CONTAINING IRAN HELPS PUTIN’S RUSSIA
Payvand Iran
March 26 2014
By Shireen T. Hunter (source: LobeLog)
Not long after the outbreak of the crisis over Ukraine and Crimea,
many observers began asking the following question: what impact
could renewed Russo-Western tensions have on the fate of the ongoing
negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program? Will the Russians
encourage Iran to become more obdurate and change its current and
more flexible approach to negotiations with the P5+1 countries (the
US, Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany), stop complying
with sanctions on Iran, or even help it financially and militarily,
for example by delivering the promised-but-withheld S-300 air defense
system or even shipping the more advanced S-400?
Other questions are also important. Notably, what impact has the West’s
treatment of Iran had on Russia’s ability to pressure Ukraine and in
general to regain its influence in independent states of the former
Soviet Union, including the Caucasus and Central Asia? Indeed, the
Western policy of containing Iran and excluding it from many regional
and transnational energy and other schemes has facilitated Russia’s
policy of consolidating its position in the former USSR.
A major tool that Russia has used in its quest to regain influence
over its former possessions has been its vast oil and gas reserves.
This is quite evident in Ukraine’s case, where Russia has switched the
gas spigot on and off as a way of pressuring Kiev. Iran is only second
to Russia in its gas reserves and could have been an alternative to
Russia in many countries of the former USSR, including Ukraine. Yet
the Western policy of preventing any foreign investment in Iran’s
energy sector, coupled with preventing any transfer of Iran’s oil
and gas to Europe via various pipeline routes, has meant that Russia
has gained an excessive share of the European energy market. Iranian
gas could have easily been transported to Europe, especially the East
European countries, through Turkey, Bulgaria and so on. Even Ukraine
could have satisfied some of its energy needs through Iranian gas.
The same has been true in the Caucasus. Both Georgia and Armenia
have wanted more energy cooperation with Iran. However, they were
discouraged by the West and, in the case of Armenia, also pressured
by Russia. The result has been their greater vulnerability to Russian
pressure.
Meanwhile, preventing any of the Central Asian energy sources to
pass through Iran, the only country with common land and sea borders
with these countries (with the exception of Uzbekistan, which is
a land-locked country), has made it more difficult for countries
like Georgia to get, for instance, Turkmen gas. In other areas, too,
excluding Iran from regional energy schemes, and discouraging Central
Asian and Caucasian countries from cooperating with Iran, has worked
either in Russia’s favor or created opportunities for China.
Even in the areas of security and conflict-resolution, Iran’s exclusion
and the West’s encouraging regional countries to adopt anti-Iran
policies has had negative effects. This has even given rise to new
tensions and problems, for instance, between Iran and the Republic of
Azerbaijan, as well as exacerbated sectarian tensions. For example,
Azerbaijan’s resulting animosity to Iran has led it periodically to
favor Sunni radical Islamists. Consequently, today Azerbaijan has a
serious Salafi problem, and sectarian tensions in the country have
been on the rise.
The experience described above provides important lessons for Western
policy towards Iran and regional issues in Central Asia, the Caucasus,
and South Asia. The first lesson is that a policy of containment on
several fronts is not practicable, at least not in the long run. For
twenty years, the US has tried to contain both Russia and Iran in
these regions and to bar Iran’s interaction with these regions,
while also looking askance at China’s progress.
A second lesson is that excluding Iranian oil and gas from global
markets inevitably limited Europe’s and Central Asia’s energy choices,
making both more vulnerable to Russian pressures since, with the
exception of Qatar, the Persian Gulf oil giants are not major players
in the gas market.
The last and the most important lesson is that the West should
press forward with negotiations with Iran, toward a satisfactory
conclusion to the nuclear dispute. This should be followed by lifting
sanctions, encouraging the return of Western energy companies to Iran,
and planning new networks of energy transport which would include
Iran. In the long run, this kind of engagement would also translate
into better political relations between Iran and the West and produce
a positive impact on Iran’s political evolution and hence issues of
human rights and other freedoms in Iran.
With regard to broader regional security issues, the West should
work with Iran on a case-by-case basis wherever this serves Western
interests, rather than making all aspects of relations with Iran
hostage to its stand on the Palestinian question. As shown by the
example of Afghanistan – where Iran supported US interests in toppling
the Taliban, only to be deemed part of an Axis of Evil – isolating
and excluding Iran harms the West as much if not more than it does
the Islamic Republic. Right now, the only real winner is Vladimir
Putin’s Russia.
About the Author:
Shireen T. Hunter is a Visiting Professor at Georgetown University’s
School of Foreign Service. Her latest book is Iran Divided: Historic
Roots of Iranian Debates on Identity, Culture, and Governance in the
21st Century (Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming September 2014).
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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From: Katia Peltekian
Subject: Containing Iran Helps Putin’s Russia
Payvand Iran
March 26 2014
Containing Iran Helps Putin’s Russia
By Shireen T. Hunter (source: LobeLog)
Not long after the outbreak of the crisis over Ukraine and Crimea,
many observers began asking the following question: what impact could
renewed Russo-Western tensions have on the fate of the ongoing
negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program? Will the Russians
encourage Iran to become more obdurate and change its current and more
flexible approach to negotiations with the P5+1 countries (the US,
Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany), stop complying with
sanctions on Iran, or even help it financially and militarily, for
example by delivering the promised-but-withheld S-300 air defense
system or even shipping the more advanced S-400?
Other questions are also important. Notably, what impact has the
West’s treatment of Iran had on Russia’s ability to pressure Ukraine
and in general to regain its influence in independent states of the
former Soviet Union, including the Caucasus and Central Asia? Indeed,
the Western policy of containing Iran and excluding it from many
regional and transnational energy and other schemes has facilitated
Russia’s policy of consolidating its position in the former USSR.
A major tool that Russia has used in its quest to regain influence
over its former possessions has been its vast oil and gas reserves.
This is quite evident in Ukraine’s case, where Russia has switched the
gas spigot on and off as a way of pressuring Kiev. Iran is only second
to Russia in its gas reserves and could have been an alternative to
Russia in many countries of the former USSR, including Ukraine. Yet
the Western policy of preventing any foreign investment in Iran’s
energy sector, coupled with preventing any transfer of Iran’s oil and
gas to Europe via various pipeline routes, has meant that Russia has
gained an excessive share of the European energy market. Iranian gas
could have easily been transported to Europe, especially the East
European countries, through Turkey, Bulgaria and so on. Even Ukraine
could have satisfied some of its energy needs through Iranian gas.
The same has been true in the Caucasus. Both Georgia and Armenia have
wanted more energy cooperation with Iran. However, they were
discouraged by the West and, in the case of Armenia, also pressured by
Russia. The result has been their greater vulnerability to Russian
pressure.
Meanwhile, preventing any of the Central Asian energy sources to pass
through Iran, the only country with common land and sea borders with
these countries (with the exception of Uzbekistan, which is a
land-locked country), has made it more difficult for countries like
Georgia to get, for instance, Turkmen gas. In other areas, too,
excluding Iran from regional energy schemes, and discouraging Central
Asian and Caucasian countries from cooperating with Iran, has worked
either in Russia’s favor or created opportunities for China.
Even in the areas of security and conflict-resolution, Iran’s
exclusion and the West’s encouraging regional countries to adopt
anti-Iran policies has had negative effects. This has even given rise
to new tensions and problems, for instance, between Iran and the
Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as exacerbated sectarian tensions. For
example, Azerbaijan’s resulting animosity to Iran has led it
periodically to favor Sunni radical Islamists. Consequently, today
Azerbaijan has a serious Salafi problem, and sectarian tensions in the
country have been on the rise.
The experience described above provides important lessons for Western
policy towards Iran and regional issues in Central Asia, the Caucasus,
and South Asia. The first lesson is that a policy of containment on
several fronts is not practicable, at least not in the long run. For
twenty years, the US has tried to contain both Russia and Iran in
these regions and to bar Iran’s interaction with these regions, while
also looking askance at China’s progress.
A second lesson is that excluding Iranian oil and gas from global
markets inevitably limited Europe’s and Central Asia’s energy choices,
making both more vulnerable to Russian pressures since, with the
exception of Qatar, the Persian Gulf oil giants are not major players
in the gas market.
The last and the most important lesson is that the West should press
forward with negotiations with Iran, toward a satisfactory conclusion
to the nuclear dispute. This should be followed by lifting sanctions,
encouraging the return of Western energy companies to Iran, and
planning new networks of energy transport which would include Iran. In
the long run, this kind of engagement would also translate into better
political relations between Iran and the West and produce a positive
impact on Iran’s political evolution and hence issues of human rights
and other freedoms in Iran.
With regard to broader regional security issues, the West should work
with Iran on a case-by-case basis wherever this serves Western
interests, rather than making all aspects of relations with Iran
hostage to its stand on the Palestinian question. As shown by the
example of Afghanistan – where Iran supported US interests in toppling
the Taliban, only to be deemed part of an Axis of Evil – isolating and
excluding Iran harms the West as much if not more than it does the
Islamic Republic. Right now, the only real winner is Vladimir Putin’s
Russia.
About the Author:
Shireen T. Hunter is a Visiting Professor at Georgetown University’s
School of Foreign Service. Her latest book is Iran Divided: Historic
Roots of Iranian Debates on Identity, Culture, and Governance in the
21st Century (Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming September 2014).
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