a collective decision can be blocked by an official
objection from a member country. Belarus had participated in
negotiations on the documents prior to the summit without registering
official objections, according to unverified claims by Russian
officials. Nevertheless, the Belarus MFA’s note did clearly warn that
Belarus’ non-participation "means a lack of approval from Belarus of the
decisions that are to be considered" at the summit, as well as disavowal
of decisions made at the pre-summit, ministerial-level meetings; which
"consequently means a lack of consensus [by Belarus] on these decisions"
(RIA Novosti, June 14).
Officially, Minsk explains its step as a response to
Moscow’s restrictive commercial measures against Belarus and abusive
practices in the energy sector. Tacitly, the Belarusian authorities from
Lukashenka on down are loath to become involved in Russia’s conflict
undertakings, whether ongoing or looming ones in the South Caucasus or
Central Asia.
The MFA note complained of "overt economic discrimination by
a CSTO member country against Belarus. Such actions undermine economic
security, which is a foundation for stability and a pillar of
comprehensive security… [Belarus’ participation in the summit] would
mock common sense against the backdrop of trade wars waged by some CSTO
members against others. In this situation, Belarus has no choice but to
cancel its participation in the CSTO summit in Moscow. Belarus will sign
the package of documents on the rapid reaction force only when
comprehensive security will have been restored within the CSTO" (RIA
Novosti, ITAR-TASS, June 14).
Last month, Russia suspended the allocation of a promised
$500 million stabilization loan to Belarus. Lukashenka publicly
complained that Moscow was retaliating for his refusal to recognize the
"independence" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Kremlin had pressured
Lukashenka on this issue for several months, but he has all along
insisted that the loan and the recognition issue must not be linked.
In recent weeks, Lukashenka and other officials criticized
Russia publicly for closing its markets for Belarus-made tractors,
sugar, and dairy and meat products. On the day of the Moscow summit,
Belarus state television read out an indictment of Russian economic
policies toward Belarus, retroactive and current: "They [Moscow] turned
off gas supplies in winter; they suddenly introduced export duties on
crude oil; they practically introduced customs control on the border."
The Belarus government depicts Moscow’s recent restrictions on tractors,
sugar, and dairy and meat products as parts of a consistent, deliberate
pattern (Belarus TV Channel One, June 14).
On June 13 Lukashenka asked the government to consider the
possibility of reintroducing border controls on the Belarus-Russia
border. On the following day the State Border Protection Committee
chief, Ivan Bandarenka, announced that his committee and the State
Customs Committee are discussing the possible reestablishment of border
and customs checkpoints, in response to Russia’s unilateral
reintroduction of 15 such checkpoints (Interfax, June 13, 14).
Lukashenka has clashed with Moscow over economic issues
during most of his tenure as president. This time, however, he
reinforces his arguments in that debate by refusing to cooperate with a
Kremlin-cherished project on international security. Moreover, the
familiar clashes over economic issues are now unfolding in an entirely
new context: that of Lukashenka’s efforts to institute a balanced
foreign policy for Belarus between Russia and the West.
–Vladimir Socor