HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA HEARING
Congressional Documents and Publications
December 5, 2012
“Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and the Surrounding Region.”;
Testimony by Brenda Shaffer, Senior Lecturer, University of Haifa
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DOCUMENTS
Thank you for the opportunity to testify in front of this committee.
We often think of Iran as a Middle Eastern country. However, Iran
borders a number of regions besides the Middle East: Southwest Asia,
Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. Iran’s location on the edge
of a number of regions endows the state with significant influence
in, but also vulnerability to influence from, these regions. As
states in a region that borders Iran, the three states of the
South Caucasus-Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia-playa special role
in Tehran’s foreign and security policies. In addition, these three
states playa crucial role in the efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. The Republic of Azerbaijan also affects the domestic
stability in Iran, since a third of Iran’s population is comprised
of ethnic Azerbaijanis.
I am a researcher who specializes on the Caucasus, focusing on Iran’s
policies in the South Caucasus, ethnic politics in Iran, and Caspian
energy issues. In my testimony, I will focus on Iran’s policies toward
the South Caucasus, the role of the states of the South Caucasus
in the implementation of u.s. sanctions on Iran, the influence of
the Azerbaijani minority in Iran on regime stability in Tehran, and
recommendations on how to integrate U.S. policies on Iran and the
South Caucasus in order to further promote the U.S. national interest.
Iran: Realpolitik in the Caucasus
Tehran has four primary goals in the Caucasus: (1) Preventing
destabilization in the northwest provinces of Iran that border
the Caucasus and any rise in ethnically based activity among the
Azerbaijanis in Iran, (2) limiting U.s. influence and power in the
Caucasus, (3) expanding its trade and influence in the region, and
(4) linking the region through energy export and transportation
infrastructure. Tehran maintains clandestine ties to a number of
regional Islamic and ethnic groups in the Caucasus that could serve
as levers of influence over the states in the region. Iran prefers,
however, to promote its direct ties with the ruling governments in
the region and primarily activates these other groups as a tool to
coerce policy change in the states or to destabilize governments that
do not conform to Iran’s demands.
Among the three states of the Caucasus, Tehran enjoys its closest
ties and greatest cooperation with Armenia. Iran maintains extensive
trade and its most intensive security cooperation in the region with
Armenia, in spite of the fact that Armenia is embroiled in a conflict
with Shiite-majority Azerbaijan. Iran and Armenia are closely linked
through energy trade and infrastructure, as Tehran supplies natural
gas to Armenia, and Yerevan supplies electricity to Iran, further
cementing long-term cooperation between the states. Iran’s relations
with Georgia during Georgian president Mikhail Saakhashvili’s tenure
were tumultuous due to Tbilisi’s close cooperation with the United
States, including with regard to non-proliferation and other issues
related to Iran. Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan, meanwhile, are the
most convoluted, due to Tehran’s concerns that Azerbaijan could serve
as a source of inspiration or support for Iran’s sizeable ethnic
Azerbaijani minority population and due to the state’s close ties
with the United States.
Iran’s policies toward the region are very instructive to understanding
Tehran’s foreign strategies. In all of the armed conflicts in the
Caucasus and greater Caspian region during the post-Soviet period,
Tehran has declined to support Muslim populations, including in
conflicts where Muslims were pitted against non-Muslim groups, such
as the Chechens in the struggle with Moscow or the Azerbaijanis in
their conflict with Armenia. Despite its rhetoric about solidarity
with Muslims facing oppression, Iran’s actual policies toward the
region show that Tehran puts its regime stability above all else and
subordinates the interests of its fellow Muslims throughout the region
in pursuit of this goal. n1
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tehran has worked to
undermine the stability of the neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan. As
part of its policy to undermine Azerbaijan’s security, Tehran has
supported Armenia in its war against Azerbaijan and engaged in broad
security, military, and economic cooperation with Yerevan since 1992.
Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war centered over the control of the
region of Nagorno-Karabagh from 1992 to 1994. As a result of the war,
Armenia now occupies 20 percent of the territory of Azerbaijan (as
legally recognized by the U.S. government) and over a million refugees
were left homeless (including 870,000 Azerbaijani refugees). Armenia
consistently praises Iran’s stance on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict
and regularly calls for greater Iranian involvement in the peace
negotiations process. n2 During the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
Iran supplied Armenia with fuel and food and allowed the flow of
arms through its territory to Armenia. Without these supplies and the
transit corridor from Iran, Armenia could not have sustained its war
effort and conquered extensive territory from Azerbaijan.
These Iranian supplies were crucial, because the civil war at the
time in neighboring Georgia hindered Russia (Armenia’s main ally)
from providing supplies to Yerevan.
Throughout the post-Soviet period, Iran has shared strong strategic
cooperation and interests with Russia in shaping the strategic outcomes
in the South Caucasus. Both states strive to minimize U.S.
influence and presence in the region. One issue where Moscow and
Tehran’s interests in the region fundamentally diverge, however,
is energy exports. Russia and Iran are natural competitors in the
field of natural gas supply. The Russian Federation is currently the
top producer and exporter of natural gas in the world, producing 24
trillion cubic feet (TCF, 20 percent of world total) and exporting 7
TCF of natural gas each year. Russia holds the largest proven reserves
of natural gas in the world, amounting to an estimated 1,680 TCF.
Iran holds the second-largest proven reserves of natural gas in the
world after Russia, amounting to about 1,046 TCF. It is also the
fifth top producer of natural gas in the world (5.2 TCF per year,
4.4 percent of world total). Yet despite its tremendous reserves,
Iran is a net importer of natural gas. At this stage, Iran exports
only small amounts of natural gas to Turkey and Armenia. However,
Iran is the only country with the potential volumes and location to
pose any major threat to Russia’s dominance in European natural gas
markets. In 2006, Moscow spent a great deal of money in order to buyout
Iran’s potential access to European gas markets through Armenia. n3
Multi-ethnic Iran’s Azerbaijan problem
Iran is a multi-ethnic state, and its domestic security could be
affected by developments in the neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan
and other neighboring states. Half of Iran’s population is comprised
of non-Persian ethnic minorities, with Azerbaijanis being the largest
group, representing close to a third of the total population: n4 The
majority of residents in the northwest provinces of Iran, contiguous
to the border with the Republic of Azerbaijan, are Azerbaijanis. One
reason that Iran supports Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan is
that it prefers Azerbaijan to be embroiled in a conflict and unable to
serve as a source of support for the ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran. In
addition, despite the shared cultural affinities between Azerbaijan and
Iran, Iran determined early after the Soviet breakup that Azerbaijan’s
independence had not created an opportunity for Iranian influence in
the country because of Azerbaijan’s Western orientation.
n5 In addition, Tehran fears that Azerbaijan-a secular, modern,
Shia-majority state that adheres to strict separation of religion
and state-could serve as an alternative model for its own citizens.
Tehran has also sponsored a number of terrorist cells and attempted
terrorist attacks inside Azerbaijan, with targets that included the
u.S. embassy, u.S. ambassador, and local Jewish institutions in Baku.
n6 Due to their long common border and the frequent flow of Iranian
citizens for visits in Azerbaijan, Tehran frequently uses the territory
of Azerbaijan in attempt to carry out attacks on Western, Israeli,
and Jewish targets. In some instances, these terrorist plans have been
conducted in conjunction with members of Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement.
Tehran also attempts to undermine the Western-oriented and open
society in Azerbaijan. Since Iranian citizens frequently visit their
northern neighbor, Tehran sees Baku’s more open lifestyle as a threat
to its domestic control. Thus, it has sponsored terrorist attempts
on Western-style cultural events held in Baku, such as the 2012
Eurovision contest. Iran also supports radical Islamic movements in
Azerbaijan and frequently attacks the Western mores of President llham
Aliyev and his family members. Iran also sponsors regular television
programming in the Azerbaijani language (Sahar TV) that broadcasts
messages against the Aliyev government in Azerbaijan. Many of these
broadcasts also employ anti-Semitic rhetoric.
Multi-ethnic Iran
* Iran is a multi-ethnic state, and over fifty percent of its
population is non-Persian. Azerbaijanis are the largest ethnic minority
in Iran, comprising over a third of the country’s population.
* Iran’s ethnic minorities are concentrated in its border provinces,
and these groups share cross-border ties with co-ethnics in the
neighboring states of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and
Turkmenistan.
* Many prominent figures in Iran are ethnic Azerbaijanis, including
Iran’s spiritual leader, Sayyid Ali Khamenei, and the head of Iran’s
opposition Green Movement, Mir Hossein Mousavi.
* Even though Azerbaijanis share the Shiite faith and a long history
of common statehood with Iran’s Persian majority, Tehran does not allow
Azerbaijanis in Iran to operate schools or universities in their native
language or to use the Azerbaijani language in government institutions.
* In addition to shared ethnic and cultural ties, many Azerbaijanis
from both sides of the border share family ties and engage in trade
with each other.
* Among the approximately 25 million ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran,
there is a wide diversity of attitudes toward the Iranian state. Some
Azerbaijanis comprise a core part of Iran’s ruling elite, while others
strive for language and cultural rights. But a growing segment of
Azerbaijanis in Iran, especially young people who openly identify as
Azerbaijanis, oppose Persian-centered rule and struggle against the
ruling regime.
* In some of Iran’s provinces with significant ethnic minority
populations, such as the Kurdish and Baluch provinces, full-scale
insurgencies are taking place and attacks on Iranian soldiers occur
on a regular basis. In the Azerbaijani-populated provinces of Iran,
more sporadic outbreaks against the regime related to tamer issues,
such as environmental questions, are used to mobilize the ethnic
Azerbaijanis to a nationalist agenda.
Prevention of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
As states bordering Iran, the states of the South Caucasus playa
crucial role in the efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons and upholding the sanctions regime. On a number of occasions,
Azerbaijan’s security services have uncovered attempts to transport
materials for Iran’s nuclear program from Russia to Iran. Furthermore,
Baku cooperates with the United States to insure that its banks are
not used to circumvent U.S. sanctions and funnel funds to Iran.
Azerbaijan’s neighbors in the Caucasus-Armenia and Georgia -can also
playa pivotal role in either hampering or aiding Iran’s proliferation
efforts. Despite being one of the top per capita recipients of U.S.
foreign aid, Armenia does not support the sanctions on Iran, and
Armenian citizens and companies have been sanctioned for trading
with Iran on a number of occasions. In November 2012, the Iranian
Minister of Justice Seyed Morteza Bakhtiari praised Armenia in the
Iranian press for not supporting the sanctions on Iran. n7
If there is a military attack on Iran’s nuclear installations,
Azerbaijan could be one of the first targets of Iran’s retaliation.
This is due to Azerbaijan’s close ties with the United States, and
also due to its vulnerability: with the extensive flow of goods and
people across the border between Iran and Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan is
very exposed to a potential Iranian attack.
Ungoverned territories in the South Caucasus-Nagorno-Karabagh, South
Ossetia, and Abkhazia-are particular regions of concern for nuclear
proliferation and the sanctions regime against Iran. Due to the fact
that they are under occupation by states that do not formally take
responsibility for the activity in these regions, their financial
systems and border control mechanisms are poorly developed and not in
line with any international treaties or U.S. sanctions on Iran. The
region’s banks and other financial institutions can be useful for
Iran for circumventing the sanctions regime.
Disinformation campaigns aimed at breaking Baku’s friendly relations
with Israel
Azerbaijan and Israel share extensive cooperation and friendly ties.
Baku is Israel’s number one supplier of oil and according to press
reports, the countries concluded a major arms supply deal in 2008. In
recent years, some have attempted to explain Iran’s antagonism
toward Azerbaijan as a response to Azerbaijan’s close cooperation
with Israel. This is not accurate: Azerbaijan and Israel’s close
security cooperation began around 2008, while Iran has attempted to
destabilize Azerbaijan since its independence in 1991. As mentioned
earlier, the clearest example of Iran’s anti-Azerbaijan policy is
its support for Armenia in the country’s war with Azerbaijan from
1992 to 1994 and in the ongoing stalemate that has followed.
Integration of U.S. policy on Iran and on the South Caucasus
U.S. policy on Iran could benefit from better coordination with its
policies on the South Caucasus. The Obama Administration has imposed
unprecedented sanctions on Iran, which required intensive work with
other nations in the world oil market, so that the potential loss of
some of the Iranian production would not have major impact on oil
prices. The administration should be commended for the sanctions
policy and the meticulous planning and strategic preparation that
accompanied it.
As bordering states to Iran, it is crucial that the three states
of the South Caucasus uphold the sanctions regime and that their
financial institutions are not used to circumvent the sanctions.
Washington should intensify its monitoring of the sanctions
regime in the three states and demand implementation. Furthermore,
the ungoverned territories of the region-Nagorno-Karabagh, South
Ossetia, and Abkhazia-should be monitored especially closely and held
accountable for any use of their territory and financial institutions
to circumvent the Iran sanctions.
Successful resolution of the secessionist conflicts in the South
Caucasus will reduce the region’s vulnerability to coercion from Iran.
Washington should invest efforts in resolution of the conflicts. The
United States should cooperate directly with Russia on resolving
these conflicts since Moscow hold the key levers for resolution and
prevention of resolution of the conflicts in the region. As part of
the conflict-resolution efforts, the U.S. Congress should halt its
annual custom of earmarking funds for the secessionist region of
Nagorno-Karabagh. These allocations are in violation of U.S. law,
since they support settlement activity in occupied territories.
Congressional allocations to Nagorno-Karabagh are equivalent to the
idea of earmarking funds for Israeli settlements in the occupied West
Bank, clearly an action that Congress would not take. However, annually
Congress approves the earmark to the occupied Nagorno-Karabagh.
In the unfolding developments over Iran’s nuclear program, policymakers
should keep in mind this rivalry between Russia and Iran in the sphere
of natural gas supplies. Moscow, while sharing strategic cooperation
with Tehran, encourages the non-resolution of the conflict between
Iran and the West in order to insure that Iran is “in a strategic box”
and that its gas riches cannot be exported to markets in Europe and
compete with the Russian supplies.
The Obama Administration should evaluate the activities of Voice of
America and other media outlets that it funds to see how they can be
best used to voice the concerns of Iran’s ethnic minorities. The United
States should encourage international human rights institutions to
monitor the state of Iran’s ethnic minorities and to study their
grievances against the regime in Iran. Research of trends and
activities of Iran’s ethnic minorities should be integrated into
analytical work on Iran.
n1 For more on the lack of Islamic influence in Iran’s policies in
the Caucasus, see Brenda Shaffer, “The Islamic Republic of Iran:
Is It Really?” in Brenda Shaffer (ed.), The Limits of Culture: Islam
and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 219-239.
n2 See, for instance, Tehran Times, “Iran Opposes Any U.S.
Peacekeeping Role for Karabakh,” Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty,
June 24, 2010 (http://tehrantimesoco mlin dex. ph
plpolitics/2666-iran-says-co nce rne d-ove r -nato-ra dar- system-in-tu
rkeyl.
n3 One of the most evident examples of this policy is the Russian
national gas company Gazprom’s April 2006 purchase of a natural gas
pipeline from Iran to Armenia that was inaugurated in March 2007, and
which might have provided a route from Iran to European gas markets.
In order to block the Armenian route for Iranian gas, Gazprom forced
Armenia to reduce the pipeline’s circumference (from the originally
designed diameter of a major gas export pipeline) to almost half of its
planned size, preventing the opportunity for significant expansion of
the volumes it carries. Armenia also granted Gazprom and its partner
Itera controlling stakes of the segment of the new pipeline that runs
through Armenian territory.
n4 For more on ethnicity in Iran, see Brenda Shaffer, Borders and
Brethren: Iran and the Challenge afAzerbaijani Identity (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2002).
n5 See, for example, Jomhuri-ye Islami, March 4, 1992,4.
n6 Office of the Coordinator on Counterterrorism, State Department,
Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, Azerbaijan “actively opposed
terrorist organizations seeking to move people, money, and material
through the Caucasus. The government has had some success in
reducing the presence of terrorist facilitators and hampering their
activities.”
n7 FARS News Agency, “Minister Appreciates Armenia for Defending Iran
against Western Sanctions”, November 11, 2012.
Read this original document at:
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