Author: Kanayan Tamar

As the centenary of the First World War Armenian Genocide nears, a
survivor describes how she still hears the screams

The Turkish police were using whips on the children and big sticks to beat them

ROBERT FISK

Sunday 30 March 2014

She was a child of the Great War, born on a faraway killing field of
which we know little, one of the very last witnesses to the last
century’s first genocide, sitting in her wheelchair, smiling at us,
talking of Jesus and the Armenian children whipped by the Turkish
police whom she saw through the cracks in her wooden front door. It’s
not every day you get to meet so finite an observer of human history,
and soon, alas, we will not see her like again in our lifetime.

They took me to meet Yevnigue Salibian last week up in the Mission
Hills of California, whose warm breezes and palm trees are not unlike
the town of Aintab in which she was born more than a hundred years
ago. She is an old lady now in a home for the elderly but with a still
impeccable memory and an equally sharp and brutal scar on her thigh –
which she displays without embarrassment – where a horse’s reins
suspended her above a ravine until she almost bled to death in her
final flight from her Armenian homeland. “Hushhhhhh,” she says.
“That’s how the blood sounded when it poured out of me. “I still
remember it: ‘hushhhhhh’, ‘hushhhhhh’.”

The facts of the Armenian Holocaust are as clear and real as those of
the later Jewish Holocaust. But they must be repeated because the
state of Turkey remains a holocaust denier, still insisting that the
Ottoman government did not indulge in the genocide which destroyed a
million and a half of its Armenian Christian population almost a
century ago. The Armenians were axed and knifed and shot in their tens
of thousands, the women and children sent on death marches into the
deserts of northern Syria where they were starved and raped and
slaughtered. The Turks used trains and a primitive gas chamber, a
lesson the Germans learned well. Very soon, there will be no more
Yevnigues to tell their story.

She was born on 14 January 1914, the daughter of Aposh Aposhian, an
Aintab copper merchant who taught his five children the story of Jesus
from a large Bible which he held on his lap as he sat with them on a
carpet on the floor of their home. They were – like so many Armenians
– a middle-class family, and Aposh had Turkish friends and, although
Yevnigue does not say so, it appears he traded with the Ottoman army;
which probably saved their lives. When the first deportations began,
the Salibians were left in their home, but the genocide lasted till
the very last months of the Great War – it had begun within weeks of
the Allied landings at Gallipoli – and in 1917, the Turks were still
emptying Aintab of its Armenians. That’s when the sound of crying led
three-year-old Yevnigue to the front door of her home.

“It was an old wooden door and there were cracks in it and I looked
through the cracks,” she says. “There were many children outside
without shoes and the Turkish gendarmes were using whips to drive them
down the street. A few had parents. We were forbidden to take food to
them. The police were using whips on the children and big sticks to
beat them with. The sounds of the children screaming on the
deportation – still I hear them as I look through the cracked door.”

So many parents were killed in the first year of the Armenian genocide
that the orphans – tens of thousands of feral children who swarmed
through the land in their absence – were only later driven out by the
Turks: these were tiny deportees whom Yevnigue saw. The Aposhians,
however, were able to cling on until the French army arrived in
eastern Turkey after the Ottoman surrender. But when Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk launched a guerrilla war against the French occupiers of his
land, the French retreated – and in 1921 the surviving Armenians fled
with them to Syria, among them Yevnigue and her family, packed into
two horse-drawn carts. She was among the very last Christians to leave
her Armenian homeland.

“My family was divided between the two carts. I changed places with an
old lady. It was at night and over a ravine, our horses panicked, and
the cart overturned and an iron bar killed the old lady and I was
thrown over the edge of a bridge and only the horse’s reins saved me
when they got wrapped around my leg. Jesus saved me. I hung there and
there was the ‘hushhhhhh’ sound of my blood pouring out of me.”
Yevnigue shows the harsh scar on her leg. It has bitten deeply into
the muscle. She was unconscious for two days, slowly recovering in
Aleppo, and then Damascus and finally in the sanctuary of Beirut.

The remainder of her life – as she tells it – was given to God, her
husband and the tragedy of losing one of her sons in a Lebanese road
accident in 1953. A photograph taken on her arrival in Beirut shows
Yevnigue to have been an extraordinarily pretty young woman and she
had, she says, many suitors. She eventually chose a bald-headed
Evangelical preacher, an older man called Vahran Salibian who had a
big smile and whose name – Salibi – means crusader. “He had no hair on
his head but he had Jesus in his heart,” Yevnigue announces to me.
Vahran died in 1995 after 60 years of marriage and Yevnigue has lost
count of her great grandchildren – there are at least 22 so far – but
she is happy in her cheerful Armenian nursing home.

“It’s not a good thing to be away from your family – but I like this
place. Here, it is my extended family.” She loves America, Yevnigue
says. Her family fled there when the civil war began in Lebanon in
1976. “It is a free place. All people come from everywhere to America.
But why is our President a Muslim?”

I try to convince her this is untrue. She reads the New Testament
every day and she talks constantly of her love for Jesus – this is an
old lady who will be happy to die, I think – and when I ask her how
she feels today about the Turks who tried to destroy the Armenians,
she replies immediately. “I pray for Turkey. I pray for the Turkish
officials that they may see Jesus. All that is left of the Prophet
Mohamed is dust. But Jesus is alive in heaven.”

And I am taken aback by this, until I suddenly realise that I am not
hearing the voice of a hundred-year-old lady. I am listening to a
three-year old Armenian girl whose father is reading the Bible on the
floor of a house in Aintab and who is looking through the cracks of
her wooden front door and witnessing her people’s persecution.

ARMENIE
L’Ukraine veut maintenir des liens diplomatiques avec l’Arménie

L’ambassadeur d’Ukraine en Arménie rappelé à Kiev “pour consultations”
la semaine dernière après des remarques controversées officielles
d’Erevan sur le référendum de Crimée sera de retour la semaine
prochaine pour continuer son travail, selon un responsable de
l’ambassade.

EU NEIGHBOURS: INSTABILITY, CORRUPTION, AUTHORITARIANISM

EUobserver
March 28 2014

By Andrew Rettman BRUSSELS – Most countries round the EU’s southern and
eastern rim are seeing an increase of instability, authoritarianism,
and corruption, according to European Commission reports published
on Thursday (27 March).

The commissioner in charge of trying to make things better, Stefan
Fuele, said in a statement that “popular aspirations for a better
life and for enjoying basic human rights and fundamental freedoms
remain strong”.

He noted the EU spent EURO 2.6 billion on “neighbourhood policy”
states last year, and has earmarked EURO 15.4 billion for 2014 to 2020.

But he added that “reform cannot be imposed from outside”.

The situation is stable in Morocco, where Fuele’s top recommendation
is to accelerate changes to the constitution.

But travelling east, problems begin with elections in Algeria on 17
April, where 77-year-old President Abdelaziz Bouteflika aims to retain
power in a country which has seen “no visible progress” on EU-demanded
electoral reforms and where lack of respect for basic civil liberties
“has not changed significantly”.

Further east again, Libya is falling apart.

The commission report says “tribal and local skirmishes continue,
politically instigated violence is a daily reality, and clashes between
military brigades outside of the control of the state are a frequent
occurrence.” The de facto secession of the Benghazi region has seen
oil output drop from 1.5 million barrels a day to 250,000.

Lack of border control has also seen Libya become “the main transit
country in the Mediterranean for economic migrants, refugees, and
asylum seekers” to Europe.

The commission report does not say it, but the German government
recently told its MPs things are so bad, the EU border control mission,
Eubam Libya, has just one third of personnel in place and is thinking
of moving to Malta.

Tunisia is a pocket of relative normality.

But Egypt is fast-turning into a basket case. The commission report
glosses over the army’s coup d’etat and its killing of more than
1,000 Muslim Brotherhood protesters in 2013 as “politically a very
challenging year.” But it documents the accompanying crackdown on
civil society and media.

It also gives weight to Fuele’s remark that EU reforms “cannot be
imposed from outside.”

The report noted that his colleague, foreign affairs chief Catherine
Ashton, visited Cairo “several times”. But despite her visits, the
crackdown continued. Egypt this week sentenced more than 500 Muslim
Brotherhood prisoners to death. Ashton published a complaint.

Moving on to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories,
Fuele’s team said Israel’s unchecked settlement building, impunity
for settler violence against Palestinians, detentions of Palestinians,
and its almost total isolation of Gaza mean “tension has increased.”

Israel’s two neighbours – Jordan and Lebanon – are struggling to cope
with a “steady and continuous wave of refugees from Syria.”

There are 584,600 UN-registered refugees in Jordan (media say 1.2
million in total), which is beginning to run out of water, and 974,400
in Lebanon, which is seeing increased sectarian violence.

The EU also puts a price on the cost of the Syrian civil war.

In the latest data available, its overall exports dropped by 52
percent in 2012 and its EU exports dropped by 91 percent.

Mainland Europe

Hopping to mainland Europe, the commission praised Georgia for its
pro-EU reforms, but warned it to “ensure that criminal prosecutions
are conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, [and] free of
political motivation.”

The EU is aiming to sign an association pact with Georgia in June
despite the fact it is partitioned by Russia.

But someone in Georgia is happy to play into Russia’s hands: the day
after the EU announced the June date, Georgia summoned its former
president, Mikheil Saakashvili, to answer prosecutors’ questions on
a string of criminal cases.

He skipped the meeting, due on 27 March, saying EU friends had told
him not to risk jail and, by extension, harming EU-Georgia ties.

The reports also take Armenia (rampant corruption) and Azerbaijan
(authoritarianism) to task.

Last year, Armenia binned its EU association hopes due to
Russian threats over its frozen conflict with Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan by itself binned an EU “strategic”
agreement by rejecting EU requests to include a promise on human
rights.

For anyone hoping that more than 20 years of EU and US diplomacy
on Nagorno-Karabakh has helped, the EU report added: “An upsurge
of violence along the line of contact was nevertheless witnessed
early 2014.”

Elsewhere, the EU’s top demand for Moldova, also partitioned by Russia
but hoping to sign an EU pact in June, was to “intensify the fight
against corruption at all levels.”

With speculation mounting that Russia will invade Moldova’s breakaway
Transniestria region to encircle Ukraine, the EU report added: “Little
development can be reported with regard to the Transnistrian conflict.”

The reports add nothing new on Ukraine.

They also note the situation in Belarus remains grim: “232
persons and 25 entities remain subject to EU sanctions, as not all
political prisoners have been released, no released prisoner has been
rehabilitated, and the respect for human rights, the rule of law and
democratic principles has not improved.”

Russia and Turkey are not covered by the neighbourhood policy.

But the Ukraine crisis has revealed a bottomless chasm between Moscow
and Brussels, which is currently preparing for economic warfare
against Russia in case of a full-scale Ukraine invasion.

The slide toward autocracy and instability in Turkey – the only
country in the region with EU accession hopes – also continued on
Thursday when PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan blocked YouTube in the run-up
to local and presidential elections.

The ban comes a few days after he blocked Twitter and two weeks after
two more people died in clashes between protesters and police.

ARMENIANS DISMAYED AS SYRIAN REBELS SEIZE HISTORIC AREA, PROMPTING RESIDENTS TO FLEE

Kansas City Star
March 28 2014

BADROUSIEH, Syria (AP) — When hundreds of residents of the
postcard-pretty coastal Syrian village of Kassab fled this week, it
bore historic weight: it was the third time since 1900 that ethnic
Armenians there felt compelled to run for their lives.

They left once at the hands of vengeful Turkish neighbors, and later
because of Ottoman forces. This time it was Syrian rebels storming
into town. It was a heavy blow for the minority community that sees
the town as key to preserving the Armenians’ identity in Syria.

Kassab “is a symbol of Armenian history, language and continuity. It’s
very symbolic,” said Ohannes Geukjian, a political science professor
who writes on contemporary Armenian history and politics. “And so
the fall of Kassab, I consider it the defeat of Armenian identity in
that area.”

Rebels seized control of Kassab on Sunday after launching an attack two
days earlier in the coastal Syrian province of Latakia. The fighters
were from an array of conservative and Islamic groups, including the
al-Qaida-affiliated Nusra Front.

The province has an ancient Armenian presence, but is better known as
a bastion of support for President Bashar Assad. It is his ancestral
home and that of followers of the Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shiite
Islam, that he belongs to.

Read more here:

ASKAR AKAYEV: “REGIONAL INTEGRATION WILL TAKE CIS COUNTRIES TO THE WORLD LEVEL”

Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
March 28 2014

28 March 2014 – 11:05am

By Vestnik Kavkaza

Academic Askar Akayev was the leader of Kyrgyzstan for 15 years,
fleeing the country after the so-called Tulip Revolution of 2005.

After just 9 years, Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych shared
his fate. Moving from Kyrgyzstan, Akayev continued his science
research, becoming the head of a science group at the Moscow State
University’s Prigozhin Institute of Mathematical Studies of Complex
Systems. He works on forecasts of economic development, including
crisis forecasts. This is why Vestnik Kavkaza has not only talked
about the situation in the post-Soviet space with Askar Akayev, but
asked about the scientist’s opinion about the Russian economy as well.

– Askar Akayevich, what is your forecast for development of the
Russian economy, especially after the annexation of Crimea?

– Russia has all the resources for dynamic development: natural
and most importantly human resources. Russians are well-educated,
there is a tremendous human potential, outstanding Russian science, so
Russia has all the conditions, all chances for a more dynamic economic
progress. I believe that Russian economy should develop at a rate of
7-8% be cause the world, with account of even undeveloped countries,
including African states, is moving at a rate of 3% a year. The whole
world, including the rapidly developing economies of China and India.

The whole! China, India are developing at a rate of 8-9%, while
Russian economy should and can develop at a rate of 7-8%. But in
order to achieve that, it needs a new industrial policy, a strong,
efficient industrial policy.

– How would you evaluate the prospects of integration on the
post-Soviet space?

– There is no alternative to integration today because globalization
is going all over the world. One of the patterns of globalization
is regional integration. We see that all Europe is integrating and
they want other countries in their orbit. Now, for instance, they are
struggling to get Moldova, Georgia and other countries in their orbit.

This is why Russia and Russian neighbours, post-Soviet republics,
have no other choice than to closely integration on the economic,
political, all aspects. Only strong regional integration will bring
Russia and CIS states to world-level development.

– What future of the Customs Union, Eurasian Union can you see after
the events in Ukraine?

– I am confident that the Customs Union will develop regardless of
what happens in Ukraine. Of course, it is very important for Ukraine
to join the Customs Union because the Ukrainian economy would gain a
new course. It is in a catastrophic state at the moment. The Ukrainian
economy is alien for Europe. European economy is not integrating that
of Ukraine, it will repulse it as an alien element. Regarding further
steps, I see that firm Eurasian integration is possible on the basis of
the Customs Union in the future, a firm Eurasian Union will be formed.

– What are the prospects for cooperating with South Caucasus states?

– Things are certainly a lot more complicated with South Caucasus
states. Though we see that Armenia is joining the Customs Union,
Armenia has its own special path. Concerning Georgia, Azerbaijan, they
probably have their own vector of development. I see no opportunities
for them to be in the Eurasian integration orbit.

RUSSIAN, ARMENIAN PRESIDENTS EXCHANGE OPINIONS ON UKRAINIAN CRISIS

ITAR-TASS, Russia
March 19, 2014 Wednesday 11:43 PM GMT+4

YEREVAN March 19

– Russian and Armenian presidents Vladimir Putin and Serzh Sargsyan on
Wednesday exchanged opinions on the situation around Crimea by phone
at the request of the Armenian side, the Kremlin said in a statement.

“The presidents exchanged opinions in connection with the reunification
of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol [a city with a special status]
with the Russian Federation,” the statement said.

Sargsyan’s press service said the two leaders “stated that it [the
referendum in Crimea] is another example of how peoples’ right to
self-determination through free will expression is exercised”.

“At the same time, the adherence to the norms and principles of
international law, first and foremost, the UN Charter, was emphasized,”
it said.

The Republic of Crimea, where most residents are Russians, held a
referendum on March 16, in which some 97 percent of the population
voted for Crimea to secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia. On
Tuesday, Russia and Crimea signed in Moscow a treaty on Crimea’s
accession to the Russian Federation as a constituent member.

Russia does not recognize the current Ukrainian authorities who took
power as a result of a coup in Ukraine in February.

Putin and Sargsyan also discussed bilateral cooperation and the process
of conflict settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian
region in Azerbaijan, the two leaders’ press services reported.

THE CAUCASIAN FACTOR IN EURASIAN INTEGRATION

Russia in Global Affairs, Russia
March 21 2014

21 march 2014
Sergei Markedonov

When Two Allies Have Problems Finding a Third One

Sergei Markedonov, Ph.D. (History), is assistant professor at the
Regional Studies and Foreign Policy department of the Russian State
University for Humanities.

Resume: Moscow has made the largest progress in Eurasian integration
with Armenia. It has had no integration plans (given numerous
constraints) with regard to Azerbaijan or Georgia. Yet Russia’s
victory cannot be regarded complete or unequivocal.

Eurasian integration is one of Russia’s key foreign policy priorities
at present, viewed as an instrument to bolster its influence in the
international arena. As President Vladimir Putin said, “We propose
a model of a powerful, supranational union, capable of becoming one
of the poles of the modern world and playing an effective role in
linking Europe to the thriving Asia-Pacific region.”

Prospects for a major reconfiguration of the post-Soviet space
emerged after the Customs Union agreement became effective in July
2010. It was followed by three-and-half-years efforts by Russia and
its closest partners Belarus and Kazakhstan to institutionalize the
Eurasian integration project, which opened the possibility of other
former Soviet republics joining the core “union of three.”

In the recent months, the problems and prospects for Eurasian
integration have been largely discussed against the backdrop of unrest
in Ukraine. Kyiv backed out of the initialed Association Agreement
with the European Union on the eve of the EU and Eastern Partnership
members’ summit in Vilnius, provoking a major domestic political
crisis. However, there were other causes behind it not necessarily
related to international problems. The crisis again highlighted
the standoff between Russia and the West, with the former viewing
the post-Soviet space as a region of its special and privileged
interests and the latter aiming to promote its “geopolitical and
energy pluralism” there, naturally at the expense of minimizing
Russia’s leading and sometimes exclusive role.

THE MOST TURBULENT REGION IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

Discussions about possibilities and constraints of the Eurasian
integration project cannot be limited to Ukrainian events no matter
how significant they look. In 2013, developments in Russian-Armenian
relations showed that the South Caucasus (Transcaucasia) had no less
importance in reconfiguring the post-Soviet space. Whereas possible
ethno-political conflicts and Ukraine’s hypothetical breakup are just
topics for discussion, the Caucasus even now can be viewed as the most
dangerous and unpredictable hotbed in the former Soviet Union. The
Caucasus accounts for six of eight armed conflicts, and none of
them can be considered settled. Furthermore, there are different
interpretations of what the settlement of an ethno-political conflict
is. For Russia, the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia is a way out of the conflict, but Georgia sees this
solution as occupation. For Armenia, the self-determination of the
Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh is the only way to resolve the
standoff with Azerbaijan, which, for its part, assumes that the only
opportunity is to reintegrate the breakaway area.

Three of the four existing de-facto states are located in the region.

It was the Caucasus that created the first precedent of recognition of
former autonomous areas as independent states. Although the process
of their international legitimization has slowed down, even vehement
opponents of official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
acknowledge their significance for settling conflicts and for the
stabilization (or de-stabilization) of the Caucasus. This is evidenced
in participation of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s representatives in
Geneva security talks launched in 2008, as part of the accords between
the Russian and French presidents that ended the Georgian-Russian
“five-day war.”

It is only in this part of the former USSR that neighboring states have
no diplomatic relations with each other. These states are Armenia and
Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia, and Armenia and Turkey. Armenia’s
borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed. The inauguration
in 2015 of the regional Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, currently under
construction, will increase Armenia’s isolation. At the same time,
Nakhichevan remains Azerbaijan’s exclave, with which it only has an
air link.

The South Caucasus has a particular significance for Russia, which
itself is a “Caucasian” country – the aggregate territory of its
North Caucasian republics is larger than that of all independent
states in Transcaucasia. The ethno-political conflicts in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the spread of radical
Islamist views, have direct bearing on Russia’s internal security. The
problem of ethnic enclaves and exclaves, a most sensitive issue in
relations between Moscow and Baku, impacts the situation in Russia’s
North Caucasus.

THE BIRTH OF EURASIASKEPTICISM

Russia in Global Affairs, Russia
March 21 2014

21 march 2014
Evgeny Vinokurov

Are There Reasons for Panic?

Evgeny Vinokurov, Ph.D (Economics), is Director of the Center for
Integration Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank.

Resume: Skepticism is normal in any project development and it will
naturally continue to accompany the Eurasian integration project.

Regular monitoring of public opinion will help uncover sore points. To
curb skepticism, systemic preventive measures are needed, such as
an earnest and well-balanced dialogue with the public and business
community.

Skepticism is increasing in the post-Soviet space about the Eurasian
Union (EAU). Similar to doubts surrounding the European Union, the
public, government officials, and business and expert communities are
growing less enthusiastic about the success of the Eurasian project.

As euphoria over the launch of the Customs Union and the Common
Economic Space dies down, attitudes towards the Eurasian project
are becoming progressively sober and public support for the emerging
Eurasian Economic Union is shrinking.

People have criticized attempts to reintegrate post-Soviet space ever
since the break-up of the Soviet Union some twenty-three years ago.

Critics have expressed doubts over the objectives and methods of the
unification processes, both from inside (in the three core countries
of the integration project – Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) and out.

However, the current skepticism is markedly different: it is swelling
as an organic part of the project, which now encompasses the Customs
Union, the Single Economic Space, and the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAU), and both its supporters and opponents recognize it as a fait
accompli.

Skepticism towards the Customs Union is still in the nascent
state. A sociological survey (the Eurasian Development Bank’s (EDB)
Integration Barometer) found that an average of 68% of people living
in EAU member-states supported that organization in 2013 (down two
points from 2012). Compared to the 50% support for the European Union
registered by a Eurobarometer pan-European survey, this means that
Eurasian integration still has some credibility and durability. Yet
the critical perception of the Customs Union, the Single Economic
Space, and the EAU (the latter is still in the process of formation)
is likely to increase in the next several years. And we all have to
reconcile ourselves to that fact.

THE EVOLVEMENT OF EURASIASKEPTICISM

This article uses data provided by the Integration Barometer project,
which is based on research conducted by the Eurasian Development Bank
on a regular basis. The surveys pose a series of diverse questions,
ranging from the commodities people prefer in post-Soviet countries to
investment partners in educational/socio-cultural institutions. Thus,
the surveys mirror annual shifts in the moods of people living in the
CIS. These indicators help to identify which spheres of integration
are doing well and which are showing signs for concern.

One of the central points of study is public opinion about the
feasibility of accession to the Customs Union and the Single Economic
Space, and the overall perception of those associations. In the polls,
the wording of questions differs depending on whether a country is
a member of a particular association or not. Consequently, people
from member-states were asked about their attitudes towards the
Customs Union and the Single Economic Space, while respondents from
non-affiliated countries were asked about the possibility of accession
to those organizations.

The public’s approval of the Customs Union and the Single Economic
Space is relatively high (see Diagram 1): in 2013, support in
Kazakhstan stood at 73% (down 7% from 80% in 2012). The drop in support
was due to an increase in the number of local residents who expressed
indifference to Kazakhstan’s participation in both associations (15%
in 2013 compared to 10% in 2012). Six percent responded negatively
about joining either organization.

In 2013, support in Russia for participation in both associations
dipped to 67% from 72% in the previous year. In addition, Russia
showed the biggest growth of indifferent attitudes, which rose to 24%
from 17% in 2012. The percentage of Russians treating these processes
negatively remained at 5%.

In Belarus, support increased for membership in the Customs Union
(to 65% from 60%) and grew closer to the level of support in
Russia. This change occurred amid an economic rebound and financial
aid from Russia. The percentage of Belarusians indifferent to the
Customs Union dropped to 23% from 28%, but, like in Russia, support
still remains relatively high. The percentage of those who responded
negatively towards integration fell to 3% from 6%

Diagram 1. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia formed a Customs Union
and abolished customs duties between the three countries. The three
countries also formed a Single Economic Space, which, in essence,
is a common market. What is your attitude towards that decision?

Source: Integration Barometer

Other questions revealed a more critical approach, especially
in the categories of commodity preferences, science, technology,
and education.

Compared to 2012, goods produced in CIS countries were in less demand
among Russians (12%) and Belarusians (8%) in 2013. “Other countries,”
i.e., countries outside of the Eurasian Union and the CIS, were named
as the most preferable sources of foreign investment. Investment
by post-Soviet neighbors (which actually means Russia) was not a
priority. One possible explanation for this is that Russian investment
is not associated in the public mind with technological progress or
industrial modernization (although the actual situation is much more
nuanced. See the data on Russia’s diversified direct investment in
the CIS provided by the EDB’s another annual report on the Monitoring
of Mutual Investments).

A question about priority partners in science and technology has
revealed a similar picture. Respondents from all CIS countries
mentioned Japan, the U.S., and Germany as priority partners. One of
the reasons may be the perception of Russia as a country that has
lost many of its leading positions in science and technology over
the past two decades.

Negative long-term trends are characteristic of educational exchanges.

Although many recognized educational centers in Moscow, St.

Petersburg, Kiev, Minsk, Almaty, Yekaterinburg, and Omsk could compete
successfully with Western universities in the 1990s in the cost to
quality grounds, current polls suggest that those institutions have
lost that advantage. Also, grassroots chauvinism, which is another
factor unrelated to the quality of education, still impacts Russia. Of
course, one should reckon with persistent trends in education that
relate to the two post-Soviet decades, not to the short history of
the Customs Union.

Diagram 2. To which of the countries below would you like to go to
study or for other educational purposes (or to send your children
for study)?

Source: Integration Barometer.

>From this point on, in diagrams depicting the categories “Former
Soviet republics,” “EU countries,” and “Other countries,” the
indicators account for the percentage of respondents who named at
least one country in an appropriate category. For instance, in this
diagram, 52% of Tajiks mentioned at least one former Soviet republic;
18% at least one EU country; and 51% at least one “other” country
(see data for Tajikistan in 2013).

Preferences indicating the most attractive countries for cooperation
in science and technology are especially important because they
directly relate to long-term strategic competitiveness. Therefore,
it should be alarming that the CIS population shows little interest
in neighboring states in these areas.

Equally worrying in terms of the Eurasian integration project is
the relatively high level of “autonomous approach” to development
with some post-Soviet countries, which is manifest in the lack of
respondents’ interest in any country on the list (see Diagram 3). The
term “autonomous approach” implies that people concentrate on their
home countries’ internal problems and resources. They show a relative
lack of interest in interacting with the world in a wide range of
areas, including trade, investment, and culture. The general tendency
is: the wealthier a country, the more inclined its citizens are to
develop on their own. Kazakhstan, which is open to the outside world,
is an exception to that rule.

Diagram 3. The level of public interest in autonomous development in
countries taking part in the project (the mean value of the total
percentages of ‘No such countries’ and ‘Undecided’ in answers to
questions asked in each country)

Source: Integration Barometer

Overall, people living in Customs Union countries and their neighbors
are fairly optimistic. For instance, three-thirds or more respondents
in the three core nations believe that the integration project will
either develop further or maintain current achievements, but the
project will definitely not collapse.

Diagram 4. Do you think there will be a rapprochement or estrangement
among CIS countries in the next five years?

THE EXPERIENCE OF EUROSKEPTICISM

>From the beginning skepticism has accompanied the discussions of
post-Soviet integration. While Eurasiaskepticism is no more than a
year old, concerns about the EU have been around for a long time.

Thus, it makes sense to compare the two phenomena on the basis of
sociological data.

Eurobarometer polling conducted in EU countries reveals a lower
percentage of those who approve of integration. People living in
incumbent EU member-states gave a relatively positive assessment of the
gains in their respective countries from involvement in the European
common market, yet the share of positive answers does not exceed 50%
(see Diagram 5). It is noteworthy that the level of approval was much
higher in the first half of the 2000s, while support dropped later
during a financial crisis in the eurozone. The number of negative
assessments now approaches the amount of positive assessments in
Britain, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Greece, and Cyprus, and sometimes
the results are even higher. Thus, the public no longer assesses all
of the blame to national governments for short-sighted fiscal policies
and bloated non-production assets, but blames Brussels instead.

Overall, the perception of economic integration within the post-Soviet
space is more positive than within the EU. However, we should bear
in mind that since the questions of the two “barometers” differ, the
responses can neither be directly compared nor provide an accurate
analysis. Importantly, Europeans were asked about what they had already
gained from the EU. Naturally, during the economic crisis Europeans
were not inclined towards favorably assessing the impact of integration
on their lives. Simultaneously, respondents from post-Soviet countries
were asked about their general attitudes towards the establishment
of the Customs Union. Since it has not had a significant influence
on their lives so far, their judgments were based on more general
perceptions (“It is a good and appropriate thing to be together and
be friends.”)

Diagram 5. Overall, has your country gained or lost from membership
in the EU (the Common Market)?

Source: Eurobarometer. This question was asked in EU countries in
May 2011, and in candidate countries in November 2012.

A similar conclusion can be drawn by comparing the results of
polling in countries that are not members in associations. Macedonia
and Montenegro were the only two of the six candidate countries in
November 2012 where more than 50% of respondents spoke favorably of
participating in the European common market. In the case of Turkey,
the figure accounts for decades of unsuccessful attempts to join a
united Europe. The Serbian response was mostly negative in the wake
of the EU’s support for the forces that had broken up the former
Yugoslavia. Icelanders reacted to the ‘hard landing’ of 2008. As for
post-Soviet space, the only negative assessments came in Azerbaijan,
where 53% of respondents indicated that they would not like to
join the Customs Union, while only 37% supported such a move. This
is a consequence of the Karabakh syndrome. In other CIS countries
the percentage of those who support economic integration was much
larger and reached three-thirds of the population in some cases (72%
in Kyrgyzstan, 75% in Tajikistan, and 77% in Uzbekistan).

ARMENIAN PRESIDENT CONCERNED ABOUT SITUATION IN SYRIAN DISTRICT OF KESAB POPULATED BY ARMENIANS

Interfax, Russia
March 24 2014

YEREVAN. March 24

Armenian President Serzh Sargsian said while on a working visit in
the Netherlands that he was concerned about the events in Kesab,
Syrian district populated mostly with Armenians.

“We all remember very well the story of Kesab, which unfortunately
is rich with hellish realities of expulsions of Armenians in the past
hundred years,” the Armenian president’s press office quoted Sargsian
as saying to Interfax on Monday.

The Armenian population of Kesab was forced to leave its homeland
twice – in 1909 and 1915 – due to the actions of Turkish military
units, Sargsian said.

“Today the third expulsion of Armenians from Kesab occurs, which is
a serious threat to mechanisms protecting ethnic minorities. I think
that everyone should realize that these historical parallels should
have a sobering effect on all parties,” the Armenian president said.

Sargsian said he was grateful to the Syrian authorities for steps
being taken to protect Armenians of Kesab.

“I have ordered Armenian representatives in the office of the UN in
Geneva and New York to raise this issue in human rights organizations
and to be consistent in guaranteeing the protection of rights of
Kesab’s Armenians and their return,” the president said.

The Armenian embassy in Syria is working on a program of actions to
assist Armenians of Kesab, which “will be implemented completely,”
Sargsian said.

The Armenian Foreign Ministry has said it was concerned about the
situation in Kesab bordering Turkey. On Monday deputies of the Armenian
parliament said they urged the Syrian and Turkish authorities to
investigate events in Kesab and demanded that UN monitors be sent
there.

The Syrian ambassador to Lebanon visited Catholicos Aram I, whose
residence is in Lebanon, upon the order of Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad on March 23. The Syrian Army will do everything possible to
restore peace in this region, Assad said.

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RAFFI HOVANNISIAN PROMISES NOT TO BECOME DESERTER

20:22 | March 28,2014 | Politics

Speaking at Heritage Party’s rally in Yerevan, head of the Heritage
parliamentary group Ruben Hakobyan said the only way to put Armenia
on the right path is to change the entire Cabinet.

“Our main aim is to create a united square, have authorities elected
by people who can represent our country in different instances. We
want people to realize that they are the masters of this country,
its soil and water,” he said.

Raffi Hovannisian said in his closing remarks that they will visit
all settlements where people are ready to stand up for their rights.

“If we are unable to carry out a revolution within a month, then we
are deserters,” he said.

Mr Hovannisin reminded again that they are preparing for the next
phase of struggle. “On April 4 we shall visit Vanadzor and Gyumri. I
expect the participation of all political forces, intellectuals and
civil initiatives. I urge all civil and political forces of Armenia
to gather at Liberty Square on April 9 to finish our job,” he said.