HRAPARAK: UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR TO RETURN TO ARMENIA SOON
10:20 30/05/2014 ” DAILY PRESS
The Ukrainian Ambassador to Armenia will return to Armenia soon to
continue his diplomatic mission, Andranik Manukyan told Hraparak. He
added that he has no plans to become Ambassador to Russia.
Citing sources in the Foreign Ministry, Hraparak notes that Serzh
Sargsyan is inclined to appoint Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh
Kocharyan as Ambassador of Armenia to Russia.
Source: Panorama.am
AZERBAIJANI ARMED FORCES CONDUCT LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES IN FRONT ZONE
Trend, Azerbaijan
May 28 2014
Baku, Azerbaijan, May 28
By Ilkin Izzet – Trend:
The units of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces led by Minister of Defense,
Colonel-General Zakir Hasanov are holding military exercises in the
front zone, the Azerbaijani defense ministry said on May 28. The
exercises are conducted in accordance with the combat training
plan-2014.
The practical firearm and armored vehicle, mortar and rocket-artillery
shooting, using modern methods of warfare was demonstrated during
the exercises. The military aviation and air defense system were
also observed.
The combat training level of military units was tested during the
exercises. Special attention was paid to the rapid and effective
implementation of the tasks, preparing the staffs’ operations, mutual
coordination of actions and a task performance level.
The conflict between two South Caucasus countries began in 1988 when
Armenia made territorial claims against Azerbaijan. As a result of
the ensuing war, in 1992 Armenian armed forces occupied 20 percent
of Azerbaijan, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven
surrounding districts.
The two countries signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994. The co-chairs
of the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia, France and the U.S. are currently
holding peace negotiations.
Armenia has not yet implemented the U.N. Security Council’s four
resolutions on the liberation of the Nagorno-Karabakh and the
surrounding regions.
edited by CN
UAE GO DOWN FIGHTING TO ARMENIA IN FRIENDLY
Khaleej Times, UAE
May 29 2014
Hisham Al Gizouli / 29 May 2014
Emirati team put up valiant performance in seven-goal thriller.
UAE’s Ahmed Khalil vies for the ball with an Armenian player during
their friendly match on Tuesday. — Supplied photo
Armenia earned a narrow 4-3 victory over UAE senior football national
team in a friendly at the Stade de La Fontenette Carouge in Switzerland
on Tuesday night.
The clash is the first of nine warm ups for the squad ahead of the
22nd Gulf Cup (Khaliji 22) scheduled in Riyadh, KSA in November and
the AFC Asian Cup finals Australia 2015 early next year.
Ismail Ahmed (40), Omer Abdul Rahman (51) and Muhanad Al Enazi (85)
struck for the UAE as Levon Hayrapetyan (38), Henrikh Mkhitaryan (42,
67) and Rumyan Hovsepyan scored for the European side.
Ali Mabkhout squandered the first scoring opportunity for the UAE in
the second minute from the fast start after the Al Jazira international
made a major breakthrough, but the ‘keeper blocked his move into a
corner. Towards the 8th minute, the Armenian defenders cleared two
attempts by Omer Abdul Rahman and Ismail Al Hammadi. Ali Mabkhout tried
his luck with a long range shot, but his effort went few inches past
the left pole. At this stage, the Armenians managed to redeploy their
squad and began to pose a real threat against the UAE ‘keeper Khalid
Essa thanks to the helpful assistance of Henrikh Mkhitaryan. However,
the European’s hard work paid dividends and Levon broke the deadlock
in the 38th minute of the first half with a fast counterattack.
The UAE head coach Mahdi Ali was forced to pull out injured libro
Hamdan Al Kamali and send in Muhanad Al Enazi after the Whites were
0-1 down to Armenia. One minute later, Al Ain’s international defender
Ismail Ahmed headed home the Omer Abdul Rahman’s perfect croner kick
to level for the UAE with three minutes remaining from the end of
the first period. But, Mkhitaryan spoiled the party with a lovely
rebound to end the first half ahead.
On resumption the two sides managed to play total football to the
delight of the few fans. Mahdi Ali sent in Essa Ahmed to replace Abdul
Aziz Haikal to stop the endless trouble caused on the right flank.
Once again, the UAE lads battled back and Omer Abdul Rahman fired
home the equaliser in the 51st minute thanks to a spoon-fed through
from Ali Mabkhout.
Thereafter, Mohammed Abdul Rahman and Mohammed Ahmed substituted
Ismail Al Hammadi and Ismail Ahmed. And while the Whites began to
set their pace, Mkhitaryan came again with a strong run to beat UAE
defenders and keeper and make it 3-2 for Armenia in the 67th minute
before Rumyan has headed home the fourth goal.
The UAE boys struggled hard to reduce the deficit and Mahdi Ali pulled
out Ahmed Khalil and replaced him with Salem Saleh as Ali Salmin took
the place of Khamis Ismail. Towards the 85th minute, Al Enazi made it
3-4 with a lovely header, but all their efforts to level the result
were in vain until the final whistle.
Meanwhile, this was the first defeat for the UAE since September 2012
when they were defeated 0-1 by Japan in the first test for Mahdi Ali
after taking over the senior national team. Ali led the boys in white
to 20 wins in official and friendly starts plus two draws and three
defeats. Korea beat UAE 1-0 in their China’s tour in preparation for
the AFC Asian Cup Qualifiers, but the match was not played on the
Fifa days.
Salem Al Enazi scored for the first time for the UAE against Armenia
and Ali Salmin made his international debut as substitute for Khamis
Ismail in the second half.
SERZH SARGSYAN: ARMENIA IS READY TO JOIN TO AGREEMENT ON FORMING OF EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION TILL JUNE 15
24.kg, Kyrgyzstan
May 29 2014
29/05/14 12:44, Astana – 24.kg news agency, by Julia KOSTENKO
“Armenia is ready to join the agreement on forming of the Eurasian
Economic Union till June 15,” the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan
said today at the session of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council.
According to him, the draft document is ready. “We ask to set a date
for the signing of the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Armenia
to the Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union till June 15. For
two or three days one can find mutually acceptable solutions on left
issues,” he said.
Recall, the members of the Customs Union approved the Roadmap for
Armenia’s accession to the union at the end of December 2013.
THE YEZIDIS OF ARMENIA FACE IDENTITY CRISIS OVER KURDISH ETHNICITY
Rudaw, Iraqi Kurdistan
May 29 2014
By Deniz Serinci yesterday at 04:55 –
YEREVAN, Armenia – The Yezidi community in Armenia is angry: First,
over attacks on their religious kin in Iraq, and the other over being
identified as Kurds.
Last week, Yezidis in Armenia held a demonstration outside the UN
Office in Yerevan, protesting recent attacks on Yezidis in Iraq.
The protest was led by the Yezidi Union in Armenia, which is known
for sharing the view that Yezidis have no connections to Kurds.
“We are not Kurds,” insisted Aziz Tamoyan, director of the Yezidi
Union in Armenia. “They speak Kurdish, we speak Ezdiki. They come
from the Middle East, Yezidis come from the ancient Babylonians.”
Armenia’s approximately 40,000 Yezidis, who arrived there as refugees
from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, are the largest minority
group in the mainly Christian country. The community is mostly
composed of Yezidis from Turkey who settled in the Transcaucasus,
mainly Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
For Tamoyan it is a matter of importance that the Yezidis have their
own identity, separate from Kurds, although his is a minority view
not shared by most academics or historians.
The Yezidis are largely regarded as a religious minority inside the
Kurdish nation. But unlike the majority of Kurds, who are Muslims,
the Yezidis have their own controversial religious beliefs, leaving
them open to attacks, especially by Islamic insurgents in Iraq.
Tamoyan pointed to the front page of the Yezidi Union’s newspaper,
“Yezidikhaya.” A front-page headline declared: “My nation is Yezidi,
my language is Ezdiki and my religion is Sharfadin,” a term the
Yezidis use to identify themselves.
In 2002, at the request of a group of Yezidis led by Tamoyan, the
Armenian parliament recognized the Yezidis as a separate ethnicity,
and their language as Ezdiki.
At Armenian universities, Kurdish and Ezdiki are taught as different
languages.
The Yezidis also have their own red-and-white flag with a yellow sun.
It is similar to the Kurdish flag, but does not contain the green
color, which the Yezidis equate with the color of Islam.
Kurdologist Garnik Asatrian from Yerevan State University supports
the Yezidikhaya project’s denial of being Kurdish.
“Yezidis and Kurds are completely different ethnic identities.
Language is not a decisive criterion, some people in Africa speak
English, but has nothing to do with British,” Asatrian said.
But there are disagreeing voices, noting that Ezdiki sounds just like
the Kurdish Kurmanji dialect.
“Obviously the Yezidis are Kurds,” said Philip G. Kreyenbroek,
professor and director of Iranian Studies at the University of
Gottingen in Germany. “Their common language, including that of their
sacred texts, is Kurmanji Kurdish, and they originate in the Lalish
area in northern Iraq,” he added.
Barzoo Eliassi, researcher at the University of Oxford in the UK,
agrees with Kreyenbroek.
“There are no doubts Yezidis are Kurds. Kurdishness is not a homogenous
category. Turks and some Kurds were involved in genocidal acts against
the Armenians in 1915. So for Yezidis, to avoid being Muslim and Kurd,
mean avoiding double stigmatization in the Armenian context,” he said.
Matthias Bjornlund, a Danish historian and author of books about
Armenia, says there was added pressure on the Yezidis to distance
themselves from the predominantly Muslim Kurds after the 1991-94
Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and predominantly-Muslim
Azerbaijan.
Titale Kerem, editor of Riya Taze, the world’s longest-lived Kurdish
newspaper that was founded in Armenia in 1932, described himself as a
“Kurd by ethnicity and Yezidi by religion.”
“Of course we are Kurds. We speak Kurdish. However, many Yezidis hold
grudges due to past massacres against them by non-Yezidi Kurds and
therefore will not be associated with them,” he said.
Aziz Gerdenzeri, an author, playwright and doctor who was born
in Georgia but lived for many years in Armenia and Central Asia,
said there was pressure on the Yezidis to distance themselves from
mainstream Muslim Kurds due to political events.
“Yezidi and Kurds are one and the same nation. We share language,
history and traditions. But due to historical reasons, people perceive
the word ‘Kurd’ as ‘Muslim’,” he said.
Outside Armenia most Yezidi associations do not share their views of
their co-religionists in the Caucasian country.
The chairman of the Ezidi Culture Association in Denmark, Yilmaz
Yildiz, questioned why generations of Yezidis have fought side-by-side
with Muslim Kurds as Kurdish partisans, Peshmergas in Iraq, Turkey
and Syria if they themselves were not Kurds.
“The Yezidi are and have been part of the Kurdish resistance movement
throughout Kurdistan, simply because they consider themselves
indigenous Kurds and are part of the Kurdish community,” Yildiz said.
Read the comments to this article at
ARMENIA: PRO-RUSSIA ACTIVISTS ATTACK DIASPORA MEMBERS FOR PROMOTING ‘EUROPEAN VALUES’
EurasiaNet.org
May 29 2014
By Gayane Abrahamyan
Wariness of “European values” within a significant segment of Armenian
society is providing fuel for a brewing culture war in Armenia.
The government’s push for closer ties with Russia appears to be
widening a cultural divide in Armenia. The gap was on display during a
May 9 court hearing concerning a domestic-violence case in the eastern
region of Gegharkunik, one of Armenia’s most socially conservative
areas. At one point during the proceedings, Robert Aharonian, an
outspoken, pro-Russian activist who was attending the hearing, lashed
out at two North American-born women’s rights advocates for promoting
“European values” that condemn physical violence against women.
“Why have you come to distort Armenia?” said Aharonian, the 45-year-old
leader of the Armenian-Russian Union and a former presidential
candidate for the Progressive Socialist Party. A man in Armenia
“has a right to slap his wife,” he claimed, according to local media
reports. The issue of domestic violence has become a hot topic for
public debate in recent months. Diaspora Armenians who “don’t know
the local traditions” should leave Armenia, Aharonian continued,
swearing vividly. “Armenia is for local people, for Armenia-Armenians,
and the day will come when we will deport you all and shut the border.”
The comments specifically targeted American-Armenian Maro Matossian,
head of the Yerevan-based Women’s Support Center, and Women’s Resource
Center Director Lara Aharonian, a native of Canada and no relation
of Robert Aharonian. Both women are long-term Armenian residents who
have been critical of the government’s civil-rights record. Both have
become targets over the past few years for anti-European-integration
activists. [Editor’s note: The Women’s Support Center and the
Women’s Resource Center both receive support from the Open Society
Foundation-Armenia, a part of the Soros foundations network.
EurasiaNet.org operates under the auspices of the New York-based Open
Society Foundation, a separate entity in the Soros network].
Tension between native-born Armenians and members of the diaspora
is nothing new. But the government’s failure to comment on Robert
Aharonian’s verbal attacks, a hot topic on social networks, has raised
suspicions that officials silently condone them as a way to push back
against critics; particularly during the run-up to Yerevan’s projected
June-1 sign-on date with the Moscow-led Customs Union with Russia,
Kazakhstan and Belarus.
Opposition activist Hranush Kharatian, a former head of the Department
of National Minorities, suggested that the focus on the family,
“a very sensitive spot for us Armenians,” is intended to isolate as
“outsiders” and “enemies” those diaspora Armenians “who are not the
authorities’ favorites.”
Anna Safarian, an advisor to government-appointed Human Rights Defender
Karen Andreasian, condemned Aharonian’s words as “harassment” and
“hate-speech.” Meanwhile, Ministry of Diaspora Chief of Staff Firdus
Zakarian maintained that Robert Aharonian’s remarks were beyond the
mainstream, and thus not worthy of a response.
“We cannot keep responding to such things,” Zakarian said. “It is
inconceivable for anyone with the slightest common sense that diaspora
Armenians could be told to leave.”
Diaspora members long have played a key economic role in Armenia.
According to the National Statistical Service, diaspora money
accounted for 69 percent of the country’s foreign direct investment
from 1994-2010. Each year, diaspora organizations pour tens of millions
of dollars into various charitable projects as well.
These days, Russian-Armenian entities are supplying the bulk of
diaspora-origin funding for Armenia-based projects. It’s worth noting
that the head of one such entity, Arman Boshian of the Pan-Armenian
Parents’ Committee, has emerged as a hardcore critic of the Women’s
Support Center and Women’s Resource Center, the two organizations
attacked by Robert Aharonian. The Pan-Armenian Parents’ Committee
receives support from Sergei Kurghinian, a Russian-Armenian political
personality and avid supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Independent political analyst Armen Badalian asserted that pro-Russian
groups such as the Parents’ Committee were a “natural” outgrowth of a
“Sovietization” trend in Armenia. “No doubt, European values are in
the way, the presence of diaspora Armenians is an obstruction, because
they [the diaspora] are not used to total violations of human rights
and cannot tolerate them, so these [pro-Russian] movements are aimed
at eliminating these obstructions,” Badalian commented.
Robert Aharonian’s denunciation of diaspora members appears not to
pertain to Russian-Armenians. Aharonian told EurasiaNet.org he opposes
all those diaspora Armenians who use grants to operate in Armenia,
and “advocate European perversion.” He defined this “perversion” as
“not human-rights defense” or “equality,” but calls “for wives to sue
their husbands, turn to the police,” which, he asserted, ultimately
breaks families apart.
His dislike of foreign grants may sound familiar. Russian
Ambassador Ivan Volinkin in early May urged Yerevan “to neutralize”
Western-financed non-governmental organizations because they were
a potential “wedge” between Russia and Armenia. Matossian and Lara
Aharonian have called on the government to show “zero-tolerance for
bigotry.” The government’s silence should prompt diaspora Armenians
who have backed Armenian authorities to understand that “they will
not be welcomed in the homeland of their dreams,” Lara Aharonian added.
Representatives of some organizations representing diaspora
Armenians, including the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU),
a New-York-City-based group that has poured about $170 million into
the country since 1991, are trying to tamp down controversy.
“Dividing Armenians based on our places of birth and citizenship is
a very dangerous trend and, therefore, has to be prevented, but this
[attitude] is not the general trend in Armenia,” said Hovig Eordekian,
deputy director of the AGBU’s Yerevan office.
Gayane Abrahamyan is a freelance reporter and editor in Yerevan.
ARMENIA A STEP AWAY FROM CUSTOMS UNION
Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
May 28 2014
28 May 2014 – 10:40am
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan said that Armenia had done a lot of
work to realize the road map for Customs Union membership in the past
9 months and harmonized its law with the Union’s rules. In his words,
the country is in the final stage of joining the Eurasian project,
RIA Novosti reports.
Sargsyan expects the Customs Union to help boost the country’s economy,
investments and exports. Businessmen and foreign investors will be
offered state support.
Experts say that the Customs Union will benefit Armenian labour
migrants working in Russia. They will be given the same rights
as migrants from Belarus and Kazakhstan after ratification of the
Customs Union Treaty. Armenian migrants may start enjoying the new
rules before Armenia officially joins the Union.
According to official sources, Armenia will have joined the Customs
Union and the Eurasian Economic Union by January 1, 2015.
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan said that Armenia had done a lot of
work to realize the road map for Customs Union membership in the past
9 months and harmonized its law with the Union’s rules. In his words,
the country is in the final stage of joining the Eurasian project,
RIA Novosti reports.
Sargsyan expects the Customs Union to help boost the country’s economy,
investments and exports. Businessmen and foreign investors will be
offered state support.
Experts say that the Customs Union will benefit Armenian labour
migrants working in Russia. They will be given the same rights
as migrants from Belarus and Kazakhstan after ratification of the
Customs Union Treaty. Armenian migrants may start enjoying the new
rules before Armenia officially joins the Union.
According to official sources, Armenia will have joined the Customs
Union and the Eurasian Economic Union by January 1, 2015.
THREE TROOPS KILLED IN FRESH KARABAKH CLASHES
Global Post
May 28 2014
At least three troops died in overnight clashes between Azerbaijani
troops and separatist forces of the Armenian-backed breakaway Nagorny
Karabakh region, officials in Baku and Karabakh said Wednesday.
The defence ministry in Baku said “a captain and a warrant officer of
the Azerbaijani armed forces were killed” in clashes on the Karabakh
frontline, while a private was injured.
The Karabakh defence ministry said in a statement: “Corporal Erik
Gasparian, 19, was killed in action in the southern sector of the
line of separation between Azerbaijani and Karabakh forces.”
There has been an increase in violence in recent months along the
Azerbaijan-Armenia border and at the Karabakh frontline, with both
sides regularly accusing the other of tit-for-tat raids. At least 11
soldiers from both sides have been killed.
Last year, around 20 soldiers from both sides were reportedly killed
in border shootouts.
Armenia-backed separatists seized Nagorny Karabakh from Azerbaijan in
a 1990s war that killed 30,000 people. Despite years of negotiations
since a 1994 ceasefire, the two sides have yet to sign a peace deal.
Azerbaijan has threatened to take back the disputed region by force
if negotiations do not yield results, while Armenia has vowed to
retaliate against any military action.
eg-mkh-im/am/jmm
The Failed Autocrat
Despite Erdogan’s Ruthlessness, Turkey’s Democracy Is Still on Track
Foreign Affairs (Published by the Council on Foreign Relations)
SNAPSHOT
May 22, 2014
By Daron Acemoglu
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was once the darling of
the international community, but no more. He is still sometimes
praised for stewarding Turkey through impressive economic growth,
defanging a Turkish military establishment with a long history of
meddling in national politics, and initiating a promising peace
process with the country’s restive Kurdish population. But Erdogan’s
achievements are now shadowed by his undeniable lurch toward
autocracy. Over the last year, he has initiated a harsh crackdown
against peaceful protesters, political opponents, and independent
media outlets. (According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at
one point, the number [1] of journalists jailed in Turkey even
exceeded the number in Iran and China.)
The worst developments of all began last December. That was when, in
order to quell a perceived threat from an erstwhile ally, the
U.S.-based Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, Erdogan fired thousands of
prosecutors, judges, and policemen, imposed bans on Twitter and
YouTube, intensified the government’s already stifling control over
the judiciary, and gave the intelligence services more latitude to
monitor Turkish citizens. That the Turkish electorate didn’t seem to
care much about the heavy-handed repression and the wholesale gutting
of judicial institutions added a degree of farce to the tragedy. The
Justice and Development Party (AKP), Erdogan’s party, won 43 percent
of the vote in the March 28 municipal election, exceeding the 39
percent it received in the previous municipal election, though falling
short of the almost 50 percent it won in the last national
elections. It all seemed to confirm that, contrary to what many
international observers once believed, Turkey was headed away from,
not toward, democracy and the rule of law.
But that that would be the wrong way to read this latest chapter of
Turkish history. Turkey is in the middle of a difficult process of
institutional rebalancing, in which key political and social
institutions have been shifting their allegiances away from the
military and the large urban-based economic interests that have long
dominated Turkish politics. In the absence of independent judicial
organizations and an organized civil society, the risk has always been
great that any politicians who took power during this turbulent time
would abuse it. In other words, Erdogan’s drift from democracy is a
lamentable, but almost predictable, stage of Turkey’s democratic
transition. If Turkey is to eventually become a democracy, there is no
way to avoid the occasionally painful process of making the country’s
institutions more inclusive — a process that the country has shown no
signs of abandoning.
FROM THE OTTOMANS TO ATATURK
To understand the need for institutional rebalancing, one needs to
first understand how the roots of Turkey’s present institutions began
in the Ottoman Empire. The reach of the Ottoman state was limited in
many ways, but the effective political power that did exist —
organized mainly around military conquest and expansion — was
concentrated in the hands of a narrow bureaucratic and military elite.
Apart from the elite stood the reaya, meaning `the flock.’ As economic
actors, these Ottoman subjects had few rights and even fewer options
for political participation. Limited private-property rights prevented
the emergence of economically independent landholders and
merchants. And social institutions were structured so as to minimize
constraints on the sultan’s and the central state’s power. Islamic law
is supposed to allow for a religious-legal establishment, the ulema,
that would constrain rulers. But the Ottoman Empire integrated the
ulema into the state bureaucracy. The sultan, then, was also the most
powerful representative of religious power.
Despite many attempts at reform during the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, Turkish rulers’ hold on the bureaucracy and the
judiciary never truly relaxed. The reason was simple: the reforms
weren’t intended to have that effect. The Ottoman reformers, hailing
mostly from the military, were interested not in sharing power with
non-elites but in strengthening the state’s existing institutions,
domestically and internationally, in the face of financial, economic,
and military crises. It is telling that the would-be reformers, from
the later infamous Committee for Union and Progress, who organized a
watershed uprising against the sultan in 1908, didn’t make a serious
attempt to co-opt an existing grassroots movement opposed to the
government, but instead relied on backers in the military. Once in
power, these `revolutionaries’ immediately turned against anyone who
they thought opposed them.
The Turkish Republic was officially founded in 1923, by another group
of young military officers, with Mustafa Kemal (later called Atatürk,
`the great Turk’) at the helm. The Turkish Republic marked a more
radical departure from the Ottoman Empire. The new rulers abolished
the monarchy, modernized state bureaucracy, regulated religion, which
they saw as an obstacle to their plans, and intended to industrialize
Turkey. But one aspect of the Ottoman order was never challenged:
state institutions and the bureaucracy remained under the command of
the ruling elite, now the upper cadre of Atatürk’s Republican People’s
Party (CHP). Once again, the elite felt that there was little need for
broad-based support. In fact, Atatürk’s reforms were intended to be
imposed forcefully on a population that was presumed, rightly, to be
opposed to many of them.
The military and political dominance of the CHP, and the party’s
willingness to use robust force if necessary, allowed the Kemalist
project to succeed under one-party rule until the end of World War
II. But cracks were appearing. In 1946, the Democratic Party (DP) was
founded by former members of the CHP, who hoped to benefit from public
discontent over the CHP’s heavy-handed rule. In 1950, when the DP
swept to power with a landslide election victory, many of its
deputies, and certainly its supporters, hailed from provincial cities
and rural areas and had backgrounds in small-scale commerce outside
the purview of the state. (This contrasted with the bureaucratic or
military background of the majority of the CHP deputies.)
THE AKP REVOLUTION
On May 27, 1960, Turkey woke up to the first of many military coups,
putting an end to its nascent experiment with democracy. The military
swiftly moved to hang Adnan Menderes, the leader of the DP.
The next 40 years brought many new political actors to the Turkish
scene, including a panoply of leftist groups bent on the overthrow of
the state. But the divide between the more statist CHP and the more
religious parties (which picked up the DP’s mantle) remained a
constant, even as the latter agreed to work with the military and
generally refrained from challenging the core precepts of the Kemalist
state (and, in some instances, forged even better ties with existing
business elites).
It was the AKP that most faithfully, and effectively, copied the DP’s
formula of religious populism mixed with free-market economics. When
the AKP emerged victorious in the 2002 parliamentary elections, the
battle lines with the Kemalist elite were already drawn. In April
2007, after the party gained control of the presidency, the military
— which had moved against three other elected governments between
1960 and 2002 — posted a memorandum on its website threatening a coup
against the AKP government. Ominously, the Constitutional Court
started proceedings to shut down the AKP, because its religious
outlook was allegedly in violation of Atatürk’s constitution.
But 2007 was not 1960. It wasn’t just that the AKP had deeper social
networks, especially in municipalities run by its predecessor, the
Welfare Party. It had also taken control of large parts of the
bureaucracy and the police. Meanwhile, the military’s status within
Turkish society was at an all-time low. This time, the Kemalists lost,
in part because the Turkish public refused to abide the generals’
meddling.Power had successfully shifted away from Kemalist elite to a
party with support from the majority of Turks, including much of the
population of provincial cities and the rural heartland.
But in terms of building a true democracy, it was never going to be
enough to simply loosen the Kemalist elite’s grip on existing state
institutions. The institutions themselves needed to become more
inclusive. Unfortunately, the AKP — in the absence of any concerted
pressure from Turkey’s still feeble civil society — concentrated
instead on building a political monopoly of its own. Rather than
strengthening independent institutions, AKP elites set out to seize
control of the state bureaucracy, the police, and the judiciary, and
then tried to use those institutions for the party’s own ends. This
mimicked the pattern of political development in many postcolonial
societies, where new political leaders swiftly seized decisive control
of the state after the colonial powers departed in a hurry. And, like
those predecessors, Erdogan has not shied from flaunting his power.
Far from trying to overcome the polarization of the Kemalist era,
Erdogan has cleverly decided to tap into it. He has declared that
Turkey is still in the midst of an existential struggle between Black
Turks (the disempowered, less educated, more conservative masses) and
White Turks (the Kemalist, educated, Westernized elites). `Your
brother Tayyip,’ he has declared, `belongs to the Black Turks.’
The problem with this rhetoric is that, because it is half true, it
resonates with the public and polarizes it further. This became quite
clear last summer, when Erdogan successfully masked his repression of
peaceful protests as a necessary step in the struggle of Black Turks
against White Turks, and then again during this year’s municipal
elections. In each instance, the strategy paid off for the AKP, not
only because it cemented Erdogan’s popularity among his core
supporters but also because the rhetoric became self-fulfilling. The
outcome is that Turkey’s state and civil institutions, caught in this
seemingly existential standoff, have failed to become any more
inclusive.
NO TURNING BACK
Despite creeping authoritarianism and polarization in Turkish
politics, one shouldn’t despair. From a democratic perspective, things
were worse under the Kemalist elite (especially after the 1980
military coup), when Turkish society was largely depoliticized. Facing
military rule allied with big business, most potential opposition
forces offered no resistance. The AKP is in the midst of a very
different situation today. Indeed, the party planted the seeds of its
own undoing when it mobilized Turkish civil society in its initial
rise to power. Even Erdogan, in his early years in government,
encouraged open dialogue in society, if only to obliterate some of the
red lines (on Kurds, minorities, the role of the military in society,
and religious freedom, at least for his Sunni supporters) previously
imposed by the Kemalist elite.
The AKP can try to mimic its Kemalist predecessors, but Turkish
society is unlikely to be as pliant as it was in earlier years. Not
only is the country’s urban youth more liberal, more independent, and
more informed than ever before — Turkey is among the top users of
both Facebook and Twitter — but also, the protests last summer made
clear, it is thirstier for political participation and democracy. The
judiciary, taking its cues from Turkey’s newly awakening civil
society, is also no longer content to be a pushover. The
Constitutional Court has struck down some of the AKP’s more repressive
laws and decrees. It is important to note that, in making these
interventions, the Constitutional Court has not been speaking on
behalf of the military-bureaucratic elite (as was its role under the
CHP), but for a broader segment of the population, and thus for the
rule of law and inclusive political institutions. Although Erdogan’s
support among the urban and rural poor and large segments of the
middle class seems solid today, it is predicated on continued economic
growth and the delivery of public services to the
underprivileged. Erdogan’s joy ride is over if the economy heads south
(and it could — Turkey’s growth over the past six years has depended
on unsustainable levels of domestic consumption and trade
deficits). In that case, the opposition is likely to broaden and,
having learned from experience with the AKP, will eventually begin to
demand institutions that fairly represent the country as a whole.
This is not to suggest that the recent slide in Turkish governance
should be viewed through rose-colored glasses. The AKP continues to
repress any opposition and will surely try to gag the Constitutional
Court. But the party’s efforts to monopolize power should not surprise
in historical context. More than 50 years on, the process of building
inclusive political institutions in many postcolonial societies is
still ongoing. And it took France more than 80 years to build the
Third Republic after the collapse of the monarchy in 1789.
Institutional rebalancing was never going to be a painless, easy
process. For the AKP to eventually fail in its attempts to monopolize
power, ordinary people and civil society will have to protest
loudly. Politics has long been an elite sport in Turkey, and the elite
— whether military, bureaucratic, big business, or the AKP — have
looked after their own interests, not the people’s. This will change
only when politics encompasses a broader segment of society. The
silver lining to the current trouble is that Turkey has already taken
some important steps toward doing just that.
Daron Acemoglu is the Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of
Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
ARTSAKH AND FULLER CENTER FOR HOUSING ARMENIA LAUNCH PARTNERSHIP
Thursday, May 29th, 2014
Artsakh Prime Minister Ara Harutyunyan (left) and FCHA President
Ashot Yeghiazaryan at a construction site in Berdzor, Artsakh
BERDZOR, Artsakh–The Fuller Center for Housing Armenia (FCHA) team
with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Artsakh, Ara Harutyunyan,
marked the official launch of the Artsakh Project on Wednesday. The
launch of the program in the Republic of Artsakh coincided with the
day of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia as well as the
launch of the FCHA’s 300th house construction.
“It is symbolic that we launch such a wonderful project on this day,
which shows the development of liberated Berdzor. Thanks to the Fuller
project and its donors for this chance. I’m looking forward to seeing
quick expansion of this program in Artsakh, with the support of the
government,” said Ara Harutyunyan.
“May is a month of victories for our nation; may the symbolism have its
impact on the project too and may it be a prosperous and contagious one
with more families assisted,” said FCHA president Ashot Yeghiazaryan
in his opening remarks.
The May 28th launch of the program started with the construction of
the symbolic 300th home. The partners joined the Khachatryan family
of three helping them build their home.
Lyudvig and his parents lost their home during the Nagorno-Karabagh
conflict when their village — Maragha — was invaded by Azeri troops
and which still remains under their control. Ludvig has met his future
wife in Berdzor, the latter had moved to Berdzor from the city of
Masis, Ararat region, in Armenia. The family had to earn their living
and build a home at the same time. The Khachatryans managed to build
two small rooms during the first 4 years, lived there for a while but
soon they sold it and left for earning their living abroad. Later in
2010 the couple returned to their homeland. They managed to buy a half
constructed house with only the walls built and the roof installed.
They renovated the roof with the support of the municipality. Since
then the family has been trying to complete the construction of the
half-built house and finally have simple housing conditions.
“The launch of this program is encouraging. Each resident of our town
came here with an only dream to build and strengthen our land and we
all still believe in it; your support will make us stronger in our
dreams and we will continue working hard to create a better future
for the coming generation,” said Lyudvig, the family father.
Thanks to this collaboration, the Khachatryans will have finally
completed the construction of their dream home by the end of year. The
Khachatryan family house is sponsored by Minakian and Candan families.
Up to now enough funds have been raised from individual donors to
sponsor three families to be assisted in the framework of this project.
All Armenians and interested sponsors are encouraged to participate
in the Artsakh Project. The completion of a half-built home is $10,500
and a renovation project is $2,900. To join this new movement, please
send your donation to: The Fuller Center for Housing, Inc., PO Box
523, Americus, Georgia 31709, USA. Be sure to add “Armenia-Artsakh”
in the memo line. Online donations can be made here. All donations
from the USA are tax-deductible.
The Fuller Center for Housing Armenia is a non-governmental, charitable
organization that supports community development in the Republics of
Armenia and Artsakh by assisting in building and renovating simple,
decent and affordable homes, as well as advocating the right to a
decent shelter as a matter of conscience and action.
FCHA provides long-term, interest-free loans to low-income families.
The monthly repayments flow into a Revolving Fund, which is used
to help more families, thereby providing a financial foundation for
sustainable community development. Up to now the Fuller Center for
Housing Armenia has assisted 300 families. For more information,
please visit