MENSOIAN: ‘MEDZ HAYRIK,’ WHY ARE YOU SO SAD?
By Michael Mensoian // Posted on June 12, 2013
Well, Armen, you remember the election for president and the election
for the city council that took place here in Yerevan.
I do, medz hayrik [grandfather]. I walked with you to the polling
place.
That you did, my Armen. Well, we have gone through a sad and
disappointing 10 weeks-70 days to be exact, beginning with the Feb. 18
presidential election and ending on May 5, the day of the city council
election. All political leaders should apologize to the Armenian people
for the spectacle witnessed during those 70 days-President Sarkisian,
for resorting to the usual fraudulent tactics, ranging from outright
vote tampering to voter intimidation; and the opposition leaders,
some for exercising poor judgment, others for a lack of aggressive
leadership, and all for failing to find common ground for the benefit
of the Armenian people.
Our political leaders, from the president to those who opposed him,
will have their particular version of what happened and why. But it
really doesn’t matter because however they explain what took place,
it is the Armenian people who ended up losing once again. It has only
been two months since the council election, and already we are back
to conditions as usual. It is like the 70 days never happened. Our
president, secure for another five years, admitted that some voters
were unhappy. What an understatement! Unfortunately nothing will
change. The political leaders who complain about the dire economic
conditions in our country still have not been able to put aside
their philosophical differences or their respective agendas to find
common ground on a host of issues where they could cooperate for the
public good.
This spectacle began when some political parties decided not to field
presidential candidates. Rightly or wrongly, they did not wish to
participate in a presidential election they knew would be stolen by the
incumbent. However, these decisions sent a message to the voter that
this was to be another sham election, and thus only served to dampen
the spirit of the electorate. It also justified the tacit acceptance
by the voter that the usual ballot tampering would take place. It
was a self-fulfilling prophecy. What happened is what was expected.
The only credible people’s candidate that emerged to challenge
Sarkisian was Raffi Hovannisian. To his credit, he conducted a spirited
campaign against an entrenched president who controlled all the levers
of incumbency. Unfortunately, the anti-Sarkisian opposition party
leaders gave lip-service to Hovannisian’s candidacy. As a result
there was no concerted effort by these opposition leaders to openly
and vigorously coalesce around Hovannisian as their standard bearer.
It is possible that their aid was rebuffed by Hovannisian, or that
the opposition leaders believed it more prudent simply to watch and
wait to see how the election unfolded.
Whatever the reason, Hovannisian stood alone to confront Sarkisian. He
became a candidate who offered hope to some voters and a candidate for
those who wanted to cast an anti-Sarkisian ballot. His vote total of
about 38 percent was somewhat of a surprise. However, the percentage
of pro-Hovannisian and anti-Sarkisian votes he received could not be
determined. While it could be hailed as a moral victory, it somehow
was translated into a political victory-a mandate from the people.
Based on this serious error in judgment, Hovannisian proclaimed
himself president based on anecdotal evidence of massive vote
rigging and an overly optimistic assessment that a groundswell of
voter dissatisfaction was sweeping the country. And so was born the
Barevolution. At best this groundswell was an undercurrent of voter
dissatisfaction with the failed policies and programs of the Sarkisian
Administration. It would have been surprising if it didn’t exist.
The Central Election Commission claimed that there were 2,525,000
registered voters eligible to cast ballots; Hovannisian’s vote total
of 577,000 represented about 23 percent of all potential ballots that
could be cast. If there had been a groundswell of voter discontent in
Armenia as many claimed existed, it could rightly be assumed that 1
million of the electorate would not have sat out the election; here
was the opportunity to show their pent-up dissatisfaction by casting
a vote against Sarkisian. Heritage Party leaders should have counseled
their standard bearer to be more realistic in assessing his achievement
and less confrontational in challenging President Sarkisian.
Maybe Heritage Party leaders did intervene, but to no avail. It
has to be accepted that it was Hovannisian’s show to win or
lose. Opposition political leaders were circumspect in their support
of his post-election efforts; they possibly had a better read on the
situation that existed.
Because Hovannisian failed to gauge the leverage he commanded, he
challenged Sarkisian head-on by demanding his resignation. For any
leader to make this grievous error with respect to his adversary’s
strength is a prelude to disaster. Ramping-up his challenge, he
demanded parliamentary elections be held by year’s end; the right
to name specified cabinet ministers; the firing of a long list of
public officials for alleged complicity in voting irregularities; and
bringing other officials up on charges of malfeasance and misfeasance.
These demands may have energized those voters who crowded Freedom
Square, but they must have made the opposition leaders cringe. This
was a serious tactical error; it was an unsustainable challenge
supported solely by Hovannisian’s determination and his misreading
of the unfolding situation.
Securely entrenched after five years in power, Sarkisian weathered what
was at its worst a political annoyance. Not only did Hovannisian’s
demands and threatened actions yield no concessions, but it weakened
an already untenable position. There was no attempt to provide a plan
that could bring the opposition leaders onboard or that would address
the legitimate concerns of the people. His eclectic shifting from one
event to another with deadlines that proved to have no meaning had its
downside: Crowds withered and his rhetoric lost its effectiveness. The
only obvious course of action, if the assault on the administration
was to continue, was to change course 180 degrees.
His claim to the presidency, for which he had been willing to die,
was cast aside. Although participating in the Yerevan City Council
election on May 5 became the next objective, he did not have his
name on the Heritage Party list. What message did this send to his
remaining supporters?
Was he inadvertently suggesting his lack of interest in being mayor?
Or did he hesitate to have the election serve as a referendum on his
leadership and his political future? The mayor of Yerevan administers
a city where some 40 percent of the country’s population live; it is
the engine that drives the country’s economy. It was a logical first
step in laying the foundation for the parliamentary election in 2017,
followed by the presidential election in 2018. Losing control of the
Yerevan City Council would have been a serious political blow to the
president. That fact alone should have made it a tempting prize.
Here was an opportunity (as well as the necessity) for political
leaders to find the common ground on which to unite in opposing the
Republic Party. Evidently neither the opportunity nor the necessity
was sufficiently compelling for them to cooperate. The parties
decided to present their own list of candidates rather than forming
a coalition with a single list. As a result they fragmented their
voter appeal. Each party had to reach the six percent threshold to
name representatives, whereas a coalition needed to reach the nine
percent threshold. The end result was predictable. The Republican
Party received approximately 56 percent of the vote, the Prosperous
Party 23 percent, and Raffi Hovannisian’s Heritage Party 8.5 percent.
Hovannisian’s vote total was surprisingly low. He had carried the
Avan, Ajapnyak, and Arabker districts in Yerevan in the presidential
election; 26 percent of Yerevan’s population live in these districts.
The voting in the council election would be a good gauge of voter
sentiment of Hovannisian’s popularity (although he was not on the
list of candidates for the Heritage Party). His support had evidently
softened. The other 4 political parties received the remaining 12
percent of the ballots cast. So much for relevancy.
So you see Asbet, our political leaders had an opportunity to come
together for the good of the people. They did not. Why was it so
difficult to do? Their willingness to cooperate, win or lose, would
have made an important statement for the future of our country. How
will the people’s interests be protected during the next five years
if our political leaders find it so difficult to find common ground?
President Sarkisian fully understands the shortcomings of his
opposition. You asked why medz hayrik is sad. This is why, my Armen.
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2013/06/12/mensoian-medz-hayrik-why-are-you-so-sad/